THIRD DIVISION
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VICTORIA
S. JARILLO,
Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 164435 Present:
Ynares-Santiago,
J., Chairperson, chico-nazario, VELASCO, JR., nachura, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated:
September 29, 2009 |
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x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x D E C I S
I O N PERALTA, J.: |
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This
resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, praying that the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution[2]
dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
On
May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in
Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA
S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of
November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being
previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the
said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora
Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner
pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.
The
undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael
Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C.
Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O,
O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
On
May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in
a church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in
Appellant
Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel
Ebora Santos Uy, at the
On
April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a
church wedding in
In
1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for
annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter,
appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City x x x.
x x
x x
Parenthetically,
accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby
finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX
(6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil
aspect of this case, such as the nullity of accused’s bigamous marriage to Uy
and its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is being determined by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
by the same court in that assailed Order dated 2 August 2001.[3]
For her
defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo
were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain
Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her
marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid
marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her
marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal
to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision
dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she
contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage
to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her
previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to
Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of
sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her marriages were
celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous
marriage as far back as 1978.
In the
meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch
140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and
1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab
initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on
July 9, 2003. In her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for
the reversal of her conviction. However,
in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,[4]
denied reconsideration and ruled that “[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity
of her first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without
legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.”[5]
Hence, the
present petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner alleges that:
V.1. THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE
THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF
PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST
TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A
PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN
EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
V.4. THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT
CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE
MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL
V.6. THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER
BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first,
second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed
jointly. It is true that right after the presentation
of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings
on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial
question. In her appeal, she also
asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy,
initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension,
while the CA struck down her arguments. In
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[6]
the Court categorically stated that:
x
x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a
case the criminal case may not be
suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity. x x x
x x x x
x
x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the
case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for
nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage.
Thus, a decision in the civil
case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
x x x[7]
The foregoing ruling had been
reiterated in Abunado v. People,[8]
where it was held thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of
the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would
only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could
simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for
annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon
the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable,
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage
were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.[9]
For the very same reasons
elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s conviction of the crime of
bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo
cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second
marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and
void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the
celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which
had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction,
was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither
would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make
any difference.[10]
As held in Tenebro, “[s]ince a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically
void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.”[11]
Petitioner’s
defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is classified under
Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that “[c]rimes
punishable by other afflictive penalties shall
prescribe in fifteen years,” while Article 91 states that “[t]he period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x
x x .”
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her
previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription began to run from
that time. Note that the party who raises a
fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to
produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing
to establish the same, it remains self-serving.[12] Thus,
for
petitioner’s defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to
adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge
of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records
of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient
evidence to support her allegation. Petitioner’s testimony that her own mother
told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not
inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:
x x x She
did not call to the witness stand her mother – the person who allegedly
actually told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the
confirmatory testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act
which she allegedly did is hearsay.[13]
As ruled
in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,[14]
“the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by
the offended party, the authorities or their [agents],” as opposed to being
counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage.[15] Since petitioner failed to prove with
certainty that the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense
is, therefore, ineffectual.
Finally,
petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the
Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is
mistaken.
The
Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised
Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law
leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the
minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided. The modifying circumstances
are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.[16]
Applying
the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is
proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty
next lower is prision correccional,
which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by
the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its
medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a
maximum penalty of 10 years.
However,
for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to
Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment[17]
to be void ab initio on account of
the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was
subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the
penalty imposed by the lower courts.
Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
IN
VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.
SO
ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis, with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring; rollo, pp. 8-21.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring; rollo, pp. 22-23.
[3] Rollo, pp. 9-10.
[4] 467 Phil. 723 (2004).
[5] CA rollo, p. 404.
[6] 391 Phil. 648 (2000).
[7] Id. at 655-657. (Emphasis supplied.)
[8] G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 562.
[9] Id. at 567-568. (Emphasis supplied.)
[10] Abunado v. People, supra note 8; Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, supra note 4, at 752.
[11] Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 742.
[12] Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 151890, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 411, 433.
[13] Records, p. 383.
[14] G.R. No. 109454, June 14, 1994, 233 SCRA 155.
[15] Id. at 161.
[16] Abunado v. People, supra note 8, at 568.
[17] See Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. 00-1217, CA rollo, pp. 343-347.