FIRST DIVISION
D.M. WENCESLAO & ASSOCIATES, INC., Petitioner, - versus - FREYSSINET PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent. |
G.R. No. 166857 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CORONA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BERSAMIN, JJ. Promulgated: September 11, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the 10 August 2004 Decision[2] and 21 January 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 58093. In its 10 August 2004
Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 17 April 1997 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 34 (trial court), with modification that only petitioner D.M.
Wenceslao & Associates, Inc. (DMWAI) shall be liable to pay respondent
Freyssinet Philippines, Inc. (FPI) P322,413.15 with interest at 6% per
annum from the date of the filing of the complaint. The Court of Appeals also deleted the awards
of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
In its 21 January 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied DMWAI’s
motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Sometime in January 1989, DMWAI
undertook the construction of the National Historical Institute Building (NHI
project). On 6 January 1989, Delfin J.
Wenceslao, Jr. (Wenceslao, Jr.) accepted the contract proposal submitted by FPI
for the fabrication and delivery of pre-stressed piles for the NHI project for P2,600,000.[5]
The contract provided for a 30% down payment upon the signing of the
contract and the balance of 70% shall be by progress payment based on work
accomplished. The contract also provided
for an interest rate of 18% per annum on
delinquent accounts.
On 5 August 1993, FPI filed a complaint[6] against Wenceslao, Jr.
doing business under the name and style of D.M. Wenceslao & Associates
and/or D.M. Wenceslao Construction.
According to FPI, the NHI project had been completed in November 1989
but Wenceslao, Jr. has not fully paid FPI for the pre-stressed piles. FPI prayed that Wenceslao, Jr. be ordered to
pay FPI P322,413.15 plus interest at 18% per annum from November 1989
until full payment and 25% of the award as attorney’s fees and the cost of the
suit.
On 29 March 1994, FPI filed a motion with leave of court to admit amended complaint.[7] In the amended complaint,[8] FPI impleaded DMWAI as a party defendant. Wenceslao, Jr. opposed the motion on the ground that the amended complaint sought to create a new cause of action against him. In its 12 July 1994 Order,[9] the trial court admitted the amended complaint.
On 17 April 1997, the trial court
rendered a decision in FPI’s favor. The
dispositive portion of the 17 April 1997 Decision provides:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the above findings, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter to jointly and
severally pay the plaintiff the sum of P322,413.15 with interest at 18%
per annum from November 1989 until full payment and to pay the sum equivalent
to 25% of the principal balance as litigation expenses and attorney’s fees and
to pay the cost of the suit.
The counterclaim interposed by the defendants is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
DMWAI appealed to the Court of
Appeals. DMWAI alleged that the trial
court erred in admitting FPI’s amended complaint. DMWAI also questioned the trial court’s
ruling that DMWAI is liable for the IBRD account and in holding Wenceslao, Jr.
severally and jointly liable with DMWAI for the monetary awards. DMWAI added that the trial court erred in
awarding interest at 18% per annum, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and
the cost of the suit.
On 10 August 2004, the Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the trial court’s 17 April 1997 Decision. The dispositive portion of the 10 August 2004
Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by
deleting the award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation and holding
defendant-appellant D.M. Wenceslao & Associates, Inc. solely liable to
plaintiff-appellee Freyssinet Philippines, Inc. for the payment of the amount
of P322,413.15, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of filing of the complaint.
However, the interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum from
the time the judgment in this case becomes final and executory and until such
amount is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[11]
DMWAI filed a motion for
reconsideration. In its 21 January 2005
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
While ruling that DMWAI had fully paid
FPI for the NHI project, the trial court still found DMWAI liable to FPI for
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) account. According to the trial court, even after the
excess payments from the NHI project were applied, DMWAI’s statement of account
showed a balance of P322,413.15 from the IBRD account. The trial court said that, based on Section
5, Rule 10[12] of the Rules of Court, it acquired
jurisdiction over the issue of the unpaid balance on the IBRD account when FPI
presented evidence to prove its claim and Wenceslao, Jr. admitted that he still
had an outstanding account with FPI. The
trial court added that DMWAI did not object when FPI presented evidence with
respect to the IBRD account.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals stated that the trial
court did not err in admitting FPI’s amended complaint because the amendment
was only a matter of form as it merely impleaded DMWAI as an additional
defendant and did not change or add another issue in the case.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s ruling that while the NHI project has been fully paid, DMWAI is still
liable to FPI for the IBRD account. The
Court of Appeals noted that DMWAI did not object to FPI’s Exhibit “J” showing
that DMWAI has an outstanding balance of P618,796 for the IBRD account
and even adopted the same as its Exhibit “7.” According to the Court of
Appeals, DMWAI’s failure to object to the evidence presented by FPI on the IBRD
account meant that DMWAI gave its implied consent to have the trial court pass
upon the issue.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that Wenceslao, Jr. should not be held jointly and severally liable with DMWAI because Wenceslao, Jr. signed the contract, not in his personal capacity, but as President of DMWAI.
However, the Court of Appeals modified
the interest rate from 18% to 6% per annum.
The Court of Appeals said that the interest rate of 18% per annum on
delinquent accounts pertained only to the NHI project, which has been fully
paid. Since the unpaid balance of P322,413.15
concerned the IBRD account and no evidence was presented to show the interest
rate on the IBRD account, the Court of Appeals ruled that the interest rate
should be 6% per annum pursuant to Article 2209[13] of the Civil Code to be
computed from the date of the filing of the complaint. However, the interest rate shall be 12% per
annum from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until it is
satisfied.
The Court of Appeals deleted the awards of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation because there was no proof that DMWAI acted in gross and evident bad faith in denying its liability to FPI on the NHI project.
The Issues
DMWAI raises the following issues:
1.
Whether
the trial court had jurisdiction over the IBRD account; and
Whether DMWAI is liable to pay interest on the IBRD account.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
DMWAI argues that the trial court’s
application of Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court was misplaced. DMWAI insists that at no time during the
trial did FPI present any evidence or testimony to prove DMWAI’s liability for
the IBRD account. DMWAI adds that it had
no opportunity to fully present evidence on the matter or to refute FPI’s
claim. DMWAI argues that the IBRD
account was “merely mentioned” during the trial to prove that an off-setting
agreement existed between the parties and that it should be applied to the NHI
project. DMWAI adds that it should not
be made liable to pay interest on the IBRD account as this was not the issue
raised in FPI’s complaint.
FPI maintains that the trial court had jurisdiction over the IBRD account because it was included in the issue of off-setting of accounts.
In Bank of America v. American Realty Corporation,[14] we stated:
When evidence is
presented by one party, with the express or implied consent of the adverse
party, as to issues not alleged in the pleadings, judgment may be rendered
validly as regards those issues, which shall be considered as if they have been
raised in the pleadings. There is
implied consent to the evidence thus presented when the adverse party fails to
object thereto.
Clearly,
a court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence before it
even though the relevant pleading had not been previously amended, so long as
no surprise or prejudice is thereby caused to the adverse party. Put a little differently, so long as the
basic requirements of fair play had been met, as where litigants were given
full opportunity to support their respective contentions and to object to or
refute each other’s evidence, the court may validly treat the pleadings as if
they had been amended to conform to the evidence and proceed to adjudicate on
the basis of all the evidence before it.[15]
DMWAI faults the trial court for
finding it liable to FPI for the IBRD account despite the fact that the
complaint sought to collect from the NHI project. This is not accurate. While on the face of the complaint there was
no specific allegation that DMWAI is liable to FPI for the IBRD account, subsequent developments, from the pre-trial
conference up to the presentation of evidence and the examination of witnesses,
show that FPI sought to recover DMWAI’s unpaid accounts including the IBRD
account. Moreover, DMWAI did not raise
any objection on the issue.
A careful scrutiny of the decisions of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals reveals that their findings and
conclusions on the matter of DMWAI’s liability to FPI for the IBRD account are
overwhelmingly supported by the evidence.
On this issue, the trial court stated:
However, considering the incorporation of the statement of
account (Exh. “J”) the balance from the IBRD project and subtracting therefrom
the excess after the payments were applied to the NHI project, this Court finds
and so holds that defendant is still liable to the plaintiff. This is affirmed by the admission of D.J.
Wenceslao, Jr., in his testimony. Based
from the provision of Rule 10, Section 5, judgment can be rendered by this
Court ordering the defendant to pay the unpaid obligation, it having acquired
jurisdiction over said subject matter.
Although
the issue raised and upon which the complaint is predicated is the collection
from the NHI project, yet the account covering the IBRD [project] of the
defendant with the plaintiff was tried with the implied consent of the
former. Under the rule it can be
considered by the Court. Defendant’s conformity is affirmed by D.J.
Wencelsao’s admission that they still have an outstanding balance with the
plaintiff but not for the NHI project.
Under Rule 10, Sec.5 [,] failure to amend does not affect the result of
the trial of said issue. The defendants
did not even object to the plaintiff’s presentation of evidence with respect to
the other account which is included in the statement of account Exh.”J”. Jurisdiction therefore over [the] other issue
other than that expressed in the present complaint was acquired by this Court.[16]
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals
declared:
The Pre-Trial Order dated October 26,
1995 defined the issues as follows:
“1. Whether there is an agreement or negotiation
regarding the off-setting of accounts between the parties.
2. If there was, whether the plaintiff [FPI] is
still entitled to collect the balance or whether there is still a balance to be
collected.
3. Whether defendant Wenceslao [Jr] is personally
liable.”
Wenceslao, Jr. admitted
that based on the statement of account, the company has a liability with
Freyssinet, but not on the NHI account.
The statement of account dated September 26, 1990 shows the total
obligation of DMWA, Inc. to Freyssinet in the amount of P2,588,346.00,
representing the contract amount of P2,969,550.00 for the NHI Project and the balance of account of P618,796.00
for the IBRD Project. However, the
statement of account prepared by Freyssinet as of March 23, 1993 shows that the
total obligation in the amount of P3,588,346.00 was reduced to P352,413.15. A check dated May 15, 1993 in the amount of P30,000.00
was issued by Wenceslao, Jr. to Freyssinet, further reducing the obligation of
DMWA, Inc. to Freyssinet to P322,413.15.
Thus,
when evidence is presented by one party, with the express or implied consent of
the adverse party, as to issues not alleged in the pleadings, judgment may be
rendered validly as regards those issues, which shall be considered as if they
have been raised in the pleadings. There
is implied consent to the evidence thus presented when the adverse party fails
to object thereto. In the case at bench,
appellants not only did not object to Freyssinet’s Exhibit “J” showing that it
has an outstanding balance in the amount of P618,796.00 for the IBRD
Project, they even adopted the same as their Exhibit “7”.[17] (Citations omitted)
Contrary to DMWAI allegations, evidence
was properly presented with full opportunity on the part of both parties to
support their relative contentions and to refute each other’s evidence. In this case, DMWAI was not prejudiced by the
inclusion of the IBRD account as one of the controverted issues. Moreover, DMWAI had been afforded ample
opportunity to refute and object to the evidence related to the IBRD account,
thus, the rudiments of fair play had been properly observed.
Since we have affirmed the ruling of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals which held DMWAI liable to FPI for the
IBRD account, we likewise affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals on DMWAI’s
liability to pay interest on the IBRD account.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the
petition. We AFFIRM the 10 August
2004 Decision and 21 January 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 58093.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C.
CORONA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Rollo, pp. 40-53. Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Associate Justices Mario L. Guarińa III and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring.
[3] Id. at 55-56.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 49-59. Penned by Judge Romulo A. Lopez.
[5] Exhibit
“A,” Folder of Exhibits, pp. 1-3.
[6] Records,
pp. 1-4.
[7] Id.
at 119-120.
[8] Id. at 121-125.
[9] Id. at 140.
[10] CA
rollo, pp. 58-59.
[11] Rollo, p. 52.
[12] Section
5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 5. - Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. - When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.
[13] Article
2209 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per annum.
[14] 378
Phil. 1279 (1999), citing Talisay-Silay
Milling Co., Inc. v. Asociacion de
Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc.,
317 Phil. 432 (1995).
[15] Id.
at 1302-1303.
[16] CA
rollo, pp. 56-57.
[17] Rollo, pp. 47-49.