Republic of the
Supreme Court
GEORGE P.
MERCADO (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS WIFE, REBECCA ROYO-MERCADO, AND CHILDREN, NAMELY,
REBECCA GAY, KRISTINA EVITA, CRIS OLIVER AND MARIAN RICA, ALL SURNAMED MERCADO),
Complainants,
-
versus - HON. ERASTO D. SALCEDO, (Ret.) PRESIDING
JUDGE, Respondent. x-----------------------------------------x |
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1781 |
|
|
STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, Complainant, - versus - HON. ERASTO D. SALCEDO, (Ret.) PRESIDING
JUDGE, Respondent. |
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1782
Present:
|
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
D E C I S I O N
PER
CURIAM:
These
are consolidated administrative cases filed against Judge Erasto D. Salcedo (respondent judge), Regional Trial Court,
Branch 31,
Administrative
Matter No. RTJ-03-1781
In a series
of letters-complaints dated
In the letter dated
On
(1) Mishandling of, or rendering a false report to the
Supreme Court on, his investigation of Judge Agayan;
(2) Grave misconduct and impropriety in possessing and
using a stolen Pajero vehicle with knowledge, actually and constructively, that
it was a subject of an Anti-Fencing Law case, docketed as Criminal Case No.
11728, which he had earlier dismissed; and
(3) Serious irregularities, dishonesty or grave
misconduct relating to the handling and improper execution of the final
decision in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99, entitled Soriano Fruits Corporation and Others versus Department of Agrarian
Reform and/or Land Bank of the Philippines, where the respondent judge
modified the final judgment on the amount of just compensation from which the
respondent judge benefited in the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00).
The letter-complaint
dated
Finally,
the letter-complaint
dated
The Office
of the Chief Justice referred the letters-complaints dated
The
respondent judge duly filed his Comment (dated
Re: Investigation of Judge Napy Agayan.
Judge Salcedo contends
that he has already submitted his recommendation to this Office and Mr.
Mercado, through his complaint, would like to interfere and dictate what his
recommendation would be. x x x
Re: Stolen Pajero found in his possession.
Judge Salcedo contends that Criminal Case No. 11728 against Leopoldo
Gonzaga was dismissed in 1999 on motion of the prosecution because during the
reinvestigation, the witness of the prosecution did not appear. He adds that
from this dismissal the Traffic Management Group did not file any motion for
reconsideration. Worse, the TMG authorized the change of color of the vehicle
and allowed the buyer to use it for years.
Judge Salcedo avers that in June 2001, the owner lent him the vehicle and
he did not know that it was the same vehicle subject of Criminal Case No.
11728, otherwise, he would not have used it for reason of delicadeza. According to him, there was no way of identifying the
vehicle because the TMG authorized the change of color. The vehicle was green
during the pendency of the criminal case while it was dirty white.
Re: Irregularities in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99.
Judge
Salcedo claims that he was designated as Acting Presiding Judge of the P3,000,000.00 for which he was able to construct
a house in Tagum City, Judge Salcedo contends that the said house was
constructed through a bank loan and the proceeds from the sale of a prime lot
in Cagayan de Oro City.[10]
The
complainant filed a Reply dated
The
complainant also pointed out that two (2) checks for P800,000.00 were
drawn from the payments made by Land Bank in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to
51-99. The proceeds of one of these
checks were given to the wife of the respondent judge.
Administrative
Case No. RTJ-03-1782
On
December 18, 2001, State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (State Prosecutor Velasco) brought to the attention of then Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. the indictment of the respondent judge for
violation of P.D. No. 1612 and recommended that appropriate administrative
charges be initiated by the Supreme Court against him for violations of the
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.[12] State
Prosecutor Velasco stated:
…undersigned finds no cogent reason why Respondent JUDGE SALCEDO chose to
use a vehicle which was the subject of a criminal case before his very own
sala. There is no proof or evidence whatsoever that the Respondent Judge forgot
that the alleged owner of the subject vehicle (Respondent LEOPOLDO GONZAGA)
previously appeared before him as respondent in a criminal case. He could never
forget it because the authorities apprehended him, Respondent JUDGE SALCEDO
even showed them a copy of his very own
In a
Resolution dated
Thereafter,
we referred the administrative cases to Justice Noel G. Tijam[15] (Justice Tijam) of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and
recommendation. The referred cases
involved:
(a)
The respondent judge’s
investigation of Judge Agayan, his possession of a stolen Pajero and the
alleged irregularities he committed in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99;
(b)
The suspension of Judge Salcedo
pending the outcome of the instant case;
(c)
The dismissal of the complaint of
George Mercado dated
(d)
The referral of the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 11728 to the Department of Justice for it’s appropriate
action on the possible administrative liability of Prosecutor Matias Aquitan.
Pending
investigation of these administrative cases before the CA, several significant
developments took place. First,
the respondent judge retired from the Judiciary on
CA Report and Recommendation
Justice Tijam found the respondent judge guilty of
dishonesty, inefficiency, incompetency and violation of Rules 1.01, 2.01 and
3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics. Justice Tijam reported:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION[18]
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY RESPONDENT JUDGE OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST THE LATE MTC JUDGE NAPY AGAYAN AND HIS
COURT PERSONNEL
The 1st Indorsement dated
x x x
. . . In
the course of his investigation, the Respondent Judge would have discovered the
fact of Minda Amar’s prolonged absences. However, Respondent Judge failed to
make any findings in this regard. Neither was there a statement that Clerk of
Court Minda Amar was absent during said period of investigation and/or that her
absences were authorized and approved by Judge Agayan. Instead, the Respondent
Judge made a sweeping declaration that Complainant Mercado’s charges of
absenteeism against Judge Agayan’s court personnel were unfounded.
There is no
evidence that Respondent Judge examined the Court personnel’s daily time
records . . .
Indubitably, Respondent Judge was negligent and
inefficient, if not dishonest, in his investigation of the administrative
complaint filed against Judge Agayan and his court personnel. For this reason,
the Respondent Judge must be held liable.
x x x
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
IN THE MATTER OF THE STOLEN
PAJERO VEHICLE[19]
x x x
. . . although the criminal case against the Respondent
Judge for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law was dismissed, the Respondent Judge
could still be held liable for his improper conduct pursuant to Rules 1.01[20] and 2.01[21] of
the Code Judicial Conduct . . . and Canon
3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics[22] [Emphasis theirs]
x x x
In this
case, Respondent Judge displayed conduct that fell short of the standards
expected of a magistrate of the law. Respondent Judge failed to be more
circumspect in his dealings with Leopoldo Gonzaga.
Leopoldo
Gonzaga was once an accused before Respondent Judge’s sala in a criminal case
for violation of the anti-fencing law which was later dismissed by the
Respondent Judge. From this fact alone, any association which Respondent Judge
may have with Leopoldo Gonzaga would be a cause for suspicion. When Respondent
Judge borrowed the subject vehicle from the accused, he already displayed
improper and reproachable conduct.
The fact
that the vehicle lent to Respondent Judge was the same Pajero vehicle which was
the subject of the dismissed criminal case makes the act more unethical.
Respondent tried to justify that it was only after Gonzaga assured him that the
Pajero was not a carnapped vehicle that he allowed himself to use it. This is
inexcusable.
Respondent
Judge was wrong when he borrowed from the accused the same vehicle subject
matter of the criminal case which was dismissed and decided in the accused’s
favor. Respondent Judge failed to comport himself in such a manner that his
conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the
public. x x x
x x x
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION[23]
IN THE MATTER OF THE
CONSOLIDATED AGRARIAN CASES
x x x
Complainant
Mercado suggested that the Respondent Judge benefited from the awarded
commissioner’s fee. Complainant Mercado presented copies of the 3 cashier’s checks
and the deposit purportedly showing how Respondent Judge profited from said
fees.
However,
this claim is completely without factual basis. The complainant failed to
adduce any substantial, direct and convincing evidence to substantiate his
allegation that Respondent Judge materially benefited from the transaction. At
most, such allegation is a mere suspicion or conjecture.
x x x
. . .
unless there is direct and convincing evidence which will prove Respondent
Judge materially benefited from the transaction, the Respondent judge cannot be
held guilty of said charge.
However, .
. . Respondent Judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law in according
and/or modifying a final and executory decision.
As settled,
when the judge’s inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge
is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds,
or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad
faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.
x x x
Respondent
Judge had clearly exhibited gross ignorance of the law when he amended the
already final decision… He is therefore guilty of violating Rule 3.01[24]
of the Code of Judicial Ethics.
Justice Tijam recommended the imposition of the following penalties:
(a) First cause of action – a
fine of P40,000.00;
(b) Second cause of action – a
fine of P20,000.00;
(c) Third cause of action – a
fine in the amount of P20,000.00.
The Court’s Ruling
After
considering the CA Report and the entire records, we find the Report to be
substantially supported by the evidence on record, and by applicable law and
jurisprudence. We therefore adopt the
findings and recommendations of the CA Report, subject to the modifications
indicated below.
Administrative cases against judges stem from the
time-honored constitutional principle that a public
office is a public trust. This principle requires a judge, like any other
public servant and more so because of the sensitivity of his position, to
exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity;[25]
his high and exalted position in the Judiciary requires him to observe
exacting standards of morality, decency and competence. As the visible
representation of the law and given his task of
dispensing justice, a judge should
conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the people.[26] He must conduct himself in a manner
characterized by propriety and decorum; like Ceasar’s wife, he must be above
suspicion.[27] As we held in Padua v. Paz:[28]
Court personnel charged with the dispensation of justice, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, bear a heavy responsibility in insuring
that their conduct is always beyond reproach. The preservation of the integrity
of the judicial process is of paramount importance. All those occupying offices
in the judiciary should at all times be aware that they are accountable to the
people. They must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives.
The records show that respondent judge failed
to live up to these exacting standards.
Investigation of Judge Agayan and his court personnel
In
his report dated August 2, 2002 (in compliance with the OCA directive to
investigate Judge Agayan), the respondent judge stated that the complaint
against Judge Agayan and his court staff for absenteeism and irregular
attendance had no merit. The respondent judge related that he went twice to the
office of Judge Agayan to ascertain the veracity of the complaint and found
that Judge Agayan was really sickly
because of a heart condition that compelled him to take leaves of absence.[29] The respondent judge claimed that since
the complainant failed to specify the particular dates when Judge Agayan failed
to report to work, he could not ascertain whether his absences had been
authorized. The respondent judge also stated that he personally inquired from
other offices in the Municipality of Kapalong, Davao del Norte, from lawyers,
and from party-litigants with pending cases in the sala of Judge Agayan; he
found that no complaint from
party-litigants in the Municipality of Kapalong had been made involving the
failure to attend to official transactions due to the absence of Court
personnel. Neither was there any complaint from lawyers about proceedings
“grinding to a halt.” Like party-litigants, local officials are more concerned
in the speedy disposition of cases when their constituents are involved. Yet,
not a single local official made a complaint.[30]
The
respondent judge, in his Comment dated
In its investigation, the CA found evidence refuting
the statements made by the respondent judge in his report to the OCA. One of these was the Certification dated
February 6, 2003 issued by Jaime Mondejar, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Kapalong-Talaingod, Davao del Norte, attesting that one Minda
Amar, the Clerk of Court in Judge Agayan’s sala, had not reported for work
prior to and during the dates the respondent judge reportedly conducted his
investigation.[31] The CA investigation also found no evidence
that the respondent judge ever examined the daily time records of Minda Amar
and the court personnel assigned to Judge Agayan’s sala.
Justice Tijam noted that since the act complained of was
absenteeism, the investigator’s first course of action should have been to
check and verify the daily time records of the concerned personnel; from such
examination the respondent judge would have known of the prolonged absences of
Minda Amar and others. Likewise, the
respondent judge would have noticed Minda Amar’s absence when he went to the
sala of Judge Agayan on two occasions. These incidents, however, were not
mentioned in the respondent judge’s report.
In addition to
these findings, we note that the respondent judge was similarly remiss in ascertaining
Judge Agayan’s absences. The respondent judge merely relied on the leave of
absence filed by Judge Agayan for October 8, 1997, and did not at all consider the
latter’s absences, subject of the complaint, and the fact that the respondent
judge conducted his investigation only in February
2000. At the very least, the gap of
more than two (2) years between the leave of absence on record and the
investigation of Judge Agayan’s absences should have alerted the respondent
judge to examine the former’s records in the intervening period, particularly
the period immediately prior to the complaint. The respondent judge failed to do this. We
observe, too, that in the “course of his investigation,” he did not appear to
have asked Judge Agayan about his absences in any formal inquiry or, at the
very least, in an interview. No record
appears in the respondent judge’s report on Judge Agayan’s position on the
matter under investigation. A close
scrutiny of the report in fact shows that the respondent judge, instead of
making an objective report on the results of his investigation, tried to
downplay and deflect the issue of absenteeism and irregular attendance by
stating that nobody complained of the
delay in the disposition of cases due to the absence and irregular attendance of
Judge Agayan and his staff.[32]
From all these,
what appears clear to us is that the respondent judge conducted a very
superficial investigation, if what he did can be labelled as an investigation
at all. Based on this shallow effort, he
prepared a slanted report that could not but lead to the exoneration of Judge
Agayan. These actions tell us that the
respondent judge deliberately covered up Judge
Agayan’s absences and irregular attendance.
The motivation for all these is not hard to discern as it can be read
between the lines in the respondent judge’s report, considered in light of the
attendant facts. He did all these under the mistaken notion of aiding a fellow
judge, who was allegedly too sickly to fully perform his judicial duties. In
rendering this assistance, the respondent judge also overlooked the absences
and irregular attendance of the court staff of Judge Agayan.
The respondent judge
apparently forgot that his first and foremost duty was to conduct a thorough
and objective investigation and to make a complete report of his findings regardless of his personal sentiments and beliefs.
The task assigned to him was an assignment involving trust and the exercise of
his functions as a judge. An administrative investigation is an essential
component in the judicial machinery for the administrative supervision of
courts and court personnel; it is a key process in determining violations of
the norms of conduct and standards of service in the judiciary. The respondent
judge, therefore, not only failed to do his duty, but violated as well the
trust reposed in him as a judge.
The absenteeism of judges or court employees and/or
their irregular attendance at work is a serious charge that, if proven, may
warrant the imposition of the penalty of dismissal or suspension from service.[33]
Unauthorized absence and irregular attendance are detrimental to the
dispensation of justice and, more often than not, result in undue delay in the
disposition of cases; they also translate to waste of public funds when the
absent officials and employees are nevertheless paid despite their absence. As
heretofore mentioned, the Supreme Court regulates the conduct of court
officials and employees and it acts through its subordinates, among them in
this case, the respondent judge. His responsibility in this administrative
supervision is direct by virtue of the delegation made by this Court. By conducting a superficial investigation and
by his slanted findings that caused the OCA to recommend the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against Judge Agayan and his court personnel, the
Court’s administrative machinery failed; the respondent judge’s intent to
shield another judge, resulting in the lack of objectivity of his report,
deprived the Court of the opportunity to act properly on the reported
violations of the norms of conduct of judges and court employees.
For failing to faithfully perform the tasks assigned
to him, the respondent committed dishonesty, inefficiency, and serious
misconduct in violation of Canon 3 and Rule 3.08 of Canon 3, both of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, which state:
Canon 3. A JUDGE
SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 3.08 – A judge should diligently
discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence
in court management, and facilitate the
performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
We also find that the respondent judge violated Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, which states that “[a] judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,”
in relation to Canon 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which
requires that a judge’s conduct be above reproach and that he administer
justice according to law. This means that a judge, in dispensing justice, “should apply the law
impartially, independently, honestly, and in a manner perceived by the public to
be impartial, independent and honest.”[34]
Serious
misconduct, as defined, refers to weighty and serious transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.[35] It warrants dismissal from the service when
the judicial act is corrupt and inspired by an intention to violate the law,
and when it translates to wrongful intention rather than mere error of
judgment.[36]
In this case, by giving premium to personal relations and personal
feelings rather than to the faithful discharge of his duty as investigating
judge, the respondent judge acted dishonestly and inefficiently, coupled with a
deliberate and wrongful intent to perform his duties unfaithfully. This is no less a serious misconduct than a
corrupt act undertaken for monetary gains; one as well as the other eroded
public confidence in a judge’s ability to render justice.[37]
The Possession and Use of a
Stolen Vehicle
In his defense on this
issue, the respondent judge claimed that the case was filed by the complainant
merely to harass him. He also claimed good faith and lack of knowledge that the
vehicle he had borrowed from Leopoldo Gonzaga was the same vehicle involved in
the Anti-Fencing case that he dismissed in 1999.
The act of borrowing a vehicle
by a judge or any court employee is not per
se a violation of judicial norms and standards established for court
personnel, as borrowing is a legitimate and neutral act that can happen in
everyday life. However, judges and court
employees – by the nature of their functions and of the norms and standards
peculiar to their positions – live their
lives under restrictions not otherwise imposed on others; specifically, they
cannot simply borrow in situations when this act may or can affect the
performance of their duties because of the nature of the thing borrowed or the
identity of the borrower, or in situations when borrowing would involve ethical
questions under express rules. In this
case, the complaint alleged that what the respondent judge borrowed was in fact
a vehicle that was the subject of a previous litigation before his sala;
the respondent judge borrowed, too, from a lender who still had cases before
his sala.
We hold, based on our
examination and analysis of the records, that the respondent judge went over
the dividing line that separates permissible from impermissible borrowing.
First, during his
cross-examination before the CA, the respondent judge admitted that he knew
that the vehicle he borrowed was owned by Leopoldo Gonzaga, who was the accused
in the Anti-Fencing case previously before him.[38]
The respondent judge could not have avoided this admission given the
surrounding circumstances of the case; the vehicle in the Anti-Fencing case was
a Pajero, while the vehicle he borrowed from Leopoldo Gonzaga was also a
Pajero;[39] while the color of the vehicle had been
changed from green to dirty white, it was shown that the vehicle consistently
carried the same plate number – “UTN 571”;[40] the respondent judge could not have missed
the identity of the vehicle considering his admission that the Pajero was under
the court’s custody for several months.[41]
Second, the records show that the
respondent judge’s initial claim of lack of knowledge is not true. In the preliminary investigation conducted by
State Prosecutor Velasco in the Anti-Fencing case involving the Pajero, the
respondent judge, when apprehended by policemen, exhibited a court decision he
penned in 1999 dismissing the Anti-Fencing case against Leopoldo Gonzaga for
the same vehicle.[42]
This incident, which the respondent judge never refuted, clearly indicated that
he knew that the vehicle he possessed and used, despite its change of color,
was the same vehicle involved in the 1999 Anti-Fencing case that came before
him.
Third, the unrefuted statement of
the complainant in his Affidavit
(Direct Examination)[43]
filed before the CA states:
I
know for a fact that Mr. Leopoldo Gonzaga had several cases pending in the two
(2) salas presided by Executive Judge Salcedo . . . Also, I know for a fact
that before the Criminal Case No. 11728 .
. . was dismissed by Executive Judge Erasto D. Salcedo, several cases of Mr.
Leopoldo Gonzaga had been pending in the sala of Judge Salcedo. I also know for
a fact that Executive Judge Erasto D. Salcedo inhibited himself from the cases
of Mr. Leopoldo Gonzaga when there was a question raised on the propriety of
his borrowing the Pajero from Mr. Gonzaga, a court litigant in his sala, during
the pendency of this Administrative case. [Emphasis theirs]
Thus, the respondent judge not only borrowed a vehicle
that was the subject of an Anti-Fencing case before him; he also borrowed it
from a lender who had other pending cases before him. In fact, he had to inhibit himself from hearing
these cases because of the pendency of the present administrative cases.
Under the circumstances,
the respondent judge is liable for serious misconduct, given his repeated and
deliberate intention to disregard and violate the legal norms of conduct
governing his behavior and action as a judge. He committed serious misconduct, first,
in using and possessing a vehicle with the knowledge that it was the subject of
an anti-fencing case previously before him; and second, he borrowed this
vehicle from a litigant who had pending cases before his sala. Both the
character of the vehicle borrowed and the identity of the lender precluded him
from borrowing and using Leopoldo Gonzaga’s Pajero. While the criminal case
filed against the respondent judge by State Prosecutor Velasco was dismissed by
the Department of Justice, we agree with Justice Tijam that the respondent judge’s
acts at least constitute irresponsible and improper conduct whose effect is to
erode public confidence in the judiciary.[44] As aptly stated by Justice Tijam, the
respondent judge’s act compromised the
image, integrity and uprightness of the courts of law;[45] it cast suspicion not only in his own
impartiality, but also in the impartiality and integrity of his judicial
office, thereby impairing public trust in the exercise of his judicial
functions.
In several cases of the same import, the Court
penalized a judge for highly improper conduct.
In Cabreana v.
Avelino,[46] the Court castigated the respondent
judge who hitched a ride in the car of
a party-litigant in going to and from the place of the ocular inspection. We
ruled that the respondent judge’s act exposed him and his office to suspicion
and impaired the trust and faith of the people in the administration of
justice.
In Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana,[47]
we admonished the judge to be circumspect in his conduct and dealings with
lawyers who had pending cases before him. It was established that the judge
displayed before the public his close familiarity with one of the lawyers who
appeared before him and whose car the judge sometimes borrowed.
We explained in Yu-Asensi
v. Villanueva that the duty to avoid improper conduct or the appearance of
impropriety becomes more crucial when one is a trial judge who has constant
dealings with the public:[48]
…[W]ithin the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an
important and visible symbol of government especially considering that as
opposed to appellate courts, trial judges are those directly in contact with
the parties, their counsel and the communities which the judiciary is bound to
serve. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of
justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, a
judge must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct,
official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that
looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. x x x it is essential
that judges, like Caesar's wife, should be above suspicion.
The evidence adduced in this charge showed that the
respondent judge violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 2.01, Canon 2, both of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, in failing to maintain the appearance of
integrity and in failing to engage in conduct to promote public confidence in
the judiciary. Likewise, he violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics relating to the avoidance of
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all the judge’s activities,
official or otherwise.
The Execution of a Final Judgment in
the Consolidated Agrarian Cases
The pertinent portion of the joint decision dated
WHEREFORE,
all the foregoing premises duly considered, the Court hereby renders its
judgment fixing, as it has judiciously determined, the just compensation for
the landholdings and the improvements of all the herein petitioners in all
these above-captioned docketed agrarian cases, as follows:
First – Hereby fixing, as determined, the just compensation of herein
petitioners’ aggregate landholdings of 123.4629 hectares hereby fixed and
determined at P25,405,553.55, plus the fixed and determined just
compensation for the existing improvements thereon of P32,800,000.00, or
a total of P58,205,553.55; and proper-computed adjustment to make such
valuation at par with current true value of the Philippine Peso vis-à-vis the
US Dollar, said upgraded amount in its upgraded value totals P89,547,005.46;
and further adding thereto the computed interests pegged at 6% per annum, which
amounted to P21,986,680.68, the total amount of just compensation which
Respondent-DAR through LBP must pay, jointly and severally, to petitioners for
their landholdings and improvements would be, as it is hereby fixed in the
aggregate amount of P111,533,686.14;
x x x
The respondent judge
contends that he merely acted on the motion filed by the landowners who
requested adjustments in enforcing the final judgment considering the statement
in the dispositive portion of the judgment that allowed adjustments based on
the current true
value of the Philippine Peso vis-à-vis the US Dollar.
In his
findings, Justice Tijam observed that the adjustment contemplated in the joint
decision was already included in the dispositive portion, making it unnecessary
for the respondent judge to make any additional adjustment. We also note that
this joint
decision, after having become final and executory, was
entered in the
Book of Entries of Judgment of the
The
respondent judge ought to have known that the joint decision was already final
and executory and could no longer be disturbed when he made his
adjustments. This legal reality, known
as the rule of immutability of judgment, is an elementary principle of law and
procedure. Once a judgment becomes final, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the Highest Court of the
land.[51] The only
recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors, or the making
of so-called nunc pro tunc entries,
which cause no prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is void.[52] To be sure, the respondent judge’s ground for
modifying the joint decision is not among these recognized exceptions.
For modifying a final and
executory decision in the course of its execution, we find the respondent judge
guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Where the law is straightforward and its
application to the facts plainly evident, not to know the law or to act as if
one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[53]
The respondent judge violated Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which mandates professional competence on the part of a judge. A
judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and is
expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence;[54]
otherwise, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts.[55] Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be
the mainspring of injustice.[56]
The Penalty
The retirement of the respondent judge and death of both the complainant and the respondent judge pending the investigation of these administrative cases are not deterrents to the resolution on the merits of the complaints and to the imposition of the sanctions demanded by the circumstances. Jurisprudence holds that the death of the complainant does not warrant the withdrawal of the charges against the respondent nor does this development render the complaint moot; the complainant is treated only as a witness in this type of proceedings.[57] On the other hand, the death of the respondent in an administrative case, as a rule, does not preclude a finding of administrative liability. The recognized exceptions to this rule are: first, when the respondent has not been heard and continuation of the proceedings would deny him of his right to due process; second, where exceptional circumstances exist in the case leading to equitable and humanitarian considerations; and third, when the kind of penalty imposed or imposable would render the proceedings useless.[58] None of these exceptional circumstances are present in the case.
Thus, despite the above
supervening events, we can still impose the penalty of fine against the
respondent judge deductible from his retirement benefits. In this case, we find that the infractions he committed all
constitute serious charges warranting the imposition of fine in the amount
of P20,000.00 to P40,000.00 range.[59] Considering the several violations he
committed and the gravity and circumstances of these infractions, we find that the maximum
amount of fine should be imposed on each charge. In so ruling, we note that
this is not the first administrative infraction committed by the respondent
judge; he had previously been fined P10,000.00 for undue delay in
rendering decisions or orders.[60]
On the first charge (false investigation report on Judge
Agayan), we find the respondent judge guilty of dishonesty, inefficiency, and
serious misconduct. He violated the provisions
of Rule 2.01 of
Canon 2, Canon
3 and Rule 3.08 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; and Canons 3 and 31
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Section 8, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, classifies dishonesty and gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as serious charges. We impose a fine of P40,000.00
on the respondent judge on
this charge.[61]
On the second charge (use and possession of the
vehicle of a litigant before his sala), the respondent judge is guilty of
serious misconduct and impropriety as provided in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 2
and Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Canon 3 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics. Considering the compounded administrative offenses,
he is meted the maximum fine of P40,000.00.[62]
For violation of Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct (in the execution of the decision of an agrarian case), the
respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law for which the maximum
fine of P40,000.00 is imposed. Gross ignorance of law is considered a
serious charge that warrants the imposition of the penalties provided under
Section 11 (A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.[63]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
find Judge Erasto D. Salcedo GUILTY of the following administrative
offenses:
1.
Dishonesty, inefficiency and serious misconduct and violation
of Rule 2.01 of
Canon 2 and
Rule 3.08 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; and Canons 3 and 31 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics. We impose a FINE
of P40,000.00.
2.
Serious misconduct and impropriety in violation
of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 2.01of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
as well as Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He is meted a FINE of P40,000.00.
3.
Gross ignorance of the law under Rule 3.01,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, for which a FINE of P40,000.00 is imposed.
The
Office of the Court Administrator is hereby ordered to deduct the amount of One
Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00) from the retirement
benefits due to Judge Erasto D. Salcedo, and to proceed with the
processing and release of these benefits, unless there are other lawful causes for withholding
them.
Finally, we refer to the Department of Justice
for appropriate action the possible administrative liability of Prosecutor Matias Aquiatan arising from the
imputations made by the complainant that he committed a hasty reinvestigation
of Leopoldo Gonzaga in Criminal Case No. 11728.
SO ORDERED.
(On official leave)
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Acting Chief Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate
Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice (On official leave) PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice (On
oficial leave) MARIANO
C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
* On official leave.
**
Acting Chief Justice from
*** On official leave.
**** On official leave.
[1]
Resolution dated
[2] Rollo, RTJ-03-1781, p. 43.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Supra note 2.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Rollo, RTJ-03-1782, p. 1.
[13]
[14]
[15]
Resolution dated
[16] Administrative Complaint with Prayer for Preventive Suspension, etc. in connection with the contempt orders issued by the respondent judge against the complainant. This was subject of a petition for certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 151954, wherein we issued a temporary restraining order in favor of the complainant and referred the matter for appropriate action and disposition to the CA (docketed as CA-GR. No. 69246); rollo, RTJ-03-1781, p. 240.
[17] CA Report and Recommendation, p. 4.
[18]
[19]
[20] Rule 1.01. A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
[21] Rule 2.01. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
[22] Canon 3 (3). A judge’s official conduct should be free from any appearance of impropriety and his personal behavior, not only in the bench and in the performance of his official duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
[23] Report and Recommendation of CA Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam, pp. 18- 22.
[24] Rule 3.01. A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
[25] Judiciary
Planning Development and Implementation Office v. Calaguas, A.M. No.
P-95-1155,
[26] Calilung
v. Suriaga, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1191,
[27] Mirano
v. Saavedra, A.M. No. P-89-383,
[28]
A.M. No. P-00-1445,
[29] Rollo, p. 156, Administrative Matter No. RTJ-03-1781.
[30]
[31] Supra note 17, p. 9.
[32] Rollo, RTJ-03-1781, p. 155.
[33] Yu-Assensi v. Villanueva, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1245,
[34] OCA v. Floro, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460,
[35] Manuel
v. Calimag, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1441,
[36]
[37] Supra note 34, pp. 139-140.
[38]
TSN,
[39]
[40] Supra note 17, p. 11.
[41]
TSN,
[42]
Resolution dated
[43] CA Rollo, p. 430.
[44] Supra note 17, p. 15.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Adm.
Matter No. 1733-CFI,
[47]
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1601,
[48] Supra note 33, p. 266.
[49] Land
Bank of the
[50] CA Rollo, p. 751.
[51] Equitable Banking Corporation v. Sadac, G.R. No. 164772,
[52]
[53] Amante-Descallar
v. Ramas, A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2142,
[54]
[55]
[56]
[57] Ferrer
v. Tebelin, A.C. No. 6590,
[58] Gonzales
v. Escalano, A.M. No. P-03-1715,
[59] Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
[60] Report on the Judicial
Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branches 2 and 31, A.M. No. 04-1-56-RTC,
[61] QBE
Insurance Phils. v. Judge Laviña, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1971,
[62] Ibid.
[63] Alconera
v. Madajucon, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1313,