Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
R TRANSPORT CORPORATION, represented by its
owner/President RIZALINA LAMZON, Petitioner, - versus - EDUARDO PANTE, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 162104 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO,
JR.,
NACHURA,
and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: September 15,
2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari[1]
of the Decision dated
The
facts[2]
are as follows:
Petitioner R Transport
Corporation, represented by its owner and president, Rizalina Lamzon,[3] is a common carrier engaged
in operating a bus line transporting passengers to Gapan, Nueva Ecija from
Cubao,
At about P48.00 for his fare,
and he was issued bus ticket number 555401.[4]
While traveling along
the
The hospital's Statement
of Account showed that respondent’s operation
and confinement cost P22,870.00.[7] Respondent also spent P8,072.60 for
his medication. He was informed that he had to undergo a second operation after two years of rest.[8] He was unemployed for almost a year after his
first operation because Goldilocks, where he worked as a production crew,
refused to accept him with his disability as he could not perform his usual
job.[9]
By way of initial assistance, petitioner gave respondent's wife, Analiza P.
Pante, the sum of P7,000.00, which was spent for the stainless steel
instrument used in his fractured arm.[10]
After the first operation, respondent demanded from petitioner, through its
manager, Michael Cando, the full payment or reimbursement of his medical and
hospitalization expenses, but petitioner refused payment.[11]
Four years later, respondent
underwent a second operation. He spent P15,170.00 for medical and
hospitalization expenses.[12]
On
In its Answer,[14] petitioner put up the defense that it had always
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees, and that the accident was a force majeure
for which it should not be held liable.
At the pre-trial on October 4, 1995, petitioner was declared in default,[15] which was
reconsidered by the trial court on December 12, 1995[16] upon finding that
petitioner had earlier filed a Motion to
Transfer Date of Hearing. Trial was
first set on
Six years later, on
On
In the hearing of
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the plaintiffs to be entitled to damages and ordering defendants to
[pay]:
1.)
P39,112.60 as actual damages;
2.)
P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3.)
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4.)
Twenty-five percent (25%) of the
total of which shall
constitute a lien as contingent fee of
plaintiff’s counsel.[24]
So ordered.
The trial court held that the provisions of the Civil
Code on common carriers govern this case.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code states that “[i]n
case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Articles 1733 and 1755.” The trial court ruled that since petitioner
failed to dispute said presumption despite the many opportunities given to it,
such presumption of negligence stands.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court
of Appeals.
In its Decision dated
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the appeal
is DENIED and the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. With double costs
against the appellant.[25]
Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated
Hence, petitioner filed this petition raising
the following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH DIVISION GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE DECISION PROMULGATED ON
II
THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH DIVISION FURTHER GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE
DECISION OF THE
III
THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH DIVISION, IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GAPAN CITY, BRANCH 35, HAS COMMITTED GRAVE AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ITS FINDING OF FACTS AND APPLICATION OF [THE] LAW.[27]
The
main issue is whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages.
The
Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable
for damages.
Under the Civil Code, common carriers, like
petitioner bus company, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of
the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each
case.[28] They
are bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.[29]
Article
1756 of the Civil Code states that “[i]n
case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Articles 1733 and 1755.”
Further, Article
1759 of the Civil Code provides that “[c]ommon
carriers are liable for the death or injury to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of
the orders of the common carriers. This
liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of their employees.”[30]
In this case,
the testimonial evidence of respondent showed that petitioner, through its bus
driver, failed to observe extraordinary diligence, and was, therefore,
negligent in transporting the passengers of the bus safely to Gapan, Nueva
Ecija on
Petitioner
cannot complain that it was denied due process when the trial court waived its
right to present evidence, because it only had itself to blame for its
failure to attend the hearing scheduled for reception of its evidence on June
19, 2002. The trial court stated, thus:
It
is noteworthy to state that during the course of the proceeding of this case,
defendant (petitioner) and its counsel hardly appeared in court and only made
innumerable motions to reset the hearings to the point that this case x x x
dragged [on] for seven years from its filing up to the time that it has been
submitted for decision. And for the
unexplained absence of counsel for defendant in the hearing set last June 19,
2002 despite repeated resetting, upon motion of the counsel for plaintiff (respondent),
Atty. Ireneo Romano, its right to present its evidence was considered waived.[32]
In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of
Appeals,[33]
the Court held that petitioner therein
was not denied due process
when the records of the case showed that he was amply given the opportunity to
present his evidence, which he, however, waived. There is no
denial of due process where a party was given an opportunity to be heard.[34]
Next, petitioner
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in denying its motion for reconsideration
of the appellate court’s Decision dated
The contention is
unmeritorious.
The Court of Appeals
has the discretion to deny petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration since it found that there was no cogent reason to
warrant reconsideration of its Decision dated
Moreover, petitioner
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial
court, which awarded actual damages in the amount of P22,870.00 based on the statement of account issued by
the
The contention is
without merit.
As cited by the Court
of Appeals in its Decision, Jarco
Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals[36]
awarded actual damages for
hospitalization expenses that was evidenced by a statement of account issued by
the
Petitioner
also contends that the award of moral damages is not proper, because it is not
recoverable in actions for damages predicated on breach of the contract of
transportation under Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.[37]
The Court is not
persuaded.
The Court of Appeals
correctly sustained the award of moral damages, citing Spouses Ong v. Court of Appeals,[38]
which awarded moral damages to paying passengers, who suffered physical
injuries on board a bus that figured in
an accident. Spouses Ong held that a person is entitled to
the integrity of his body and if that integrity is violated, damages are due
and assessable. Thus, the usual practice
is to award moral damages for physical injuries sustained. In Spouses Ong, the Court awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to a passenger who was deemed to have suffered
mental anguish and anxiety because her
right arm could not function in a normal manner. Another passenger, who suffered injuries on
his left chest, right knee, right arm and left eye, was awarded moral damages
in the amount of P30,000.00 for the mental anxiety and anguish he
suffered from the accident.
In this case, respondent
sustained a “laceration frontal area, with fracture of the right humerus” due
to the vehicular accident. He underwent an operation for the fracture of the bone extending from the
shoulder to the elbow of his right arm. After a few years of rest, he had to undergo a
second operation. Respondent, therefore,
suffered physical pain, mental anguish and anxiety as a result of the vehicular
accident. Hence, the award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is proper.
Petitioner likewise contends that the award
of exemplary damages is improper, because it did not act in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
The contention is
without merit.
Article 2232 of the Civil
Code states that “[i]n contracts and
quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. In this case, respondent’s testimonial
evidence showed that the bus driver,
Johnny Merdiquia, was driving the bus
very fast in a reckless, negligent and imprudent manner; hence, the bus hit a
tree and a house along the highway in Baliuag, Bulacan. The award of exemplary damages is, therefore, proper.
The award of exemplary damages is justified to serve as an example or as a
correction for the public good.[39]
Further, the Court
affirms the award of attorney’s fees to respondent’s counsel. The Court notes
that respondent filed his Complaint for damages on P34,778.15. The award of legal fees is commensurate to
the effort of respondent’s counsel, who attended to the case in the trial court
for seven years, and who finally helped secure redress for the injury sustained
by respondent after 14 years.
Lastly, petitioner
contends that the medical certificate presented in evidence is without
probative value since respondent failed to present as witness Dr. Virginia
Cabling to affirm the content of said medical certificate.
The contention lacks merit. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the
medical certificate is admissible since petitioner failed to object to the
presentation of the evidence.[40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76170, dated P39,112.60 as actual damages; P50,000.00
as moral damages; and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. Twenty-five
percent (25%) of the total amount shall constitute a lien as contingent fee of respondent’s
counsel.
Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] As culled from the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, the transcript of stenographic notes and the records of the
case.
[3] Also
referred to as Rosalina Lamson in the RTC Decision and as Rosalina Lanson in
the CA Decision.
[4] Exhibit “A,” records, p. 37.
[5]
Exhibit “B,” records, p. 114.
[6]
[7] Exhibit “E,” records, p. 119.
[8] TSN,
[9]
[10] Exhibit “D,”records, p. 118; TSN,
[11] TSN,
[12] Exhibits “F-1”to “F-5,” records, pp.
241-243.
[13] Docketed as Civil Case No. 1460.
[14] Records, pp. 53-57.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] CA rollo, p. 284.
[24] Rollo,
p. 90.
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] Civil
Code, Art. 1733.
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case.
[29] Civil
Code, Art.
1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
[30] Emphasis
supplied.
[31] See Mallari, Sr. v. Court of
Appeals, 381 Phil. 153 (2000); Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
326 Phil. 762 (1996).
[32] Records, p. 89.
[33] G.R.
No. 109979,
[34]
[35] Rollo, p. 26.
[36] 378
Phil. 991 (1999).
[37] Art.
2219. Moral damages may be recovered in
the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts of actions
referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Art. 2220.
Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages
are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
[38] 361
Phil. 338 (1999).
[39] Prudencio v.
[40] SCC Chemicals Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 405 Phil. 514 (2001).