Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
|
PEOPLE
OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, -
versus - ALFREDO
DELA CRUZ y MIRANDA, alias “DIDONG,” Accused-Appellant. |
|
G.R. No. 184792 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,
and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: October
12, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
On
appeal is the Decision dated April 15, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01024, which affirmed the April 15, 2005 Decision in
Criminal Case No. 1206-M-2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12 in
Malolos City, Bulacan. The RTC convicted accused-appellant Alfredo Dela Cruz,
alias “Didong,” of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
In
an Information dated April 10, 2002, appellant and three others, namely: Narciso
Samonte, alias “Boyet,” Alfredo Gongon, alias “Fred,” and Florante Flores,
alias “Nante,” were charged with murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of November, 2001, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a handgun and fanknives, [sic] conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill one Ahlladin Trinidad y Payumo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, shoot and stab the said Ahlladin Trinidad y Payumo, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body which directly caused the death of the said Ahlladin Trinidad y Payumo.[1]
Of
the four indicted, only appellant Dela Cruz (Didong) and Samonte (Boyet) were
taken into custody. The other two accused, Gongon (Tata Fred) and Flores (Nante),
remained at large.
Upon
their arraignment, both appellant and Samonte pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The Case for the Prosecution
During
trial, the prosecution presented in evidence the testimony of Anthony
Villacorta and his mother, Zenaida Soriano, to establish the ensuing course of
events:
On
At
about
The
next morning, Ahlladin’s lifeless body was discovered. Among those who joined
the curious onlookers was Anthony who, upon seeing Ahlladin’s corpse, remarked,
“Iyan pala ang pinaputukan ni Tata Fred
kagabi.” Tata Fred, who was among those
in the crowd and who heard Anthony’s utterances, pulled the latter
aside, told him to keep quiet, and slapped him. The next day, Tata Fred
threatened Anthony again while the latter was with his mother, Zenaida. He told
Anthony not to tell anyone of his drinking spree with Ahlladin. Zenaida then instructed her son to go home.[3]
Zenaida
confirmed that there was indeed a drinking session at Tata Fred’s house in the
afternoon of
Boyet
and Nante then headed to Zenaida’s house that same night. It was around
The
following morning, Zenaida observed people running in the direction of the
forest area. She learned along with her son Anthony that Ahlladin’s body had
been discovered there. Anthony then told Zenaida that it was his Tata Fred who
killed Ahlladin.[7]
On
In
his Karagdagang Salaysay, Anthony
recounted that at about
The
following day,
Per Medico-Legal Report No. M-244-01,[11]
marked and presented in evidence as Exhibit “F,” gunshot wounds on his head and
trunk, as well as a stab wound on his trunk, caused Ahlladin’s death.
The Case for the Defense
Didong proffered the defenses of alibi and
denial. He testified to being at Tata Fred’s
house from five in the afternoon of
When
asked of any motive that might have impelled the prosecution witnesses to
implicate him in Ahlladin’s death, appellant answered that, in 1998, Zenaida
was arrested and subsequently convicted of drug charges. He acknowledged being
the police informant who reported on her drug activities.[14]
The Ruling of the Trial and Appellate Courts
After
trial, the RTC, finding the prosecution’s evidence sufficient to sustain a
finding of guilt, rendered judgment convicting appellant and his co-accused
Samonte of murder. The dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding herein accused Alfredo dela Cruz y Miranda @ “Didong” and Narciso Samonte y Dionisio @ “Boyet” each guilty as principal beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged in the information, there being no other circumstances, aggravating or mitigating, found attendant in its commission, except the qualifying circumstance of treachery as alleged, due to the drunkenness of the victim which rendered him helpless to put up any defense or to retaliate, said accused are hereby sentenced each to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of victim Ahlladin Trinidad y Payumo in the amount of P75,000.00, plus P93,000.00 as actual damages (Exh. “C”), and the further sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages subject to the corresponding filing fees as a first lien, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
In the service of their sentence, each of the aforenamed accused being a detention prisoner, shall be credited with the full time during which he had undergone preventive imprisonment, pursuant to art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to the other two accused still at-large, Alfredo Gongon alias Fred and Florante Flores alias Nante, let alias warrant of arrest issue against them and, pending their actual apprehension, let the record of this case be in the meantime committed to the Archives to be recalled therefrom as soon as circumstances demand so.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Therefrom, only Didong appealed to the CA. Eventually, the CA rendered on
WHEREFORE, the appealed DECISION dated 15 April 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 12 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the award of civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00; (2) the award of moral damages is deleted; and (3) appellant Alfredo dela Cruz is further ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[16]
On
On
Appellant
questions his conviction on the following grounds or issues on which he
anchored his appeal to the CA, viz:
I
WHETHER THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
II
WHETHER THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE RULE THAT CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED IS BASED ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE AND NOT ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE; and
III
WHETHER THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CASE OF TWO CONFLICTING CULPATORY FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES THE ONE THAT IS EXCULPATORY IN NATURE SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR
OF THE ACCUSED.[17]
The Court’s Ruling
We
deny the appeal.
Didong
urges the Court to overturn his conviction, basing his plea on the supposed
contradictory statements by the prosecution’s principal witness. He avers: witness Anthony testified that he, Didong,
was not part of the group that went to the forest with the victim on the night
of the incident; Didong was not in the vicinity of the crime scene when the
victim was shot; and Anthony was not an eyewitness to the killing, as deduced
from his res gestae statement of “Iyan pala ang pinaputukan ni Tata Fred
kagabi” the day after the incident. Rounding up his arguments, Didong alleges
that Anthony’s Karagdagang Salaysay is
in direct conflict with his earlier statement which did not mention appellant
as one of the men who was with the victim when
killed.
The
Court is not convinced.
The appeal essentially assails the credibility accorded by
the trial court to the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies.
As
a matter of settled jurisprudence, the Court generally defers to the trial
court’s evaluation of the credibility of witness and their testimonies, for it
is in a better position to decide questions of credibility having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their attitude and deportment during trial.[18]
Accordingly, a finding on the credibility of witnesses, as here, with respect
to the testimony of Anthony and Zenaida, deserves a high degree of respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing that the trial court had
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance which could reverse a judgment of conviction.[19]
None of the exceptions exists in this case.
To
be sure, Anthony’s testimony is not without discrepancies. But as the trial
court and later the CA found, Anthony was able to satisfactorily explain the
perceived inconsistencies in his testimony. As noted by the courts a quo,
Anthony first excluded appellant from his sworn statement as the latter had
confronted and frightened him into silence about appellant’s
participation. As the CA observed keenly,
“We can only imagine the fright experienced by a young boy who at the tender
age of 13 years old was threatened to be killed by appellant. It was only after
his fear had subsided that he was able to recount what truly happened on that
fateful day.”[20] After
somehow overcoming the anxiety and the thought of reprisal troubling his young
mind, Anthony subsequently identified appellant as among the perpetrators of
the crime. As it turned out later,
Anthony’s fears were not unfounded, as an attempt on his mother’s life was made
a few months after Ahlladin’s murder. Even the attacker apologized to Anthony’s
mother shortly before taking a shot at her, saying he had just been ordered to
kill her by “Mang Teteng,” appellant’s father. As the trial court noted:
x x x It is, therefore, understandable, if the son Anthony was so afraid of the [accused], especially Alfredo Gongon. Somehow he was able to testify and he did so without visible traces of lying on the stand. His credibility could have really been tried and destroyed if any of his friends and companions at the time he saw the killing was presented in court to belie his testimony. Edwin Samonte was a relative of accused Boyet Samonte, while Ronnel Alimarcan was a relative of accused Alfredo Gongon. The defense could have utilized any one of them to show that Anthony just made up what he said he saw of the killing of the victim by the four (4) accused while the three of them were together under the hut. The only conceivable explanation why the defense did not do that was because Anthony did tell the whole truth and nothing but, when he testified against herein accused. These friends and companions of Anthony when he saw the killing might even corroborate and confirm what he said to the Court as an eyewitness for the prosecution.[21]
Also
going against Didong’s submission about Anthony’s inconsistency is the
recognition that affidavits or statements made before the police, which are
usually taken ex parte, are often incomplete and inaccurate.[22] Thus, by nature, these affidavits are
inferior to open court testimony, and whenever there is inconsistency between
the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands
greater weight. Moreover, inconsistencies between the declaration of the
affiant in his sworn statements and those in open court do not necessarily discredit
said witness.[23]
All told, the prosecution has
discharged the burden of proving the commission of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt. It was able to establish two things: first, the corpus delicti or the
presence of all the elements of the offense of murder; and second, the fact that Didong was the perpetrator of the crime.[24] The fact that Didong was one of the men who
killed Ahlladin was proved by the testimony and the positive identification by
the prosecution witnesses.
Didong’s proffered defense to evade
criminal responsibility is too feeble to merit consideration. His defense of alibi cannot overcome, and is
in fact destroyed by the categorical testimony of Anthony, who positively
pointed to and identified him as one of the malefactors. Moreover, in order to
justify an acquittal based on alibi, the accused must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that (1) he was somewhere else at the time of the
commission of the offense; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.[25]
And when the law speaks of physical impossibility, the reference is to the
distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and
the locus criminis, as well as the facility of access between the two
places.[26]
Where the possibility exists for the accused to be present at the crime scene,
the defense of alibi must fail.[27]
Evidently, here, the requisites for appreciating alibi are not present. In fact, by appellant’s own admission, he was
with one of his co-accused the day before Ahlladin’s death was uncovered. Even
supposing that during the latter part of the day, he really did go home, such a
detail does not remove the possibility of his being at the forested area, the
scene of the crime.
Finally,
the Court lends concurrence to the trial court’s determination that treachery
attended the killing of Ahlladin.
The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressors on unsuspecting victims,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring
its commission without risk to the aggressors, and without the slightest
provocation on the victim’s part.[28]
We find that circumstances do exist to justify the finding of treachery in this
case. The prosecution alleged and sufficiently proved that Ahlladin was too
drunk to fight off any aggression from his four assailants, at least two of
them armed. His killers took advantage of his condition and attacked him
without considerable difficulty, as plainly seen in the post mortem report on
Ahlladin’s body. What the trial court wrote indubitably indicated treachery:
From there, [Anthony] saw Didong hit with his
piece of wood the nape of Ahladdin then held by the hand by Nante. When Nante
released his hold Didong again hit Ahladdin on the back of the knees. After
Boyet, Nante and Didong stabbed Ahladdin, Fred Gongon shot him saying “Siguraduhin niyo patay na yan.” x x x[29]
We
now tackle Didong’s civil liability. The appellate court reduced the award of
civil indemnity to PhP 50,000, deleted the award of moral damages for want of
evidence to support it, and further ordered the payment of PhP 25,000 in
exemplary damages.
When as a consequence to a criminal
act death ensues, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages;
(3) moral damages; and (4) exemplary damages.[30]
Civil
indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime. The award of civil indemnity of
PhP 50,000 is increased to PhP 75,000 in view of the ruling that the crime is
murder qualified by the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. Said crime is a heinous crime under Republic Act 7659 punishable
by death but now reduced to reclusion
perpetua by virtue of RA 9346, which prohibits the imposition of death
penalty.
The
deletion of the award of moral damages was erroneous. Moral damages are mandatory in cases of murder,
without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. The
award of PhP 75,000 as moral damages is consequently in order and in accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence.[31]
The
award of exemplary damages, but in the amount of PhP 30,000, up from the PhP
25,000 the CA granted, is proper under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, since
the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Finally,
as documentary evidence[32]
of burial expenses was presented during the trial and in fact became the basis
of an award of actual damages, a grant of temperate damages is no longer
justified. If actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence of
supporting receipts, entitlement to said award must be shown with a reasonable
degree of certainty under the facts of the case.[33]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision dated April 15,
2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01024 finding accused-appellant Alfredo Dela Cruz
alias “Didong” guilty of murder is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that he is
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim civil indemnity of PhP 75,000, moral
damages in the amount of PhP 75,000, and exemplary damages in the increased
amount of PhP 30,000.
SO
ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T
A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I
C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice