THIRD
DIVISION
ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION,
Petitioner, - versus - M/V “PILAR-I” and SPOUSES ERNESTO DY
and Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 157901 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: September 11, 2009 |
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D
E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[1]
dated
Petitioner
Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation (Orix Metro) is a domestic
corporation engaged in the leasing and financing business. Respondents Ernesto and Lourdes Dy (spouses
Dy) are the proprietors of Limchia Enterprises, engaged in the shipping business.
Needing
to raise funds for the acquisition of a cargo vessel, Limchia Enterprises, with
Lourdes Dy as co-maker, obtained a loan from Orix Metro in the amount of P4,764,024.00[4]
evidenced by a Promissory Note executed on
With the proceeds of the loan, Limchia Enterprises was able to acquire and register in its name the vessel M/V Pilar-I. On 16 July 1990, the Philippine Coast Guard in Zamboanga City issued in favor of Limchia Enterprises the Certificate of Ownership and Certificate of Philippine Registry of M/V Pilar-I.
As
additional security for the loan from Orix Metro, Limchia Enterprises, with Lourdes Dy as signatory, executed on
On
P3,140,364.00; however, they
were only able to pay P2,775,339.00.[8] Consequently, Orix Metro sent them several
demand letters.
The spouses Dy appealed for the
restructuring of their loan with Orix Metro.
Lourdes Dy also requested the release of the mortgage on their
On
We
are pleased to inform you that your request for the release of Real Estate
Property located at San Francisco del Monte, P800,000.00) to cover all your arrearages, penalty
charges and advance payment.
Release of the said property shall be subject to the final clearing of your check.[9]
When the spouses Dy still failed to
make any payments, counsel for Orix Metro sent a final demand letter to Lourdes
Dy on
For
and in behalf of my client therefore, we are constrained to make FINAL LEGAL
DEMAND against your company and its surety, ERNESTO T. DY, for the considered
amount of THREE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND FIFTY PESOS (P3,411,050.00)
to be paid and on hand on or before 28 February 1992, failing which we will be
constrained to exercise our options under our contract, the pertinent
provisions of which have been reproduced above for your perusal, and collect
the full amount of P4,167,702.00 inclusive of penalties, attorney’s fees
and liquidated damages as provided for under our contract.[10]
It would appear that several checks
issued by Lourdes Dy to Orix Metro to cover the loan bounced, prompting Orix
Metro to file several criminal complaints against her for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, with the Makati RTC, Branch 134, where it was
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 92-3964-08.[11]
Lourdes Dy wrote Orix Metro a letter on
This has reference
to I.S. No. 922871, P132,334.00.
After a careful study and deliberation of cash flow and considering the onset of rainy season which renders mobility slower we would like to offer the following schedule of payment:
P280,000.00
Orix Metro replied in a letter dated P550,000.00.[14]
The spouses Dy, however, asked Orix
Metro to waive the requirement for additional collateral:
This
is in reply to your letter of P55,128.00 in
order that their arrearages will be obliterated on
However,
we beg to be allowed to reinstate the account without being required to post an
additional collateral of P500,000.00 considering that the value of the
vessel mortgaged is more than double the amount of the loan.[15]
In a letter dated
In response to
your letter dated June 22, 1992, we acknowledge your request to waive the
requirement of additional collateral of P500,000.00 provided that (1)
the vessel M/V Pilar I should be reinsured in the amount of P3.5 million
with an insurance company accredited to COLF; (2) we would require the issuance
of post dated checks for all proposed payments including the additional of P55,128.00;
and (3) we would execute an affidavit of desistance only after the second
payment of P330,000.00 on 31 July 1992 is cleared and credited to our
account.[16]
The
spouses Dy did not meet the foregoing conditions and were not able to reinsure
the vessel or deliver all of the required postdated checks. In the meantime, on
Upon
the filing of an affidavit of merit and the posting of a bond in the amount of P2,386,825.00
by Orix Metro as required by the Revised Rules of Court, the RTC issued an
Order of Arrest (of Vessel) dated 1 September 1992, directing the Sheriff to
arrest, seize, and take immediate possession of M/V Pilar-I and to keep it under
the custody of the court. Pursuant to
the said arrest order, the Sheriff seized the vessel on
On
Also
on
Subsequently,
the spouses Dy filed their Answer,[22]
again averring that there was yet no default on their part at the time the
Complaint was filed on
On
1 February 1993, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion to lift/set aside
the order of arrest/seizure of M/V Pilar-I and ordering the Sheriff to return
the vessel to the spouses Dy, but requiring them to pay Orix Metro according to
the terms embodied in the 10 August 1992 letter of Orix Metro to spouses Dy.[23] However, acting on the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Orix Metro, the RTC set aside its 1 February 1993
Order and directed that M/V Pilar-I be returned to Orix Metro.
The spouses Dy assailed the RTC Order
of
On
Trial on the merits ensued.
The RTC rendered its Decision[26]
on
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering [herein petitioner] Consolidated Orix Leasing and Finance Corporation and whoever is presently in actual possession of M/V “Pilar I” to return said vessels to [herein respondents]. The Sheriff of this Court with the assistance of the Philippine Coast Guard is ordered to effect the return of M/V Pilar I to [respondents] Limchia Enterprises and Spouses Ernesto Dy and Lourdes Dy; and
2. Ordering [petitioner] Consolidafted Orix Leasing and Finance Corporation [to pay] the following amounts to the [respondents]:
a)
P2,340,000.00 as actual damages;
b)
P300,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and,
c)
P500,000.00 as moral damages.[27]
Orix Metro sought recourse from the
Court of Appeals by filing a Notice of
Appeal on
Evidently,
the parties agreed to restructure the loan and [herein petitioner Orix Metro]
acceded to the [herein respondents’] proposed schedule of payments. Records
show that in accordance with [Lourdes Dy]’s letter dated P55,128.00 which they agreed to incorporate in their monthly
payments in addition to what was proposed in the
The question we will now resolve is whether
or not [respondents] are in default, in order to determine whether or not [Orix
Metro] has a cause of action to institute the instant case.
In
the instant case, [Orix Metro] gave [respondents] until P330,000.00, [respondents] paid only P130,000.00,
claiming that they still have an advance payment of P289,480.00 with
[Orix Metro].
When [respondents] defaulted in the payment of the monthly amortizations, [Orix Metro] demanded from [respondents] the full payment of the total obligation due in accordance with the terms in the contract of mortgage. However, after representations were made by [respondents], [Orix Metro] accepted the late and partial payments of [respondents], making their default immaterial. When they again defaulted in paying the next amortization due, [Orix Metro] this time made no demand for the full payment of the total obligation. Consequently, [respondents] made payments even after the due date, as in fact they paid several installments to [Orix Metro] which the latter accepted. Thus, upon expiration of the period to pay the monthly amortization, [Orix Metro] continued accepting late payments, an act which cannot but be construed as a waiver of the right to demand full payment of the obligation due and to foreclose the preferred mortgage. When the mortgagee, instead of availing of their right as embodied in the contract of mortgage, accepted and received delayed payments of installments beyond the period stipulated, and the mortgagors were in arrears, the mortgagee in effect waived and are now estopped from exercising such right. (Heirs of Escanlar vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 176).
Under the contract of mortgage, [Orix Metro] was given the right to demand payment of the entire unpaid obligation upon default of [respondents] in the payment of any installments. In other words, without default, such provision remains dormant as the [Orix Metro] could not demand payment of the entire obligation while [respondents] were religiously complying with their monthly obligation. In this case, while it is clear that [respondents] defaulted in paying their monthly amortizations, the parties agreed to update the delayed amortizations payments by way of a new schedule of payments. Thus, unless [respondents] default in paying any of the amortizations in accordance with the new schedule of payments agreed upon, [Orix Metro]’s right to demand payment of the total obligation becomes dormant. Admittedly, there were several defaults as evidenced by previous unsatisfied or partially satisfied payments. However, the previous defaults became immaterial when [Orix Metro], through pleas and entreaties of [respondents] for a chance to continue paying the obligation by partial payments, consequently, and compassionately allowed the latter to resume paying the unpaid amortizations by restructuring the monthly installments. Having become immaterial, it was as though no default previously occurred. This leaves that provision in the Contract of Mortgage on [Orix Metro]’s right to demand payment of the total obligation still dormant, thus, having the effect of stalling the right to foreclose the preferred mortgage (Jacinto v. Intermediate Appellate Court, August 29, 1988) [Orix Metro]’s acceptance of the late and partial payments from [respondents] constitutes a waiver of [Orix Metro]’s right as embodied in the contract of mortgage. (Elisco Tool Mfg. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 307 SCRA 731).[28]
The Court of Appeals, thus, affirmed
the RTC Decision of 31 July 1997, with the following modifications: (1) the
award for actual and moral damages be deleted; (2) attorney’s fees be reduced
to P50,000.00; and (3) the spouses Dy be ordered to reimburse Orix Metro
for repair and drydocking expenses while the vessel was in the latter’s
possession. The fallo of the
Decision of the appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Decision dated
1. The award for actual damages is deleted for lack of basis;
2.
The award for moral damages is reduced to P100,000.00;
3.
The award (for) attorney’s fees is likewise reduced to P50,000.00;
and
4. [Herein respondents] are ordered to reimburse [herein petitioner Orix Metro] for the expenses it incurred for the repair and drydocking of the subject vessel at the time it was under [Orix Metro]’s possession.
The Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Orix Metro were both
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated
Hence, the instant Petition of Orix
Metro with the following assignment of errors:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PARTIES AGREED TO RESTRUCTURE THE LOAN AND THAT ORIX METRO ACCEEDED TO THE SPOUSES DY’S PROPOSED SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS.
II. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ORIX METRO’S ACCEPTANCE OF THE LATE AND PARTIAL PAYMENTS FROM THE SPOUSES DY CONSTITUTED A WAIVER OF ORIX METRO’S RIGHT TO FORECLOSE THE SHIP MORTGAGE.
III.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ORIX METRO
SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED THE ADVANCE PAYMENT OF P289,439.00 TO INTEREST
DUE ON THE LOAN WITHOUT INFORMING THE SPOUSES DY.
IV. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SPOUSES DY ARE THE LEGAL POSSESSORS OF RESPONDENT VESSEL.
V.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ORIX METRO’S
ASSIGNEE,
VI. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SPOUSES DY ARE ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.
VII. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE A SPECIFIC RULING WITH REGARD TO THE BALANCE OF THE SPOUSES DY’S OBLIGATION TO ORIX METRO.
VIII. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES TO PETITIONER.[29]
It is a settled doctrine that
foreclosure is proper when the debtors are in default of the payment of their
obligation. The conditions essential for
that foreclosure would be to show, firstly, the existence of the chattel
mortgage; and, secondly, the default of the mortgagor.[30]
The constitution of a chattel
mortgage over M/V Pilar-I was never disputed.
The Deed of Chattel Mortgage over the vessel, in favor of Orix Metro,
was signed by Lourdes Dy, on behalf of
Limchia Enterprises, on
The issue arises as to the existence
of the second condition for foreclosure, i.e.,
whether the spouses Dy were already in default at the time Orix Metro filed, on
18 August 1992, its Complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage constituted on
M/V Pilar-I.
Orix
Metro maintains that the spouses Dy defaulted in the payment of their
obligation and denies that it acceded to the proposed restructure of payments
of the spouses Dy. Orix Metro argues
that it rejected the proposal for restructuring of the loan of the spouses Dy
when it made a counter-offer with certain conditions, which spouses Dy failed
to accept and comply with.
Both parties, however, agree that the
issue of whether the spouses Dy were already in default when Orix Metro instituted
foreclosure proceedings is factual in nature. There is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[31] It requires a re-evaluation of the evidence on
record and is generally not under the cognizance of this Court. In petitions
for review on certiorari, the Court
only passes upon questions of law in light of the general rule that findings of
fact of the appellate court are binding on this Court, especially when these
merely affirm the factual findings of the trial court.[32]
In
the instant case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals uniformly found, based
on the evidence adduced by the parties, that the filing of the foreclosure
proceedings was premature, since the spouses Dy were not yet in default of
their obligation at the time thereof. The
RTC and the Court of Appeals both observed that while the spouses Dy may not
have been up to date on the payment of their monthly amortizations, Orix Metro
did not pursue its right to foreclose and opted to accept the spouses Dy’s
offer to restructure their loan obligation.
The Court of Appeals, in particular, held that the previous defaults
became immaterial when Orix Metro continued to accept the spouses Dy’s partial
payments.
Strictly, the Court, not being a
trier of facts, is under no obligation to examine and weigh anew evidence
adduced below. It should already be bound
by the aforementioned findings of fact of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. True, there are recognized
exceptions to this general rule and the Court may be prevailed upon to review
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals when the same are manifestly
mistaken, or when the appealed judgment was based on a misapprehension of
facts, or when the appellate court overlooked certain undisputed facts which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[33] No such circumstances, however, exist in this
case.
Nonetheless,
in this case, the Court delves into the evidence on record in order to dispel
any doubt as to the correctness of the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The
foreclosure proceedings were instituted by Orix Metro on P610,000.00,[34] broken
down as follows:
Date of Payment |
Monthly Amortization |
|
|
|
|
From the admission of Orix Metro, as
of P450,000.00,[35] the
details of which are presented below:
Date of Payment |
Amount of Partial Payment |
|
P 88,847.00 |
|
129,363.00 |
|
81,790.00 |
|
47,573.00 |
|
102,427.00 |
In
addition to the aforementioned payments, the spouses Dy had previously advanced
the amount of P289,480.00. Resultantly,
they have already paid Orix Metro the sum of P739,480.00.
Simple computation would reveal that
the amount paid (P739,480.00) by the spouses Dy even exceeded the amount
they were due to pay (P610,000.00) by August 1992. Thus, at the time the foreclosure proceedings
were instituted by Orix Metro on 18 August 1992, there was no installment
payment due and demandable, and remaining unpaid, which would have rendered the
spouses Dy in default and justified the foreclosure of the mortgage on M/V
Pilar-I.
The
argument of Orix Metro that it did not accede to the restructuring of the loan
is only a belated repudiation of the new schedule of payments and deserves
scant consideration. Orix Metro had
already benefited from the said new schedule when it accepted the payments made
by the spouses Dy based thereon. In
fact, as further proof of its consent to the restructured schedule of payment,
records show that Orix Metro wrote a letter to Limchia Enterprises, Inc. on P127,261.00
for the next 12 months. The spouses Dy
relied on the acceptance without any objection by Orix Metro of the payments made
based on the new schedule. On equitable
principles, particularly on the ground of estoppel, this Court upholds the new
schedule of payment. Let it be noted
that the doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair
dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak
against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to
whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable
principles and the equities in the case.
It is designed to aid the law in the administration of justice where,
without its aid, injustice might result. As aptly ruled by the Court of Appeals
in this case:
When [the spouses Dy] defaulted in the payment of the monthly amortizations, [Orix Metro] demanded from [spouses Dy] the full payment of the total obligation due in accordance with the terms in the contract of mortgage. However, after representations were made by [spouses Dy], [Orix Metro] accepted the late and partial payments of [spouses Dy], making their default immaterial. When they again defaulted in paying the next amortization due, [Orix Metro] this time made no demand for the full payment of the total obligation. Consequently, [spouses Dy] made payments even after the due date, as in fact they paid several installments to [Orix Metro] which the latter accepted. Thus, upon the expiration of the period to pay the monthly amortization, [Orix Metro] continued accepting late payments, an act which cannot but be construed as a waiver of the right to demand full payment of the obligation due and to foreclose the preferred mortgage. When the mortgagee, instead of availing of their right as embodied in the contract of mortgage, accepted and received delayed payments of installments, beyond the period stipulated, and the mortgagors were in arrears, the mortgagee in effect waived and are now estopped from exercising such right. x x x.
Under the contract of mortgage, [Orix Metro] was given the right to demand payment of the entire unpaid obligation upon default of [spouses Dy] in the payment of any installments. In other words, without default, such provision remains dormant as the [Orix Metro] could not demand payment of the entire obligation while [spouses Dy] were religiously complying with their monthly obligations. In this case, while it is clear that [spouses Dy] defaulted in paying their monthly amortizations, the parties agreed to update the delayed amortization payments by way of a new schedule of payments. Thus, unless [spouses Dy] default in paying any of the amortizations in accordance with the new schedule of payments agreed upon, [Orix Metro]’s right to demand payment of the total obligation becomes dormant. Admittedly, there were several defaults as evidenced by previous unsatisfied or partially satisfied payments. However, the previous defaults became immaterial when [Orix Metro], through the pleas and entreaties of [spouses Dy] for a chance to continue paying the obligation by partial payments, consequently and compassionately allowed the latter to resume paying the unpaid amortizations by restructuring the monthly installments. Having become immaterial, it was as though no default previously occurred. This leaves that payment of the total obligation still dormant, thus, having the effect of stalling the right to foreclose the preferred mortgage. [Orix Metro]’s acceptance of the late and partial payments from [spouses Dy] constitutes a waiver of petitioner’s right as embodied in the contract of mortgage.[36] (Emphases supplied.)
Suffice
it to say that as of the time Orix Metro instituted the foreclosure proceedings
against the spouses Dy, the legal basis for foreclosure of mortgage did not
exist. Thus, Orix Metro had no cause of
action against them and cannot demand foreclosure of the mortgage on M/V Pilar-I.
On
the application of the advance payment of P289,480.00 to the obligation,
the Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that Article 1252[37]
of the Civil Code controls. Therefore,
the spouses Dy may properly apply said advance payment against their outstanding
obligation following the new schedule of payments. Additionally, in contracts involving
installment payments with interest chargeable against the remaining balance of
the obligation, the creditor is duty-bound to inform the debtor of the amount
of interest that falls due, and that he is applying the installment payments to
cover said interest. Without notifying
the debtor, the creditor cannot apply the payments to the interest and then
later on hold the debtor in default for nonpayment of installments on the
principal.[38] In this case, as found by the appellate
court, Orix Metro clearly failed to provide the spouses Dy a detailed
accounting of the remaining principal obligation, interest, and payments already
made.[39] The spouses Dy had all the right to apply the
advance payment to the amount due in the new schedule of payments.
The
Court further agrees in the deletion by the Court of Appeals of the award for
actual damages made by the RTC. Actual
or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proven with a
reasonable degree of certainty.[40] Here, only the bare and self-serving
testimonies of respondents’ witnesses support the claim for actual
damages. The Court cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but
must depend on competent proof that the claimant has suffered, and an evidence
of, the actual amount thereof.[41]
Finally, the Court cannot sustain the
order of the Court of Appeals for the spouses Dy to reimburse Colorado, as the
successor-in-interest of Orix Metro, for the expenses incurred by the latter in
repairing and drydocking MV Pilar-I,[42]
which, according to Bills No. 1 and 2, presented by P5,154,620.20.[43] Said Bills do not deserve much evidentiary
weight, being also self-serving, having been prepared by
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
The Decision dated 22 November 2002 and Resolution dated 2 April
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57321 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the order requiring respondents
spouses Dy to reimburse petitioner Orix Metro/Colorado’s expenses incurred for
the repair and drydocking of the vessel MV Pilar-I is DELETED.
SO
ORDERED.
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Associate Justices Bernardo P.
Abesamis and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo, pp. 60-71.
[2] Rollo, p. 73.
[3] CA
rollo, pp. 144-153.
[4] Breakdown:
P3 million loan, the rest withheld by Orix as interest payments etc.
[5] Rollo, pp. 111-112.
[6]
[7]
[8] Orix
Metro presented the following table of amortizations:
Monthly Amortization |
Date of Payment |
||
|
|
|
|
|
132,334.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
|
67,666.00 |
|
|
|
50,000.00 |
|
|
|
14,668.00 |
6 May 1991 |
132,334.00 |
|
1,999.00 |
|
|
|
130,335.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
6 July1991 |
132,334.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
|
132,334.00 |
|
129,363.00 |
|
129,363.00 |
|
129,363.00 |
|
129,363.00 |
|
129,363.00 |
|
13,937.00 |
|
|
|
115,426.00 |
|
129,363.00 |
|
16,908.00 |
|
|
|
112,455.00 |
|
129,363.00 |
|
19,679.00 |
|
|
|
50,000.00 |
|
|
|
50,000.00 |
|
|
7 May 1992 |
9,484.00 |
|
129,363.00 |
7 May 1992 |
40,516.00 |
|
|
|
88,847.00 |
|
129,363.00 |
|
129,363.00 |
|
129,363.00 |
|
81,790.00 |
|
|
|
47,573.00 |
6 May 1992 |
129,363.00 |
|
102,427.00 |
|
|
|
26,936.00 |
|
129,363.00 |
|
23,064.00 |
|
|
|
(partial and |
|
|
|
incomplete |
|
129,363.00 |
|
|
|
129,363.00 |
|
|
|
127,261,00 |
|
|
|
127,261,00 |
|
|
|
127,261,00 |
|
|
|
127,261,00 |
|
|
|
127,261,00 |
|
|
|
127,261,00 |
|
|
|
127,261,00 |
|
|
|
127,261,00 |
|
|
6 May 1993 |
127,261,00 |
|
|
|
127,261,00 |
|
|
|
127,261,00 |
|
|
|
127,261,00 |
|
|
TOTAL |
|
|
(Memorandum,
rollo, pp. 1289-1290): |
[9] Records,
Vol. II, p. 9.
[10] Rollo, pp. 214-216.
[11] Criminal
Cases No. 92-3964-68 for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were eventually
filed against Lourdes Dy before the Makati RTC, Branch 134. In a Decision dated
[12] Proposed
Restructured Schedule of Payment; rollo, p.
217.
[13] Rollo, p. 218.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Records,
pp. 1-16.
[18] Orix
Metro filed criminal complaints against Lourdes Dy for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as “The Bouncing Checks Law,” as a result
of the latter’s issuance of five worthless checks totaling P661,670.00
in payment of her loan obligation to Orix Metro. The criminal informations were
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 92-3964 to 68, entitled “People of the Philippines v. Lourdes P. Dy,” before the Regional
Trial Court,
[19]
[20] Records,
p. 163.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] Records,
pp. 495-498.
[25] Rollo, pp. 827-829.
[26] CA rollo, pp. 144-153.
[27]
[28] Rollo, pp. 66-67.
[29]
[30] Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 376 Phil. 602, 612 (1999).
[31] Barbacina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
135365,
[32] Cargolift Shipping, Inc. v. L. Acuario Marketing
Corporation, G.R. No. 146426, 27 June 2006, 493 SCRA 157, 163.
[33]
[34] CA rollo, pp. 149-150.
[35] Rollo, p. 1280.
[36]
[37] The
provision reads:
Art. 1252. He who has various debts of the same kind in
favor of one and the same creditor, may declare at the time of making the
payment, to which of them the same must be applied. Unless the parties so stipulate, or when the
application of payment is made by the party for whose benefit the term has been
constituted, application shall not be made as to debts which are not yet
due.
If the debtor accepts from the
creditor a receipt in which an application of the payment is made, the former
cannot complain of the same, unless there is a cause for invalidating the
contract.
[38] Rapanut v. Court of Appeals, 316 Phil.
391, 398 (1995).
[39] CA rollo, p. 234.
[40] MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong
Corporation, G.R. No. 170633, 17 October 2007, 536 SCRA 408, 466.
[41]
[42] CA rollo, p. 236.
[43] Records,
pp. 74-112.
[44] See MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v.
Ssangyong Corporation, supra note 40 at 467.