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JULITA
V. IMUAN, RODOLFO VELASQUEZ, ARTURO
VELASQUEZ, ARCADIO VELASQUEZ, BETTY VELASQUEZ, ROSA V. PETUYA, FELICIDAD
VELASQUEZ, RAYMUNDO IMUAN, GERARDO IMUAN, JR., and ANDONG VELASQUEZ,
Petitioners, - versus - JUANITO CERENO, FEBELINDA G. CERENO,
GEMMA C. GABARDA, LEDESMA G. CERENO, BLECERIA C. SULA and SALLY G. CERENO, Respondents |
G.R. No.
167995 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: September
11, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
Before
us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the
Decision[1] dated
The facts are
as follows:
During
his lifetime, Pablo de Guzman (Pablo) contracted two marriages. His first
marriage was with Teodora Soriano (Teodora), with whom he had three children,
namely, Alfredo de Guzman (Alfredo),
Cristita G. Velasquez (Cristita), and Inday G. Soriano (Inday). His second
marriage was in 1919 with Juana Velasquez (Juana), with whom he also had
three children, namely: Nena De Guzman
(Nena), Teodora de Guzman (Teodora), and Soledad G. Cereno (
Petitioners are Pablo's
grandchildren by his first marriage, while respondent Juanito Cereno (Juanito) is
On July 15, 1936, Pablo
died intestate leaving two parcels of land, to wit: (1) a parcel of coconut land located at Salaan
Mangaldan, Pangasinan, containing an area of nine hundred eighty-six (986) square
meters, more or less, declared under Tax
Declaration No. 8032; and (2) a parcel of cornland located at (Inlambo) Palua,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan, containing an area of
three thousand three hundred thirty-four (3,334) square meters, more or
less, declared under Tax Declaration No. 5155.
After Pablo's death in
1936, his second wife Juana and their children continued to be in possession of
the parcel of land located at Salaan, Mangaldan, Pangasinan (the disputed property), where they lived
since they were married in 1919.
On
husband Juanito conveying the subject
property. The deed was duly registered with the Register of Deeds of Lingayen,
Pangasinan.
On
Subsequently, Tax
Declaration No. 23803[5]
was issued in the names of respondents-spouses who religiously paid the taxes
due on the property. Since then respondents-spouses
enjoyed exclusive, open and uninterrupted possession of the property. Later,
the disputed property which originally consisted of one whole lot was traversed
by a barangay road dividing it into two (2) lots, namely, Lot 3533, with
an area of 690 square meters covered by Tax Declaration No. 21268[6];
and Lot 3559, with an area of 560 square
meters covered by Tax declaration No. 21269.[7]
Respondents-spouses Cereno built
their house on
Sometime in January 1999,
petitioners entered and took possession of
On
April 5, 1999, petitioners filed with the RTC of Dagupan City a Complaint for annulment of document,
reconveyance and damages against respondents alleging that: (1) the estate of
their grandfather Pablo has not yet been settled or partitioned among his heirs
nor had Pablo made disposition of his properties during his lifetime; (2) it
was only through their tolerance that Juana and his children constructed their
house on Lot 3559; (3) the sale of the
disputed property made by Juana to respondents-spouses Cereno and the issuance
of tax declarations in the latter's names are null and void. Petitioners prayed
for the annulment of the deed of sale, cancellation of Tax Declaration Nos.
21268 and 21269, the reconveyance of the property to them and damages.
In their Answer,
respondents claimed that after the death of
Pablo's first wife, Pablo partitioned his property among his children
and that spouses Nicomedes and Cristita Velasquez acquired most of the
properties as they were more financially capable; that at the time Pablo
married Juana, the properties he had were his exclusive share in the partition;
that of the two parcels of land Pablo
had at that time, he donated the subject property to Juana in a donation propter
nuptias when they married; that the deed of donation was lost during the
Japanese occupation and such loss was evidenced by the Joint Affidavit executed by Alfredo de
Guzman and Teofilo Cendana attesting to such donation; that Juana could validly
convey the property to the Spouses Cereno at the time of the sale because she
was the owner; and that they have been in public and uninterrupted possession
of the disputed lot since its acquisition and have been paying the realty taxes
due thereon. As affirmative defense,
respondents contended that petitioners' rights over the property were already
barred by the statute of limitations.
After trial, the RTC
rendered its Decision[9]
dated
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
(a)
Declaring as null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale; Tax Declaration Nos.
21268 for
(b) Ordering the defendants (1) to
reconvey the property in question to the plaintiffs and to peacefully surrender
the possession of the premises to the plaintiffs; and (2) to pay plaintiffs
litigation expenses in the amount of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The
RTC found that Juana and her children of the second nuptial built their house
on the disputed property by tolerance of
Pablos’ children of the first marriage; that Juana alone sold the
property to respondents Spouses Cereno and such sale was not valid because she
was not the owner of the property at the time she sold the same; that the
estate of Pablo has not been settled among the heirs since the property was
still in the name of Pablo at the time Juana sold the same; that respondents Spouses
Cereno’s claim that the property was
donated to Juana by Pablo by way of
donation propter nuptias was not supported by evidence; that Pablo could
not have donated the property to Juana because Pablo’s children were the legal
heirs of his first wife, and have rights and interests over the property. The RTC found the Joint Affidavit
dated January 26, 1970 executed by Alfredo, Pablo’s son by first marriage, and Teofilo
Cendana, a former Chief of Police of Mangaldan, Pangasinan, attesting that the
donation propter nuptias executed by Pablo in favor of Juana was lost
during the Japanese occupation was inconsequential, since it cannot substitute
for the donation which validity was highly
questionable; that petitioners were able to prove that the property was
the conjugal property of Pablo and his first wife which has not been divided
between Pablo and his children of the first nuptial.
On
appeal, the CA rendered its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal. The assailed decision dated November 10, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Dagupan City, in Civil Case No. 99-02910-D is consequently REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against the plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.[11]
While
the CA agreed with the findings of the RTC that there was no evidence that
Pablo undertook a partition of the properties of his first marriage before he
contracted his second marriage and that the Joint Affidavit dated January 26,
1970 could not be considered as conclusive proof of the transfer of the
property by Pablo to Juana, it was not a sufficient basis for Juana to validly
transfer the property to respondent Spouses Cereno, however, the CA gave probative value to the joint affidavit
as it was executed long before the present controversy arose. The CA found that
the joint affidavit was executed by Alfredo, one of Pablo’s children by his
first marriage who was necessarily affected by the claimed donation propter
nuptias and who ought to know the facts attested to; that the affidavit was evidence of the basis of Juana's own good faith belief
that the property was hers to dispose of when she sold it to respondents Spouses
Cereno; that the same affidavit can also be the basis of respondents Spouses
Cereno's good faith belief that Juana, who had undisputably been in possession
of the disputed property at the time of
the sale, was the owner and could transfer the property to them by
sale.
The CA also gave
probative value to the deed of sale executed by Juana in favor of respondents Spouses
Cereno as it is still an evidence of the
fact of transaction between Juana and respondents Spouses Cereno for the
sale of the disputed property. The CA found that the deed of sale and the joint
affidavit assumed great importance on the issue of prescription.
The CA found that Juana possessed the property
in the concept of an owner, which is a
sufficient basis for the belief that Juana was the owner of the property she
conveyed by sale and respondents Spouses Cereno had the good faith that
acquisition by prescription requires when they became the purchasers in the
contract of sale with her . The CA further stated that a sale, coupled with the
delivery of the property sold, is one of the recognized modes of acquiring
ownership of real property and that respondents Spouses Cereno immediately took
possession of the property which showed that respondent Spouses Cereno have
just title to the property.
The
CA further found that respondents Spouses Cereno are in peaceful possession of
the property for 29 years and, thus,
have satisfied the ten-year period of open, public and adverse possession in
the concept of an owner that the law on prescription requires. The CA added
that petitioners are now barred by laches from claiming ownership of the disputed property as they
have been negligent in asserting their
rights.
Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
Petitioners
raise the following issues for our consideration:
WHETHER
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 41,
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE NATURE OF THE PROPERTY IN ISSUE WHEN IT RENDERED ITS DECISION.
WHETHER LACHES/PRESCRIPTION BARRED HEREIN PETITIONERS FROM CLAIMING THEIR RIGHTFUL SHARE IN THE PROPERTY IN ISSUE.[12]
Petitioners
contend that since the CA and the RTC found that there was no partition of the
property and no valid donation propter nuptias was made by Pablo to
Juana, the rule on co-ownership among
Pablo’s heirs should govern the property; that when Juana sold the property to
respondents Cerenos, the rights of
petitioners as co-owners should not have been affected; that the CA’s finding
that the joint affidavit attesting to the donation propter nuptias can
be the basis of a belief in good faith that Juana was the owner of the disputed
property is erroneous, since Juana had knowledge from the time she got married
to Pablo that the property was acquired during the latter's first marriage;
that respondents Spouses Cereno could not be considered in good faith since
Soledad is the daughter of Juana with her marriage to Pablo and could not be
considered a third party to the dispute without knowledge of the nature of the
property; that being co-owners, neither prescription nor laches can be used
against them to divest them of their property rights.
In
their Comment, respondents argue that Juana in her own right had acquired the
property by prescription; that the CA correctly considered respondents’ 29
years of actual and peaceful possession of the property aside from their purchase
of the property from Juana in finding them as the true owners.
Petitioners and
respondents submitted their respective memoranda.
The petition
has no merit.
We agree with the CA that
respondents have acquired the disputed property by acquisitive prescription.
Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and
other real rights over immovable property.[13]
It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down
by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.[14] Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not clandestine.[15] It is continuous when uninterrupted,
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;[16]
exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land
and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is
so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the
people in the neighborhood.[17] The party who asserts ownership by adverse
possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive
prescription.[18]
Acquisitive
prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.[19]
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with
just title for ten years.[20]
In extraordinary prescription, ownership
and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through
uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years without need of title or of
good faith.[21]
The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable
belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof,
and could transmit his ownership.[22]
For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law
for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not
the owner or could not transmit any right.[23]
Records show that as early as 1970, when the property was sold
by Juana to respondents Spouses Cereno, the latter immediately took possession
of the property. Since then, respondents
possessed the property continuously, openly, peacefully, in the concept of an
owner, exclusively and in good faith with just title, to the exclusion of the
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest until the filing of the
complaint in 1999 which is the subject of this present petition.
Notably, the property was traversed by a barangay road,
thus, it was divided into two lots. The house of respondents is located on the
eastern part of the road, while the lot on the western part of the road was
planted to fruit- bearing trees by respondents.[24]
It was admitted by petitioners that they
saw the house of respondents constructed on the lot and yet never questioned
the same.[25] It was also established that respondents are
the ones gathering the fruits of the land and enjoying the same[26]
to the exclusion of petitioners and yet the latter never prevented them from doing
so. In fact, while petitioners learned of the sale of the property by Juana to the
Spouses Cereno in 1980, they never took any action to protect whatever rights
they have over the property nor raised any objection on respondents' possession
of the property. Petitioners' inaction is aggravated by the fact that
petitioners just live a mere 100 meters away from the property.[27]
Moreover, immediately after the sale of the property to the Spouses
Cereno, they declared the property in
their names for taxation purposes[28]
and since then religiously paid the taxes[29]
due on the property. Petitioners
admitted that they knew that the Spouses Cerenos are the ones paying the taxes;[30]
yet, they never challenged the same for a long period of time which clearly
establishes respondents' claim as owners of the property. Jurisprudence is
clear that although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession.[31] They constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property.[32]
As is well known, the payment of taxes,
coupled with actual possession of the land covered by the tax declaration,
strongly supports a claim of ownership.[33]
Respondent Juanito also exercised dominion over the property
by mortgaging the same to Manaoag Rural
Bank in 1994[34]
and the mortgage was cancelled only in January 1999.[35]
While there is a question regarding the alleged donation propter
nuptias at the time Juana executed the deed of sale in favor of the Spouses
Cereno in 1970, however, the requirement of
just title and good faith are still satisfied in this case. As the CA said:
x x x [T]he joint affidavit that the defendants-appellants presented, attesting to the donation propter nuptias of the disputed property by Pablo to Juana, can be the basis of the belief in good faith that Juana was the owner of the disputed property. Related to this, it is undisputed that Pablo and Juana had lived in the disputed property from the time of their marriage in 1919, and Juana continued to live and to possess this property in the concept of an owner from the time of Pablo's death in 1936 up to the time she sold it to spouses Cereno in 1970. These circumstances, in our view, are sufficient bases for the belief that Juana was the owner of the property she conveyed by sale, and leave us convinced that the spouses Cereno had the “good faith” that acquisition by prescription requires when they became the purchasers in the contract of sale with Juana.[36]
Notably, one of the affiants in the joint affidavit which was
executed in 1970 was Alfredo, Pablo's son by his first marriage, where he
attested that the property was given by his father Pablo to Juana by donation propter
nuptias. Not one among Alfredo's children had ever come out to assail
the validity of the affidavit executed by their father. In fact, not one of
Alfredo's heirs joined petitioners in this case.[37]
Moreover, not one among the children of the first marriage when they were still
alive ever made a claim on their successional rights over the property by
asking for its partition. Such joint affidavit could constitute a legal basis
for Juana's adverse and exclusive character of the possession of the property[38]
and would show the Spouses Cereno's good faith belief that Juana was the owner
of the property. Thus, when petitioners filed the instant case, more than 29
years had already elapsed, thus, the ten-year period for acquisitive
prescription has already been satisfied.
We likewise agree with the CA when it found that petitioners
are guilty of laches that would bar them from belatedly asserting their claim.
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. This
equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the
discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society.[39]
Juana sold the property
to the Spouses Cereno in 1970 and since then have possessed the property
peacefully and publicly without any opposition from petitioners. While petitioners
claim that they knew about the sale only in 1980 yet they did not take any
action to recover the same and waited until 1999 to file a suit without
offering any excuse for such delay.
Records do not show any justifiable reason for petitioners' inaction for
a long time in asserting whatever rights they have over the property given the publicity of respondents' conduct as owners of the
property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court), with
Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Eliezer R. de los
[2]
[3] Exhibit “19,” folder of exhibits, p. 23.
[4] Exhibit”21,” id at 25.
[5] Exhibit “23,” id at 32.
[6] Exhibit “9,” id. at 9.
[7] Exhibit “10,” id. at 10.
[8] Exhibit “34,” id. at 68-69.
[9] Penned by Judge Deodoro J. Sison; rollo, pp. 43-48.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391,404, citing Calicdan v. Cendaña, 466 Phil. 894, 902 (2004).
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Civil Code, Art. 1117.
[20] Civil Code, Art. 1134
[21] Civil Code, Art. 1137.
[22] Calicdan v. Cendaña, supra note 13, at 903, citing Civil Code, Art. 1127.
[23]
[24] TSN,
[25] TSN,
[26] TSN,
[27] TSN,
[28] Exhibit “23,” folder of exhibits, p. 32.
[29] Annexes “25”
to “25-A to 25-P,” id. at 34-49.
[30] TSN,
[31] Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, supra note 13, at 410, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 238, 248 (1996).
[32]
[33]
[34] TSN,
[35] Exhibit “24,” folder of exhibits, p. 33.
[36] Rollo, p. 102.
[37] TSN,
[38] See
Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 121157,
[39] Vda. de Rigonan v. Derecho, G.R. No. 159571, July 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 627, 648, citing Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968).