ANTONIO CABADOR, G.R. No. 186001
Petitioner,
Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J.,*
- versus - Carpio Morales,**
Acting Chairperson,
Brion,
Del Castillo, and
Abad, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE
Respondent. Promulgated:
October 2, 2009
x
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
ABAD, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for
review on certiorari, assailing the Court
of Appeals’ (CA) Decision of August 4, 2008[1]
and Resolution of October 28, 2008[2] in
CA-G.R. SP 100431 that affirmed the August 31, 2006 Order[3] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
The facts are not disputed.
On June 23, 2000 the public prosecutor
accused petitioner Antonio Cabador before the RTC of Quezon City in Criminal Case
Q-00-93291 of murdering, in conspiracy with others, Atty. Jun N. Valerio.[4] On February 13, 2006, after presenting only five
witnesses over five years of intermittent trial, the RTC declared at an end the
prosecution’s presentation of evidence and required the prosecution to make a written
or formal offer of its documentary evidence within 15 days from notice.[5] But the public prosecutor asked for three extensions
of time, the last of which was to end on
On
Unknown to petitioner Cabador, however,
four days earlier or on July 28, 2006 the prosecution asked the RTC for another
extension of the period for its formal offer, which offer it eventually made on
August 1, 2006, the day Cabador filed his motion to dismiss.[7]
On August 31, 2006 the RTC issued an Order
treating petitioner Cabador’s August 1, 2006 motion to dismiss as a demurrer to
evidence. And, since he filed his motion
without leave of court, the RTC declared him to have waived his right to
present evidence in his defense. The
trial court deemed the case submitted for decision insofar as he was
concerned. Cabador filed a motion for
reconsideration of this Order but the RTC denied it on
The issue in this case is whether or
not petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss before the trial court was in fact a
demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court, with the result that he effectively
waived his right to present evidence in his defense and submitted the case for
decision insofar as he was concerned.
The trial proper in a criminal case
usually has two stages: first, the prosecution’s presentation of
evidence against the accused and, second, the accused’s presentation of
evidence in his defense. If, after the
prosecution has presented its evidence, the same appears insufficient to
support a conviction, the trial court may at its own initiative or on motion of
the accused dispense with the second stage and dismiss the criminal action.[10] There is no point for the trial court to hear
the evidence of the accused in such a case since the prosecution bears the
burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The order of dismissal amounts to an
acquittal.
But because some have in the past used
the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in the case, the remedy now carries
a caveat. When the
accused files a demurrer without leave of court, he
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall
be considered submitted for judgment.[11] On occasions, this presents a problem such as
when, like the situation in this case, the accused files a motion to dismiss
that, to the RTC, had the appearance of a demurrer to evidence. Cabador insists that it is not one but the
CA, like the lower court, ruled that it is.
This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections[12]
that, to determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer
to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the
allegations in it made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which
it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it.
Here, the pertinent portions of petitioner
Cabador’s motion to dismiss read as follows:
2. On November 9, 2001, the accused was
arrested and subsequently brought to the
3. The accused was arraigned on January 8, 2002 and trial began soon after.
4. UP-OLA entered its appearance as counsel for the accused on January 20, 2005.
5. On February 10, 2006, the Honorable Court terminated the presentation of evidence for the prosecution considering that the case has been going on for 5 years already and during that period the prosecution has only presented 5 witnesses. Moreover, xxx there had been numerous postponements due to failure of the prosecution to ensure the presence of its witnesses.
6. In an order dated March 31, 2006, the Honorable court required the public prosecutor to submit its formal offer of evidence within fifteen (15) days from receipt of such order.
7. On April 17, 2006, the public prosecutor was again absent so the presentation of evidence for the accused was reset to June 6, 2006.
8. During the same hearing, the Prosecution was again granted an additional fifteen (15) days within which to file their formal offer of evidence.
9. On June 6, 2006, the public prosecutor again failed to appear and to file their formal offer of evidence. In an order, the Honorable Court again extended to the prosecution an additional fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order within which to file their formal offer of evidence.
10. On June 28, 2006, the Honorable Court issued an order granting the prosecution a thirty-day extension, or until July 28, 2006 within which to file their formal offer of evidence since the public prosecutor was on leave.
11. Upon the expiration of the extension granted by the Honorable Court, the prosecution failed to file their formal offer of evidence.
10. (Sic) Despite three (3) extensions, the prosecution failed to file formal offer of evidence.
11. (Sic) Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that “the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.” A formal offer is necessary, since judges are required to base their findings of fact and their judgment solely and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial (Ong vs. CA, GR No. 117103). Hence, without any formal offer of evidence, this Honorable Court has no evidence to consider.
12. The charge against the accused has no leg to stand on. The witnesses that had been presented by the prosecution testified mainly on the occurrences on the night of the incident and had no knowledge of any connection with or any participation by the accused in the incident.
13. The hearings of the case have been delayed since 2001 through no fault of the defense to the prejudice of the rights of the accused to a speedy trial, mandated by no less than Art. III, Sec. 16 of the Constitution.
14. Since UP-OLA had entered its appearance in 2005, the case had been reset for twelve (12) times, most of which are due to the fault or absence of the prosecution. For the five year duration of the case, the prosecution still has not presented any evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Meanwhile, the accused has been unduly stripped of this liberty for more than five (5) years upon an unsubstantiated charge.
15. The accused was injured and debilitated in the course of his arrest which resulted in the amputation of his left leg. His movement is severely hampered and his living conditions are less adequate. To subject him to further delays when there is no substance to the charge against him would tantamount to injustice.[13]
It can be seen from the above that
petitioner Cabador took pains to point out in paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, “10 (sic),” 13, 14, and 15 above how trial in the case had painfully dragged
on for years. The gaps between
proceedings were long, with hearings often postponed because of the prosecutor’s
absence. This was further compounded, Cabador
said, by the prosecution’s repeated motions for extension of time to file its
formal offer and its failure to file it within such time. Cabador then invoked in paragraph 13 above
his right to speedy trial. But the RTC and
the CA simply chose to ignore these extensive averments and altogether treated Cabador’s
motion as a demurrer to evidence because of a few observations he made in
paragraphs “11 (sic)” and 12 regarding the inadequacy of the evidence against
him.
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss
may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused’s right to speedy trial.[14] This denial is characterized by unreasonable,
vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the accused,
or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial.[15] This was the main thrust of Cabador’s motion
to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial
court.
Cabador of course dropped a few lines
in his motion to dismiss in paragraphs “11 (sic)” and 12, saying that the trial
court “has no evidence to consider,” “the charge has no leg to stand on,” and
that “the witnesses x x x had no knowledge of any connection with or any
participation by the accused in the incident.”
But these were mere conclusions, highlighting what five years of trial
had accomplished.
The fact is that Cabador did not even
bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer. He did not state what evidence the prosecution
had presented against him to show in what respects such evidence failed to meet
the elements of the crime charged. His so-called
“demurrer” did not touch on any particular testimony of even one witness. He cited no documentary exhibit. Indeed, he could not because, he did not know
that the prosecution finally made its formal offer of exhibits on the same date
he filed his motion to dismiss.[16] To say that Cabador filed a demurrer to
evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind man, touching the side of an
elephant, and exclaiming that he had touched a wall.
Besides, a demurrer to evidence
assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, reads:
Demurrer
to evidence. – After the prosecution
rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the evidence
filed by the accused with or without leave of court. (Emphasis supplied)
Here, after the prosecution filed its
formal offer of exhibits on
In sum, tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, the Court finds that petitioner Cabador filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer
to evidence. He cannot be declared to
have waived his right to present evidence in his defense.
On a final note, a demurrer to evidence shortens the proceedings
in criminal cases. Caution must, however, be exercised[17] in
view of its pernicious consequence on the right of the accused to present
evidence in his defense, the seriousness of the crime charged, and the gravity
of the penalty involved.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED, the August
4, 2008 Decision and the October 28, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP 100431 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the August 31, 2006 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
81 is NULLIFIED. The latter court is DIRECTED to resolve petitioner Antonio Cabador’s motion to dismiss
based on the circumstances surrounding the trial in the case.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
Acting
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Acting Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, per Special Order No. 691 dated September 4, 2009.
** In lieu of Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, per Special Order No. 690 dated September 4, 2009.
[1] Rollo, p. 39. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Mariflor P. Punzalan-Castillo.
[2]
[3]
[4] Also referred to as “Justice Valerio” in the Petition.
[5] Rollo, p. 120.
[6]
[7] Petition, id. at 24 and 30.
[8]
[9]
[10] SEC. 23 (Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure). Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the
court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on
its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or
(2) upon demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of
court.
If the Court denies the demurrer
to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the demurrer to evidence
is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence
and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.
x x x x
[11] Id.,
par. 2; see Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, G.R. No. 165496,
[12] 347 Phil. 510 (1997).
[13] Rollo, pp. 75-76.
[14] People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372,
[15] Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 496, 507 (1996).
[16] Rollo, pp. 24 and 30.
[17] Consolidated
Bank and Trust Corporation v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., G.R.
No. 143338,