Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
|
GINA A. DOMINGO, Petitioner, -
versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 186101 Present: CARPIO,
J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,
and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: October
12, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1]
dated November 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31158
entitled People of the Philippines v.
Gina A. Domingo, which affirmed the Decision[2]
dated May 21, 2007 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-98-75971-87 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 80 in
Private complainant, Remedios D. Perez (Remedios), is a
businesswoman and a valued depositor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI),
Being the wife of the best friend of Remedios’ son, petitioner
had a close relationship with Remedios and her family.
On June 15, 1995, Remedios accompanied petitioner to BPI
because the latter wanted to open an account therein. Remedios then introduced petitioner
to the bank’s staff and officers. Soon thereafter, petitioner frequented
Remedios’ office and volunteered to deposit her checks in her bank account at
BPI.
Sometime in October 1996, Remedios wanted to buy a car
thinking that she already had a substantial amount in her account. Thus, she
went to BPI to withdraw two hundred thousand pesos (PhP 200,000). To her
surprise, however, she found out that her money had already been withdrawn. The
withdrawals were effected through 18 encashment slips bearing her forged
signatures reaching the amount of eight hundred thirty-eight thousand pesos (PhP
838,000). She denied having affixed her signatures on the encashment slips
used.
Testimonies showed that on several occasions beginning
September 18, 1995 until October 18, 1996, petitioner presented a number of
encashment slips of various amounts to BPI, and by virtue of which she was able
to withdraw huge amounts of money from the checking account of the complainant.
She deposited the bigger portion of these amounts to her own account and
pocketed some of them, while also paying the rest to Skycable. The transactions
were processed by four tellers of BPI, namely: Regina Ramos, Mary Antonette
Pozon, Sheila Ferranco, and Kim Rillo who verified the signatures of the
complainant on the questioned encashment slips.
As synthesized by the trial court, the transactions are as
follows:
|
Date of encashment slip |
Amount withdrawn via encashment slip |
Amount deposited to accused’s account |
Amount paid to Skycable (PS) or Pocketed
( |
Name of Teller who processed the
transaction |
|
1. Sept. 8, 1995 |
P10,000.00 |
P8,000.00 |
P2,000.00 ( |
|
|
2. Sept. 18, 1995 |
30,000.00 |
20,000.00 |
10,000.00 ( |
|
|
3. Feb. 12, 1996 |
30,000.00 |
28,550.00 |
1,450.00 (PS) |
Shiela Ferranco |
|
4. Feb. 15, 1996 |
20,000.00 |
20,000.00 |
none |
Mary Antonette Pozon |
|
5. March 21, 1996 |
40,000.00 |
30,000.00 |
10,000.00 ( |
Shiela Ferranco |
|
6. April 8, 1996 |
40,000.00 |
35,000.00 |
5,000.00 ( |
|
|
7. April 10, 1996 |
30,000.00 |
30,000.00 |
none |
Shiela Ferranco |
|
8. April 29, 1996 |
40,000.00 |
34,500.00 |
5,500.00 ( |
|
|
9. May 13, 1996 |
40,000.00 |
38,550.00 |
1,450.00 (PS) |
Shiela Ferranco |
|
10. May 24, 1996 |
50,000.00 |
50,000.00 |
none |
Mary Antonette Pozon |
|
11. June 7, 1996 |
40,000.00 |
40,000.00 |
none |
Shiela Ferranco |
|
12. June 26, 1996 |
45,000.00 |
45,000.00 |
none |
Shiela Ferranco |
|
13. July 5, 1996 |
25,000.00 |
25,000.00 |
none |
Mary Antonette Pozon |
|
14. July 17, 1996 |
40,000.00 |
40,000.00 |
none |
Mary Antonette Pozon |
|
15. Aug. 5, 1996 |
50,000.00 |
48,550.00 |
1,450.00 (PS) |
Shiela Ferranco |
|
16. Sept. 17, 1996 |
35,000.00 |
35,000.00 |
none |
Shiela Ferranco |
|
17. Oct. 4, 1996 |
40,000.00 |
40,000.00 |
none |
Kim P. Rillo |
|
18. Oct. 18, 1996 |
40,000.00 |
40,000.00 |
none |
Kim P. Rillo |
After having been apprised of the illegal transactions of petitioner
on complainant’s account, the latter complained to the bank for allowing the
withdrawal of the money with the use of falsified encashment slips and demanded
that the amount illegally withdrawn be returned. She was required by BPI to
submit checks bearing her genuine signature for examination by the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. After examination, Josefina dela Cruz
of the PNP Crime Laboratory came up with a finding that complainant’s
signatures on the questioned encashment slips had been forged. Only then did
the bank agree to pay her the amount of PhP 645,000 representing a portion of
the amount illegally withdrawn with the use of the forged encashment slips.
In her defense, petitioner testified that she is a dentist, practicing
her profession in her house at No. 21,
Petitioner, however, admitted that she was once a depositor of
Remedios and BPI filed a complaint before the prosecutor’s office.
The Information in Criminal Case No.
Q-98-75971 reads as follows:
That
on or about the 18th day of October 1996, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, a private individual, by means of false
pretenses and/or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud and by means of falsification of commercial document
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Remedios D.
Perez and/or the Bank of the Philippine Islands represented in the following
manner, to wit: said accused falsified or caused to be falsified an encashment
slip of Bank of the Philippine Islands dated October 18, 1996 for P40,000.00,
Philippine Currency, by then and there filling up said encashment slip and
signing the name of one Remedios D. Perez, a depositor of said bank under
Account No. 3155-0572-61, thereby making it appear, as it did appear that said
encashment slip is genuine in all respect, when in truth and in fact said
accused well knew that Remedios D. Perez never signed the said encashment slip;
that once said encashment slip was forged and falsified in the manner set
forth, accused pretending to be the said Remedios D. Perez used it to withdraw
the aforesaid sum of P40,000.00 from the latter’s account, and once, in
possession of the said amount of money misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the same to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the offended party.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[3]
The allegations in the
Information in Criminal Case Nos. Q-98-75972-87 are all substantially the same
as those in Criminal Case No. Q-98-75971, except for the dates of the
commission of the crime or dates of the BPI encashment slips and the amounts
involved, to wit:
Criminal Case No. Date of the
commission of Amount Involved the crime/encashment
slip
1. Q-98-75972 October 4, 1996 P40,000.00
2. Q-98-75973 September 4, 1996 35,000.00
3. Q-98-75974 August 5, 1996 50,000.00
4. Q-98-75975 July 17, 1996 40,000.00
5. Q-98-75976 July 5, 1996 25,000.00
6. Q-98-75977 June 26, 1996 45,000.00
7. Q-98-75978 June 7, 1996 40,000.00
8. Q-98-75979 May 24, 1996 50,000.00
9. Q-98-75980 May 13, 1996 40,000.00
10. Q-98-75981 April 29, 1996 40,000.00
11. Q-98-75982 April 10, 1996 30,000.00
12. Q-98-75983 April 8, 1996 40,000.00
13. Q-98-75984 March 21, 1996 40,000.00
14. Q-98-75985 February 15, 1996 20,000.00
15. Q-98-75986 February 12, 1996 30,000.00
16. Q-98-75987 September 18, 1995 30,000.00[4]
Upon motion by the prosecution, the 17 cases were
consolidated and tried jointly by the trial court. When arraigned, petitioner
pleaded not guilty to each of the crimes charged in the 17 Informations. Trial
on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting seven witnesses, namely:
Remedios; Arturo Amores, General Manager of BPI, Aurora Blvd. Branch; Regina
Ramos, Mary Antonette Pozon, Sheila Ferranco, and Kim P. Rillo, all bank
tellers of BPI, Aurora Blvd. Branch; and Josefina Dela Cruz, a Document
Examiner III of the PNP Crime Laboratory. On the part of the defense, it
presented petitioner herself and Carmelita Tanajora, petitioner’s house helper.
Ruling of the Trial Court
On May 21, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, joint judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged in Criminal [Case] Nos. Q-98-75971; Q-98-75972; Q-98-75973; Q-98-75974; Q-98-75975; Q-98-75976; Q-98-75977; Q-98-75978; Q-98-75979; Q-98-75980; Q-98-75981; Q-98-75982; Q-98-75983; Q-98-75984; Q-98-75985; Q-98-75986 and Q-98-75987. Accordingly, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75971 – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75972 – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
3. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75973 – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
4. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75974 – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Eight (8) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
5. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75975 – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
6. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75976 – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Six (6) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
7. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75977 – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Eight (8) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
8. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75978 – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
9. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75979 – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Eight (8) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
10. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75980 – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
11. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75981 – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
12. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75982 – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Six (6) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
13. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75983 – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
14. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75984 – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
15. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75985 – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Six (6) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
16. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75986 – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Six (6) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
17. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-7598[7] – Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Six (6) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
Further, the accused is hereby ordered to pay BPI and/or Remedios Perez the total sum of Six Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P635,000.00), as civil indemnity, plus six percent (6%) interest per annum from the time of the filing of these cases, until fully paid.
The bond posted by the accused for her provisional liberty is hereby canceled.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Ruling of the Appellate Court
On appeal, the CA, in its
Decision dated November 24, 2008, disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged Joint Decision of the Court a quo is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The CA held that petitioner was the
one who authored the crimes of which she was convicted reasoning that she was
the only person who stood to be benefited by the falsification of the document
in question; thus, the presumption that she is the material author of the
falsification is present.
Moreover, petitioner’s theory that the crimes committed were
perpetrated by the bank tellers or is an inside job cannot be sustained because
of the lack of any evidence showing that the tellers harbored any ill motive
against her. The CA emphasized that the defense of denial, unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving and merits no
weight in law; it cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony
of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matter.
On March 4, 2009, petitioner
filed a timely appeal before this Court.
Petitioner interposes in
the present appeal the following assignment of errors:
I
ERROR IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE,
DOCUMENTARY AND TESTIMONIAL, WERE COMMITTED BY THE
II
ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW,
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL, WERE COMMITTED IN THE PROMULGATION OF THE SUBJECT
DECISION.
The appeal has no merit.
Substantially, the issues raised boil down to the question of
whether or not the evidence adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to
establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
Elements of Falsification of Commercial Documents are
Present
Petitioner contends that the decision of the lower court is
not supported by the evidence on record and that this evidence cannot sustain
in law the requirements of proof beyond reasonable doubt for the crime for
which she was charged.
Specifically, petitioner claims that, as a matter of policy,
the bank personnel verified the signature cards of private complainant Remedios
before any encashment can be drawn against the account of Remedios. Thus, petitioner
contends that the signatures in the encashment slips are genuine as found by
the staff and manager of BPI and that the cases filed against her are the
products of inside jobs. Further, she argues that the results of the
examinations conducted by Josefina dela Cruz of the PNP Crime Laboratory lack
evidentiary value, since the report only stated that the signatures on the
Encashment/Withdrawal Slips were different from the genuine signatures of Remedios
based on the checks, which contained the genuine signatures of Remedios, but
did not state that the signatures belong to petitioner.
The contentions are flawed.
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) punishes any
private individual who commits any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Art. 171 of the Code in any public or official document or letter of exchange
or any other kind of commercial document. The acts of falsification enumerated
in Art. 171 are:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. – The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Essentially, the elements of the crime of Falsification of
Commercial Document under Art. 172 are: (1) that the offender is a private
individual; (2) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification;
and (3) that the act of falsification is committed in a commercial document.
As borne by the records, all the elements of the crime are
present in the instant case. Petitioner is a private individual who presented
to the tellers of BPI 17 forged encashment slips on different dates and of
various amounts. The questioned encashment slips were falsified by petitioner
by filling out the same and signing the name of the private complainant, thereby
making it appear that Remedios signed the encashment slips and that they are genuine
in all respects, when in fact petitioner knew very well that Remedios never
signed the subject encashment slips.
In her testimony, Remedios categorically denied having filled
out and signed any of the subject encashment slips on the dates indicated on
them. Her testimony is further strengthened by the testimonies of the bank
manager and the bank tellers, who facilitated the banking transactions carried
out by petitioner with their branch. Their testimonies were coherent and
consistent in narrating that it was indeed petitioner who presented the
encashment slips, received the proceeds of the transactions, and/or caused the
transfer of the money to her own bank account.
Moreover, the testimony of Josefina dela Cruz (dela Cruz)
bolsters the findings of the trial court that the alleged signatures of
Remedios in the encashment slips are forged, to wit:
Q: Using the method you employed in the examination of questioned and standard signatures of Remedios Perez, will you please elaborate the study you made?
A: After conducting the examination, I reduced my examination to writing and my findings are as follows:
‘Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the questioned documents and the submitted standard signature reveals significant divergences in handwriting movement, stroke structure and other individual handwriting characteristics.’
Q: You mentioned divergences in handwriting movement, will you please point to this Honorable Court this significant divergences of differences in the strokes of handwriting?
A: First of all the manner of execution. The manner of execution is slow while in the execution of the standard, it is moderate. The line quality in the questioned signature, there is presence of tremors in the strokes while in the standard signatures, all the strokes are smooth. In the capital ‘R’ in the questioned signature, there is presence of re-trace strokes while in the standard signature, there is no re-trace strokes. In the downward portion of the letter ‘R’ in the questioned signature, the direction is downward while in the standard it is horizontal. Now the angular strokes following the capital ‘R’ is traced in the middle part of the letter ‘R’, the downward portion while in the standard, it is found in the last stroke of capital ‘R’. In the middle name letter ‘D’, the shape is more rounded on the questioned signature but in the standard it is more elongated. In the loop of the family name, it is more rounded in questioned signature[;] while in the standard, it is more elongated. With that, I was able to conclude that the questioned signatures Remedios D. Perez marked ‘Q-1’ to ‘Q-36’ standard signatures of Remedios Perez marked ‘S-1’ to ‘S-27’ inclusive were not written by one and the same person.[7]
Typically, such inconspicuous divergences noted by dela Cruz
on the questioned signatures could not be easily detected by untrained eyes or
by one who had no formal training in handwriting examination; thus, resort to
the opinion of an expert is imperative. This explains why the bank tellers who
processed the illegal transactions entered into by the petitioner on the
account of Remedios failed to notice the forgery or falsification. As a result,
they allowed the encashment by petitioner. The training or skill, if any, of
the tellers in detecting forgeries is usually minimal or inadequate and their
opinion is generally unreliable. It was, therefore, prudent on the part of the
bank to seek the opinion of an expert to determine the genuineness of the
signatures in the encashment slips.
As found by the trial court, the totality of the testimonies
of Remedios, dela Cruz, the handwriting expert, and the bank tellers bears the
earmarks of truth that the questioned encashment slips had been falsified by petitioner
and that they were presented to the bank in order to defraud the bank or holder
of the account.
Additionally, the Court has held that in gauging the relative
weight to be given to the opinion of handwriting experts, the following
standards are adhered to:
We have held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer. The test of genuineness ought to be the resemblance, not the formation of letters in some other specimens but to the general character of writing, which is impressed on it as the involuntary and unconscious result of constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is, therefore itself permanent.[8]
Moreover, it cannot be said that since none of the
prosecution witnesses saw the falsification actually done by petitioner, she
cannot be held liable. The bank tellers who processed the illegal transactions
of petitioner involving the account of Remedios were consistent in their
testimonies that it was petitioner herself who presented the encashment slips
and received the proceeds of the slips. In
such a situation, the applicable rule is that if a person has in his possession
a falsified document and he made use of it, taking advantage of it and
profiting from it, the presumption is that he is the material author of the
falsification.[9] In the instant case, petitioner
has failed to overthrow the presumption.
Furthermore, contrary to petitioner’s assertions, the
questioned encashment slips are commercial documents. Commercial documents are,
in general, documents or instruments which are used by merchants or businessmen
to promote or facilitate trade.[10]
An encashment slip necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the
person whose name and signature appears thereon to encash a check and withdraw
the amount indicated therein.
Even more, petitioner would have this Court believe that the
crime of falsification of a commercial document did not exist because Remedios
and BPI did not suffer any damage. Such argument is specious. It has been ruled
that damage or intent to cause damage is not an element in falsification of a
commercial document, because what the law seeks to repress is the prejudice to
the public confidence in such documents.[11]
Therefore, the acts of petitioner clearly satisfy all the
essential elements of the crime of Falsification of Commercial Document.
Crime of Falsification was a Necessary Means to Commit
Estafa
It has been held that whenever a person carries out on a public,
official, or commercial document any of the acts enumerated in Art. 171 of the
RPC as a necessary means to perpetrate another crime, such as estafa or
malversation, a complex crime is formed by the two crimes.[12]
Under Art. 48 of the RPC, a complex crime refers to: (1) the
commission of at least two grave or less grave felonies that must both (or all)
be the result of a single act; or (2) one offense must be a necessary means for
committing the other (or others).
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial
document may be a means of committing estafa, because before the falsified
document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification
has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of public, official, or commercial
document. In other words, the crime of
falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public,
official, or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of
estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public,
official, or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.[13]
In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) that the accused
defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence or (b) by means of deceit; and (2)
that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person. Deceit is the false representation of a matter
of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by
concealment of that which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or is
intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.
In the case before us, all the elements of estafa are
present. Once petitioner acquired the possession of the amounts she encashed by
means of deceit, she misappropriated, misapplied, and converted the same to her
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the private complainant
and BPI.
Without a doubt, the falsification of the encashment slips
was a necessary means to commit estafa. At that time, the offense of
falsification is already considered consummated even before the falsified
document is used to defraud another.
Therefore, the trial court aptly convicted petitioner for the
complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document.
Defense of Denial Is Untenable
It is a hornbook doctrine that the
defense of denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
negative and self-serving, and merits no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who
testified on affirmative matters.[14]
In the instant case, petitioner’s defense of denial crumbles in the face of the positive identification
made by the prosecution witnesses during trial. As enunciated by this Court,
“[p]ositive identification where categorical and consistent and not attended by
any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses on the matter
prevails over alibi and denial.”[15]
The defense has miserably failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part
of the prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify against her.
Thus, between the categorical
statements of the prosecution witnesses, on the one hand, and bare denials of
the accused, on the other hand, the former must, perforce, prevail.[16]
We accord the trial court’s
findings the probative weight it deserves in the absence of any compelling
reason to discredit its findings. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the
findings of fact of the trial court are not disturbed on appeal, except when it
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance that would have materially affected the outcome of the case. We
find that the trial court did not err in convicting petitioner of the crime of
Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for failure to sufficiently show reversible error in the
assailed decision. The Decision dated November 24, 2008 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31158 is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA
V.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 56-78. Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Jose C. Reyes, Jr.
[8] Eduarte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105944, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 391, 399; citations omitted.