THIRD DIVISION
|
CITY GOVERNMENT OF
TAGAYTAY, Petitioner, - versus - HON. ELEUTERIO F.
GUERRERO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay, Branch
XVIII; TAGAYTAY-TAAL TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; PROVINCE OF BATANGAS;
MUNICIPALITY OF LAUREL, BATANGAS; and MUNICIPALITY OF TALISAY, BATANGAS, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - x AMEURFINA MELENCIO-HERRERA
and EMILINA MELENCIO-FERNANDO, Petitioners, - versus - HON. ELEUTERIO F.
GUERRERO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch XVIII;
TAGAYTAY-TAAL TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; PROVINCE OF BATANGAS;
MUNICIPALITY OF LAUREL, BATANGAS; MUNICIPALITY OF TALISAY, BATANGAS; and CITY
OF TAGAYTAY, Respondents. |
G.R.
Nos. 140743 & 140745
G.R.
Nos. 141451-52
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: September
17, 2009 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before
the Court are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision[1]
dated June 19, 1998 and the Resolution[2]
dated November 11, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 39008
and 38298.
The Facts
Tagaytay-Taal
Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner of two (2)
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9816[3]
and T-9817[4] of
the Registry of Deeds of
On
November 28, 1983, for failure of TTTDC to settle its delinquent real estate
tax obligations, the City Government of Tagaytay (City of
On
July 14, 1989, the City of
WHEREFORE,
finding the petition to be meritorious and sufficiently sustained with
preponderant, legal and factual basis, this Court hereby gives its imprimatur
to it and grants the same, dismissing in the process, the Opposition filed by
Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City is hereby ordered to
allow the City to consolidate the titles covering the properties in question
(TCT Nos. T-9816 and T-9817), by issuing in its favor, and under its name, new
Transfer Certificates of Titles and canceling as basis thereof, the said TCT
Nos. 9816 and 9817 in the name of Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development
Corporation, all of which, being hereby declared null and void, henceforth.
SO
ORDERED.[8]
In
granting the petition for entry of new certificates of title in favor of the
City of P3,307,799.00. Accordingly, TTTDC’s failure to exercise its right
of redemption by way of paying its delinquent real estate taxes and charges
called for the application of Section 75[9] of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree.[10] TTTDC
appealed to the CA. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 24933, entitled “City of Tagaytay v. Tagaytay-Taal Tourist
Development Corporation.”
On
June 29, 1990, Atty. Donato T. Faylona, acting as agent of Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera and Emilina Melencio-Fernando (Melencios), purchased the
subject properties pursuant to Section 81[11]
in relation to Section 78[12] of
P.D. No. 464.[13] The
Melencios bought the subject properties for Three Million Five Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P3,550,000.00) representing the total amount of taxes and
penalties due on the same.[14]
Meanwhile,
on July 21, 1991, during the pendency of CA-G.R. CV No. 24933, TTTDC filed a
petition for nullification of the public auction involving the disputed
properties on the ground that the properties were not within the jurisdiction
of the City of Tagaytay and, thus, beyond its taxing authority.[15]
The case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1196 before the RTC of Cavite, Branch
XVIII,
Despite
the fact that the Melencios had already purchased the subject properties, they
were not impleaded in Civil Case No. TG-1196.
Thus, on June 23, 1994, they filed a Motion to Intervene.[19]
On October 5, 1994, the RTC issued an Order[20]
denying the motion. The pertinent portions of the Order read:
This Court could clearly discern from the
records that on July 13, 1994, this Court, after the parties to the case at bar
have concluded the presentation of their respective evidences (sic), issued an
Order giving the parties thirty (30) days within which to file their respective
memoranda simultaneously and thereafter the instant case is considered
submitted for decision. It is equally
observed by the Court that although the motion to intervene was filed by the
movants on July 1, 1994, the latter had set the same motion for the
consideration of this Court on July 15, 1994 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning or
two (2) days after the trial in this case was concluded. Thus, while this Court is inclined to agree
with movants’ postulation that they have a legal interest in the case at bar
being the purchasers of the parcels of land involved in the instant
controversy, it however believes and so holds that it is legally precluded from
granting the motion to intervene on account of the provisions of Section 2,
Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court which is quoted hereinunder as follows:
“SEC. 2. Intervention. – A person may, before or during a trial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by the distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an official thereof.”
It is quite evident that the movants have filed their motion to intervene beyond the period mentioned in the above-quoted rule as it was repeatedly held by jurisprudence that “the authority of the court to permit a person to intervene is delimited by the provisions of Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court – ‘before or during trial.’” “And, trial is here used in a restricted sense and refers to ‘the period for the introduction of evidence by both parties.’” (Pacusa v. Del Rosario, L-26353, July 29, 1968; 24 SCRA 125, 129-130; Bool v. Mendoza, 92 Phil. 892, 895; Trazo v. Manila Pencil Co., 1 SCRA 403, 405).
Surprisingly,
even with the denial of the motion, the Melencios did not further pursue their
cause. This was allegedly due to the
assurances of the City of
On
November 11, 1991, the CA, in CA-G.R. No. 24933, affirmed the decision of the
trial court in the unnumbered petition. The case was elevated to the Supreme
Court via a petition for review on certiorari and was docketed as G.R. No.
106812.[22]
The case was entitled “Tagaytay-Taal
Tourist Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals (Special Ninth Division)
and The City of
During
the pendency of the proceedings in G.R. No. 106812, on October 21, 1994, the
RTC rendered a Decision[23]
in Civil Case No. TG-1196 wherein the trial court directed the annulment of the
public sale of the contested properties. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered granting the instant petition and as a consequence, the public auction
sale of the properties of the petitioner, both covered by TCT Nos. T-9816 and
T-9817 of the Registry of Deeds of Tagaytay City, as well as the Certificate of
Sale and the Final Bill of Sale of said properties in favor of the respondent
City of Tagaytay City (sic), and all proceedings held in connection therewith
are hereby annulled and set aside, and the respondent Register of Deeds of the
City of Tagaytay is hereby directed to cancel Entries Nos. 21951/T-9816 and 36984/T9816
annotated and appearing on TCT No. T-9816 and Entries Nos. 21950/T-9817 and
30087/T-9817 annotated and appearing on TCT No. T-9817 regarding the sale of
the lots described therein in favor of the City of
Moreover, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on September 24 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.[24]
The
City of
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Court finds no cogent grounds (sic) for a grant of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent City of Tagaytay and considering that the same motion failed to comply with the requirements imposed by Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court hereby directs that the said motion be stricken from the records and the Acting Clerk of this Court is directed to enter the Decision dated October 21, 1994 as required under Section 2, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.[26]
On
November 9, 1994, the RTC Decision dated October 21, 1994 in Civil Case No.
TG-1196 became final and executory. On March 24, 1995, the Decision was entered
in the Book of Entries of Judgments.[27]
On
August 31, 1995, the Melencios filed before the CA a petition for annulment of
judgment of the RTC Decision in Civil Case No. TG-1196. The case was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 38298, entitled “Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera and Emilina Melencio-Fernando v. Hon. Eleuterio F. Guerrero,
Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation, the
On
November 15, 1995, City of
CA-G.R.
SP Nos. 38298 and 39008 were eventually consolidated.
In
the interregnum, on June 10, 1997, the Supreme Court rendered a Decision[32]
in G.R. No. 106812, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on November 11, 1991 and its resolution
of August 24, 1992, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite
dated December 5, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Petition
for Entry of New Certificates of Title" of respondent City of
SO ORDERED.[33]
In
denying the petition, the Court ratiocinated, thus:
The Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
sitting as a land registration or cadastral court, could not have ordered the
issuance of new certificates of title over the properties in the name of
respondent City if the delinquency sale was invalid because said properties are
actually located in the
x x x x
The Regional Trial Court of Cavite in Civil Case No. TG-1196 rendered a decision on October 21, 1994 ruling that the properties in question are actually situated in Talisay, Batangas, hence, the assessment of real estate taxes thereon by respondent City and the auction sale of the properties on November 28, 1983, as well as the Certificate of Sale and Final Bill of Sale in favor of respondent City are null and void. We quote with favor portions of said decision:
As earlier stated herein, the
portion of Barrio of Birinayan, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Batangas,
by virtue of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 338 corresponds to Exhibit “1-B”
of the Plan of Mendez-Nuñez marked as Exhibit “1,” and it is noted that Exhibit
“1-B” or that portion of the Municipality of Talisay, Province of Batangas
given to the respondent City under Commonwealth Act No. 338 is located below
the Tagaytay Ridge which was the boundary between the Provinces of Cavite and
Batangas before the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 338. Thus, taking into
account the above-quoted portion of the explanatory note of Republic Act No.
1418, there can be no doubt that what had been ordered returned by the law to
the Municipality of Talisay, Province of Batangas does not extend only to the
portion annexed to the respondent City by virtue of Executive Order No. 336 but
also the portion mentioned under Commonwealth Act No. 338. Besides, the same
explanatory note mentions specifically the return of the two (2) barrios of
Talisay, Batangas, and not merely portions thereof, hence the conclusion is
inescapable that Republic Act No. 1418 intended the return of the entire
barrios of
It is beyond [any] doubt, therefore, that Lots 10-A and 10-B of TCT Nos. T-9816 and T-9817 of petitioner, which are located in Barrio Birinayan, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Batangas, at the time Republic Act No. 1418 took effect, are no longer within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent City of Tagaytay and since there is no dispute that under the law, the City of Tagaytay may only subject to the payment of real estate tax properties that are situated within its territorial boundaries (See Sections 27 & 30, Commonwealth Act No. 338; Presidential Decree No. 464; and 1991 Local Government Code), the assessment of real estate taxes imposed by the respondent City on the same properties in the years 1976 up to 1983 appears to be legally unwarranted. In the same manner, the public auction sale, which was conducted by the same respondent on November 28, 1989, for deficiencies on the part of the petitioner to pay real estate taxes on the same years, as well as the certificates of sale and the final bills issued and executed in connection with such auction sale, and all proceedings taken by the respondent City in connection therewith are all considered by this Court as illegal, and null and void.
In fine, this Court finds from the evidence adduced on record that petitioner has preponderantly established its entitlement to the reliefs mentioned in its petition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered granting the instant petition and as a consequence, the public auction
sale of the properties of the petitioner, both covered by TCT Nos. T-9816 and
T-9817 of the Registry of Deeds of Tagaytay City, as well as the Certificates
of Sale and the Final Bills of Sale of said properties in favor of the
respondent Tagaytay City, and all proceedings held in connection therewith are
hereby annulled and set aside, and the respondent Register of Deeds of the City
of Tagaytay is hereby directed to cancel Entries Nos. 21951/T-9816,
21984/T-9816 annotated and appearing on TCT No. T-9816 and Entries Nos.
21950/T-98917 and 30087/T-9817 annotated and appearing on TCT No. T-9817
regarding the sale of the lots described therein in favor of the City of
The above-cited decision has not been appealed and is now final and executory.[34]
The Supreme Court decision in G.R. No. 108612 is already
final and executory.
On
June 19, 1998, the CA rendered a Decision[35] dismissing
the consolidated petitions for annulment of judgment of the RTC Decision in
Civil Case No. TG-1196.
Both
the City of
Hence,
the instant consolidated petitions.
The Issues
In
G.R. Nos. 140743 and 140745,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE ON THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION AND TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGAYTAY CITY HAS NO JURISDICTION TO RENDER ITS OCTOBER 21, 1994 DECISION BECAUSE:
A] THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT HAS NO ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER A BOUNDARY DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO
PROVINCES (
B] THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE FOR FAILURE OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF DEPOSITING/PAYING
TO THE COURT THE AMOUNT EQUIVALENT TO THE TAX
C] THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO CHANGE/AMEND THE EXISTING TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.[37]
In
G.R. Nos. 141451-52, the Melencios assign the following errors, viz.:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT FOR EXTRINSIC FRAUD TO JUSTIFY AND/OR WARRANT THE NULLIFICATION OF THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, THE SAME MUST BE COMMITTED BY THE “PREVAILING PARTY.”
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT PETITIONERS HAVE VESTED RIGHTS OVER THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO ANNUL THE JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONERS WERE NOT IMPLEADED IN THE CASE DESPITE BEING INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE FOLLOWING JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES:
(1) SECTION 83 OF PD 464;
(2) THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
(3) THE DOCTRINE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING;
(4) DOCTRINE OF LITIS PENDENTIA; AND
(5) THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE OF CO-EQUAL BODY
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT
The errors assigned by petitioners may be distilled into
two major issues: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to settle the alleged
boundary dispute; and (2) whether the City of
The Ruling of the Court
The consolidated petitions are an offshoot of the petitions for annulment of judgment
of the RTC Decision in Civil Case No. TG-1196 filed by the City of
Annulment
of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a recourse equitable in
character and allowed only in exceptional cases where the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of petitioner.[39] Section
2 of the said Rule provides that the annulment may be based only on the grounds
of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, although jurisprudence recognizes
denial of due process as an additional ground.[40]
Petitioners
aver that the instant case involves a boundary dispute and, thus, the RTC had
no jurisdiction to decide the matter. They maintain that the basic issue
resolved by the RTC was the location of the properties, whether in the City of
Tagaytay or in the
SECTION 118.
Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute. — Boundary
disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible,
be settled amicably. To this end:
(a) Boundary
disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality
shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan concerned.
(b) Boundary
disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province
shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
(c) Boundary
disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces
shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the province
concerned.
(d) Boundary
disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a
highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities,
shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the
parties.
(e) In the
event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60)
days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a
certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried
by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days
from the date of the certification referred to above.
SECTION 119.
Appeal. — Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any
party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper
Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional
Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing
thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute
shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes.
They further claimed that the RTC had
no jurisdiction to repeal by
The
subject properties, covered by TCT Nos. 9816 and 9817, are more particularly
described as follows:
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION
TCT No. T-9816
CITY
OF
A parcel of land (Lot 10-A of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-229279, being a portion of Lot 10, Psu-82838, Amd. 4 LRC Record No. 49057), situated in the Barrio of Birinayan, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Batangas, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NW., and NE., points 7 to 1, and 1 to 2 by Lot 10-B; on the SE., points 3 to 4, by Lot 10-C both of the subdivision plan; and on the SW., points 4 to 7, by property of Agapito Rodriguez x x x containing an area of SEVENTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY (74,340) SQUARE METERS, more or less x x x.[42]
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION
TCT No. T-9817
CITY
OF
A parcel of land (Lot 10-B, of the
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-229279, being a portion of
Based
on the decision of the Court in G.R. No. 106812 and the findings of fact of the
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, the subject properties that are situated in Barrio
Birinayan,
Under
Commonwealth Act No. 338, Barrio Birinayan was annexed to the City of
SECTION 1. The former barrios of
SECTION 2. The portion of Executive Order numbered three hundred and
thirty-six, dated April first, nineteen hundred and forty-one, relating to the
transfer of the said barrios of
On
June 21, 1969, by virtue of R.A. No. 5689,[45] Barrio
Birinayan became part of the
SECTION 1. Barrios Bayuyungan, Ticub, Balakilong, Bugaan, Borinayan, As-is, San Gabriel, and Buso-buso in the Municipality of Talisay, Province of Batangas, are separated from said municipality and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality to be known as the Municipality of Laurel, same province. The seat of government of the new municipality shall be in the present site of Barrio Bayuyungan.
Central
to the resolution of this dispute is the proper interpretation of Section 1 of
R.A. No. 1418.
A
statute is not subject to interpretation or construction as a matter of course. It is only when the language of the statute
is ambiguous when taken in relation to a set of facts, or reasonable minds
disagree as to its meaning, that interpretation or construction becomes
necessary. Where the terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous, no
interpretation is called for, and the law is applied as written, for
application is the first duty of the court, and interpretation is needed only
where literal application is impossible or inadequate.[46]
Every
statute is understood to contain, by implication, if not by its express terms,
all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose,
or to make effective the rights, powers, privileges, or jurisdiction which it
grants, and also all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly
and logically inferred from its terms.[47]
There
is no boundary dispute in the case at bar. The RTC did not amend the existing
territorial limits of the City of
The
City of
Petitioners
also claim that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was
violated when the RTC took cognizance of the case for the annulment of the
auction sale. They aver that the jurisdiction of the RTC is only appellate in
view of Section 119 of R.A. No. 7160. However, as already explained, the
instant case does not involve a boundary dispute. As such, there is no room for
the application of Section 119.
Petitioners
likewise make reference to Section 83 of P.D. No. 464 to assail the
jurisdiction of the RTC in entertaining the petition for the annulment of the
auction sale of the contested properties. They aver that compliance with
Section 83 of P.D. No. 464 is a jurisdictional requirement that must be
complied with before a court may take cognizance of a case assailing the
validity of a tax sale of real estate. The said Section reads:
Section 83. Suits assailing validity of tax sale. No court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax sale of real estate under this Chapter until the taxpayer shall have paid into court the amount for which the real property was sold, together with interests of twenty per centum per annum upon that sum from the date of sale to the time of instituting suit. The money so paid into court shall belong to the purchaser at the tax sale if the deed is declared invalid, but shall be returned to the depositor if the action fails.
However, this provision may only be
used in a voidable tax sale. When the sale is void because the property
subjected to real estate tax is not situated within the jurisdiction of the taxing
authority, the provision cannot be invoked. In this case, there is already a
final and executory decision by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 106812 that the
properties are situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the City of
The
other arguments of petitioners, i.e.,
violation of the doctrine of non-forum shopping, violation of the doctrine of litis pendentia and the doctrine of
non-interference of a co-equal body, must likewise be struck down. These issues
were already addressed by the Court, through the ponencia of Justice Kapunan, in G.R. No. 106812, viz.:
The issues raised before the RTC sitting as a land registration or cadastral court, without question, involved substantial or controversial matters and, consequently, beyond said court's jurisdiction. The issues may be resolved only by a court of general jurisdiction.
In Re: Balanga v. Court of Appeals, we emphatically held:
x x x. While it is true that Section 78 of Act. 496 on which the petition is based provides that upon the failure of the judgment-debtor to redeem the property sold at public auction the purchaser of the land may be granted a new certificate of title, the exercise of such function is qualified by the provision that “at any time prior to the entry of a new certificate the registered owner may pursue all his lawful remedies to impeach or annul proceedings under executions or to enforce liens of any description.” The right, therefore, to petition for a new certificate under said section is not absolute but subject to the determination of any objection that may be interposed relative to the validity of the proceedings leading to the transfer of the land subject thereof which should be threshed out in a separate appropriate action. This is the situation that obtains herein. Teopista Balanga, the judgment-debtor, is trying to impeach or annul the execution and sale of the properties in question by alleging that they are conjugal in nature and the house erected on the land has been constituted as a family home which under the law is exempt from execution. These questions should first be determined by the court in an ordinary action before entry of a new certificate may be decreed.
This pronouncement is also in line with the interpretation we have placed on Section 112 of the same Act to the effect that although cadastral courts are empowered to order the cancellation of a certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in favor of the purchaser of the land covered by it, such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or no serious objection is interposed by a party in interest. As this Court has aptly said: “While this section, (112) among other things, authorizes a person in interest to ask the court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title x x x and apparently the petition comes under its scope, such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs” (Angeles v. Razon, G.R. No. L-13679, October 26, 1959, and cases cited therein). x x x.
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that petitions under Section 75 and Section 108 of P.D. 1529 (formerly Sec. 78 and Sec. 112 of Act 496) can be taken cognizance of by the RTC sitting as a land registration or cadastral court. Relief under said sections can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or that there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs.[48]
The
foregoing ponencia is now the controlling
precedent on the matters being raised anew by petitioners. We can no longer
digress from such ruling. The determination of the questions of fact and of law by this Court in
G.R. No. 106812 already attained finality, and may not now be disputed or
relitigated by a reopening of the same questions in a subsequent litigation
between the same parties and their privies over the same subject matter.
Furthermore,
Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court en
banc or its Divisions may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting
en banc. Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy, judicial time,
and interests of litigants, as well as the peace and order of society, all
require that stability be accorded the solemn and final judgments of the courts
or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. There can be no question that such
reasons apply with greater force to final judgments of the highest Court of the
land.[49]
II. On Extrinsic Fraud
Fraud
is of two categories. It may either be:
(a) actual or constructive and (b) extrinsic or intrinsic.
Actual
or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of
the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is
construed as such because of its detrimental effect upon public interest and
public or private confidence, even though the act is not done with an actual
design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.[50]
On
the other hand, fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. There is intrinsic
fraud where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original
action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been
litigated therein. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where the act prevents a
party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or
where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the
manner in which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the
controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the
transaction sued upon.[51]
In
this case, the Melencios allege extrinsic fraud on the part of
Extrinsic
fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation
which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful
party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent. The fraud or deceit cannot be of the losing
party's own doing, nor must such party contribute to it. The extrinsic fraud
must be employed against it by the adverse party, who, because of some trick,
artifice, or device, naturally prevails in the suit.[52] It
affects not the judgment itself but the manner in which the said judgment is
obtained.[53]
Extrinsic
fraud is also present where the unsuccessful party has been prevented by his
opponent from exhibiting fully his case by keeping the former away from court
or giving him a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had
knowledge of the suit, having been kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumed to
represent a party and connived at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed
corruptly sold out his client's interest to the other side. The overriding
consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court.[54]
In
the instant case, we find that the action or inaction of the City of
The
alleged assurances and representations of certain officials of the City of
Tagaytay that they would file the necessary motion for reconsideration or
appeal in case of an unfavorable decision in Civil Case No. TG-1196 was not an
impediment to the Melencios protecting their rights over the disputed
properties. There is no allegation that the City of
The
foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we reiterate our finding that the City
of Tagaytay acted in bad faith when it levied real estate taxes on the subject
properties, and should be held accountable for all the consequences thereof,
including the void sale of the properties to the Melencios.
The
City of
Under
the doctrine of respondeat superior,
the principal is liable for the negligence of its agents acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks.[55] The City of
Negligence
is the failure to observe protection of the interests of another person, that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.[56] Thus,
negligence is the want of care required under circumstances.[57]
In
this case, it is basic that before the City of
Accordingly,
the City of
The
gross negligence of the City of Tagaytay in levying taxes and auctioning properties to answer for real property tax deficiencies
outside its territorial jurisdiction amounts to bad faith that calls for the
award of moral damages. Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for
any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar
injuries unjustly caused. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
amount must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering
inflicted.[59]
Moral
damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering the person has
undergone, by reason of defendant's culpable action. The award is aimed at
restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante.
Thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since each case must
be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule
in determining the proper amount.[60]
The
social standing of the aggrieved party is essential to the determination of the
proper amount of the award. Otherwise, the goal of enabling him to obtain
means, diversions, or amusements to restore him to the status quo ante
would not be achieved.[61]
The
Melencios are likewise entitled to exemplary damages. Exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages.[62]
Article 2229 of the Civil Code grants the award of exemplary or corrective
damages in order to deter the commission of similar acts in the future and to
allow the courts to mould behavior that can have grave and deleterious
consequences to society.[63]
In the instant case, the gross negligence of the City of
WHEREFORE, in lieu of the foregoing, the
Decision dated June 19, 1998 and the Resolution dated November 11, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 39008 and 38298 are hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS:
(1)
The City of Tagaytay is hereby ORDERED to return to petitioners
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera and Emilina Melencio-Fernando the total amount that
they have paid in connection with the auction sale of the lands covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 9816 and 9817, plus interest on the said
amount at six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. TG-1196. A twelve percent (12%) interest per annum, in
lieu of the six percent (6%), shall be imposed on such amount upon finality of
this decision until the full payment thereof;
(2) The City of
Tagaytay is hereby ORDERED to pay
petitioners Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera and Emilina Melencio-Fernando moral
damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00);
(3) The City of
Tagaytay is hereby ORDERED to pay
petitioners Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera and Emilina Melencio-Fernando exemplary
damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); and
(4) To pay the
costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas, with Associate Justices Ma. Alicia Austria- Martinez (a retired member of this Court) and Artemio G. Tuquero, concurring; rollo (G.R. Nos. 140743 and 140745), pp. 33-56.
[2]
[3] CA
rollo, p. 51.
[4]
[5] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 140743 and 140745), p. 66.
[6]
[7] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 141451-52), pp. 88-90.
[8]
[9] P.D.
1529, Sec. 75:
SEC. 75. Application for new certificate upon expiration of redemption period. —
Upon the expiration of the time, if any, allowed by law for redemption after
registered land has been sold on execution taken or sold for the enforcement of
a lien of any description, except a mortgage lien, the purchaser at such sale
or anyone claiming under him may petition the court for the entry of a new
certificate of title to him.
Before the entry of a new
certificate of title, the registered owner may pursue all legal and equitable
remedies to impeach or annul such proceedings.
[10] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 141451-52), p. 89.
[11] P.D. 464, Sec. 81:
SECTION 81. Disposition
of real property acquired by province or city. — The provincial or city
treasurer shall have charge of the delinquent real property acquired by the
province or city under the provisions of Section seventy-five during which time
the delinquent taxpayer shall have possession and usufruct of such property in
accordance with Section seventy-nine hereof. Said treasurer shall take steps
within one year from the date of issuance of final bill of sale to dispose of
the delinquent real property at public auction; but at any time before the
auction sale, any person in his own right may repurchase such property by
paying the total amount of the taxes and penalties due up to the time of
repurchase, the costs of sale, and other legitimate expenses incurred by the
province or city with respect to the property, and an additional penalty of
twenty per cent on the purchase price: Provided, however, That the right of the
delinquent taxpayer or his representative or any person holding lien or claim
over the property to further redeem said property within one year from the date
of acquisition by the province or city, in the manner provided in Section
seventy- eight hereof; and, Provided, further That if the treasurer has entered
into a contract for the lease of the property in the meantime, any repurchase
made hereunder shall be subject to such contract.
[12] P.D. 464, Sec. 78:
SECTION 78. Redemption
of real property after sale. — Within the term of one year from the date of
the registration of sale of the property, the delinquent taxpayer or his
representative, or in his absence, any person holding a lien or claim over the
property, shall have the right to redeem the same by paying the provincial or
city treasurer or his deputy the total amount of taxes and penalties due up to
the date of redemption, the costs of sale and the interest at the rate of
twenty per centum on the purchase price, and such payment shall invalidate the
sale certificate issued to the purchaser and shall entitle the person making
the same to a certificate from the provincial or city treasurer or his deputy,
stating that he had redeemed the property.
The provincial or city treasurer
or his deputy shall, upon surrender by the purchaser of the certificate of sale
previously issued to him, forthwith return to the latter the entire purchase
price paid by him plus the interest at twenty per centum per annum herein
provided for, the portion of the cost of the sale and other legitimate expenses
incurred by him, and said property shall thereafter be free from the lien of
said taxes and penalties.
[13] Republic
Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) repealed P.D. No. 464 (The Real
Property Tax Code); rollo (G.R. Nos.
140743 and 140745), p. 36; rollo (G.R.
Nos. 141451-52), p. 495.
[14] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 141451-52), p. 496.
[15] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 140743 and 140745), p. 37.
[16]
[17] Commonwealth Act No. 338.
[18] In
Civil Case No. TG-1196,
[19] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 38298), pp. 376-379.
[20]
[21] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 140743 and 140745), p. 37.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] CA rollo (CA G.R. SP No. 38298), pp. 3-28.
[29]
[30] CA rollo (CA G.R. SP No. 39008), pp. 1-29.
[31]
[32] Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106812, June 10, 1997, 273 SCRA 182.
[33]
[34]
[35] Supra note 1.
[36] Supra note 2.
[37] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 140743 and 140745), p. 17.
[38] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 141451-52), p. 501.
[39] RULES OF COURT, Rule 47, Sec. 1.
[40] Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank,
G.R. No. 161417, February 8, 2007, 515
SCRA 106; Intestate Estate of the Late
Nimfa Sian v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 168882, January 31, 2007,
513 SCRA 662; Arcelona v. Court of
Appeals, 345 Phil. 250 (1997).
[41] Charter of the City of
[42] CA rollo (CA G.R. SP No. 38298), pp. 362-363.
[43]
[44] AN
ACT TO TRANSFER TO THE MUNICIPALITY OF TALISAY, PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, ITS
FORMER BARRIOS OF CALOOCAN AND BIRINAYAN WHICH WERE ANNEXED TO THE CITY OF
TAGAYTAY.
[45] AN
ACT CREATING THE
[46] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Limpan Investment Corp., et al., 145 Phil. 191 (1970).
[47] Department of Agrarian Reform v. Philippine Communications Satellite Corp., G.R. No. 152640, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 729; Go Chioco v. Martinez, 45 Phil. 256 (1923).
[48] Tagaytay-
[49] Lee Bun Ting v. Judge Aligaen, 167 Phil. 164 (1977).
[50] Cal, Jr. v. Zosa, G.R. No. 152518, July
31, 2006, 497 SCRA 291.
[51]
[52] Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
157194, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 452.
[53] People v. Bitanga, G.R. No. 159222, June
26, 2007, 525 SCRA 623.
[54] Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank,
supra note 40.
[55] City
of
[56] Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-73998, November 14, 1988, 167 SCRA 363.
[57] Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company, No. L-21291, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 674.
[58] The foregoing disposition on the interest
rate on the amount of liability of the City of
I. When an obligation, regardless of
its source, i.e., law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be
held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on
"Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of
recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award
of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of
interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached,
and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be
that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due
shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In
the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article
1169[58] of
the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not
constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the
rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only from the date of the judgment of the court is
made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest
shall, in any case, be on the amount of finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
[59] Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 99301 and 99343, March 13, 1997, 269 SCRA 433, 451.
[60]
[61] Samson, Jr. v. Bank of the Philippine
[62] CIVIL CODE, Art. 2229.
[63] People of the