Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
PEOPLE OF THE
Appellee, - versus - ERNESTO CRUZ, jR. y
Appellants. |
G.R. No. 168446 (formerly
G.R. Nos. 144174-75) Present: Puno, C.J., Quisumbing,* Ynares-Santiago, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, chico-nazario,
velasco,
jr., nachura,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: September 18, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
The present appeal is from a Decision[1]
dated April 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00264,
affirming in toto the Joint Decision[2]
dated May 25, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan, finding appellants Ernesto Cruz, Jr. and Reynaldo Agustin guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention (Article 267, Revised Penal Code [RPC] as amended by Republic Act [R.A.]
No. 7659) and Robbery (Article 294, RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659).
The antecedent facts, as culled from
the records, are the following:
On
While the vehicle was on the road,
appellant Cruz put his left arm around the neck of Atty. Soriano, poked a gun
at the latter and announced a hold-up.
Narciso Buluran (now deceased), held Atty. Soriano's hands, while
accused Totchie Kulot grabbed Atty. Soriano’s eyeglasses and used his umbrella
to shield them from approaching vehicles.
The men then got Atty. Soriano's bag and took his wristwatch, P2,500.00
cash, Totes umbrella worth P880.00, pager worth P3,000.00, a
Swiss knife worth P1,500.00 and tools worth P1,500.00, totaling P12,000.00.[7] Then
they brought Atty. Soriano to a dimly-lighted hut, but was later
transferred to another hut. Atty.
Soriano remained there for a week, closely guarded by Narciso Buluran, who was armed with an armalite rifle, and
Tochie Kulot, who was armed with a revolver. Appellant Cruz visited him most of the time,
while accused Allen Francisco prepared the food.[8]
A day after the abduction, or on a
Monday, appellant Cruz demanded ransom from Atty. Soriano; otherwise, they
would kill the latter. Atty. Soriano was
allowed to write two letters[9]
to his wife Iluminada (Luming) and a note[10]
on which he was told to write as follows:
OFFER OF COMPROMISE
1. P100,000 cash payable today
2. US
$20,000, telegraphic transfer to
(Sgd. Illegible)
The letters were eventually sent to
his wife, while appellant Cruz kept the short note in his wallet.[11] Appellant Cruz also called the victim's
family from the cellular phone using the telephone number found on Soriano's
diary.[12] That Friday or on August 28th,
appellant Cruz arrived in the hut late in the evening appearing to be drunk and
told Atty. Soriano that the ransom money had been raised and that the latter
would be released the following day.[13]
That Saturday, August 29th,
at
Around
premises.[15] Then PAOCTF Chief Superintendent (now
Senator) Panfilo Lacson later handed to Atty. Soriano a bag containing the
ransom money recovered, consisting of 10 bundles of P1,000.00 bills.[16]
As a consequence thereof, an
Information[17]
dated
Criminal Case No. 1489-M-98
That
on or about 6:30 o'clock in the evening of August 23, 1998 at the intersection
of Pasong Kalabaw and J. Bernardino Streets, Poblacion Pandi, Bulacan and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap ATTY. DANILO SORIANO for the purpose of
demanding ransom for the latter's release, and in fact, accused collected and
received the ransom money in the amount of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS, detaining and
depriving Atty. Danilo Soriano of his personal liberty until his rescue by
police officers on August 29, 1998.
CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
Another
Information[18]
was also filed against Ernesto Cruz, Jr., John Doe a.k.a. Tochie Kulot, and two
unidentified men with violation of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
reading:
Criminal Case No. 1490-M-98
That on or about 6:30 o'clock in the evening of August 23, 1998 at the intersection of Pasong Kalabaw and J. Bernardino Streets, Poblacion, Pandi, Bulacan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation and with the use of a firearm, robbed and took the following articles from Atty. Danilo Soriano, to wit:
1.
Cash Money P2,500.00
2. Eyeglasses 1,500.00
3. Pager 3,000.00
4. Casio calculator 800.00
5. Totes Umbrella 800.00
6. Imported Swiss knife 1,500.00
7. Folding pliers, screw driver
and other handy tools 2,000.00
8. Other personal belongings
of nominal value _________
P12,180.00
To the damage and prejudice of ATTY. DANILO SORIANO in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon
arraignment[19]
on
After
Pre-trial on
The
prosecution presented as witnesses, Atty. Soriano, SMART Telecommunications
Supervisor, Daisy Sazon, Senior Police
Inspector (SPO)1 Ricardo
On the
other hand, the defense presented the testimonies of accused Allen Francisco,
appellant Agustin, appellant Cruz, Lilibeth Francisco, Danilo Agustin,
Isabelita Agustin and Bonifacio Moramion.
According
to accused Allen Francisco, he was merely a helper and caretaker of the
fishpond of appellant Cruz and knew nothing about the kidnapping.[20] This was corroborated by his wife, Lilibeth,
who stated that she prepared food for Atty. Soriano, a visitor who stayed in
the hut from
Appellant
Agustin, the caretaker of Atty. Soriano's farm, testified that he only drove
Atty. Soriano to the jeepney stop on
However,
accused Ernesto Cruz gave a version completely different from the earlier
testimonies. He claimed that Atty.
Soriano had staged the kidnapping.
According to him, Atty. Soriano devised the kidnapping plan after the
former's teasing remark of “Atty., magpakidnap ka na lang,” said during
one of Atty. Soriano's frequent visits to appellant Cruz's nearby
farm/fishpond. The said teasing remark
was uttered after Atty. Soriano told appellant Cruz of the former's problems in
dealing with bank installments for the on-going construction of his building in
P1,000,000.00), as it was the only amount available in the family
coffers. Finally, he said that Atty.
Soriano promised them 10% of the ransom money.[24]
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, this Court hereby finds accused Ernesto Cruz, Jr. y
Concepcion and Reynaldo Agustin y Ramos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659,
and hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay private
complainant Atty. Danilo Soriano the amount of P50,000 as moral damages.
Accused Allen Francisco y Buensaleda is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge.
This
Court likewise finds accused Ernesto Cruz, Jr. y Concepcion GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7659, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 6 months of Arresto Mayor Maximum, as minimum, to 8 years of Prision
Mayor Medium, as maximum, and to pay herein private complainant the amount of P12,000 as actual damages. With
costs.
SO ORDERED.
The
cases were appealed to this Court due to the imposition of the death penalty. However,
on September, 14, 2004, in conformity with the decision promulgated on July 7,
2004 in G.R. Nos. 147678-87, entitled The People of the Philippines v. Efren
Mateo y Garcia, modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, more particularly Sections 3 and of Rule 125 and any other
rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTCs to this Court in
cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, as well as the resolution of this Court en banc, dated
September 19, 1995, in “Internal Rules of the Supreme Court” in cases similarly
involving the death penalty, pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules
of procedure in all courts under Article VII, Section 5 of the Constitution,
and allowing an intermediate review by the CA before such cases are elevated to
this Court, this Court transferred the case to the CA for appropriate action
and disposition.
On
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, this Court
renders judgment AFFIRMING the appealed
decision in toto. However, instead of
rendering judgment, We hereby certify and elevate the entire records of this
case to the Supreme Court for its final review and disposition, consonant with
the ruling in the case of People v. Mateo,
supra and its Resolution in A.M. No.
00-5-03-SC dated
SO ORDERED.
Hence,
the present appeal.
Appellant
Reynaldo Agustin filed his Supplemental Brief[25]
dated
In
his earlier Brief[26]
dated
In
refutation of the Brief of appellant Agustin, the OSG filed its Brief[27]
dated
As a
reply to the brief filed by the OSG, appellant Agustin filed his Appellant's
Reply Brief[28]
dated
Appellant
Cruz, on the other hand, filed his Brief[29]
dated December 8, 2002 and argued that the trial court erred in not giving any
credence or weight to his evidence that the kidnapping of Atty. Soriano was the
idea of the latter and in not considering said circumstance that had removed or
cast doubt on the element of illegal restraint upon the supposed victim, even
only as a mitigating circumstance. He
further stated that the trial court erred in finding that the crime allegedly
committed by him is Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention, punishable by
death, whereas, there was actually no forcible taking of the person of Atty.
Soriano, who appeared to have voluntarily cooperated with appellant Agustin and
his companions to make Atty. Soriano's plan appear to be real. The brief does not mention about any
contention as to his being found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery.
To
refute the contentions of appellant Cruz in his brief, the OSG, in its Brief[30]
dated
In
his Reply Brief[31]
dated
The
appeal lacks merit.
Before
tackling the respective contentions of the appellants, this Court finds it apt
to discuss the nature of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The corresponding
provisions and ruling[32]
of this Court are as follows:
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, reads:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female, or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (As amended by RA No. 7659).
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.[33] If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
The essential elements for this crime is the deprivation of liberty of the victim under any of the above-mentioned circumstances coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same.[34] There must be a purposeful or knowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim coupled with intent.[35]
Central
to the issues raised in the respective briefs of appellants Cruz and Agustin is
a question of the factual findings of the RTC. However, this Court, in numerous
cases, has ruled that, [W]ell-entrenched is the doctrine that the factual
findings of the trial court, especially on the assessment or appreciation of
the testimonies of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. The trial
court has the singular opportunity to observe the witnesses "through the
different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of
an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous
mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the
furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere
or the flippant
or sneering tone, the heat, the
calmness, the yawn, the
sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity
of an oath, the carriage and mien".[36]
Appellant Agustin claims that the RTC
erred in disregarding his defense that he did not conspire with appellant Cruz
and that he had no knowledge of the kidnapping.
He then proceeded to explain that the RTC based its conviction on
circumstantial evidence. According to him,
his only involvement was in accompanying Atty. Soriano to the town proper of
Pandi, Bulacan. As such, he claims to be
neither a principal by indispensable cooperation nor an accomplice. Circumstantial evidence, as held[37] by
this Court, consists of the following:
x x x Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.[38] What was once a rule of account respectability is now entombed in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur:
x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[39]
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of accused for the offense charged.[40] For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.[41] If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution.
A
careful perusal of the records and the transcript of stenographic notes clearly
shows that the prosecution was able to adduce the requisite circumstantial
evidence to prove the guilt of appellant Agustin beyond reasonable doubt.
Atty.
Soriano testified as to the participation of appellant Agustin, thus:
Q: What happened next?
A: My caretaker Reynaldo Agustin was insistent that he personally drive the motorcycle, although his son was presenting himself which was the usual practice. His wife also asked if it was possible to allow his son to drive the motorcycle because there was a drinking spree in some corner and his wife did not want him to drive the motorcycle but he insisted.
x x x x
Q: What happened next?
A: We were still some distance away from the waiting shed. There was a parked private owner-type jeepney along the road. Without being told, Reynaldo Agustin stopped in front of that jeepney.
Q: And then what happened?
A: He gave some kind of signal to the four (4) men who were wearing black jacket. Three were boarded inside the jeepney and one was on the road. He gave the signal, Ano ba? Si Attorney! So I wondered what it was all about. Then he told me to board the jeepney and I asked why.
Q: What else happened?
A: When asked why I would have to take the jeep, he said, pointing to Ernesto Cruz, He is my compadre.[42]
The
above testimony, coupled with the fact that appellant Agustin was arrested in
the late afternoon of August 29, 1998 while he acted as a guard outside the hut
where Atty. Soriano was kept, are consistent with each other, thereby
warranting the conclusion that the former indeed had an indispensable part in
the crime charged. His defense that his
presence outside the hut where Atty. Soriano during the rescue operation, which
eventually led to his arrest, does not make him criminally liable, deserves
scant consideration. It was merely a statement which is not corroborated
by any other evidence; thus, it is not enough to debunk the earlier mentioned
circumstantial evidence.
With the above consideration, the
evidence, therefore, is sufficient to show that appellant Agustin cooperated
with the other appellant in the commission of the offense. Conspiracy, as ruled by this Court in People
v. Pagalasan[43] means the following:
Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy “the darling of the modern prosecutor’s nursery.”[44] There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.[45] Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proven separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.[46] Paraphrasing the decision of the English Court in Regina v. Murphy,[47] conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.[48] To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[49] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[50]
The United States Supreme Court in Braverman v. United States,[51] held that the precise nature and extent of the conspiracy must be determined by reference to the agreement which embraces and defines its objects. For one thing, the temporal dimension of the conspiracy is of particular importance. Settled as a rule of law is that the conspiracy continues until the object is attained, unless in the meantime the conspirator abandons the conspiracy or is arrested. There is authority to the effect that the conspiracy ends at the moment of any conspirator’s arrest, on the presumption, albeit rebuttable, that at the moment the conspiracy has been thwarted, no other overt act contributing to the conspiracy can possibly take place, at least as far as the arrested conspirator is concerned.[52] The longer a conspiracy is deemed to continue, the greater the chances that additional persons will be found to have joined it. There is also the possibility that as the conspiracy continues, there may occur new overt acts. If the conspiracy has not yet ended, then the hearsay acts and declarations of one conspirator will be admissible against the other conspirators and one conspirator may be held liable for substantive crimes committed by the others.[53]
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design.[54] Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[55] Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result that they are in contemplation of law, charged with intending the result.[56] Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator even though such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit.[57] The Court agrees with the ruling of the Circuit Court of Appeals (Second District) per Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Peoni[58] “that nobody is liable in conspiracy except for the fair import of the concerted purpose or agreement as he understood it; if later comers change that, he is not liable for the change; his liability is limited to the common purpose while he remains in it.” Earlier, the Appellate Court of Kentucky in Gabbard v. Commonwealth[59] held that:
The act must be the ordinary and probable effect of the wrongful acts specifically agreed on, so that the connection between them may be reasonably apparent, and not a fresh and independent project of the mind of one of the confederates, outside of or foreign to the common design, and growing out of the individual malice of the perpetrator.
Equally
persuasive is the pronouncement of the Circuit Court of Appeals (Second
District) in United States v. Crimms,[60]
that it is never permissible to enlarge the scope of the conspiracy itself by
proving that some of the conspirators, unknown to the rest, have done what was
beyond the reasonable intendment of the common understanding. This is equally
true when the crime which the conspirators agreed upon is one of which they
severally might be guilty though they were ignorant of the existence of some of
its constitutive facts. Also, while conspirators are responsible for consequent
acts growing out of the common design they are not for independent acts growing
out of the particular acts of individuals.[61]
It is immaterial whether appellant Agustin acted as a principal or an accomplice. What really matters is that the conspiracy was proven and he took part in it. As lucidly shown in the evidence, without the participation of appellant Agustin, the commission of the offense would not have come to fruition, and as clearly presented by the prosecution, he was the one who paved the way for Atty. Soriano to board the vehicle and his closeness with the victim led the latter to trust the former, thus, accomplishing the appellants' devious plan. Consequently, the conspirators shall be held equally liable for the crime, because in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.[62]
For his part, appellant
Cruz claims that his guilt for the crime of kidnapping for ransom has not been
sufficiently established. He alleged
that Atty. Soriano was not deprived of his liberty as he was free to move about,
nor was the latter at any time threatened or intimidated. However, the testimony of the victim proved
otherwise, thus,
Q: Going back to the place in Bustos where you claimed to have been in detention. You said you were being guarded by Narciso Buluran and Totchie Kulot round the clock?
A: When I said I was being guarded from the first kubo, there were times
I could sense they were taking turns. There were times when both of them were not there and I could only see Allen Francisco going around.
Q: You could only sense that there were two of them guarding you on the second hut because you were in fact locked inside. It was bolted from the outside?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And as you describe the place, it was 3 x 3 in measurement, no windows, only one door?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you were made to sleep on a bamboo sofa?
A: Sofa, actually.
Q: But there was an opening through which you could see outside the kubo?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That is where you saw two persons guarding you round the clock?
A: Not only 2, sometimes 3.
Q: Who might be the third?
A: Especially when fed by Allen Francisco because he was the one delivering the food.
Q: You stated in your August 29 statement and during your testimony last time that Allen was the one preparing the food for you?
A: Not exactly preparing. He was the one bringing food.
Q: Your statement that it was Francisco who prepares the food is not accurate?
A: It was possible he is. It was possible somebody else because I knew he has a wife in the first kubo.
Q: How did you know?
A: I saw her.
Q: When?
A: Early morning, Monday, August 24 when she transferred to the second kubo from the first kubo.
Q: So the wife of Francisco was in the second kubo when you were left in the early morning of August 25 by the group?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the wife of Francisco had to transfer to the second Jubo to take her place?
A: That is correct.[63]
From the above testimony of Atty. Soriano, it was obvious that there was actual confinement and that he was deprived of his liberty. The primary element of the crime of kidnapping is actual confinement, detention and restraint of the victim.[64] There must be a showing of actual confinement or restriction of the victim, and that such deprivation was the intention of the malefactor. An accused is liable for kidnapping when the evidence adequately proves that he forcefully transported, locked up or restrained the victim.[65] There must exist indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the victim of his liberty. The restraint of liberty must not arise merely as an incident to the commission of another offense that the offender primarily intended to commit.[66]
As to the contention of
appellant Cruz that there was no force or intimidation involved in the taking,
this Court held in the case of People v. Santos,[67]
that the fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused did not remove
the element of deprivation of liberty, because the victim went with the accused
on a false inducement without which the victim would not have done so. In the present case, although Atty. Soriano
boarded the vehicle without any protestation, he was under the impression that
the said persons inside the same vehicle were to be trusted as he was assured
by appellant Agustin about that matter.
Without such assurance, the victim would not have boarded the said
vehicle. Moreover, it is important to
emphasize that, in kidnapping, the victim need not be taken
by the accused forcibly or against his will. What is controlling is the act of
the accused in detaining the victim against his or her will after the offender
is able to take the victim in his custody. In short, the carrying away of the victim in the
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention can either be made forcibly or fraudulently.[68]
Anent appellant
Cruz contention that the kidnapping was concocted by Atty. Soriano himself to
secure money from his relatives, such claim is specious and
uncorroborated. As correctly ruled by
the CA:
Accused Ernesto
Cruz's defense – that the kidnapping was concocted by Atty. Soriano himself to
secure money from his relatives and that he was merely inveigled into it – is
self-serving and unworthy of belief, as it is neither logical nor satisfactory,
much less consistent with human
experience and knowledge.
Soriano, a lawyer gainfully employed with Del Monte
Cruz’s defense does not hold water; his version is either unsupported by or inconsistent with the evidence. First, Cruz alleged that he knew Soriano prior to the incident as his farm in Bagong Barrio, Pandi, Bulacan abutted that of Soriano’s and that the latter often visited him. But Soriano’s farm is situated in another barangay, in Brgy. Masuso, Pandi, Bulacan. Agustin’s testimony that he introduced Cruz to complainant as his compadre before asking the latter to board Cruz’s jeep, also belied Cruz’s claim. Hence, we accord credence to private complainant’s assertion that, except for appellant Agustin, he knew none of the accused prior to his abduction.
It bears noting that despite Cruz’s claim that Soriano confided in him and asked him to participate in the kidnapping scheme, he denied any reference to friendship, stating that he and Soriano merely developed a mutual liking for each other. Assuming this latter statement to be true, We cannot believe that complainant would propose such a delicate scheme to a mere acquaintance.
Second, appellant Cruz’s testimony that Attorney Soriano was “Free to move about”, “treated like a guest”, “like taking a vacation” during his stay at Cruz’s hut was belied by his helpers, former co-accused Allen Francisco and Francisco’s wife, Lilibeth Mitra, who testified that they never saw complainant leave the hut (because) complainant was closely guarded by Buluran, who was armed with an armalite rifle. Moreover the presence of guns and other weapons in the alleged “kidnap me” charade, eventually resulting in the shooting to death of Narciso Buluran, strongly militates against its credence.
Third, the tearful reaction of complainant’s family to his kidnapping was clearly sincere and unorchestrated, belying knowledge of any scheme.
Finally, appellant Cruz’s silence for more than a year after his arrest and his failure to report the alleged charade to the authorities despite being in detention for one month and 18 days, or even to his family, is highly unusual and goes against the grain of human nature. It would have been the natural and logical reaction of a person in his predicament to immediately inform the authorities of the alleged scheme instead of revealing it only in court. This omission makes his defense in court of the alleged kidnap-me charade suspect. Empirical data is yet to be found in order to accurately measure the value of testimony of a witness other than its conformity to human behavior and the common experience of mankind. This Court is convinced that appellant’s “kidnap me” defense is a mere afterthought in order to stave off his certain conviction.[69]
From the above
disquisitions, it is apparent that appellants Cruz and Agustin conspired to
commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom which was proven beyond reasonable
doubt by the prosecution.
Finally, the RTC imposed the penalty
of Death on both appellants, since it was then the prescribed penalty for
violations of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659.
However, the death penalty cannot be imposed on the appellants
in view of the passage of R.A. No. 9346 on
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
|
On Official Leave LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice |
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice |
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice |
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice |
|
LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño–Hormachuelos (Chairperson, Seventh Division), with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-34.
[2] Penned by Judge Gregorio S. Sampaga; CA rollo, pp. 30-50.
[3] TSN,
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Exhibits “A” and “H,” records, vol. II, pp. 268 and 282, respectively.
[10] Exhibit “B,” records, vol. II, pp. 271, 272.
[11] TSN,
[12]
[13]
[14] TSN,
[15] Id. at 12-13; TSN, January 11, 1999, pp. 1-7; Affidavit of Arrest, Exhibit “M,” records, vol. II, p. 286; PAOCTF Report, Exhibit “S,” records, vol. II, p. 293.
[16] Exhibits “E” to “E-9,” records, vol. II, pp. 298-495; Exhibit “F,” p. 280.
[17] CA rollo, pp. 8-10.
[18]
[19] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 110-113.
[20] TSN,
[21] TSN,
[22] TSN,
[23]
[24] TSN,
[25] Rollo, p. 45.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32] People
v. Pagalasan, 452 Phil. 341, 361-362
(2003).
[33] People v. Salimbago, G.R. No.
121365,
[34] People. v. Borromeo, G.R. No.
130843,
[35] People.
v. Soberano, G.R. No. 116234,
[36] People.
v. Yambot, et al., G.R. No. 120350,
October 13, 2000, 343 SCRA 20, citing People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191,
212-213; citing: People v. De Guzman, 188 SCRA 407 (1990); People v.
De Leon, 245 SCRA 538 (1995); People v. Delovino, 247 SCRA 637
(1995).
[37] People
v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 451-452
(2003).
[38] Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court of the
[39] Supra.
[40] People
v. Elizaga, G.R. No. L-23202,
[41] People
v. Casingal, G.R. No. 87163,
[42] TSN,
[43] Supra note 32, at 363-365.
[44] Harrison v.
[45] Revised Penal Code, Art. 8.
[46] People
v. Quilaton, G.R. No. 131835,
[47] 172
[48] People
v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755,
[49] People
v. Elijorde, G.R. No. 126531,
[50] People v.
[51] 87 L.ed. 23 (1942).
[52] 22A Corpus Juris Secundum,
Conspiracy, p. 1150;
[53] Revised Rules of Evidence, Rule 130, Sec. 30.
[54] 15A Corpus Juris Secundum, Conspiracy, p. 828.
[55]
[56] Ingram v.
[57] Pring v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-41605,
[58] 100 F.2d. 401 (1938).
[59] 236 SW 942 (1922).
[60] 123 F.2d. 271 (1941).
[61] Martin v. State, 8 So. 23 (1890).
[62] People v. Pangilinan, 443 Phil. 198, 239 (2003), citing
People v. Boller, 429 Phil. 754 (2002); People v. Bacungan, 428
Phil. 798 (2002); People v. Manlansing, 428 Phil. 743 (2002).
[63] TSN,
[64] People
v. Ubongen, G.R. No. 126024,
[65]
[66] People
v. De la Cruz, 342 Phil. 854 (1997); People
v. Sinoc, 341 Phil. 355 (1997).
[67] G.R.
No. 117833,
[68] People
v. Deduyo, G.R. No. 138456,
[69] Rollo, pp. 21-24.
[70] People v. Domingo Reyes y Paje, et
al., G.R. No. 178300,