EN BANC
|
JOSELITO
R. MENDOZA, Petitioner, - versus - COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 188308 Present: *PUNO, C.J., **Quisumbing, CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO
MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO,
***velasco,
JR., NACHURA, leonardo-de castro, brion, peralta,
BERSAMIN,
****DEL CASTILLO, and ABAD,
JJ. Promulgated: October 15, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
The present case involves a clash
between the power under the Philippine Constitution of the respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the handling of a provincial
election contest, and the claimed due process rights of a party to the contest. The petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza (the petitioner)
essentially asserts in his petition for certiorari[1]
that the COMELEC conducted proceedings in the election contest for the
gubernatorial position of the Province of Bulacan, between him and the
respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan (the
respondent), without due regard to his fundamental due process rights. The COMELEC, on the other hand, claims that
its decision-making deliberations are internal, confidential and do not require
notice to and the participation of the contending parties.
THE ANTECEDENTS
The
petitioner and the respondent vied for the position of Governor of the
The
respondent seasonably filed an election protest with the COMELEC, which was raffled
to the Second Division and docketed as EPC No. 2007-44. Revision of ballots involving the protested
and counter-protested precincts in Angat, Bocaue, Calumpit, Doña Remedios Trinidad,
Guiginto, Malolos, Meycauayan, Norzagaray, Pandi, Paombong, Plaridel, Pulilan,
The
COMELEC approved the parties’ formal offer of evidence and then required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The parties complied with the COMELEC’s order. The
case was thereafter submitted for resolution.
On
The COMELEC’s Second Division denied
the petitioner’s motion in its Order of
Allegedly
alarmed by information on COMELEC action on the provincial election contest within the SET premises without notice to
him and without his participation, the petitioner’s counsel wrote the SET
Secretary, Atty. Irene Guevarra, a letter dated
x x x please be informed that the
conduct of proceedings in COMELEC EPC No. 2007-44 (Pagdanganan vs. Mendoza)
within the Tribunal Premises was authorized by then Acting Chairman of the
Tribunal, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, upon formal request of the Office of
Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle.
Basis of such grant is Section 3,
Comelec Resolution No. 2812 dated
THE
PETITION
The
SET Secretary’s response triggered the filing of the present petition raising
the following ISSUES –
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC
VIOLATED DUE PROCESS BY CONDUCTING PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT GIVING DUE NOTICE TO THE
PETITIONER.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO AN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
APPRECIATING BALLOTS WHICH ARE NOT IN ITS OFFICIAL CUSTODY AND ARE OUTSIDE ITS
OWN PREMISES, AUTHORITY AND CONTROL.
The
petitioner argues that the election protest involves his election as Governor;
thus, its subject matter involves him and the people of the
Citing
the commentaries of Father Joaquin Bernas,[4]
the petitioner argues that the proceedings before the COMELEC in election
protests are judicial in nature and character.
Thus, the strictures of judicial due process – specifically, (a) opportunity
to be heard and (b) that judgment be rendered only after lawful hearing –
apply. Notices in judicial dispute, he
claims, are not really just a matter of courtesy; they are elementary
fundamental element of due process, they are part and parcel of a right of a
party to be heard. He further cites
Justice Isagani A. Cruz,[5]
who wrote:
x x x Every litigant is entitled to his day in court. He has a right to be notified of every
incident of the proceeding and to be present at every stage thereof so that he
may be heard by himself and counsel for the protection of his interest.
The
petitioner claims that without notice to him of the proceedings, the due
process element of the right to have judgment only after lawful hearing is
absent. There is no way, he claims, that
a judicial proceeding held without notice to the parties could be described as
a lawful hearing, especially a proceeding which has as its subject matter the
sovereign will of an entire province.
He
was therefore denied his day in court, he claims, when the COMELEC conducted the
examination and appreciation of ballots.
The proceedings should be stopped and declared null and void; its future
results, too, should be nullified, as
nothing derived from the anomalous and unconstitutional clandestine and
unilateral proceedings should ever be part of any decision that the COMELEC may
subsequently render. The poisonous fruits (derived from the
proceedings) should have no part and should not be admitted for any purpose and/or
in any judicial proceeding.
Other than his due process concern,
the petitioner takes issue with the COMELEC’s appreciation of ballots even when
the ballots and other election materials were no longer in its official custody
and were outside its premises, authority and control. He asserts that an important element of due
process is that the judicial body should have jurisdiction over the property
that is the subject matter of the proceedings.
In this case, the COMELEC has transferred possession, custody and
jurisdiction over the ballots to the SET, a tribunal separate and independent
from the COMELEC and over which the COMELEC exercises no authority or
jurisdiction. For the COMELEC to still
conduct proceedings on property, materials and evidence no longer in its
custody violates the principle of separation of powers.
The petitioner also points out that the
COMELEC’s unilateral appreciation of the ballots in the SET premises deviates
from the Commission’s usual and time honored practice and procedure of
conducting proceedings within its premises and while it has custody over the
ballots. There is no precedent,
according to the petitioner, for this deviation, nor is there any compelling
reason to make the present case an exception.
Citing Cabagnot v. Commission on
Elections (G.R. No. 124383, August 9, 1996) which involves a transfer or
change of venue of the revision of ballots, the petitioner alleges that this
Court has been very emphatic in denouncing the COMELEC for its departure from
its own rules and usual practice; while Cabagnot
involves the issue of change
of venue, the petitioner finds parallel applicability in the present case which
also involves a deviation from COMELEC rules and usual practice. The petitioner adds that the act of the
Second Division is effectively an arrogation of the authority to promulgate
rules of procedure – a power that solely belongs to the COMELEC en banc.
After a preliminary finding of a genuine due process issue, we issued a
Status Quo Order on
THE RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS
In
his Comment to the Petition with
Extremely Urgent Motion to Lift/Dissolve Status Quo Ante Order, the private
respondent asserts that the petition contains deliberate falsehoods and
misleading allegations that led the Court to grant the injunctive relief the
petitioner had asked. He asserts that the
“proceeding” the petitioner stated in his petition was actually the COMELEC’s decision-making
process, i.e., the appreciation of
ballots, which is a procedure internal to the Members of the Second Division of
the COMELEC and their staff members; no revision of ballots took place as revision
had long been finished. What was
therefore undertaken within the SET’s premises was unilateral COMELEC action
that is exclusive to the COMELEC and an internal matter that is confidential in
nature. In this light, no due process violation ever arose.
The private respondent also asserts
that the petitioner cannot claim that he was not notified of and denied
participation in the revision proceedings, as the petitioner himself is fully
aware that the revision of the ballots was completed as early as July 28, 2008
and the petitioner was present and actively participated in the entire
proceedings, all the way to the filing of the required memoranda. Thus, the
petitioner’s right to due process was duly satisfied.
The private respondent implores us to
commence contempt proceedings against the petitioner who, the respondent
claims, has not been forthright in his submissions and was not guided by the
highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in his conduct as a
party and in his relations with the opposing party, the other counsel and the
Court.
Lastly, the private respondent posits
that the present petition was filed out of time – i.e., beyond the reglementary
period provided under Rule 64. All these reasons, the private respondent
argues, constitute sufficient basis for the lifting of the status quo order and
the dismissal of the petition.
Public respondent COMELEC, for its
part, claims that the petition is without basis in fact and in law and ought to
be dismissed outright. Given the
possibility of simultaneous election contests involving national and local
officials, it has institutionalized an order
of preference in the custody and revision
of ballots in contested ballot boxes. The established order of preference
is not without exception, as the expeditious disposition of protest cases is a
primary concern. Additionally, the order
of preference does not prevent the COMELEC from proceeding with pending protest
cases, particularly those already submitted for decision. It claims that it has wide latitude to employ
means to effectively perform its duty in safeguarding the sanctity of the
elections and the integrity of the ballot.
The COMELEC further argues that in the
absence of a specific rule on whether it can conduct appreciation of ballots outside its premises or official custody,
the issue boils down to one of discretion – the authority of the COMELEC to
control as it deems fit the processes or incidents of a pending election
protest. Under Section 4 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the COMELEC may use all auxiliary writs, processes and
other means to carry into effect its powers or jurisdiction; if the procedure
to be followed in the exercise of such power or jurisdiction is not
specifically provided for by law or the Rules of Procedure, any suitable
process or proceeding not prohibited by law or by its rules may be adopted.
The COMELEC lastly submits that while
due process requires giving the parties an opportunity to intervene in all
stages of the proceedings, the COMELEC in the present case is not actually
conducting further proceedings requiring notice to the parties; there is no
revision or correction of the ballots, as the election protest had already been
submitted for resolution. When the
COMELEC coordinated with the SET, it was simply for purposes of resolving the
submitted provincial election contest before it; the parties do not take part
in this aspect of the case which necessarily requires utmost secrecy. On the whole, the petitioner was afforded
every opportunity to present his case.
To now hold the election protest hostage until the conclusion of the protest
pending before the SET defeats the COMELEC’s mandate of ensuring free, orderly
and honest election.
THE COURT’S RULING
We
review the present petition on the basis of the combined application of Rules
64 and 65 of the Rules of Court. While COMELEC
jurisdiction over the Bulacan election contest is not disputed, the legality of
subsequent COMELEC action is assailed for having been undertaken with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, our
standard of review is “grave abuse of discretion,” a term that defies exact
definition, but generally refers to “capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.”[6] Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the
abuse must be grave to merit our positive action.[7]
After due consideration, we find
the petition devoid of merit.
The petition is anchored on the
alleged conduct of proceedings in the election protest – following the completed
revision of ballots – at the SET premises without notice to and without the
participation of the petitioner.
Significantly, “the conduct of proceedings” is confirmed by the SET
Secretary in the letter we quoted above.[8] As the issues raised show – the petitioner’s
focus is not really on the COMELEC Orders denying the suspension of proceedings
when the ballot boxes and other election materials pertinent to the election
contest were transferred to the SET; the focus is on what the COMELEC did after
to the issuance of the Resolutions.
We read the petition in this context as these COMELEC Orders are now unassailable
as the period to challenge them has long passed.[9]
The
substantive issue we are primarily called upon to resolve is whether there were
proceedings within the SET premises, entitling the petitioner to notice and
participation, which were denied to him; in other words, the issue is whether the
petitioner’s right to due process has been violated. A finding of due process
violation, because of the inherent arbitrariness it carries, necessarily amounts
to grave abuse of discretion.
As a preliminary matter, we note that
the petitioner has claimed that COMELEC exercises judicial power in its action over provincial election contests and
has argued its due process position from this view. We take this opportunity to clarify that
judicial power in our country is “vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.”[10] This exclusive grant of authority to the
Judiciary is reinforced under the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution which further states that “Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable.. .,” thus constitutionally
locating the situs of the exercise of
judicial power in the courts.
In
contrast with the above definitions, Section 2, Article IX(C) of the
Constitution lists the COMELEC’s powers and functions, among others, as
follows:
(1) Enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or
rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay officials shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those
involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
Under
these terms, the COMELEC under our governmental structure is a constitutional
administrative agency and its powers are essentially executive in nature (i.e.,
to enforce and administer election laws),[11]
quasi-judicial (to exercise original jurisdiction over election contests of
regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over election
contests of other lower ranking officials), and quasi-legislative (rulemaking
on all questions affecting elections and the promulgation of its rules of
procedure).
Historically,
the COMELEC has always been an administrative agency whose powers have been
increased from the 1935 Constitution to the present one, to reflect the
country’s awareness of the need to provide greater regulation and protection to
our electoral processes to ensure their integrity. In the 1935 Constitution, the powers and functions
of the COMELEC were defined as follows:
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions
which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving
the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including
the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the
appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials. All law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, when so required
by the Commission, shall act as its deputies for the purpose of insuring free,
orderly, and honest election. The decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission
shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court. [emphasis supplied]
These
evolved into the following powers and functions under the 1973 Constitution:
(1) Enforce and administer
all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and
elective provincial and city officials.
(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote,
administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of
the number and location of polling places, the appointment of election
officials and inspectors, and the registration of voters.
These
powers have been enhanced in scope and details under the 1987 Constitution, but
retained all the while the character of an administrative agency.
The
COMELEC’s adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional
body, other than a court, vested with
authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the exercise of its
jurisdiction, to hold hearings and exercise discretion of a judicial nature;[12] it receives evidence, ascertain the facts
from these submissions, determine the law and the legal rights of the parties,
and on the basis of all these decides on the merits of the case and renders
judgment.[13] Despite the exercise of discretion that is essentially
judicial in character, particularly with respect to election contests, COMELEC is
not a tribunal within the judicial branch of government and is not a court
exercising judicial power in the constitutional sense;[14] hence, its adjudicative function, exercised
as it is in the course of administration and enforcement, is quasi-judicial.
As
will be seen on close examination, the 1973 Constitution used the unique
wording that the COMELEC shall “be the sole
judge of all contests,” thus giving the appearance that judicial power had
been conferred. This phraseology,
however, was changed in the 1987 Constitution to give the COMELEC “exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests,” thus removing any vestige of exercising its
adjudicatory power as a court and
correctly aligning it with what it is – a quasi-judicial body.[15]
Consistent with the characterization of its adjudicatory power as
quasi-judicial, the judicial review of COMELEC en banc decisions (together with
the review of Civil Service Commission decisions) is via the prerogative writ of certiorari,
not through an appeal, as the traditional mode of review of quasi-judicial
decisions of administrative tribunals in the exercise the Court’s supervisory
authority. This means that the Court
will not supplant the decision of the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body except
where a grave abuse of discretion or any other jurisdictional error exists.
The
appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an
administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal
case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations,[16]
quoted below:
(1) The first of these rights is
the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. xxx
(2) Not only must the party be
given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate
does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when
directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some
evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
"substantial.” "Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered
on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial
Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial
Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved,
and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in
administrative proceedings.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the
substantive rights of a party at hearing
stage of the proceedings. The
essence of this aspect of due process, we
have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard,
or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.[17] A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its
Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as
the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and
sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements
are reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable
at the deliberative stage, as the
decision-maker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set forth the guiding considerations
in deliberating on the case and are the material and substantial components of decision-making.
Briefly, the tribunal must consider the
totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of
the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion,
reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based
on substantial evidence.[18]
Finally, the last requirement,
relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further
complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar
in substance to the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must
state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based.[19] As a component of the rule of fairness that
underlies due process, this is the “duty
to give reason” to enable the affected person to understand how the rule of
fairness has been administered in his case, to expose the reason to public
scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through
by the decision-maker.
In
the present case, the petitioner invokes both the due process component rights at
the hearing and deliberative stages and alleges that these component rights
have all been violated. We discuss all
these allegations below.
The Right to Notice and
to be Heard.
a. At the Hearing and Revision of
Ballots.
Based
on the pleadings filed, we see no factual and legal basis for the petitioner to
complain of denial of his hearing stage rights.
In the first place, he does not dispute that he fully participated in
the proceedings of the election protest until the case was deemed submitted for
resolution; he had representation at the revision of the ballots, duly presented
his evidence, and summed up his case through a memorandum. These various phases
of the proceedings constitute the hearing proper of the election contest and
the COMELEC has more than satisfied the opportunity to be heard that the Ang Tibay hearing stage rights require. In these proceedings, the petitioner stood
head-to-head with the respondent in an adversarial contest where both sides
were given their respective rights to speak, make their presentations, and
controvert each other’s submission, subject only to established COMELEC rules
of procedures. Under these undisputed
facts, both parties had their day in court, so to speak, and neither one can
complain of any denial of notice or of the right to be heard.
b.
At the “Proceedings” at the SET.
A
critical question to be answered in passing upon due process questions at this
stage of the election contest is the nature of the so-called “proceedings”
after the ballots and other materials pertinent to the provincial election
contest were transferred to the SET.
In
the petition, the petitioner alleged that there were “strange proceedings”[20]
which were “unilateral, clandestine and surreptitious” within the premises of
the SET, on “documents, ballots and election materials whose possession and
custody have been transferred” to the SET, and the “petitioner was NEVER
OFFICIALLY NOTIFIED of the strange on-goings” at the SET.[21] Attached to the petition was the letter of the
Secretary of the SET confirming the “conduct of proceedings” in the provincial
election contest, and citing as basis the authority of Acting SET Chairman,
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, upon the formal request of the Office of
Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle, and citing Section 3, COMELEC Resolution No.
2812 dated 17 October 1995 on the coordination envisioned among the COMELEC,
the SET and the courts “so as not to delay or interrupt the revision
of ballots being conducted.” While
the SET letter made the reservation that “While the said provision speaks only
of revision, it has been the practice of the Tribunal to allow the conduct of
other proceedings in local election protest cases within its premises as may be
requested,” no mention whatsoever was made of the kind of proceedings taking
place.
It
was at this point that this Court intervened, in response to the petitioner’s
prayer for the issuance of temporary injunctive relief, through the issuance of
a Status Quo Order with a non-extendible directive for the respondents to file
their comments on the petition; for indeed, any further revision of ballots or
other adversarial proceedings after the case has been submitted for resolution,
would not only be strange and unusual but would indicate a gross violation of
due process rights.
After
consideration of the respondents’ Comments and the petitioner’s petition and
Reply, we hold that the contested proceedings at the SET (“contested proceedings) are no longer part of the adversarial
aspects of the election contest that would require notice of hearing and the
participation of the parties. As the
COMELEC stated in its Comment and without any contrary or disputing claim in
the petitioner’s Reply:[22]
“However,
contrary to the claim of petitioner, public respondent in the appreciation of
the contested ballots in EPC No. 2007-44 simultaneously with the SET in SET
Case No. 001-07 is not conducting “further proceedings” requiring notice to the
parties. There is no revision or
correction of the ballots because EPC No. 2007-04 was already submitted for
resolution. Public respondent, in
coordinating with the SET, is simply resolving the submitted protest case
before it. The parties necessarily take
no part in said deliberation, which require utmost secrecy. Needless to state, the actual decision-making
process is supposed to be conducted only by the designated members of the
Second Division of the public respondent in strict confidentiality.”
In
other words, what took place at the SET were the internal deliberations of the
COMELEC, as a quasi-judicial body, in the course of appreciating the evidence
presented and deciding the provincial election contest on the merits. These deliberations are no different from
judicial deliberations which are considered confidential and privileged.[23]
We find it significant that the private respondent’s Comment fully supported
the COMELEC’s position and disavowed any participation in the contested
proceeding the petitioner complained about.
The petitioner, on the other hand, has not shown that the private
respondent was ever present in any proceeding at the SET relating to the
provincial election contest.
To
conclude, the rights to notice and to be heard are not material considerations
in the COMELEC’s handling of the Bulacan provincial election contest after the
transfer of the ballot boxes to the SET; no proceedings at the instance of one
party or of COMELEC has been conducted at the SET that would require notice and
hearing because of the possibility of prejudice to the other party. The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to
notify either party of the steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on
the merits of the provincial election contest.
In the context of our standard of review for the petition, we see no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed
by the COMELEC in its deliberation on the Bulacan election contest and the
appreciation of ballots this deliberation entailed.
Alleged
Violations of
Deliberation
Stage Rights.
On
the basis of the above conclusion, we see no point in discussing any alleged
violation of the deliberative stage rights. First, no illegal proceeding ever
took place that would bear the “poisonous fruits” that the petitioner
fears. Secondly, in the absence of the
results of the COMELEC deliberations through its decision on the election
protest, no basis exists to apply the Ang
Tibay deliberative stage rights; there is nothing for us to test under the
standards of the due process deliberative stages rights before the COMELEC
renders its decision. Expressed in terms of our standard of review, we have as
yet no basis to determine the existence of any grave abuse of discretion.
Conduct
of COMELEC
Deliberations
at the SET Premises
We
turn to the issue of the propriety of the COMELEC’s consideration of the
provincial election contest (specifically its appreciation of the contested
ballots) at the SET premises and while the same ballots are also under
consideration by the SET for another election contest legitimately within the
SET’s own jurisdiction.
We
state at the outset that the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the provincial
election contest, as the petitioner seems to imply, because of the transmittal
of the provincial ballot boxes and other election materials to the SET. The Constitution conferred upon the COMELEC
jurisdiction over election protests involving provincial officials. The COMELEC
in this case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter, i.e.,
the provincial election contest, as well as over the parties. After its jurisdiction attached, this jurisdiction
cannot be ousted by subsequent events such as the temporary transfer of
evidence and material records of the proceedings to another tribunal exercising
its own jurisdiction over another election contest pursuant to the Constitution. This is the rule of adherence of
jurisdiction.[24]
Thus,
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over provincial election contest exists side by
side with the jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, with each tribunal
being supreme in their respective areas of concern (the Senate election
contests for the SET, and the regional, provincial and city election contests
for the COMELEC), and with neither one being higher than the other in terms of
precedence so that the jurisdiction of one must yield to the other.
But
while no precedence in jurisdiction exists, the COMELEC, vowing to the reality
that only a single ballot exists in an election for national and local
officials, saw it fit to lay down the rule on the “order of preference in the custody and revision of ballots and
other documents contained in the ballot boxes.”
The order, in terms of the adjudicatory tribunal and as provided in
COMELEC Resolution No. 2812, runs:
1.
Presidential Electoral Tribunal;
2.
Senate Electoral Tribunal;
3.
House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal;
4.
Commission on Elections; and
5.
Regional Trial Courts.
This
order of preference dictated that the ballot boxes and other election materials
in Bulacan’s provincial election contest, had to be transferred to the SET when
the latter needed these materials for its revision of ballots. The transfer to
the SET, however, did not mean that the Bulacan provincial election contest –
at that time already submitted for decision – had to be suspended as the
COMELEC held in its Orders of
With the COMELEC retaining its
jurisdiction over the Bulacan provincial election contest, the legal effect of
the physical transfer of the ballots and other election materials to the SET for
purposes of its own revision becomes a non-issue, given the arrangement between
the COMELEC and the SET, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2812, to “coordinate
and make arrangements with each other so as not to delay or interrupt the revision
of ballots being conducted,” all for the purpose of the expeditious disposition
of their respective protest cases. The
SET itself honored this arrangement as shown by the letter of the SET Secretary
that the COMELEC could “conduct proceedings” within the Tribunal premises as
authorized by the Acting Chairman of the Tribunal, Justice Antonio T. Carpio.[26] This arrangement recognized the COMELEC’s effective
authority over the Bulacan ballots and other election materials, although these
were temporarily located at the SET premises.
This arrangement, too, together with the side by side and
non-conflicting existence of the COMELEC and SET jurisdictions, negate the
validity of the petitioner’s argument that the COMELEC transgressed the rule on
separation of powers when it acted on the Bulacan provincial election contest
while the ballot boxes were at the SET premises. Rather than negate, this
arrangement reinforced the separate but co-existing nature of these tribunals’
respective jurisdictions.
As the petitioner argues and the
COMELEC candidly admits, “there is no specific rule which allows the COMELEC to
conduct an appreciation of ballots outside its premises and of those which are
outside its own custody.”[27] But while this is true, there is likewise
nothing to prohibit the COMELEC from undertaking the appreciation of ballot
side by side with the SET’s own revision of ballots for the senatorial votes,
in light especially of the COMELEC’s general authority to adopt means to effect
its powers and jurisdiction under its Rules of Procedure. Section 4 of these Rules states:
Sec. 4.
Means to Effect Jurisdiction. - All auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry into effect its powers or jurisdiction may be employed
by the Commission; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
power or jurisdiction is not specifically provided for by law or these rules,
any suitable process or proceeding may be adopted.
This
rule is by no means unusual and unique to the COMELEC as the courts have the
benefit of this same type of rule under Section 6, Rule 136 of the Rules of
Court. The courts’ own rule provides:
Means
to Carry Jurisdiction into Effect. When by law jurisdiction is conferred o n a
court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer;
and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode
of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said
law or rules.
Incidentally,
the COMELEC authority to promulgate the above rule enjoys constitutional
moorings; in the grant to the COMELEC of its jurisdiction, the Constitution provided
it with the accompanying authority to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings
and practice before it or before any of its offices, provided that these rules
shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.[28] The Constitution additionally requires that
the rules of procedure that the COMELEC will promulgate must expedite the disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies.[29] This
constitutional standard is authority, no less, that the COMELEC can cite in
defending its action. For ultimately, the appreciation of the Bulacan ballots
that the COMELEC undertook side by side with the SET’s own revision of ballots,
constitutes an exercise of discretion made under the authority of the
above-cited COMELEC rule of procedure.
On the basis of the standards set
by Section 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and of the Constitution itself
in the handling of election cases, we rule that the COMELEC action is a valid exercise
of discretion as it is a suitable and reasonable process within the exercise of
its jurisdiction over provincial election contests, aimed at expediting the
disposition of this case, and with no adverse, prejudicial or discriminatory
effects on the parties to the contest that would render the rule unreasonable.
Since
the COMELEC action, taken by its Second Division, is authorized under the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the Second Division cannot in any sense be said to be
intruding into the COMELEC en banc
rule-making prerogative when the Second Division chose to undertake ballot
appreciation within the SET premises side by side with the SET revision of
ballots. To be exact, the Second
Division never laid down any new rule; it merely acted pursuant to a rule that
the COMELEC en banc itself had
previously enacted.
In
light of these conclusions, we need not discuss the other issues raised.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, we DISMISS the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
We accordingly LIFT the STATUS QUO ORDER we issued, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
(On official leave)
|
REYNATO
S. PUNO Chief
Justice |
|
|
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING Acting
Chief Justice RENATO
C. CORONA Associate
Justice MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate
Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice (On
official leave) PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
|
(On official
leave) MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO
A. ABAD Associate Justice
Associate Justice
|
|
CERTIFICATION
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
**
Acting Chief Justice from
***
On official leave.
**** On official leave.
[1] Filed under Rule 64, in relation
to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court.
[2] See Petition, p. 12.
[3] Rollo, p. 45.
[4] J. Bernas, Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government, 2005, pp.
718-719.
[5] I. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2003, p. 14.
[6] Quintos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 149800,
[7] Suliguin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 166046,
[8] Supra note 3.
[9] See Section 3, Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court. The petitioner received the COMELEC Resolution denying his
motion for reconsideration on
[10] Section 1 (first paragraph),
Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
[11] Ututalum v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. L-25349,
[12] See: Presidential Anti-Dollar
Salting Task Force v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83578,
[13] See: Cariño v. Commission on
Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681,
[14] See: Cipriano v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 158830,
[15] The Senate and House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunals, as provided in the Constitution are still
the “sole judge” of their respective
election contests, but like the COMELEC, they are quasi-judicial bodies and do
not exercise judicial power under the Constitution. For its part, the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, wholly composed of the Justices of the Supreme
Court, is not a quasi-judicial body because adjudicative power is given to the
Supreme Court, as a court sitting en banc.
[16] 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
[17] Bautista v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 154796-97,
[18]
Supra note 17.
[19] CONSTITUTION,
Article VIII, Section 14; See Solid
Homes, Inc. v. Laserna, G.R. No. 166051, April 8, 2008, 550 SCRA 613.
[20] Rollo, p. 12.
[21]
[22] COMELEC Comment; rollo,
pp. 72-S and 72-T.
[23]
See Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, G.R. No. 133250,
[24] See: Ramos v. Central Bank of
the Philippines, No. L-29352,
[25] Rollo, pp. 29-34.
[26] Supra note 3.
[27] Petition, pp. 13–14; rollo,
pp. 18-19; COMELEC Reply; rollo, pp. 72-R – 72-S.
[28] CONSTITUTION, Article IX-A,
Section 6.
[29] CONSTITUTION, Article IX-C,
Section 3.