THIRD DIVISION
|
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner, - versus - COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 164815
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: September
3, 2009 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
For
resolution is the Letter-Appeal[1] of
Senior Inspector (Sr. Insp.) Jerry C. Valeroso (Valeroso) praying that our
The
facts are briefly stated as follows:
Valeroso
was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 10th day of
July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused without any authority
of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her
possession and under his/her custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 “Charter Arms” revolver
bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5) live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary
license/permit issued by the proper authorities.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[4]
When arraigned, Valeroso
pleaded “not guilty.”[5]
Trial on the merits ensued.
During trial, the
prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior Police Officer (SPO)2 Antonio Disuanco
(Disuanco) of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Central Police
District Command; and Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito), Records Verifier of the
Firearms and Explosives Division in
On July 10, 1996, at
around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch Order from the desk officer
directing him and three (3) other policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest,
issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping
with ransom.[6]
After a briefing, the
team conducted the necessary surveillance on Valeroso checking his hideouts in
Valeroso was then brought
to the police station for questioning. Upon
verification in the Firearms and Explosives Division in
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R.
Timbol, Jr. (Timbol), and Adrian Yuson testified for the defense. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
On
Disuanco informed Valeroso
that there was a standing warrant for his arrest. However, the raiding team was not armed with
a search warrant.[12]
Timbol testified that he
issued to Valeroso a Memorandum Receipt[13]
dated July 1, 1993 covering the subject firearm and its ammunition, upon the
verbal instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno.[14]
On May 6, 1998, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon City, convicted Valeroso as
charged and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as
maximum. The gun subject of the case was
further ordered confiscated in favor of the government.[15]
On appeal, the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed[16]
the RTC decision but the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty was lowered
to four (4) years and two (2) months.
On petition for review,
we affirmed[17]
in full the CA decision. Valeroso filed a Motion for Reconsideration[18]
which was denied with finality[19]
on
Valeroso is again before
us through this Letter-Appeal[20]
imploring this Court to once more take a contemplative reflection and
deliberation on the case, focusing on his breached constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizure.[21]
Meanwhile, as the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to timely file its Comment on Valeroso’s
Motion for Reconsideration, it instead filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment.[22]
In its Manifestation, the
OSG changed its previous position and now recommends Valeroso’s acquittal.
After a second look at the evidence presented, the OSG considers the
testimonies of the witnesses for the defense more credible and thus concludes
that Valeroso was arrested in a boarding house. More importantly, the OSG
agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearm was obtained by the police
officers in violation of Valeroso’s constitutional right against illegal search
and seizure, and should thus be excluded from the evidence for the
prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the
subject firearm was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be
convicted of the crime, since he was able to establish his authority to possess
the gun through the Memorandum Receipt issued by his superiors.
After considering anew
Valeroso’s arguments through his Letter-Appeal, together with the OSG’s position
recommending his acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial rights must
ultimately reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to
reconsider.[23]
The Letter-Appeal is
actually in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration. While a second
motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is
within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is
filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better served
thereby.[24]
This is not the first
time that this Court is suspending its own rules or excepting a particular case
from the operation of the rules. In De
Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[25]
despite the denial of De Guzman’s motion for reconsideration, we still
entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was actually a second motion for
reconsideration. Eventually, we
reconsidered our earlier decision and remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan
for reception and appreciation of petitioner’s evidence. In that case, we said that if we would not
compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities, petitioner would surely
experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might
not have committed after all.[26]
Also in Astorga v. People,[27]
on a second motion for reconsideration, we set aside our earlier decision,
re-examined the records of the case, then finally acquitted Benito Astorga of
the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt. And in Sta.
Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,[28] by virtue of the January 13, 2004 En Banc Resolution, the Court authorized
the Special First Division to suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to consider
and resolve respondent’s second motion for reconsideration after the motion was
heard on oral arguments. After a
re-examination of the merits of the case, we granted the second motion for
reconsideration and set aside our earlier decision.
Clearly, suspension of
the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the re-examination of the findings
of fact and conclusions of law earlier made, is not without basis.
We would like to stress
that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. They are conceived and
promulgated to effectively aid the courts in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.
In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a
backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would
tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would always be within our
power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation.[29]
Now on the substantive
aspect.
The Court notes that the
version of the prosecution, as to where Valeroso was arrested, is different
from the version of the defense. The
prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested near the INP Central Police
Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about to board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the
arresting officers bodily searched him, and they found the subject firearm and
ammunition. The defense, on the other
hand, insists that he was arrested inside the boarding house of his
children. After serving the warrant of
arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of the police officers
searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a cabinet where they discovered
the subject firearm.
After a thorough
re-examination of the records and consideration of the joint appeal for
acquittal by Valeroso and the OSG, we find that we must give more credence to
the version of the defense.
Valeroso’s appeal for
acquittal focuses on his constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure alleged to have been violated by the arresting police officers; and if
so, would render the confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in
evidence against him.
The right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
From this constitutional
provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a general rule, the procurement
of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize the
person, house, papers, or effects of any individual.[30]
To underscore the
significance the law attaches to the fundamental right of an individual against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution succinctly declares in
Article III, Section 3(2), that “any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.”[31]
The above proscription is
not, however, absolute. The following
are the well-recognized instances where searches and seizures are allowed even
without a valid warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to
a lawful arrest;
2. [Seizure] of evidence in “plain
view.” The
elements are: a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the
right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency
circumstances.[32]
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other
premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations.[33]
In the exceptional instances
where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, what
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial
question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place
or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.[34]
In light of the
enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of reasonableness laid down above,
is the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?
We answer in the
negative.
For one, the warrantless
search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest. Searches and
seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
We would like to stress
that the scope of the warrantless search is not without limitations. In People
v. Leangsiri,[35] People v. Cubcubin, Jr.,[36]
and People v. Estella,[37]
we had the occasion to lay down the parameters of a valid warrantless search
and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest.
When an arrest is made,
it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in
order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest
or effect his escape. Otherwise, the
officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for
the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.[38]
Moreover, in lawful
arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to
conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in
the permissible area within the latter’s reach.[39]
Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate
control.[40] The phrase “within the area of his
immediate control” means the area from within which he might gain possession of
a weapon or destructible evidence.[41]
A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as
dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the
person arrested.[42]
In the present case, Valeroso
was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with
ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house of his
children. He was awakened by the
arresting officers who were heavily armed.
They pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside
the room, tied his hands, and then put him under the care of Disuanco.[43] The other police officers remained inside the
room and ransacked the locked cabinet[44]
where they found the subject firearm and ammunition.[45] With such discovery, Valeroso was charged
with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
From the foregoing
narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting officers served
the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him
immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him
out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according
to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an “area within his
immediate control” because there was no way for him to take any weapon or to
destroy any evidence that could be used against him.
The arresting officers
would have been justified in searching the person of Valeroso, as well as the
tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be used
against the former. But under the
circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable justification to search
through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or concealed
areas in that room itself.[46]
It is worthy to note that
the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an incident to a lawful
arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person
arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter
from destroying evidence within reach.
The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed
to serve its purpose.[47]
In the case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot be
said to have been within Valeroso’s immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may
be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.[48]
Nor can the warrantless
search in this case be justified under the “plain view doctrine.”
The “plain view doctrine”
may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to
extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s
guilt. The doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.[49]
As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.[50]
and People v. Leangsiri:[51]
What the “plain view” cases have
in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification
for an intrusion in the course of which[,] he came inadvertently across a piece
of evidence incriminating the accused.
The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification – whether it
be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest,
or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused – and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police
that they have evidence before them; the “plain view” doctrine may not be used
to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges.[52]
Indeed, the police
officers were inside the boarding house of Valeroso’s children, because they
were supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers had a
prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently, any evidence that they
would inadvertently discover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers
did not just accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they
actually searched for evidence against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made
was illegal, a violation of Valeroso’s right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Consequently, the evidence
obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence against him.
Unreasonable searches and
seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full
protection. While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary for public welfare, still it may be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights
of the citizens, for no enforcement of any statute is of sufficient importance
to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. Those who are
supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of an
individual in the name of order. Order
is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty.[53]
Because a warrantless
search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who conduct
it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions.[54]
The Bill of Rights is the
bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their
rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes
meaningless. This explains why the Bill
of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a
position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on
governmental power.[55]
Without the illegally
seized firearm, Valeroso’s conviction cannot stand. There is simply no sufficient evidence to
convict him.[56] All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt measured by the required moral certainty for
conviction. The evidence presented by
the prosecution was not enough to overcome the presumption of innocence as
constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it
would be better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime
charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.[57]
With the foregoing
disquisition, there is no more need to discuss the other issues raised by
Valeroso.
One final note. The Court
values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional
rights as a condition sine qua non
against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of the government.[58]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision
and June 30, 2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED
and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry
Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J.VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 229-232.
[2]
[3]
[4] Records, p. 1.
[5]
[6] Rollo, p. 149.
[7]
[8] Exh. “C,” Folder of Exhibits.
[9] Rollo, pp. 149-150.
[10]
[11] Valeroso’s testimony was corroborated by Yuson; id. at 151.
[12] Rollo, p. 152.
[13] Exh. “1,” Folder of Exhibits.
[14] Rollo, p. 152.
[15] The decision was penned by Judge Oscar L. Leviste; id. at 38-45.
[16] Embodied in a decision dated
[17] Rollo, pp. 148-165.
[18]
[19]
[20] Supra note 1.
[21] Rollo, p. 230.
[22]
[23] See De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 326 Phil. 182 (1996).
[24] Astorga
v. People, G.R. No. 154130,
[25] Supra note 23.
[26] De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 191.
[27] Supra note 24.
[28] G.R. Nos. 112526 and 118838, March 16, 2005, 453 SCRA 432.
[29] Astorga v. People, supra note 24, at 155-156.
[30] People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125, 139 (2000).
[31]
[32] People v. Tudtud, G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003, 412 SCRA 142, 153-154; Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263, 277 (2002); People v. Sevilla, supra note 30, at 139-140; People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 879-880 (1998).
[33] Nachura, Antonio Eduardo B., Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2009, pp. 139-142.
[34] Caballes
v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32, at 278.
[35] 322 Phil. 226 (1996).
[36] 413 Phil 249 (2001).
[37] 443 Phil. 669 (2003).
[38] People v. Estella, id. at 685.
[39] People v. Cueno, 359 Phil. 151, 163 (1998).
[40] People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 36, at 271; see People v. Leangsiri, supra note 35.
[41] People v. Estella, supra note 37, at 685.
[42]
[43] TSN, February 19, 1997, pp. 21-25.
[44] TSN,
[45]
[46] People v. Estella, supra note 37, at 685.
[47]
[48]
[49] People
v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 40, at 271; People v. Leangsiri, supra note 35, at 249.
[50] Supra note 40.
[51] Supra note 35.
[52] People
v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 36, at 272; People v. Leangsiri, supra note 35, at 249-250.
[53] People v. Aruta, supra note 32, at 895.
[54] People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 36, at 270-271.
[55] People v. Tudtud, supra note 32, at 168.
[56] People v. Sarap, 447 Phil. 642, 652 (2003).
[57]
[58] People v. Januario, 335 Phil. 268, 304 (1997).