SECOND
DIVISION
|
CARLOS T. GO, SR., Petitioner, - versus - LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent. x----------------------------------------x |
G.R. No. 167569 Present: Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,* Carpio Morales, ABAD, JJ. |
|
JIMMY T.
GO, Petitioner, - versus - LUIS T. RAMOS, |
G.R. No. 167570 |
|
Respondent. x----------------------------------------x HON. ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., in his capacity as the Commissioner of
the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION; ATTY. FAISAL HUSSIN and ANSARI M. MACAAYAN, in
their capacity as Intelligence Officers of the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Petitioners, - versus - JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 171946 Promulgated: September 4, 2009 |
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before
us are three petitions. G.R. Nos. 167569
and 167570 are petitions for review on certiorari to set aside the October 25,
2004 Decision[1] and February 16, 2005 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 that affirmed the Decision[3] dated
January 6, 2004 and Order[4]
dated May 3, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167 in SCA No. 2218 upholding the
preparation and filing of deportation charges against Jimmy T. Go, the
corresponding Charge Sheet[5]
dated
On the
other hand, G.R. No. 171946, also a petition for review on certiorari, seeks to
set aside the
Considering
that the three cases arose from the same factual milieu, the Court resolved to
consolidate G.R. Nos. 167570 and 167569 with G.R. No. 171946 per Resolution[8]
dated
These
petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit[9] for deportation initiated by Luis T.
Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of
Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and
undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents
himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and other records
indicate that he is not so. To prove his
contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as
“FChinese.” Luis argued that although it
appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario
Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the
citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries
were typewritten. He also averred that
in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and
scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of
falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a
Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy
refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit,[10]
averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a
harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business
dealings. Jimmy maintained that there is
no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a
natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged
that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina
mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section
1, paragraph 4[11]
of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625[12]
(Com. Act No. 625), as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on
July 11, 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine
citizenship on July 12, 1950. Although
the said oath and affidavit were registered only on
With
regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is “FChinese,”
he maintained that such was not of his own doing, but may be attributed to the
employees of the Local Civil Registrar’s Office who might have relied on his
Chinese-sounding surname when making the said entry. He asserted that the said office has control
over his birth certificate; thus, if his father’s citizenship appears to be
handwritten, it may have been changed when the employees of that office
realized that his father has already taken his oath as a Filipino.[15]
As regards the entry in his siblings’
certificates of birth, particularly Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr., that their
father is Chinese, Jimmy averred that the entry was erroneous because it was
made without prior consultation with his father.[16]
In a
Resolution[17] dated
On
On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed
against Jimmy, charging him of violating Section 37(a)(9)[19]
in relation to Section 45(c)[20]
of Com. Act No. 613, otherwise known as The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940,[21]
as amended, committed as follows:
x x x x
1. That Respondent was born on
2. That Respondent through some stealth machinations was able to subsequently cover up his true and actual citizenship as Chinese and illegally acquired a Philippine Passport under the name JAIME T. GAISANO, with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, in violation of the above-cited provisions of the Immigration Act[;]
3. That [R]espondent being an alien, has formally and officially represent[ed] and introduce[d] himself as a citizen of the Philippines, for fraudulent purposes and in order to evade any requirements of the immigration laws, also in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[22]
On
In the
interim, the Board issued a Decision[24]
dated
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of
Commissioners hereby Orders the apprehension of respondent JIMMY T. GO @ JAIME
T. GAISANO and that he be then deported to CHINA of which he is a citizen, without
prejudice, however, to the continuation of any and all criminal and other
proceedings that are pending in court or before the prosecution arm of the
Philippine Government, if any. And that
upon expulsion, he is thereby ordered barred from entry into the
SO ORDERED.[25]
In view of
the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed on
Carlos
and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But
their motion was likewise denied.[29]
Following
the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the Board issued a warrant of
deportation[30] which led to the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas corpus,
but the same was eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on
bail.[31]
Carlos
and Jimmy then questioned the Decision in SCA No. 2218 as well as the
Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration by way of a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85143. They imputed grave abuse of discretion by the
trial court for passing upon their citizenship, claiming that what they asked
for in their petition was merely the nullification of the March 8, 2001
Resolution and the charge sheet.
The
appellate tribunal dismissed the petition.[32] It did not find merit in their argument that
the issue of citizenship should proceed only before the proper court in an independent
action, and that neither the Bureau nor the Board has jurisdiction over
individuals who were born in the
The
Court of Appeals held that the Board has the exclusive authority and
jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the
process, determine their citizenship.
The
appellate court agreed with the trial court that the principle of jus soli was never extended to the
Philippines; hence, could not be made a ground to one’s claim of Philippine
citizenship. Like the trial court, the
appellate tribunal found that Carlos failed to elect Philippine citizenship
within the reasonable period of three years upon reaching the age of
majority. Furthermore, it held that the
belated submission to the local civil registry of the affidavit of election and
oath of allegiance in September 1956 was defective because the affidavit of
election was executed after the oath of allegiance, and the delay of several
years before their filing with the proper office was not satisfactorily
explained.
The
course of action taken by the trial court was also approved by the appellate tribunal. The Court of Appeals stated that the trial court
necessarily had to rule on the substantial and legal bases warranting the
deportation proceeding in order to determine whether the Board acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the appellate court found that due
process was properly observed in the proceedings before the Board, contrary to
the claim of Jimmy.
Unfazed
with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration. Their motion having been denied,[33]
Carlos and Jimmy each filed a petition for review on certiorari before this
Court, respectively docketed as G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570.
Meanwhile,
in view of the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 85143, Bureau of Immigration
Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant of Deportation No.
AFF-04-003[34] dated
On
account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus[36]
before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 11507
assailing his apprehension and detention despite the pendency of his appeal and
his release on recognizance.
In an
Order[37] dated
Jimmy
assailed the Orders of the trial court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 88277. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and
enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the issue of his citizenship is settled
with finality by the court. The Court of
Appeals held as follows:
x x x x
…the issuance of a warrant to arrest and deport the petitioner without any proof whatsoever of his violation of the bail conditions [that he was previously granted] is arbitrary, inequitable and unjust, for the policies governing the grant of his bail should likewise apply in the cancellation of the said bail. Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, yet considering that it is such a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person who all his life has always lived in the Philippines, where he has established his family and business interests, one who appears to be not completely devoid of any claim to Filipino citizenship, being the son of a Filipina, whose father is alleged to also have elected to be a Filipino, the constitutional right of such person to due process cannot be peremptorily dismissed or ignored altogether, and indeed should not be denied. If it later turns out that the petitioner is a Filipino after all, then the overly eager Immigration authorities would have expelled and relegated to statelessness one who might in fact be a Filipino by blood.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition with reference to the Warrant of Deportation issued by the BID is hereby GRANTED. The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, through Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr., Atty. Faizal Hussin and Ansari Maca Ayan, and any of their deputized agents, are ENJOINED from deporting petitioner Jimmy T. Go, a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, until the issue of petitioner’s citizenship is finally settled by the courts of justice.
SO ORDERED.[39]
Their motion
for reconsideration[40]
having been denied on
The
parties have raised the following grounds for their respective petitions:
G.R. No. 167569
I.
THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PERSON OF PETITIONER CARLOS GO, SR.
II.
… GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN
PETITIONER CARLOS GO SR.’S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A FULL BLOWN TRIAL UNDER THE
MORE RIGID RULES OF EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN COURT PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN
CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT THROUGH MERE “SUMMARY
PROCEEDINGS” SUCH AS THE ONE HAD BEFORE THE B.I.D. AS WELL AS IN THE COURT A QUO.
III.
A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS NOT REQUIRED TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
IV.
ASSUMING CARLOS GO, SR. STILL NEEDS TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP, HE HAD COMPLIED WITH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF COM. ACT NO. 625.
V.
PETITIONER CARLOS GO, SR. ENJOYS THE “PRESUMPTION OF CITIZENSHIP.”
VI.
RESPONDENT’S “CAUSE OF ACTION” HAD LONG PRESCRIBED.[41]
G.R. No. 167570
I.
THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO
IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PERSON OF PETITIONER’S FATHER, CARLOS GO,
SR.
II.
THE DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE B.I.D. ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS.
III.
THE B.I.D.’S CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER JIMMY T. GO HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
IV.
… GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN PETITIONER’S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A FULL BLOWN TRIAL UNDER THE MORE RIGID RULES OF EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN COURT PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT THROUGH MERE “SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS” SUCH AS THE ONE HAD BEFORE THE B.I.D.[42]
G.R. No. 171946
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ENJOINING RESPONDENT’S DEPORTATION.[43]
Succinctly
stated, the issues for our resolution are: (a) whether the cause of action of
the Bureau against Carlos and Jimmy had prescribed; (b) whether the deportation
proceedings are null and void for failure to implead Carlos as an indispensable
party therein; (c) whether the evidence adduced by Carlos and Jimmy to prove
their claim to Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust the
Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation proceedings in
order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of
alienage; (d) whether due process was properly observed in the proceedings
before the Board; and (e) whether the petition for habeas corpus should be
dismissed.
The arguments
raised by Carlos and Jimmy in their respective petitions are merely a rehash of
the arguments they adduced before the appellate tribunal and the trial
court. Once again, they raised the same
argument of prescription. As to Carlos,
it is his position that being recognized by the government to have acquired
Philippine citizenship, evidenced by the Certificate of Election issued to him
on
In any
event, they argue that the deportation proceeding should be nullified
altogether for failure to implead Carlos as an indispensable party
therein. Jimmy posits that the
deportation case against him was made to depend upon the citizenship of his
father, Carlos, in that the Board found justification to order his deportation
by declaring that his father is a Chinese citizen even though the latter was
never made a party in the deportation proceedings. They argue that the Board could not simply
strip Carlos of his citizenship just so they could question the citizenship of
Jimmy. To do so without affording Carlos
the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove his claim to Philippine citizenship
would be the height of injustice. For
failing to accord him the requisite due process, the whole proceeding should
perforce be stuck down.
While they
concede that the Board has jurisdiction to hear cases against an alleged alien,
they insist that judicial intervention may be resorted to when the claim to
citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the claim is correct, like in this case.
Their claim to Philippine citizenship, they said, is clearly shown by
the fact that they were born, had been raised and had lived in this country all
their lives; they speak fluent Tagalog and Ilonggo; they engage in businesses
reserved solely for Filipinos; they exercise their right to suffrage; they enjoy
the rights and privileges accorded only to citizens; and they have no record of
any Alien Certificate of Registration. More
importantly, they contend that they were validly issued Philippine passports. They further posit that the judicial
intervention required is not merely a judicial review of the proceedings below,
but a full-blown, adversarial, trial-type proceedings where the rules of
evidence are strictly observed.
Considering
that his citizenship affects that of his son, Carlos opted to present
controverting arguments to sustain his claim to Philippine citizenship,
notwithstanding the fact that according to him, he was never impleaded in the
deportation proceedings.
Carlos
takes exception to the ruling of the appellate court that the doctrine of jus soli failed to accord him Philippine
citizenship for the reason that the same was never extended to the
According
to Carlos, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916 deemed all
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands as well as their children born after the
passage of said laws to be citizens of the
ARTICLE IV. Citizenship
SECTION
1. The following are citizens of the
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
x x x x
Even assuming
that his father remained as a Chinese, Carlos also claims that he followed the
citizenship of his Filipina mother, being an illegitimate son, and that he even
validly elected Philippine citizenship when he complied with all the
requirements of Com. Act No. 625. He
submits that what is being disputed is not whether he complied with Com. Act
No. 625, but rather, the timeliness of his compliance. He stresses that the 3-year compliance period
following the interpretation given by Cuenco
v. Secretary of Justice[46]
to Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 when
election must be made, is not an inflexible rule. He reasoned that the same decision held that
such period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino, like in his case.[47]
We deny
the appeal of Carlos and Jimmy for lack of merit.
Carlos and Jimmy’s claim that the cause of action of the
Bureau has prescribed is untenable.
Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once the
citizenship of an individual is put into question, it necessarily has to be
threshed out and decided upon. In the
case of Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections,[48]
we said that decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship
cannot govern a person’s future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes
recognized by law for the purpose.[49] Indeed, if the issue of one’s citizenship, after
it has been passed upon by the courts, leaves it still open to future
adjudication, then there is more reason why the government should not be
precluded from questioning one’s claim to Philippine citizenship, especially so
when the same has never been threshed out by any tribunal.
Jimmy’s
invocation of prescription also does not persuade us. Section 37 (b) of Com. Act No. 613 states:
Section 37. …
x x x x
(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of this section at any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause of deportation arises….
x x x x
As shown
in the Charge Sheet, Jimmy was charged for violation of Section 37(a)(9),[50]
in relation to Section 45(e)[51]
of Com. Act No. 613. From the foregoing
provision, his deportation may be effected only if his arrest is made within 5 years
from the time the cause for deportation arose.
The court a quo is correct when
it ruled that the 5-year period should be counted only from
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
x x x x
The
counting could not logically start in 1989 when his passport was issued because
the government was unaware that he was not a Filipino citizen. Had the government been aware at such time
that he was not a Filipino citizen or there were certain anomalies attending
his application for such passport, it would have denied his application.
As to the issue
of whether Carlos is an indispensable party, we reiterate that an indispensable
party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of
an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant.[54] To be indispensable, a person must first be a
real party in interest, that is, one who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[55] Carlos clearly is not an indispensable party
as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. What is sought is the deportation of Jimmy on
the ground that he is an alien. Hence,
the principal issue that will be decided on is the propriety of his
deportation. To recall, Jimmy claims
that he is a Filipino under Section 1(3),[56]
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution because Carlos, his father, is allegedly a
citizen.[57] Since his citizenship hinges on that of his
father’s, it becomes necessary to pass upon the citizenship of the latter. However, whatever will be the findings as to
Carlos’ citizenship will in no way prejudice him.
Citizenship
proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other
cases, res judicata does not obtain
as a matter of course. In a long line of
decisions, this Court said that every time the citizenship of a person is
material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res
judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion
may demand.[58] Res
judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur:
1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and
3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.[59]
In the
event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or his deportation
sought, the same has to be ascertained once again as the decision which will be
rendered hereinafter shall have no preclusive effect upon his citizenship. As neither injury nor benefit will redound
upon Carlos, he cannot be said to be an indispensable party in this case.
There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear and
determine the deportation case against a deportee and in the process determine
also the question of citizenship raised by him.[60] However, this Court, following American
jurisprudence, laid down the exception to the primary jurisdiction enjoyed by
the deportation board in the case of Chua
Hiong v. Deportation Board[61]
wherein we stressed that judicial determination is permitted in cases when the
courts themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the
claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the
belief that the claim is correct.[62] Moreover, when the evidence submitted by a
deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should
also be recognized and the courts shall promptly enjoin the deportation
proceedings.[63]
While we are
mindful that resort to the courts may be had, the same should be allowed only
in the sound discretion of a competent court in proper proceedings.[64] After
all, the Board’s jurisdiction is not divested by the mere claim of citizenship.[65] Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a
citizen and not therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his
citizenship reviewed by the courts, after the deportation proceedings.[66] The decision of the Board on the question is,
of course, not final but subject to review by the courts.[67]
After a careful
evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not convinced that the same
was sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue with the
deportation proceedings considering that what were presented particularly the
birth certificates of Jimmy, as well as those of his siblings, Juliet Go and
Carlos Go, Jr. indicate that they are Chinese citizens. Furthermore, like the Board, it found the
election of Carlos of Philippine citizenship, which was offered as additional
proof of his claim, irregular as it was not made on time.
We find no
cogent reason to overturn the above findings of the appellate tribunal. The question of whether substantial evidence
had been presented to allow immediate recourse to the regular courts is a
question of fact which is beyond this Court’s power of review for it is not a
trier of facts.[68] None of the exceptions[69]
in which this Court may resolve factual issues has been shown to exist in this
case. Even if we evaluate their
arguments and the evidence they presented once again, the same conclusion will
still be reached.
One of the
arguments raised to sustain Carlos’ claim to Philippine citizenship is the
doctrine of jus soli, or the doctrine
or principle of citizenship by place of birth.
To recall, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the
doctrine of jus soli was never
extended to the
Neither will
the Philippine Bill of 1902[73]
nor the Jones Law of 1916[74] make Carlos a citizen of the
It is a
settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father
and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother
and follow her nationality.[75] Moreover, we have also ruled that an
illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him
all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the
As to the
question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on Carlos
Filipino citizenship, we find that the appellate court correctly found that it
did not.
Com. Act No. 625
which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make
a valid election of Philippine citizenship.
Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers
may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention “in a statement
to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized
to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of
the
However, the
1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within
which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the
election should be made “upon reaching the age of majority.” The age of majority then commenced upon reaching
21 years. In the opinions of the then
Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine
citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the
decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for
electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of
the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the
election should be made within a “reasonable time” after attaining the age of
majority. The phrase “reasonable time”
has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3)
years from reaching the age of majority.[78]
It is true
that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be
extended as when the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our considered view
that not a single circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of
the 3-year period. The fact that Carlos
exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such
belief, considering that the acts were done after he elected Philippine
citizenship. On the other hand, the mere
fact that he was able to vote does not validate his irregular election of
Philippine citizenship. At most, his
registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining
exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real citizenship,
which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges
granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a
person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and
privileges of citizens of this country.[79]
It is incumbent
upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the
court that he is really a Filipino. No
presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship,
and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.[80]
As Carlos and
Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship nor presented
substantial proof of the same, we have no choice but to sustain the Board’s
jurisdiction over the deportation proceedings.
This is not to say that we are ruling that they are not Filipinos, for
that is not what we are called upon to do.
This Court necessarily has to pass upon the issue of citizenship only to
determine whether the proceedings may be enjoined in order to give way to a
judicial determination of the same. And
we are of the opinion that said proceedings should not be enjoined.
In our
considered view, the allegation of Jimmy that due process was not observed in
the deportation proceedings must likewise fail.
Deportation
proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary court proceedings.[81] The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.[82] As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process
are sufficiently met.[83] Although Jimmy was not furnished with a copy
of the subject Resolution and Charge Sheet as alleged by him, the trial court
found that he was given ample opportunity to explain his side and present
controverting evidence, thus:
x
x x It must be stressed that after receiving the Order dated September 11, 2001
signed by BSI Chief Ronaldo P. Ledesma on October 4, 2001, petitioner Jimmy T.
Go admitted that when his representative went to the B.I.D. to inquire about
the said Order, the latter chanced upon the Resolution dated February 14, 2001 and March 8, 2001 as well
as the Charge Sheet dated July 3, 2001.
Hence on
This circumstance satisfies
the demands of administrative due process.
As regards the
petition in G.R. No. 171946, petitioners contend that the appellate tribunal
erred in enjoining Jimmy’s deportation.[85]
Petitioners
question the remedy availed of by Jimmy.
They argue that the existence of the remedy of an ordinary appeal
proscribes the filing of the petition for certiorari as was done in this
case. They point out that the appeal
period in habeas corpus cases is only 48 hours, compared to a special civil
action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which is 60 days. This clearly shows that an ordinary appeal is
the more plain, speedy and adequate remedy; hence, it must be the one availed
of.[86] Since the decision of the trial court was not
properly appealed, the same may be said to have attained finality, and may no
longer be disturbed.[87]
They maintain
that the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus by the trial court was
proper. A petition for habeas corpus has
for its purpose only the determination of whether or not there is a lawful
ground for Jimmy’s apprehension and continued detention. They urge that the decision of the Board
dated
Petitioners
in G.R. No. 171946 also argue that Jimmy cannot rely on the bail on
recognizance he was previously granted to question his subsequent apprehension
and detention. Under the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, the power to grant bail can only be exercised while
the alien is still under investigation, and not when the order of deportation
had already been issued by the Board.[89] Hence, the bail granted was irregular as it
has no legal basis. Furthermore, they
said the petition for habeas corpus necessarily has to be dismissed because the
same is no longer proper once the applicant thereof has been charged before the
Board, which is the case with Jimmy.[90] Nonetheless, they claim that the habeas
corpus case is rendered moot and academic as Jimmy is no longer being detained.[91]
On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition is the most appropriate, speedy and adequate remedy
in spite of the availability of ordinary appeal considering that what is
involved in this case is his cherished liberty.
Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the petitioners in ordering his
arrest and detention, he argues, all the more justifies the avails of the
extraordinary writ.[92] Contrary to the petitioners’ stand, Jimmy
argues that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board has not attained finality
owing to the availability of various remedies, one of which is an appeal, and
in fact is actually void because it was rendered without due process.[93] He also insists that the bail issued to him
is valid and effective until the final determination of his citizenship before
the proper courts.[94] Moreover, he maintains that the petition for
habeas corpus was proper since its object is to inquire into the legality of
one’s detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee.[95] As in his petition in G.R. No. 167570, Jimmy
also contends that the proceedings before the Board is void for failure to
implead therein his father, and that he should have been given a full blown
trial before a regular court where he can prove his citizenship.[96]
Considering
the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find the petition in G.R. No.
171946 meritorious.
We have held
in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The writ of certiorari does not lie where an
appeal may be taken or where another adequate remedy is available for the
correction of the error.[97]
The
petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy availed of
as it is more plain, speedy and adequate. The 48-hour appeal period demonstrates the
adequacy of such remedy in that no unnecessary time will be wasted before the
decision will be re-evaluated.
A petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by
Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. If it is,
the writ cannot be issued. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at the earliest,
the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the
detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening
events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4[98]
of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.[99]
Once a person
detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention
through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information
and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued.
The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought
to be released had been charged before any court. The term “court” in this context includes
quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s
confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.[100] Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot
be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus.
When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation
pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional
Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus
proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.[101]
Given that
Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested
pending his deportation, coupled by this Court’s pronouncement that the Board
was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation
proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to
touch on the other arguments advanced by respondents regarding the same subject.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167569
and 167570 are DENIED. The Decision dated
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
|
WE CONCUR: ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
|
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice |
|
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
|
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
Additional member per Raffle of
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 597-609. Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., with Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Japar B. Dimaampao concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Rollo (G.R. No. 167570), p. 157.
[6] Rollo
(G.R. No. 171946), pp. 35-49. Penned by
Associate Justice Eliezer R. De los
[7]
[8] Rollo (G.R. No. 167570), p. 530.
[9] Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 631-634.
[10]
[11] ARTICLE IV. Citizenship
SECTION 1. The
following are citizens of the
x x x x
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the
x x x x
[12] An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen, approved on June 7, 1941.
[13] Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 642-643.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Rollo, (G.R. No. 167570), pp. 155-156.
[19] Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:
x x x x
(9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in sections forty-five and forty-six of this Act, independent of criminal action which may be brought against them: Provided, That in the case of an alien who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer both imprisonment and deportation, said alien shall first serve the entire period of his imprisonment before he is actually deported: Provided, That the imprisonment may be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with the consent of the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by the Department Head;
x x x x
[20] Section 45. Any individual who−
x x x x
(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing it to be false; or
x x x x
[21] An
Act to Control and Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the Philippines,
approved on
[22] Rollo (G.R. No. 167570), p. 157.
[23] Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 692-742.
[24] Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), pp. 106-124.
[25]
[26] Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 743-761.
[27] Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), pp. 125-126.
[28] Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 612-617.
[29] Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), pp. 135-136.
[30]
[31] Records, p. 71, SP. Proc. No. 11447.
[32] Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), p. 609.
[33] Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), p. 308.
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41] Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 566-588.
[42] Rollo (G.R. No. 167570), pp. 32-46.
[43] Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), p. 18.
[44] An Act Temporarily to Provide for the Administration of the Affairs of Civil Government in the Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes, approved on July 1, 1902.
[45] An Act to Declare the Purpose of the People of the United States as to the Future Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to Provide a More Autonomous Government for those Islands, approved on August 29, 1916.
[46] No. L-18069,
[47]
[48] G.R. Nos. 120295 & 123755,
[49]
[50] Supra at 19.
[51] Section 45. Any individual who −
x x x x
(e) Being an alien, shall for any fraudulent purpose represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in order to evade any requirement of the immigration laws; or
x x x x
[52] Tolentino
v. Court of Appeals, No. L-41427,
[53] Approved on
[54] Rules of Court, Rule 3,
SEC 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.¾Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
[55] Rules of Court, Rule 3,
SEC. 2 Parties in interest.¾A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
See also Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116236,
[56] ARTICLE IV. Citizenship
SECTION 1. …
x x x x
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the
x x x x
[57] Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), p. 642.
[58] Moy Ya
Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, No. L-21289,
[59] Board
of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, supra at 878. See also
Burca v. Republic, No. L-24252,
[60] Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81798, December 29, 1989, 180 SCRA 756, 761.
[61] 96 Phil. 665 (1955).
[62] Chua
Hiong v. Deportation Board, supra at 672.
See also Co v. The Deportation
Board, No. L-22748,
[63] Chua
Hiong v. Deportation Board, id. at 671.
See also Co v. The Deportation Board, id. at 107; Calacday v. Vivo, No. L-26681,
[64] Chua
Hiong v. Deportation Board, supra at 672.
See also Co v. The Deportation
Board, supra at 107-108.
[65] Chua
Hiong v. Deportation Board, supra at 670, citing Miranda, et al. v. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531, 533 (1954).
[66] Chua
Hiong v. Deportation Board, supra at 671.
[67] Vivo
v. Montesa, No. L-24576,
[68] Civil
Service Commission v. Bumogas, G.R. No. 174693,
[69] Ong v. Bogñalbal, G.R. No. 149140, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA 490, 501; Heirs of Dicman v. Cariño, G.R. No. 146459, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 240, 261-262; Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 311, 322.
[70] See
[71] 79 Phil.
249, 257-258 (1947). See also Tio Tiam
v. Republic of the Philippines, 101 Phil. 195, 198-199 (1957).
[72] R. Joson and R. Ledesma, Manual on the Alien Registration Act of 1950 10 (1999).
[73] SECTION
4. That all inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine and then resided in
said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris, December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
[74] SECTION
2. That all inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of
the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since
become citizens of some other country:
PROVIDED, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is
hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of the Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within
the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United
States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.
[75] J.
Bernas, Constitutional Rights and Social Demands: Notes and Cases Part II
929 (2004 ed.), citing Ching Leng v.
Galang, 104 Phil. 1058 (1958), unreported; Serra v. Republic, 91 Phil. 914 (1952), unreported; Zamboanga Transportation Co., Inc. v. Lim,
105 Phil. 1321 (1959), unreported; Board
of Immigration Commissioners v. Go Callano, No. L-24530,
[76] In re: Florencio Mallare, Adm. Case No.
533,
[77] Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching, supra at 8.
[78]
[79] I R. Ledesma, An Outline of Philippine Immigration and Citizenship Laws 405 (2006 ed.)
[80] Paa v.
Chan, No. L-25945,
[81] Lao Tang Bun v. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682, 691 (1948).
[82] CMP Federal Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 125298, February 11, 1999, 303 SCRA 99, 111; Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111933, July 23, 1997, 276 SCRA 1, 7.
[83] Montemayor
v. Bundalian, G.R. No. 149335,
[84] Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), p. 131.
[85]
[86]
[87]
[88]
[89]
[90]
[91]
[92]
[93]
[94]
[95]
[96]
[97] Dwikarna
v. Domingo, G.R. No. 153454,
[98] SEC. 4. When
writ not allowed or discharged authorized.¾ If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of
a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed;
or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not
be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment,
or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of
a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
[99] Office
of the Solicitor General v. De Castro, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2018,
[100]
[101] Bengzon
v. Ocampo, 84 Phil. 611, 613 (1949); Ong
See Hang v. Commissioner of Immigration, No. L-9700,