THIRD DIVISION
|
PEREGRINA MISTICA, Petitioner, - versus - REPUBLIC OF THE Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 165141
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: September
11, 2009 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari
of the Court of Appeals (CA) April 2, 2004 Decision[1] in
CA-G.R. CV No. 75058 and August 18, 2004 Resolution[2]
denying petitioner Peregrina Mistica’s motion for reconsideration.
On
July 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, an Application for Registration of Title[3]
over a parcel of land known as
In
her application, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-98-09, petitioner
alleged that she is the owner in fee simple of the land sought to be
registered. She claimed that she and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject lot since time
immemorial. She further averred that she did not know of any lien, mortgage or
encumbrance affecting said lot or that any person has any claim or interest
therein, legal or equitable, remainder, reversion, or expectancy.[5]
Attached to the application were the
following documents: 1) the technical description of the subject lot;[6] 2)
Certification in Lieu of Lost Surveyor’s Certificate;[7] 3)
tax declaration of Real Property No. 06075, covering the subject lot effective
1998;[8] 4)
official receipts of realty tax payments;[9]
and 5) blueprint/machine copies of Subdivision Plan Csd-03-010587-D.[10]
Petitioner, thus, prayed for the
registration and confirmation of her title over the subject lot.[11]
Respondent
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition[12]
to the application on the grounds that: a) neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto; b) the muniments of title did not appear to be genuine and did not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for, or of petitioner’s
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof in
the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945; c) the claim of ownership in fee
simple of the subject lot on the basis of a Spanish title or grant could no
longer be availed of by petitioner who failed to file an appropriate
application for registration within a period of six (6) months from January 16,
1976 as required by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892; and d) the subject lot
applied for was a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines not subject to private appropriation.[13]
During
trial, petitioner testified that the previous owner and possessor of the
subject lot was her father. She added
that her father acquired the property by virtue of a contract of sale but she
could not remember the vendor’s name.[14] In support thereof, she presented a photocopy
of a document[15] dated
Meanwhile,
on
On
WHEREFORE,
confirming the order of General Default issued by this Court on
After
this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree issue.
Furnish
copy of this decision, the Land Registration Authority,
SO
ORDERED.[19]
With
the denial of its motion for reconsideration,[20]
respondent filed a Notice of Appeal[21]
stating that it was appealing to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The appeal was
given due course by the MTC on
Petitioner
moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the case should have
been elevated to the CA. She argued that
since the MTC heard and decided the case in the exercise of its delegated
jurisdiction, the appeal should not have been taken to the RTC.
Acting
on petitioner’s motion, the RTC held that it indeed had no jurisdiction over
the appeal. However, it refused to
dismiss the case. It instead forwarded
the case to the CA considering that the appeal had already been perfected when
the MTC gave due course to petitioner’s notice of appeal.[23]
In
the assailed decision,[24]
the CA set aside the MTC decision and, consequently, dismissed petitioner’s
application for registration. Contrary to the conclusions of the trial court,
the appellate court found that the most important requirement for granting
petitioner’s application for registration – that the applicant has been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject lot since June 12, 1945 – had not been adequately established.[25]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on
Aggrieved,
petitioner comes before the Court raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE
THAT SHE HAS BEEN [IN] OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION AND
OCCUPATION OF AN ALIENABLE AND
We
deny the petition.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 states:
SEC.
14. Who
may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to
the land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Likewise, Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073, provides:
Section
48. The following described citizens
of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court]
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
x
x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
In accordance with the aforesaid
laws, any person, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, who has
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier, may file in the proper trial court an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through his duly
authorized representative.[28]
Being the applicant for confirmation
of imperfect title, petitioner bears the burden of proving that: 1) the land
forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and 2) she
has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona
fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.[29]
These the petitioner must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing
evidence.[30]
To prove that she has been in
possession of the subject lot, petitioner presented documentary evidence such
as the technical description of the subject lot, Certification in Lieu of Lost Surveyor’s
Certificate, tax declaration of real property, official receipts of realty tax
payments, blueprint/machine copies of Subdivision Plan Csd-03-010587-D, joint
affidavits of her co-heirs, and Deed of Partition dated July 30, 1980.
Moreover, to prove that her predecessors-in-interest had also been in
possession thereof, petitioner presented a document written in Spanish which
she claimed to be a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 16, 1921. Lastly, she testified
that she acquired the subject lot from her parents who had been the owners and
possessors thereof since she was still very young.
As aptly held by the appellate court,
these pieces of evidence, taken together, do not suffice to prove that
petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. The technical
description, Certification in Lieu of Lost Surveyor’s Certificate, and
blueprint copies of the subdivision plan only prove the identity of the lot
sought to be registered. The joint
affidavits of her co-heirs, as well as the Deed of Partition, merely show that
petitioner acquired the property through succession.
It
is true that petitioner presented tax declarations of the subject lot, as well
as tax receipts evidencing payment thereof.
The Court notes, however, that the tax declaration was effective only in
1998, and that the tax receipts were dated 1997 and 1998. She failed to adduce in evidence any tax
declaration over the property under the name of her parents and that the realty
taxes for the property had been paid prior to 1998. At best, she offered a copy of a tax
declaration which began in 1985 in the name of her co-heirs. While a tax
declaration by itself is not adequate to prove ownership, it may serve as
sufficient basis for inferring possession.[31]
The voluntary declaration of a piece of real property for taxation purposes not
only manifests one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property,
but also announces an adverse claim against the state and all other interested
parties with an intention to contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.[32]
The presentation of a
document dated May 16, 1921 which, according to petitioner, was a Deed of Sale
of the subject property where her father was the vendee, did not work to her advantage. In the first place, the document was written
in Spanish and petitioner did not bother to have the contents thereof
translated to English or to any other language that the court could understand.
We cannot, therefore, determine if, indeed, the document was a Deed of Sale,
and if the subject matter thereof was the property sought to be
registered.
Moreover, in her direct
testimony, petitioner only stated that her parents were the owners and
possessors of the subject lot since she was still very young. She added that, considering that she was 73
years old when she testified (in 1999), her parents could have owned and
possessed the property for more than 50 years.
Still, her testimony failed to meet the standard required by law.
Petitioner failed to state the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged
ownership of the land applied for. To be
sure, general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof
of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.[33]
More importantly, we
would like to stress that possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title
to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession
and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction
“and,” the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the
all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to
qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property.[34]
With the general
statements made by petitioner that she and her predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the property, and even with the Deed of Absolute Sale
allegedly executed in 1921, actual possession of the subject lot was not convincingly
established.
In sum, petitioner could not have
acquired an imperfect title to the land in question because she has not proven
possession openly, continuously and adversely in the concept of an owner since
June 12, 1945, the period of possession required by law.[35] Accordingly, the CA did not err in reversing the decision
of the trial court and in denying the application for registration of title
over the subject lot.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo and Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring; rollo, pp. 9-19.
[2]
[3] Records, pp. 5-8.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Rollo, p. 11.
[15] Records, pp. 206-207.
[16] Rollo, p. 12.
[17]
[18] Records, pp. 174-175.
[19] Penned by Judge Calixtro O. Adriatico, id. at 238.
[20] Records, pp. 240-245.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] Supra note 1.
[25] Rollo, pp. 16-18.
[26]
[27]
[28] Alfredo,
Preciosa, Angelita & Crisostomo, all surnamed
[29] Id.; In Re: Application for Land Registration of Title, Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corporation v. Republic, G.R. No. 147359, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 92, 103; Republic v. Carrasco, G.R. No. 143491, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 150, 158.
[30] Alfredo, Preciosa, Angelita & Crisostomo, all surnamed Buenaventura v. Amparo Pascual & Republic of the Phil., supra note 28.
[31] In Re: Application for Land Registration of Title, Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corporation v. Republic, supra note 29, at 104; Limcoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Republic, G.R. No. 167652, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 233, 245.
[32] Republic v. Carrasco, supra note 29, at 160; Republic v. Jacob, G.R. No. 146874, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 529, 539.
[33] In Re: Application for Land Registration of Title, Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corporation v. Republic, supra note 29, at 104-105; The Dir., Lands Management Bureau v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 761, 770 (2000).
[34] Ong
v. Republic, G.R. No. 175746,
[35] Republic v. Carrasco, supra note 29, at 164.