FIRST DIVISION
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Petitioner, -
versus - CRISTINA D. AMAGNA, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 152614
Present: PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BERSAMIN, JJ. Promulgated: September 30, 2009
|
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D
E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
Before
this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside and annul the Decision[1]
dated May 25, 2001 and the Resolution[2]
dated March 14, 2002 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 46910.
The CA decision affirmed the decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
The facts may be
succinctly stated as follows:
On September 23, 1996, a
complaint for unlawful detainer[4]
was filed by respondent Cristina Amagna against petitioner Salvador Fernandez
in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of P1,300.00. In July 1995, petitioner failed to pay the
monthly rentals, prompting respondent to send a demand letter dated April 11,
1996 to pay and vacate but petitioner refused.
Respondent also alleged that she and her siblings needed the leased
premises as they were also renting.
In his Answer,[5]
petitioner averred that he had been renting the premises for over fifty (50)
years and had, in fact, already constructed substantial improvements on the
lot; that he was one of several lessees of the property represented by their
association known as “Barangay 843 Neighborhood Association”; that the monthly
rental was only P420.00 and not P1,300.00 as claimed by
respondent; that respondent had been transacting business with him through the
association and respondent acknowledged payments made through the said
association; that there was no agreement with respondent regarding the period
for the lease; that he was surprised to receive a demand letter from respondent
because he was sure that he had no arrears; and that on May 15, 1997, he filed
a Petition for Consignation before the MeTC, Manila, Branch 3 and deposited his
arrears in rent computed at the rate of P420.00 per month.
On October 13, 1997, the
MeTC,
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [herein respondent] and against the defendant [herein petitioner] ordering:
1. The defendant and all persons claiming rights under him to immediately vacate the premises known as 1901-K Int. 34, Zamora St., Pandacan, Manila, and surrender its peaceful possession to the plaintiff;
2. To remove and demolish the structure he built on the premises;
3. To pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,300.00 monthly beginning July 1995 and every month thereafter until he shall have finally and actually vacated the subject premises;
4. To pay the plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees; and
5. To pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[6] (Words in bracket ours)
Thereafter, petitioner appealed the
case to the RTC which rendered a decision on February 4, 1998 affirming the
decision of the MeTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, except with the qualification that any demolition of the structures introduced by the defendant should be made only after the procedures mandated under Rule 39, Section 10(d)[7] is observed, the MTC Manila decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against defendant.[8]
Aggrieved with
the ruling of the RTC, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. On May 25, 2001, the CA promulgated its
assailed decision dismissing petitioner’s appeal and affirming the RTC
decision. The CA held:
Thus, the Court has ruled that lease agreements with no
specified period, but where monthly rentals are paid monthly are considered to
be on a month-to-month basis. They are for a definite period and expire at the
last day of any given thirty-day period, upon proper demand, and a notice by
the lessor to vacate.
In the
case at bar, it was found by the two lower courts that the lease over the
subject property was on a month-to-month basis, and there was a proper demand
to vacate the premises made by the respondent-appellee on petitioner-appellant.
Consequently, the verbal lease agreement entered into by the parties has been validly
terminated on April 11, 1996, when respondent-appellee gave a written demand on
the petitioner-appellant to pay his back rentals, and to vacate the premises.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent-appellee claims that from July 1995 up to the filing of the complaint, the petitioner-appellant has refused to heed the demand to settle his unpaid rentals and to vacate the leased premises. On the other hand, petitioner-appellant argues that the monthly rentals from July 1995 to January 1997 at P420 per month were paid in consignation case filed before Branch 3 of Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
When petitioner-appellant filed a consignation case, a fact was established that there was really an unpaid rental commencing from July 1995. A closer examination of the records reveals that the complaint for ejectment was filed on September 23, 1996, while the consignation case was commenced on May 15, 1997. Hence, when the petitioner-appellant paid the back rentals, the respondent-appellee had already filed the ejectment case. Case law is to the effect that the acceptance by the lessor of the payment by lessee of rentals in arrears does not constitute a waiver of the default of the payment of rentals as a valid cause of action for ejectment. xxx.[9]
Petitioner’s
subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated March 14, 2002. Hence, petitioner
filed the instant petition anchored on the following grounds:
A.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE ORDINANCE NO. 8020
ENACTED BY THE CITY OF MANILA ON MARCH 12, 2001 AUTHORIZING ACQUISITION OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY, FOR RESALE TO THE BONAFIDE TENANT THEREAT, UNDER THE
LAND-FOR-THE-LANDLESS PROGRAM OF THE CITY OF MANILA.
B.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER OR TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE
OF THE FACT THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS UNDER EXPROPRIATION BY THE CITY OF
MANILA AND THEREFORE PETITIONER BY FORCE OF P.D. NO. 1517 IS A BENEFICIARY OF
“NO EVICTION RULE” UNDER THE SAME.
C.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE RENT CONTROL LAW
(BP BLG. 877) INSOFAR AS ALLOWABLE INCREASE OF RENTAL OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
IS CONCERNED, I.E. FROM P480.00/PER MONTH TO P1,300.00/PER MONTH.
D.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO REVERSE THE ASSAILED DECISION
(ANNEX “A”) IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER.[10]
Petitioner
argues that the decision rendered by the MeTC of Manila, Branch 11, must be
voided on account of the approval of Ordinance No. 8020 by the City Council of
Manila on March 12, 2001 which authorized the acquisition of the subject
property for resale to qualified tenants under the land-for-the-landless
program of the City of Manila. He also
maintains that the property is within the area for Priority Development Zone
pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1517 (P.D. No. 1517) or the
Urban Land Reform Act. Petitioner claims
that he is qualified under the so called “no eviction rule” considering that he
has resided on the leased premises for more than ten (10) years already.
Likewise,
petitioner insists that the agreed monthly rental is not P1,300.00 but P420.00
only. According to petitioner, the
monthly rental had been increased from P420.00 to P1,300.00 which
was a clear violation of the allowable increase under Batas Pambansa Blg. 877
(B.P. Blg. 877) or the Rent Control Law.
Nevertheless, petitioner paid the said increase albeit under protest but
when respondent did not accept his payments, he was forced to file a
consignation case where the back rentals for the period July 1995-April 1996
had been deposited in court. These
payments were withdrawn by respondent from the court, thus, respondent no
longer had a cause of action against him.
In her Comment,[11]
respondent asserts that Ordinance No. 8020 does not apply in this case because
the said ordinance did not indicate that the subject property had been acquired
by the City of
Respondent also
avers in her Memorandum[12]
that she was able to prove that grounds exist for the ejectment of petitioner
when the latter failed to pay the rent for over three (3) months. She further asserts that her acceptance of
the rents paid by petitioner by way of consignation will not legitimize
petitioner’s unlawful possession of the premises.
As to
petitioner’s claim that he is entitled to the benefits of P.D. No. 1517,
respondent asseverates that under it, only legitimate tenants can take
advantage of its beneficent provisions.
By reason of petitioner’s failure to pay the rents, his possession
became unlawful and he could not be considered a bona fide tenant of the property.
We agree with
the findings of all the three (3) lower courts that the verbal lease agreement
between petitioner and respondent was on a monthly basis. It is settled that if the rent is paid
monthly, the lease is on a month-to-month basis and may be terminated at the
end of each month. Article 1687 of the
Civil Code is in point, thus:
Art.
1687. If the period for the lease has
not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed
upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if
the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid,
and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for
the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may
likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for
over six months. In case of daily rent,
the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the
place for over one month.
In the case at
bar, it is undisputed that the lease was verbal, that the period for the lease
had not been fixed, that the rentals were paid monthly, and that proper demand
and notice by the lessor to vacate were given. In the case of Acab v. Court of Appeals,[13]
this Court held:
…lease
agreements with no specified period, but in which rentals are paid monthly, are
considered to be on a month-to-month basis.
They are for a definite period and expire after the last day of any
given thirty-day period, upon proper demand and notice by the lessor to vacate.[14]
A lease on a
month-to-month basis provides for a definite period and may be terminated at
the end of any month, hence, by the failure of the lessees to pay the rents due
for a particular month, the lease contract is deemed terminated as of the end
of that month.[15] Applying this principle, the lease contract in
the instant case was deemed terminated at the end of the month when the
petitioner, as lessee, failed to pay the rents due.
B.P. Blg. 877[16]
was the rent control law in force at the time the
complaint for unlawful detainer was filed. Sec. 5 thereof allows for judicial ejectment
of a lessee on the following grounds:
Section
5. Grounds for Judicial Ejectment.
― Ejectment shall be allowed on the following grounds:
(b)
Arrears in payment of rent for a total of three (3) months: Provided, that in
case of refusal by the lessor to accept payment of the rental agreed upon, the
lessee may either deposit, by way of consignation, the amount in court, or with
the city or municipal treasurer, as the case may be, or in a bank in the name
of and with notice to the lessor, within one month after the refusal of the
lessor to accept payment.
The
lessee shall thereafter deposit the rental within ten days of every current
month. Failure to deposit rentals for
three months shall constitute a ground for ejectment. If an ejectment case is already pending, the
court upon proper motion may order the lessee or any person or persons claiming
under him to immediately vacate the leased premises without prejudice to the
continuation of the ejectment proceedings.
At any time, the lessor may, upon authority of the court, withdraw the
rentals deposited.
The
lessor, upon authority of the court in case of consignation and upon joint
affidavit by him and the lessee to be submitted to the city or municipal
treasurer and to the bank where deposit was made, shall be allowed to withdraw
the deposits.
xxx xxx xxx
(f)
Expiration of the period of the lease contract. No lessor or his successor-in-interest
shall be entitled to eject the lessee upon the ground that the leased premises
has been sold or mortgaged to a third person regardless of whether the lease or
mortgage is registered or not.
Clearly, grounds
for ejectment exist in this case and respondent could lawfully ask for
petitioner’s eviction from the premises. As already discussed, the month-to-month lease contract of the parties
expired when petitioner failed to pay the rentals and the lease was not renewed by respondent. Likewise, respondent sufficiently
proved that from July 1995 up to the filing of the complaint for ejectment,
petitioner has failed to pay his monthly rentals for over three (3) months and
even refused to settle his unpaid rentals and vacate the leased premises
despite demand to do so. The subsequent
payment by petitioner of his arrears by way of consignation and the acceptance
by respondent of said payments will not operate to bar the eviction of
petitioner. The evidence on record
reveals that the ejectment case was instituted on September 23, 1996 while the
petition for consignation was filed only on May 15, 1997 which means that when
petitioner paid the back rentals, respondent had already filed the ejectment
case. The subsequent acceptance by the
lessor of rental payments does not, absent any circumstance that may dictate a
contrary conclusion, legitimize the unlawful character of the possession.[17] Hence, the respondent acted well within her right to file a complaint for
unlawful detainer.
As to the petitioner’s
contention that the monthly rental is only P420.00 and not P1,300.00,
we quote with approval the ruling of the CA, thus:
We
have gone through the records and We have no reason to depart from the factual
finding of the RTC that the petitioner-appellant failed to show any receipt to
establish his claim that the monthly rental is only P420. The rule is well-settled that he who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. The Official Receipts No. 1698 and 1759 are
not competent proofs to show that the true rental is P420. Those receipts are for rentals paid for
December 1993 and February 1994. The
bone of contention here is the rental starting from July 1995. On the other hand, as shown by the records,
the respondent-appellee was able to establish that the agreed rental since
March 1995 is P1,300.[18]
Petitioner
having failed to prove his claim that the amount of rental starting July 1995
was just P420.00, the findings of the trial courts, as affirmed by the CA,
stand. Likewise, petitioner’s argument
that the increase in the monthly rental from P420.00 to P1,300.00
contravenes the allowable increase under B.P. Blg. 877,[19]
the following disquisition of the CA is relevant:
Further,
We cannot allow the petitioner-appellant to belatedly question the validity of
the increase of the rental and issue of payment under protest. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that
no new issues shall be raised for the first time on appeal.[20]
In the case of Ulep v. Court of Appeals,[21]
the Court made the following pronouncement:
Points
of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the
lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing
court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic considerations of fair play, justice and
due process underlie the rule. It would
be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present
evidence in contra to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware
of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.[22]
We cannot take
an opposite stance in the present case. The
issue of the validity of the alleged increase in rent was not a litigated issue
in the trial courts. To allow petitioner
to do so on appeal would be utterly unfair to respondent. The CA correctly opted
not to resolve the issue in its decision of May 25, 2001.
Moreover,
petitioner did not mention the supposed valid increase in rental authorized by
law, which he should have paid nor did he offer to pay or deposit the same
within the period of time mandated by law.
In the same
vein, the issues concerning petitioner’s entitlement to the benefits of
Ordinance No. 8020 were raised by petitioner only in
his motion for reconsideration of the CA decision, “the effect of which is as
if it was never duly raised in that court at all,”[23]
while the issue on the applicability of P.D. No. 1517 was only raised before
this Court. Nevertheless,
even if we delve into the merits of petitioner’s contentions on the matter, the
same must be rejected.
Petitioner
cannot capitalize on Ordinance No. 8020 passed by the City Council of Manila
which authorized the City to acquire the lot owned by the late spouses Aurelio
and Clara Restua for resale to its qualified and bona fide
tenants/occupants under the land-for-the-landless program of the City. It should be noted that the Ordinance was
approved and took effect only on March 12, 2001 or almost five (5) years after
the case for ejectment was filed by respondent on September 23, 1996. Basic is the rule that no statute, decree,
ordinance, rule or regulation (and even policies) shall be given retrospective
effect unless explicitly stated so.[24]
We find no provision in Ordinance No.
8020 which expressly gives it retroactive effect to those tenants with pending
ejectment cases against them. Rather, what the said Ordinance provides is that
it “shall take effect upon its approval,” which was on March 12, 2001.
Further,
no proof was presented which showed that the property being leased by
petitioner has been acquired by the City of
Petitioner also asserts that he cannot be evicted
from the premises pursuant to the so-called “no eviction rule” under Section 6
of P.D. No. 1517[25] which
reads:
Sec. 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas. —
Within the Urban Zones legitimate tenants who have resided on the land for ten
years or more who have built their homes on the land and residents who have
legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last ten years
shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first
refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time and at reasonable prices,
under terms and conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and
Land Management Committee created by Section 8 of this Decree.
To be
entitled to the benefits of P.D. No. 1517, a party must provide prima facie evidence of the following
facts: a) that the property being leased falls within an Area
for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zone; b) that the party is a tenant on said property as
defined under Section 3(f) of P.D. No. 1517; c) that the party built a house on
said property; and d) that the party has been residing on the property
continuously for the last ten (10) years or more, reckoned from 1968.[26]
While
there is no dispute that petitioner was able to establish the third and fourth
requisites, i.e., that he built a
house on said property and that he has been residing on the property
continuously for more than ten (10) years, no convincing evidence was offered
to prove the first and second requisites, i.e.,
that the
property being leased falls within an Area for Priority Development and Urban
Land Reform Zone and that he is a tenant
on said property as defined under Section 3(f) of said decree.
The case of Heirs
of Antonio Bobadilla v. Castillo[27]
declared as follows:
As the decree (P.D. No. 1517) is not
self-executing, Proclamation No. 1967 (issued on May 14, 1980) was issued
identifying 244 specific sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas for Priority
Development (APD) and Urban Land Reform Zones (ULRZ). It amended Proclamation No. 1893 (issued on
September 11, 1979) by expressly limiting the operation and narrowing the
coverage of PD No. 1517 from the entire Metropolitan Manila to the specific areas
declared as APD/ULRZ.[28]
Petitioner failed to show that
Likewise, petitioner could not be
considered a tenant as defined under Section 3(f) of P.D. No. 1517, thus:
(f) Tenant refers to the rightful occupant of
land and its structures, but does not include those whose presence on the land
is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who enter the
land by force or deceit, or those whose possession is under litigation.
Petitioner had a month-to-month lease contract with respondent, which
expired when he failed to pay the rentals. When petitioner opted
to stay after the expiration of the lease contract, he had become an unlawful
occupant of the place. Thus, he could not avail of the benefits of P.D. No.
1517, “because its intended beneficiaries are legitimate tenants, not usurpers
or occupants by tolerance.”[31] Besides, petitioner’s possession over the
property is obviously under litigation, thus, his insistence
that he was a “tenant” within the contemplation of P.D. No. 1517 was nothing
more than a ludicrous attempt to bring himself into the scope of the decree.
Another factor
which militates against petitioner’s claim is the fact that there is no
intention on the part of respondent to sell the property. P. D. No. 1517
applies where the owner of the property intends to sell it to a third party.[32] As alleged in her complaint, respondent
merely intended to use the leased premises for herself and her siblings. Petitioner, therefore, cannot invoke P.D. No.
1517 to abatement of the complaint for ejectment.
All told, petitioner failed to show why the
actions of the three courts which have passed upon the same issues should be
reversed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is
hereby DENIED. The assailed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 46910 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice Chairperson |
|
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
|
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona (ret.), with Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (ret.) and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (ret.), concurring; rollo, pp. 23-38.
[2] Id. at 37-38.
[3] Id. at 80-85.
[4] Id. at 39-41.
[5] Id. at 43-49.
[6]
[7] Section 10(d) of Rule 39 reads:
Sec. 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.
x x x x
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. — When the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
[8] Supra note 6 at 85.
[9] Id. at 31-32.
[10]
[11] Id. at 97-103.
[12] Id. at 124-136.
[13] G.R. No. 112285, February 21, 1995, 241 SCRA 546.
[14] Id. at 550-551.
[15] Arquelada v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 139137, March 31, 2000, 329 SCRA 536, 554-555.
[16] Approved on June 12, 1985.
[17] Tagbilaran Integrated Settlers Association (TISA) Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148562, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 193, 199.
[18] Rollo, p. 33.
[19] Sec. 1. Monthly Rentals and Maximum
Increases. – Beginning July 1, 1985 and for a duration of two and a half years
thereafter ending on December 31, 1987, monthly rentals of all residential
units not exceeding four hundred eighty (P480.00) pesos shall not be
increased by the lessor by more than the rates herein provided:
July 1, 1985 to December 31, 1985 10 percent
January 1, 1986 to December 31, 1986 20 percent
January 1, 1987 to December 31, 1987 20 percent
In Arquelada v. Philippine Veterans Bank (supra note 15), the Court held, “Initially, the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 877 was up to 31 December 1987 only. However, just like its predecessor, the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 877 was extended up to 31 December 1989 by Republic Act No. 664330 Subsequently, the legislature passed Republic Act No. 662831 and Republic Act No. 764432 which both extended the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 877 for another three (3) years. Finally, Republic Act No. 843733 gave another extension to the rent control period in B.P. Blg. 877 from 1 January 1998 up to 31 December 2001. Hence, presently, the controlling rental law for certain residential units is still B.P. Blg. 877.”
[20] Supra note 18.
[21] G.R. No. 125254, October 11, 2005, 472 SCRA 241.
[22]
[23] Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110015, July 11, 1995, 245 SCRA 715, 729.
[24] Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), G.R. No. 113420, March 7, 1997, 269 SCRA 316, 332-333.
[25] Issued on June 11, 1978.
[26] Fernando v. Lim, G.R. No. 176282, August 22, 2008.
[27] G.R. No. 165771, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 107.
[28]
[29] Memorandum for the Petitioner, rollo, p. 149.
[30] Alonzo
v.
[31] Delos Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127465, October 25, 2001, 368 SCRA 226, 229.
[32] Alcantara v. Reta, Jr., G.R. No. 136996, December 14, 2001, 372 SCRA 364, 370.