SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
|
ASSOCIATED BANK (now
UNITED OVERSEAS BANK [PHILS.]), Petitioner, - versus - SPOUSES RAFAEL and
MONALIZA PRONSTROLLER, Respondents. SPOUSES EDUARDO and MA.
PILAR VACA, Intervenors. |
G.R.
No. 148444
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, BRION,* NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ.** Promulgated: September
3, 2009 |
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RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
For resolution are the Motion for
Reconsideration[1] filed by
petitioner Associated Bank (now United Overseas Bank [Phils.]) and Motion for
Leave to Intervene[2] filed by
Spouses Eduardo and Ma. Pilar Vaca (spouses Vaca).
After
a thorough examination of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, together
with its voluminous attachments, it is readily apparent that no new issues are
raised and the arguments presented are a mere rehash of what have been
discussed in its pleadings, all of which have been considered and found unmeritorious
in the July 14, 2008 Decision.[3]
Be
that as it may, we would like to reiterate that the second letter-agreement
modified the first one entered into by petitioner, through Atty. Jose Soluta,
Jr. (Atty. Soluta). In previously allowing Atty. Soluta to enter into the first
letter-agreement without a board resolution expressly authorizing him,
petitioner had clothed him with apparent authority to modify the same via the second letter-agreement.[4]
As
early as June 1993, respondents already requested a modification of the earlier
agreement such that the full payment should be made upon receipt of this
Court’s decision confirming petitioner’s right to the subject property. Instead of acting on the request, the Board of
Directors deferred action on it. It was
only after one year and after the bank’s reorganization that the board rejected
respondents’ request. We cannot,
therefore, blame respondents for believing that the second letter-agreement
signed by Atty. Soluta was petitioner’s action on their request.[5]
We
also would like to stress that the first letter-agreement was not rescinded by
respondents’ failure to deposit in escrow their full payment simply because the
date of full payment had already been modified by the later agreement. Neither
was the second letter-agreement rescinded by respondents’ new offer because the
offer was made only to demonstrate their capacity to purchase the subject
property.[6]
In
our Decision, we affirmed the factual findings of the Court of Appeals (CA) because
they were amply supported by the evidence on record. Well-established is the rule that if there is
no showing of error in the appreciation of facts by the CA, this Court treats
them as conclusive. The conclusions of
law that the appellate court drew from those facts are likewise accurate and
convincing.[7]
Hence,
we deny with finality petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. No further pleadings will be entertained.
After
the promulgation of the July 14, 2008 Decision, spouses Vaca filed a Motion for
Leave to Intervene alleging that they are the registered owners of the subject
property and are thus real parties-in-interest.
They add that they stand to be deprived of their family home without
having been given their day in court.
They also contend that the Court should order petitioner to reimburse
the spouses Vaca the amount received from the latter.
The
Motion for Leave to Intervene must be denied.
Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court, provides:
SEC.
2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed at
any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the
original parties.[8]
Obviously,
the spouses Vaca’s motion for leave to intervene before this Court was belatedly
filed.
The
purpose of intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party
to protect his interest, and the court, incidentally, to settle all conflicting
claims.[9]
The spouses Vaca are not strangers to the action. Their legal interest in the litigation
springs from the sale of the subject property by petitioner in their favor
during the pendency of this case. As
transferee pendente lite, the spouses
Vaca are the successors-in-interest of the transferor, the petitioner, who is
already a party to the action. Thus, the
applicable provision is Section 19, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, governing
transfers of interest pendente lite. It provides:
SEC.
19. Transfer of interest. – In case of any transfer of interest, the
action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon
motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted
in the action or joined with the original party.
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[10] citing Santiago Land Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[11]
we have ruled that:
[A] transferee pendente lite of the property in
litigation does not have a right to intervene.
We held that a transferee stands exactly in the shoes of his
predecessor-in-interest, bound by the proceedings and judgment in the case
before the rights were assigned to him.
It is not legally tenable for a transferee pendente lite to still intervene.
Essentially, the law already considers the transferee joined or
substituted in the pending action, commencing at the exact moment when the
transfer of interest is perfected between the original party-transferor and the
transferee pendente lite.[12]
That the Certificate of Title covering the subject property
is in the name of the spouses Vaca is of no moment. It is noteworthy that a notice of lis pendens was timely annotated on
petitioner’s title. This was done prior to the sale of the property to the
spouses Vaca, the cancellation of petitioner’s title, and the issuance of the new
Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the spouses. By virtue of the
notice of lis pendens, the spouses
Vaca are bound by the outcome of the litigation subject of the lis pendens. Their interest is subject to the incidents or
results of the pending suit, and their Certificate of Title will afford them no
special protection.[13]
Lastly, the spouses Vaca’s claim for reimbursement, if any,
must be ventilated in a separate action against petitioner. To allow the
intervention would unduly delay and prejudice the rights especially of
respondents who have been deprived of the subject property for so long.
IN LIGHT OF THE
FOREGOING, we deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and the Spouses
Vaca’s Motion for Intervention.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* In lieu of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (retired) per Raffle dated March 25, 2009.
** In lieu of Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (retired ) per Raffle dated August 3, 2009.
[1] Rollo, pp. 1316-1340.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Heirs of Pael v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 67, 70 (2001).
[8] Emphasis supplied.
[9] Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 1, 27 (2002);
[10] Supra.
[11] Supra note 9.
[12] Citations omitted.
[13] Seveses v. Court of Appeals, 375 Phil. 64, 71 (1999).