SPS. LEONARDO AND MILAGROS CHUA,
Petitioners, - versus - HON. JACINTO G. ANG, DENNIS R. PASTRANA, IN THEIR CAPACITIES
AS CITY AND ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR OF PASIG, RESPECTIVELY, FERDINAND T. SANTOS,
ROBERT JOHN L. SOBREPEÑA, NOEL M. CARIÑO, ROBERTO S. ROCO, ALICE
ODCHIQUE-BONDOC,* ROMULO T. SANTOS AND ENRIQUE A. SOBREPEÑA, JR., Respondents. |
G.R. No. 156164
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES, BRION, ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: September 4, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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Before
us is the petition for certiorari[1] filed
by the spouses Leonardo and Milagros Chua (petitioners)
to assail the Resolution dated November 4, 2002 of the City Prosecutor of Pasig
in I.S. No. PSG
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The
antecedent facts, drawn from the records, are briefly summarized below.
On
As
a result, the petitioners filed on September 3, 2002 a Complaint-Affidavit[3]
before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasig City accusing the private respondents, as officers and
directors of FEPI, of violating P.D. No. 957, specifically its Sections 17 and 20, in
relation with Section 39.[4] These provisions state:
Sec. 17. Registration. - All contracts to sell, deeds of sale and other similar instruments relative to the sale or conveyance of the subdivision lots and condominium units, whether or not the purchase price is paid in full, shall be registered by the seller in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the property is situated.
x x x
Sec. 20. Time of Completion. - Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.
x x x
Sec. 39. Penalties. - Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Decree and/or any rule or regulation that may be issued pursuant to this Decree shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years: Provided, That in the case of corporations, partnership, cooperatives, or associations, the President, Manager or Administrator or the person who has charge of the administration of the business shall be criminally responsible for any violation of this Decree and/or the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto. [Emphasis supplied]
The petitioners alleged that the private
respondents did not construct and failed to deliver the contracted condominium
unit to them and did not register the Contract to Sell with the Register of
Deeds.
Of
the seven (7) private respondents, only private respondent Alice Odchique-Bondoc
filed a Counter-Affidavit.[5]
She countered that the City Prosecutor has no jurisdiction over the case since it
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
On
THE PETITION and THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
On
PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT DISMISSED
PETITIONER'S COMPLAINANT (sic) ON THE GROUND THAT THE HLURB, NOT THEIR OFFICE
HAS JURISDICTION TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND FILE THE
CORRESPONDING INFORMATION IN COURT FOR CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS OF P.D. No. 957.[8]
The
petitioners argue that jurisdiction to entertain criminal complaints is lodged
with the city prosecutor and that the jurisdiction of the HLURB under P.D. No.
957 is limited to the enforcement of contractual rights, not the investigation
of criminal complaints.
In
their Comment,[9]
the private respondents
submit that the petition should be dismissed outright because the petitioners
failed to avail of other remedies provided by law, such as (a) the filing of a
motion for reconsideration with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, (b) the filing
of a petition for review with the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ), (c) the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of any judgment rendered by the DOJ, or (d) the filing of an
appeal or a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA); that even if certiorari is a
proper remedy, the petition was filed in violation of the hierarchy of courts; and
that even on the merits, the petition must fail since the public respondents
correctly dismissed the complaint as a reasonable interpretation of P.D. No.
957 which requires a prior determination by the HLURB that a corporation
violated P.D. No. 957 before criminal charges may be filed against its
corporate officers.
In
their Reply, the petitioners reiterate that the public respondents abdicated
their authority to conduct a preliminary investigation and to indict the
private respondents for criminal violations of P.D. No. 957 when they dismissed
the criminal complaint for being premature.[10]
OUR RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
At the outset, we note
that the petitioners indeed filed the present petition for certiorari
without prior recourse to other available remedies provided by law and the
observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. Nonetheless, the rules on prior
recourse to these available remedies are not without exceptions, nor is the
observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts an inflexible rule; the
peculiarity, uniqueness and unusual character of the factual and circumstantial
settings of a case may allow the flexible application of these established
legal principles to achieve fair and speedy dispensation of justice.
A
prior motion for reconsideration is unnecessary: (a) where the
order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court; (c) where
there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e)
where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is an extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by
the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are
a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had
no opportunity to object; or (i) where
the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.[11]
On the other hand, prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately: (a) when there is a violation of due process; (b) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question; (c) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (d) when there is estoppel on the part of
the administrative agency concerned; (e) when there is irreparable injury; (f)
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (g) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (h) when it would amount to
a nullification of a claim; (i) when the subject matter is a private land in
land case proceedings; (j) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; or (k) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.[12]
On the non-observance of the principle of hierarchy of courts,
it must be remembered that this rule generally applies to cases involving conflicting
factual allegations. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot
be brought immediately before us as we are not triers of facts.[13] A
strict application of this rule may be
excused when the reason behind the rule is not present in a case, as in the
present case, where the issues are not factual but purely legal. In these types of questions, this Court has
the ultimate say so that we merely abbreviate the review process if we, because
of the unique circumstances of a case, choose to hear and decide the legal
issues outright.[14]
In
the present petition for certiorari, we find that there are four (4)
compelling reasons to allow the petitioners' invocation of our jurisdiction in
the first instance, even without prior recourse to a motion for reconsideration
or to the exhaustion of administrative remedies, and even in disregard of the
principle of hierarchy of courts.
First, the petitioners raise a pure
question of law involving jurisdiction over criminal complaints for
violation of P.D. No. 957. A question of law exists when the doubt or
controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a
certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted.[15] As noted earlier, this Court is the undisputed
final arbiter of all questions of law.
Second, the present case requires prompt action
because public interest and welfare are involved in subdivision and condominium
development, as the terms of P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344 expressly reflect.[16] Questions of conflicting
processes, essentially based on jurisdiction, will consistently recur as
people’s need for housing (and hence, subdivisions and condominiums) escalate.
Shelter is a basic human need whose fulfillment cannot afford any kind of
delay.[17]
Third, considering that this case has been pending for nearly seven (7) years
(since the filing of the Complaint-Affidavit on September 3, 2002) to the
prejudice not only of the parties involved, but also of the subdivision and
condominium regulatory system and its need for the prompt determination of
controversies, the interests of justice now demand the direct resolution of the
jurisdictional issue this proceeding poses. As mentioned, at stake in this case is shelter – a basic
human need and to remand the case to the DOJ for a determination of the merits
of the parties’ jurisdictional tug-of-war would not serve any purpose other than
to further delay its resolution.[18]
Thus, the practicality of the situation and the need for the speedy administration of justice justify a
departure from the strict application of procedural rules. Besides, the issue before us presents
no special difficulty, and we feel it should be decided now, without going
through the procedural formalities that shall anyway end up with this Court.
Fourth, the petition is meritorious. The public respondents committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaints for violation of P.D. No.
957 on the ground that jurisdiction lies with the HLURB.
Generally,
the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends
largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating and defining
the terms of the agency’s mandate. P.D.
No. 1344 clarifies and spells out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the
grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB in
the following specific terms:[19]
SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
The extent of its quasi-judicial authority, on the other
hand, is defined by the terms of P.D. No. 957 whose Section 3 provides:
x x x National Housing Authority [now HLURB]. - The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree.
The provisions of P.D No. 957 were intended to encompass all
questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. The intention was to provide
for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all
parties – buyers and sellers of subdivision and condominium units - may seek
remedial recourse. The law recognized, too, that subdivision and condominium
development involves public interest and welfare and should be brought to a
body, like the HLURB, that has technical expertise.[20]
In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB, on the other hand,
is empowered to interpret and apply contracts, and determine the rights of
private parties under these contracts. This ancillary power, generally
judicial, is now no longer with the regular courts to the extent that the
pertinent HLURB laws provide.[21]
Viewed from this perspective, the
HLURB’s jurisdiction over contractual rights and obligations of parties under
subdivision and condominium contracts comes out very clearly. But hand in hand with this definition and
grant of authority is the provision on criminal penalties for violations of the
Decree, provided under the Decree’s Section 39, heretofore quoted.
Significantly, nothing in P.D. No. 957 vests the HLURB with jurisdiction to
impose the Section 39 criminal
penalties. What the Decree provides is
the authority of the HLURB to impose administrative
fines under Section 38, as implemented by the Rules Implementing the
Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protective Decree. This Section of the Decree provides:
Sec. 38. Administrative Fines. – The Authority may prescribe and impose
fines not exceeding ten thousand pesos for violations of the provisions of this
Decree or of any rule or regulation thereunder.
Fines shall be payable to the Authority and enforceable through writs of
execution in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.
The
Implementing Rules, for their part, clarify that “The implementation and payment of administrative fines shall not
preclude criminal prosecution of the offender under Section 39 of the Decree.”
Thus, the implementing rules themselves expressly acknowledge that two separate
remedies with differing consequences may be sought under the Decree,
specifically, the administrative remedy and criminal prosecution.
Unless the contrary appears under other provisions of law (and in this
case no such provision applies), the determination of the criminal liability lies
within the realm of criminal procedure as embodied in the Rules of Court. Section 2, Rule 112 of these Rules provide
that the prerogative to determine the existence or non-existence of probable
cause lies with the persons duly authorized by law; as provided in this Rule,
they are (a) Provincial
or City Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) Judges of the Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (c) National and Regional
State Prosecutors; and (d) other officers as may be authorized by law.
In the present case, the petitioners have expressly chosen to pursue the
criminal prosecution as their remedy but the prosecutor dismissed their
complaint. The prosecutor’s dismissal for prematurity was apparently on the
view that an administrative finding of violation must first be obtained before
recourse can be made to criminal prosecution.
This view is not without its model in other laws; one such law is in the
prosecution of unfair labor practice under the Labor Code where no criminal
prosecution for unfair labor practice can be instituted without a final
judgment in a previous administrative proceeding.[22]
The need for a final administrative determination in unfair labor practice
cases, however, is a matter expressly
required by law. Where the law is silent
on this matter, as in this case, the fundamental principle – that administrative
cases are independent from criminal actions[23]
– fully applies, subject only to the rules on forum shopping under Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.[24] In the present case, forum shopping is not
even a matter for consideration since the petitioners have chosen to pursue only
one remedy – criminal prosecution. Thus, we see no bar to their immediate recourse
to criminal prosecution by filing the appropriate complaint before the
prosecutor’s office.
In
light of these legal realities, we hold that the public respondent prosecutors
should have made a determination of probable cause in the complaint before
them, instead of simply dismissing it for prematurity. Their failure to do so and
the dismissal they ordered effectively constituted an evasion of a positive
duty and a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law; they acted on the
case in a manner outside the contemplation of law. This
is grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction warranting a reversal of the assailed resolution.[25] In
the concrete context of this case, the public prosecutors effectively shied
away from their duty to prosecute, a criminal violation of P.D. No. 957 as
mandated by Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court and Republic Act No.
5180,[26]
as amended,[27]
otherwise known as the Law on Uniform Procedure of Preliminary Investigation.
As a final
word, we stress that the immediate recourse to this Court that this
Decision allows should not serve as a precedent in other cases where the
prosecutor dismisses a criminal complaint, whether under P.D. No. 957 or any
other law. Recourse to (a) the filing a motion for reconsideration with the
City or Provincial Prosecutor, (b) the filing a petition for review with the
Secretary of the DOJ, (c) the filing a motion for reconsideration of any
judgment rendered by the DOJ, and (d) intermediate recourse to the CA, are
remedies that the dictates of orderly procedure and the hierarchy of
authorities cannot dispense with. Only
the extremely peculiar circumstances of the present case compelled us to rule
as we did; thus our ruling in this regard is a rare one that should be
considered pro hac vice.
WHEREFORE,
we hereby GRANT the petition and
accordingly REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolution dated November
4, 2002 of the City Prosecutor of Pasig in I.S. No. PSG
SO
ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Chairperson |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice |
MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Spelled as “Alice Odchigue-Bondoc” in other parts of the record.
[1] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Rollo, pp. 37-48.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 157911, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 354, 373; Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128764, July 10, 1998, 292 SCRA 452, 457; Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108634, July 17, 1997, 275 SCRA 568, 574-575.
[12] Buston-Arendain v. Gil, G.R. No. 172585, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 561, 573; Paat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111107, January 10, 1997, 266 SCRA 167.
[13] Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral, G.R. No. 143951, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 153, 161; Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547 and 155661, January 21, 2004, 420 SCRA 575, 584.
[14] Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 338, 346; Real v. Belo, G.R. No. 146224, January 17, 2007, 513 SCRA 111.
[15] Mendoza v. Salinas, G.R. No. 152827, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 414, 419; Bukidnon Doctors’ Hospital, Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. 161882, July 8, 2005, 463 SCRA 222, 233.
[16] Entitled “Empowering The National Housing Authority To Issue Writ Of Execution In The Enforcement Of Its Decision Under Presidential Decree No. 957.”
[17] The
first whereas clause of Executive Order No. 90 of
“WHEREAS, Government recognizes that shelter is a basic need for which low and middle income families, particularly in urbanized areas, require assistance; x x x” (Emphasis supplied).
[18] See
Filipinas Manufacturers Bank v. Eastern
Rizal Fabricators, G.R. No. L-62741,
[19] Jurisdiction was originally vested in the
National Housing Authority (NHA) under P.D. No. 957, later clarified by P.D.
No. 1344. Under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 648 of
[20] See
Arranza v. B. F. Homes, Inc., G.R.
No. 131683,
[21] Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National
Housing Authority, No. L-50444,
[22] Article
247, Labor Code.
[23] People v.
Toledano, G.R. No. 110220, May 18,
2000, 332 SCRA 210, 216-217; Larin v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745, October 16, 1997, 280 SCRA 713, 727;
see also Barillo v. Gervacio, G.R.
No. 155088,
[24] Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The
plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom
to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or noncompliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
[25] Deutsche Bank Manila v. Chua Yok See,
G.R. No. 165606, February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 672, 692; Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162580, January 27, 2006, 480
SCRA 411, 416.
[26] Entitled “An Act Prescribing a
Uniform System of Preliminary Investigation by Provincial and City Fiscals and
Their Assistants, and by State Prosecutors or their Assistants,” approved on
September 8, 1967.
[27] By Presidential Decree No. 77,
effective