THIRD DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE
Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - PABLO LUSABIO, JR. y VERGARA, Accused-Appellant, TOMASITO DE LOS Accused. |
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G.R. No. 186119 Present: CARPIO, J. Chairperson. CHICO-NAZARIO, PERALTA, BERSAMIN,* and ABAD,** JJ. Promulgated: October 27, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On appeal before Us is the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01462 dated
The antecedents are as follows:
For the death of Edwin Labini on
That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of June 12, 2001, at Barangay Biton, municipality of Magallanes, province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stabbed one Edwin Labini, who sustained mortal/fatal injuries that caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.[3]
On
That on or about June 12, 2001, at more or less 9:00 o’clock in the evening, at Sitio Talisay, Barangay Biton, Municipality of Magallanes, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while both armed with bolos, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another by means of treachery and evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of murder directly by overt acts by then and there hacking and stabbing one Pablo Lusabio, Jr., who sustained the following injuries, to wit:
- incised wound 2nd and 4th finger posterior 1 ½ cm. each;
- incised wound forearm left anterior, m 1/3 #2 4-5 cm each;
- stab wound right thigh proximal 1/3 post. 0/0 middle 1/3 medial 4-5 cm. each;
- incised wound left arm middle 1/3 lateral 3-4 cm. involving muscle;
- stab wound chest over 5th and 8th ICS post axillary line 1 cm. each non-penetrating;
- incised wound lumb[a]r area left, 1 cm.
but said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, by reason of causes other than their spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries sustained by said Pablo Lusabio, Jr., are only slight and not mortal.[4]
In
Criminal Case No. 01-459 for murder, when arraigned on
In
the case for attempted murder (Criminal Case No. 01-464), Tomasito de los
Upon
agreement of the parties, the criminal cases were consolidated and heard
simultaneously, inasmuch as they happened on the date involving the same
persons and under similar circumstances.
In
Criminal Case No. 01-459 (Murder), the prosecution presented four
witnesses, namely: Doris Labini,[5] Dr.
Irene V. Ella,[6] Jose
Labini[7]
and Elsie Gocoyo.[8]
Doris
Labini, wife of the victim – Edwin Labini – testified that at around
Dr.
Irene V. Ella, Municipal Health Officer of Magallanes, Sorsogon, conducted a
post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Edwin Labini at
Jose
Labini, brother of the victim, testified that at
Elsie
Gocoyo, sister of the victim, testified that at around
Elsie
testified they spent around P46,635.00, which included P2,500.00
for the cemetery and P20,000.00 for funeral services.
For
the defense, Dr. Antonio L. Lopez,[10]
Medical Specialist II at the
Accused-appellant
Pablo Lusabio, Jr.[13]
took the witness stand. His version of
the incident is as follows: On 12 June
2001, he was in his house at Sitio Talisay, Barangay Biton, Magallanes,
Sorsogon. He decided to go to the house
of Bugoy Gelilio to inform the latter that the former could not stand as the
godfather of Bugoy’s son, because accused-appellant could not attend the
baptism, for it coincided with the fiesta
of their place. As Bugoy was not in his
house, Lusabio told one of Bugoy’s visitors that he (Lusabio) could not attend
the baptism of his son the following day, because it was their barangay fiesta, and to just get someone
else to stand in his place. Lusabio
proceeded home. Along the way, Tomasito
de los
Accused-appellant
denied the statement of Doris Labini that he was the one who stabbed Edwin. He claimed that if it were true that
In
Criminal Case No. 01-464 (Attempted Murder), private complainant Pablo
Lusabio, Jr.,[14] Dr.
Antonio Lopez[15] and
Ricardo Cabrera[16] took
the witness stand.
Dr.
Antonio Lopez testified anew that he issued a Medical Certificate to Pablo
Lusabio, Jr., whom he treated from 13 to
Ricardo
Cabrera testified to corroborate the statement of Lusabio that Tomasito de los
As
private complaint, Pablo Lusabio testified, reiterating the statements he made
in Criminal Case No. 01-459. He said he
knew Edwin and Doris Labini, because they came from the same barangay. He claimed that Edwin Labini and Tomasito de
los
For
the defense, the witnesses were Tomasito de los
Accused
Tomasito de los
Tomasito could not figure out why he was
impleaded in the murder case, when he even volunteered to be a prosecution
witness in favor of the Labinis, considering that he was a witness to the
killing of Edwin Labini by Pablo Lusabio, Jr.
He explained that he did not come to the aid of Edwin Labini when the
latter was stabbed by Lusabio, because he was unarmed while Lusabio was armed
with a bladed weapon.
Tomasito
disclosed that on the fateful night, he was about to buy liquor when Edwin, who
was inside his house, saw him and asked where he was going. When he informed Edwin that he was going to
buy liquor, Edwin told him not to buy anymore, because he (Edwin) had liquor in
his house. Edwin gave Tomasito liquor,
and they proceeded to the house of Romeo de los
On
the early morning of
Edgar
Apuya, Barangay Captain of Biton, Magallanes, Sorsogon, testified that on the
evening of
Apuya
disclosed that Lusabio surrendered to him the following day and the former immediately
turned him over to the police. Edgar
observed that Lusabio had injuries when the latter surrendered to him.
Jose
Labini, brother of Edwin Labini, testified he came to know about the death of
his brother from Tomasito de los
Pablo
Lusabio, Jr.[21] took
the witness stand anew as a rebuttal witness.
He denied stabbing Edwin Labini and said that if it were not for the
latter, he would have been killed.
Lusabio said Edwin Labini tried to pacify and stop Tomasito de los
Lusabio
bared that a certain Melda, sister of Tomasito de los
The
next rebuttal witness was Emily Tan,[22]
Barangay Secretary of Barangay Biton, Magallanes, Sorsogon, who revealed that a
case had been blottered in the barangay against
Edwin Labini. The complainant therein was
the Barangay Captain who had been verbally maligned by Edwin Labini. Said case, which was referred to the police,
was settled amicably when Edwin Labini apologized to the Barangay Captain and
promised not to commit the same wrong again.
As
sur-rebuttal witness, Imelda Trongcoso,[23]
sister-in-law of Tomasito de los
In
its decision dated 24 September 2004, the trial court, in Criminal Case No.
01-459, found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, while
Tomasito de los Santos was acquitted of the charge. As to Criminal Case No. 01-464, Tomasito de
los
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused PABLO LUSABIO, JR. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of –
a) MURDER in Criminal Case No. 01-459, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, regardless of the presence of mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender (Art. 63, R.P.C.); to indemnify the heirs of Edwin Labini in the amounts of Php20,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages; Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death; and another Php50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs.
b) As regards the other accused TOMASITO DE LOS SANTOS, for failure of the prosecution’s evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 01-459 and Crim. Case No. 01-464, he is hereby ordered ACQUITTED of the two charges filed against him in both cases. Without pronouncement as to costs.
The period of preventive imprisonment already served by accused PABLO LUSABIO, JR. shall be credited in the service of his sentence pursuant to the provisions of Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The case against the other accused Ronnie Dig is hereby ordered temporarily archived pending his arrest.[24]
In
convicting Pablo Lusabio, Jr. of murder, the trial court found prosecution
witness Doris Labini, wife of the victim Edwin Labini, to be credible. Her testimony relative to the stabbing of her
husband was candid, straightforward and consistent with the substance of her
Sworn Statement and declaration during the preliminary investigation. The trial court ruled that her credibility
was not impaired by her relationship with the victim. No ill motive was ascribed to her in
testifying against Pablo Lusabio, Jr. and Tomasito de los
As
to accused-appellant Pablo Lusabio’s defenses of denial and alibi, the trial
court did not find them convincing to exonerate him from the murder charge, in
light of the positive identification made by the victim’s wife that Pablo was the
one who had assaulted the late Edwin Labini.
His identification as the attacker was made not only by the victim’s
wife, but also by Tomasito de los
As
to Tomasito de los
The
trial court declared that treachery attended the killing of Edwin Labini
explaining that although the attack was frontal, same was so sudden and
unexpected giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself. It did not appreciate the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and superior strength. However, it appreciated in favor of Lusabio the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
As
regards the case for attempted murder, the trial court found the case filed by
Pablo Lusabio, Jr. against Tomasito de los
The trial court found the
corroborating testimony of alleged eyewitness Ricardo Cabrera absurd. It said that Cabrera who was afraid to tell
the barangay authorities what he saw
that fateful night would now suddenly volunteer to testify in behalf of Pablo
Lusabio, Jr. It likewise found incredible
his testimony that Lusabio, despite lying prostrate on the ground while
Tomasito de los Santos and Ronnie Dig, who were armed with a machete and a ginunting, were ganging up on him,
suffered only slight wounds that would not cause death even without immediate
medical attention.
Despite finding that Pablo Lusabio,
Jr. suffered minor injuries on the night of 12 June 2001, the trial court found
the prosecution’s evidence insufficient to show that Tomasito de los Santos had
anything to do with the infliction of said wounds. However, it said that it was not discounting
entirely the probability that Ronnie Dig, the other accused who had remained at
large, could be the real culprit who inflicted the wounds on Pablo Lusabio, Jr.
On 21 October 2004, accused-appellant
filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the decision be reconsidered
and/or modified by acquitting him of Murder in Crim. Case No. 01-459 and
finding Tomasito de los Santos guilty in Crim. Case No. 01-464.[25]
In its Order dated
The trial court, per Order dated
The appeal of accused-appellant was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR. HC No. 01462. Appellant’s
brief contained the following assignment of errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS DORIS LABINI, WHO IS THE VICTIM’S WIFE, THE VICTIM’S SIBLINGS, AND OF THE ACCUSED TOMASITO DE LOS SANTOS WHO HIMSELF ADMITTED HAVING FETCHED THE VICTIM AND IMMEDIATELY FLED THE CRIME SCENE AFTER THE INCIDENT.
3. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE LATTER’S WITNESSES WHICH ARE MORE IN ACCORD WITH TRUTH, HUMAN EXPERIENCE, LOGIC AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE.
On
Aggrieved,
accused-appellant appeals to this Court via
a Notice of Appeal.[29] Said notice of appeal having been filed
within the reglementary period, the same was given due course and the records
of the case elevated to us.[30]
In
a resolution dated
It is the contention of accused-appellant
that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, three of whom were related
to the victim, should not have been given full credence by the lower courts. He
further tries to discredit one of them, Doris Labini, the wife of the victim,
who allegedly witnessed the stabbing of Edwin Labini, arguing that her
testimony was inconsistent with that of Tomasito de los
Accused-appellant brands Doris Labini
as a biased witness, thus unreliable, because she was the wife of Edwin
Labini. The fact that she was the wife
of the victim did not necessarily make her a partial witness. It is well-settled that mere
relationship of a witness to the victim does not impair the witness’
credibility. On the contrary, a witness’
relationship to a victim of a crime would even make his or her testimony more
credible, as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in
vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.[34] A witness is said to be biased when his relation to the cause
or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false
color to his statements, or to suppress or to pervert the truth, or to state
what is false.[35] To warrant rejection of the
testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently
of the relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or
that improper or evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused
falsely.[36]
The relationship
of Doris Labini to the victim, per se, does not impair her credibility. We, like both lower courts, are convinced
that she is telling the truth. Moreover,
the defense failed to show any evidence that Doris Labini had improper or evil motives to
testify falsely against accused-appellant.
This being the case, her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
The defense tries to further destroy
the credibility of Doris Labini by arguing that her testimony is not consistent
with that of Tomasito de los
Such inconsistency, which we consider
to be minor or trivial, will not impair Doris Labini’s credibility. This Court has ruled that inconsistencies in
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declarations, their
veracity, or the weight of their testimonies. Such minor flaws may even enhance
the worth of a testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities.[37] Trivial inconsistencies do not rock the
pedestal upon which the credibility of the witness rests, but enhance
credibility, as they manifest spontaneity and lack of scheming.[38] It is not to be expected that the witness will
be able to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total
recall.[39] Furthermore, it is to be noted that Tomasito
de los
In the case at bar, Doris
Labini positively identified Pablo Lusabio, Jr. as the one who stabbed her
husband. Such declaration was
corroborated by the testimony of Tomasito de los
Accused-appellant interposes the
defense of denial. He denies
participation in the crime, claiming that it was Tomasito de los
Both lower courts found Cabrera’s
testimony incredible. So do we. The trial court aptly explained why it did
not give credence to Cabrera’s testimony.
Indeed,
we find it absurd, that an alleged eyewitnesses such as Ricardo Cabrera, who
was even afraid to tell the barangay authorities of Brgy. Biton, Magallanes,
Sorsogon, of what he saw on that evening of June 12, 2001 at around 9:00
o’clock, despite the fact that the alleged incident happened just near the
house of the barangay captain, would suddenly come out into the open as bold as
a lion and volunteer to testify for and in behalf of accused Pablo Lusabio,
Jr. It must [be] emphasized that said
witness instead of reporting the incident to the barangay captain of Biton, ran
towards the dance hall and spent the whole night there dancing and enjoying
himself as if nothing unusual happened.
He did not even bother to tell the family of Pablo Lusabio, Jr. with
whom he is accordingly familiar about what happened to Pablo in the hands of a
certain Tomasito de los
Moreover, a comparison of the substance of the testimonies of accused Pablo Lusabio, Jr. and that of Ricardo Cabrera would lead one to the inevitable conclusion – THAT THEY WERE SPECIALLY TAILORED TO SUIT ONE ANOTHER.
Pablo Lusabio, Jr. testified – that
on his way home, he was waylaid by the duo of
Tomasito de los
The version of Ricardo Cabrera is
this – he was on his way to the dance hall from their house, when he
accidentally saw Pablo Lusabio, Jr. being hacked by Tomasito de los
From the two versions it can readily be deduced, that it was only after the deceased Edwin Labini shouted at Ronnie Dig to stop and Tomasito turned his attention to Edwin Labini, that accused Pablo Lusabio, Jr. was able to crawl through a bamboo fence and escaped. Almost of the same substance was the tenor of the testimony of Ricardo Cabrera, when he stated that he heard the deceased Edwin Labini who was seated on the fence uttered something. He failed to understand it, however, because he ran very fast. Both versions were tailored to show, that deceased Edwin Labini was still alive when the two of them left the scene of the incident, thus, implying that the persons responsible for this death were no other than the accused Tomasito de los Santos and Ronnie Dig.
If that were really true, why would the
duo of Tomasito de los Satnos and Ronnie Dig suddenly turn their ire on the
deceased just because he shouted at them to stop, if their real intention was
to kill the accused Pablo Lusabio, Jr.
It must be borne in mind that the late Edwin Labini was already there
present seated on the fence and watching the duo ganging up on Pablo Lusabio,
Jr. as per version of Ricardo Cabrera, even before the latter chanced upon the
incident. Thus, implying that the three
were in the company of one another and not against each other. Furthermore, considering that accused Pablo
Lusabio, Jr. was lying prostrate on the ground, while the duo of Tomasito and
Ronnie who were armed with a “machete” and a “ginunting” type of bolo were
ganging up on him, it was surprising to note, that the former only suffered
slight injuries. Which injuries as
described by the doctor were not serious and could not cause the death of the
patient even without immediate medical attention. Finally, why did Pablo Lusabio, Jr. not give
a statement before the barangay captain during his surrender the following
morning, denying his participation in the killing of Edwin Labini, and pointed
to Tomasito de los
To be believed, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence
of non-culpability. Otherwise, it is purely self-serving and without merit.[41] A denial unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence is negative, self-serving, merits no weight in law, and
cannot therefore be given greater evidentiary value than the testimonies of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[42] Greater weight is given to the categorical
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the
accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime.[43] Indeed, denial cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any
ill motive to testify against accused-appellant. Absence of improper motives makes a testimony
worthy of full faith and credence.[44] In this case, there being no strong and
credible evidence adduced to overcome the testimonies of Doris Labini and
Tomasito de los
In another attempt at exoneration, accused-appellant
argues that the testimony of Dr. Antonio Lopez, the doctor who treated his
wounds, should not have been disregarded, because it substantiates his (accused-appellant’s)
claim that it was he who was attacked by Tomasito de los Santos and Ronnie Dig;
and that when Edwin Labini tried to pacify De los Santos and Dig, the two
turned their ire on him. The physician’s
testimony, he said, showed that the wounds he sustained were not
self-inflicted.
We fully agree with the trial court
that this declaration of Dr. Lopez will not free accused-appellant from
criminal liability. The trial court
never denied that accused-appellant suffered minor injuries on the night Edwin
Labini was killed. However, it ruled
that the infliction of the wounds on him can be interpreted to pertain to
another incident different from that which led to the death of Edwin Labini. It stressed that said incident would not
exonerate accused-appellant completely from criminal liability, as he had been
positively identified as the attacker of Edwin Labini. In fact, the trial court did not discount
entirely the possibility that the other accused Ronnie Dig, who has remained at
large, could have been the real culprit who had inflicted the wounds on the
person of accused-appellant.
All in all, we find the evidence of
the prosecution to be more credible than that adduced by
accused-appellant. When it comes to
credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence.
The reason is obvious. Having the
full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of
testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to
evaluate testimonial evidence properly.[45]
The Court of Appeals further affirmed the findings
of the RTC. In this regard, it is
settled that when the trial court’s findings
have been affirmed by the appellate court,
said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. We find
no compelling reason to deviate from their findings.
Finally, accused-appellant submits
that if ever he committed a crime, he merely committed homicide. He maintains that the prosecution failed to
prove that he deliberately and consciously adopted a particular mode of attack
in order to eliminate the risk to his person from any defense that Edwin Labini
might offer.
The lower court was correct in appreciating
treachery in the commission of the crime.
There is treachery when the following
essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was
not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed
by him.[46] The essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the
latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the
part of the victim.[47] It was clearly established that Edwin Labini,
while talking to Pablo Lusabio, Jr. face to face, was suddenly stabbed by the
latter with a ten-inch bladed weapon for no reason at all. The suddenness of the stabbing and the fact
that Edwin Labini was unarmed gave him no opportunity to defend himself. It is likewise apparent that accused-appellant
consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack, making sure that the
victim would have no chance to defend himself by reason of the surprise attack.
In
People v. Villonez,[48]
we ruled that treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was
forewarned of danger to his person. What was decisive was that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or
to retaliate.
In the case on appeal, Edwin Labini was
completely unaware that he was going to be attacked. He was not forewarned of any danger to
himself, as there was no altercation or disagreement between the accused and him. He was merely conversing with
accused-appellant. If treachery may be
appreciated when the victim was forewarned, more so should it be appreciated
when the victim was not, as in the case at bar.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659,[49] murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. In the instant case, treachery, which was alleged and proved,
qualified the offense to murder. There being
no other mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
felony, accused-appellant was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua,
conformably to Article 63(2)[50] of
the Revised Penal Code.
We now go to the award of
damages. When death occurs due to a
crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim;
(2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages;
and (5) temperate damages.[51]
Civil indemnity is mandatory and
granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime.[52] The trial court and the Court of Appeals
properly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim as
civil indemnity. The amount of P75,000.00
as civil indemnity is awarded only if the crime is qualified by circumstances that
warrant the imposition of the death penalty.[53]
As to actual damages, both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals awarded only the amount of P20,000.00,
since the prosecution was only able to prove this amount via an official
receipt. The award of P25,000.00 for
temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of
burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.[54] Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,
temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of
the victim suffered pecuniary loss, although the exact amount was not proved.[55] In People
v. Magdaraog,[56]
we pronounced that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial
amount to less than P25,000.00, the award of temperate damages for P25,000.00
is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. Conversely, if the amount of actual damages
proven exceeds P25,000.00, then temperate damages may no longer be
awarded; actual damages based on the receipts presented during trial should
instead be granted. Thus, in lieu of
actual damages, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 are
awarded to the heirs of the victim.
Anent moral damages, the same are mandatory in case
of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the
death of the victim.[57] The award of
P50,000.00 by both lower courts is proper.
Both lower courts did not award exemplary
damages. The heirs of the victim are
entitled to exemplary damages, since the qualifying circumstance of treachery
was firmly established.[58] Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary
damages as part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The term aggravating
circumstances as used therein is to be understood in its broad or generic sense,
since the law did not specify otherwise.[59] Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we
award the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of the
victim.[60]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01462 dated P25,000.00 are awarded in lieu of actual damages; and
(2) exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 are awarded to the
heirs of Edwin Labini. Costs against the
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice |
LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
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ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
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ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Per
Special Order No. 763, dated
** Per
Special Order No. 753, dated
[1] Penned by Associate Vicente Q. Roxas with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring. CA rollo, pp. 183-199.
[2] Records (Crim. Case No. 01-464), pp. 182-225.
[3] Records (Crim. Case No. 01-459), p. 1.
[4] Records (Crim. Case No. 01-464), p. 1.
[5] TSN,
[6] TSN,
[7] TSN, 20 May 2002.
[8] TSN,
[9] Exh. A; Records (Crim. Case No. 01-459), p. 12.
[10] TSN,
[11] Exh. 4; Records (Crim. Case No. 01-464), p. 12.
[12]
[13] TSN,
[14] TSN,
[15] TSN,
[16] TSN, 20 May 2002.
[17] TSN,
[18] TSN,
[19] TSN, 19 May 2003.
[20]
[21] TSN,
[22] TSN,
[23] TSN,
[24] Records (Crim. Case No. 01-464), pp. 224-225.
[25] Records (Crim. Case No. 01-464), pp. 228-231.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] CA rollo, p. 222.
[30]
[31] Rollo, p. 26.
[32]
[33]
[34] People
v. Romero, 459 Phil. 484, 499 (2003).
[35] People v. Ulgasan, 390 Phil. 763, 778 (2000).
[36] People
v. Daen, Jr., 314 Phil.
280, 291 (1995).
[37] People
v. Mariano, G.R. No. 168693,
[38] People
v. Malate, G.R. No. 185724,
[39] Sayoc
v. People, G.R. No. 157723,
[40] Records (Crim. Case No. 01-464), pp. 219-221.
[41] Belonghilot v. Hon. Angeles, 450 Phil. 265, 293 (2003).
[42] People
v. Alviz, G.R. Nos. 144551-55,
[43] People v. Baccay, 348 Phil. 322, 327-328 (1998).
[44] People
v. Brecinio, G.R. No. 138534,
[45] People v. Escultor, 473 Phil. 717, 730 (2004).
[46] People v. Escote, Jr., 448 Phil. 749, 786 (2003).
[47] People
v. Botona, G.R. No. 161291,
[48] 359 Phil. 95, 112 (1998).
[49] An Act to Impose the Death Penalty
on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, other Special Laws, and for other Purposes. Took Effect on
[50] Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. x x x.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
x x x x
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
[51] People
v. Beltran, Jr., G. R. No. 168051,
[52] People
v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271,
[53] People
v. Barcena, G.R. No. 168737,
[54] People v. Dacillo, 471 Phil. 497, 510 (2004).
[55] People
v. Surongon, G.R. No. 173478,
[56] G.R. No. 151251,
[57] People v. Bajar, 460 Phil. 683, 700 (2003).
[58] People v. Beltran, Jr., supra note 51.
[59] People v. Abolidor, 467 Phil. 709, 722 (2004).
[60] People
v. Anguac, G.R. No. 176744,