WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and SCANDIC
SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED, Petitioner, – versus – ERIBERTO S. BULTRON, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 185261 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,* J., CARPIO MORALES,**
Acting Chairperson, PERALTA,*** DEL CASTILLO, and ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: October 2, 2009 |
|
|
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Wallem
Maritime Services, Inc. and Scandic Shipmanagement, Ltd. (petitioners) hired Eriberto
S. Bultron (respondent) on
In the
course of his employment, respondent developed “chronic coughs,” hence, petitioners
referred him to their company physician in Langkawi, Malaysia who issued a
medical report dated April 6, 2000 stating, inter
alia, that “by the nature of [respondent’s] work
as a seaman, he has been exposed
to cement dust as his cargo ship carries
cement;” and that his “Chest X-ray shows bilateral apical infiltrations
of the lungs, minimal pleural effusion of the left lung and heart configuration
is enlarged.” Dr. Haroun thus advised
petitioners to take care of him “for further management . . .”[1]
Petitioners
allowed respondent to continue with his job until he was repatriated to Manila
on April 29, 2000 at the expiration of his contract.[2]
As respondent constantly complained of
“on and off cough[ing],” petitioners referred him to the Metropolitan Hospital.
After a
series of medical tests, Dr. Robert D. Lim (Dr. Lim), petitioners’ medical
coordinator at the Metropolitan Hospital, issued a medical report on July
28, 2000 stating that, inter alia,
respondent “is now fit to work.”[3]
Respondent refused,
however, to sign the certificate of fitness for work as he felt he was still
ill and suffering from disabilities.[4]
Petitioners having discontinued providing medical services and treatment,
respondent consulted, at his own expense, a private physician, Dr. Juan
Alejandro Legaspi (Dr. Legaspi), who diagnosed him on August 10, 2000 to be suffering
from “spinal stenosis, L4-L5, L5-S1,” and thus advised him to
“avoid exertional activities and prolonged sitting”
and to have ‘bed rest.’[5]
Claiming, inter alia, that his illness has “persisted”
and has “totally disabled [him] from pursuing his work as a seaman” due to
petitioners’ failure to provide safety measures and protective gears during his
work to shield him from contracting illnesses, respondent filed a Complaint[6]
for disability benefits and damages against petitioners before the NLRC-NCR
Arbitration Branch, Quezon City.
Petitioners
resisted respondent’s Complaint,
contending that under the POEA Standard Employment Contract, he may only
recover such benefits when his repatriation is due to medical reasons, not when
it is due to completion of contract as in his case.
By Decision
dated October 8, 2003, Labor Arbiter Felipe P. Pati found
for respondent, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises all considered, judgment
is hereby rendered ordering respondents [now petitioners] jointly and severally
liable to:
1. pay
complainant [now respondent] his proportionate disability benefits in the
amount of US$60,000.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment; and
2. pay
complainant attorney’s fees at 10% of the total monetary award to be recovered.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
After petitioners received a copy of
the Labor Arbiter’s Decision on November 4, 2003, they filed a Notice of Appeal with Appeal Memorandum
via registered mail on the last day of the 10-day reglementary
period of appeal or on November 14, 2003, a Friday, without the requisite
appeal bond. It was only on the next business day,
Respondent thus
filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal[8] on the ground that petitioners’ appeal was
filed out of time.
Explaining
their failure to file their appeal bond
on November 14, 2003, petitioners, through counsel, stated that the appeal bond
“was not processed on time by the
bonding company” and “was issued only on 14 November 2003 at
around 4:05 PM in the office of Pioneer Insurance Corporation at Paseo de
Roxas, Makati City;” and that “undersigned counsel then carried the appeal bond, drove his car from Makati
to Manila area,” but “due to extreme traffic condition, he called-up thru his mobile
phone his legal assistant to file the appeal via registered mail.”[9]
Petitioners
thus concluded that “there is actually no delay inasmuch as the appeal
was initiated within the ten-day reglementary period via registered mail.”[10]
The National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), by Decision[11]
of March 8, 2006, denied respondent’s motion to dismiss petitioners’
appeal which it considered to have been effected on November 14, 2003. On the merits, it reversed the Labor
Arbiter’s decision and accordingly dismissed respondent’s complaint, as well as
petitioners’ permissive counter-claims.
Respondent’s
Motion for Reconsideration[12]
having been denied, he filed a petition for Certiorari
before the Court of Appeals.
By Decision[13]
of February 20, 2008, the appellate court annulled the NLRC Decision and
Resolution, and reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, it ruling that
the NLRC “never acquired jurisdiction” over the appeal of petitioners as they “failed
to perfect their appeal “within the ten calendar-day period” and thus render the
Labor Arbiter’s Decision final and executory.[14]
Petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration having
been denied by Resolution of October 22, 2008,[15]
they filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The
petition fails.
The decisions,
awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed
to the NLRC by any parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt
thereof, with proof of payment of the required appeal fee accompanied by a
memorandum of appeal. And where, as
here, the judgment involves monetary award, an
appeal therefrom by the employer may be “perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.”[16] A mere notice of appeal without complying
with the other requisites mentioned does not stop the running of the period for
perfecting an appeal[17]
as in fact no motion for extension of said
period is allowed.[18]
The
perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is
not only mandatory but jurisdictional and must, therefore, be strictly
observed.
Petitioners’
re-filing on the next working day, November 17, 2003, of the Notice of Appeal with Appeal Memorandum,
which was accompanied, this time, by the appeal
bond, did not cure the fatal defect of their appeal since said bond was filed after the ten-day
reglementary period had expired – at which time the Labor
Arbiter’s judgment had already become final and executory and, therefore,
immutable.[19]
Respecting petitioners’
argument that their appeal was “initiated” within the ten-day
reglementary period,”[20]
suffice it to state that all the essential requirements
for the perfection of the appeal must
be filed within the reglementary
period.
Petitioners’
bare invocation of “the interest of substantial justice” does not lie.”[21]
Only under exceptionally meritorious
cases may a relaxation from an otherwise stringent rule be allowed “to relieve
a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of thoughtlessness
in not complying with the procedure prescribed”[22]
– the existence of which petitioners failed to demonstrate.
WHEREFORE, the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari
is DENIED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A.
ABAD Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional member per Special Order No. 691.
** Per Special Order No. 690 in lieu of the sabbatical leave of Senior Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing.
*** Additional member per Special Order No. 711.
[1] Annex “B” of Respondent’s Position Paper, rollo, pp. 265-266, 278.
[2] CA Decision, id. at 96.
[3] Id. at 96-97.
[4]
[5] Ibid.
[6] Id. at 184-193.
[7] Id. at 120-121.
[8] Annex “M” of Petition, id. at 321-323.
[9] Opposition to Complainant’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal, id. at 324-325 (underscoring supplied).
[10] Ibid (underscoring and emphasis supplied).
[11] Penned by Presiding Commissioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr., with Commissioners Perlita B. Velasco and Romeo L. Go concurring; id. at 121-128.
[12] Id. at 330-354.
[13] Penned
by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De
[14] Id. at 39, 41-42.
[15]
[16] Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended;
Section 3, Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC; Mary Abigail’s Food Services, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 140294, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 265, 273-274
(underscoring supplied).
[17] Section 3, Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.
[18] Section 7, id.
[19] Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 147623, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 516, 531.
[20] Rollo, pp. 324-325 (underscoring supplied).
[21] Zaragoza v. Nobleza, G.R. No. 144560, May 13, 2004, 428 SCRA 410, 420-421.
[22]