THIRD DIVISION
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CHARLIE T. LEE, petitioner, - versus - ROSITA DELA PAZ,
Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 183606 Present: QUISUMBING,*
J., CARPIO,
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, PERALTA,
and ABAD,** JJ. Promulgated: October 27, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure filed by petitioner Charlie T. Lee seeking the
reversal and setting aside of the Decision[1]
dated 25 January 2008 and Resolution[2]
dated 1 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97334. In its assailed Decision, the Court of
Appeals dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure because of petitioner’s failure to establish
his claim of ownership and right of possession over portions of respondent
Rosita dela Paz’s[3] property.
Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision[4]
dated 4 April 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch
71, in Civil Case No. 04-361, reversing the Decision[5]
dated 3 May 2004 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1,
Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 68-00, and ordering petitioner to vacate
portions of respondent’s property that petitioner occupied. In its questioned Resolution, the Court of
Appeals refused to reconsider its earlier Decision.
The undisputed facts of the case are
as follows:
On 29 October 1990, Gabriel Danga
(Danga) executed a notarized Transfer of Rights[6]
transferring to respondent, for the consideration of P150,000.00, all
his rights, interest, and title over a parcel of agricultural land located in
Barrio Pinagbarilan (later known as Barangay San Isidro and now Barangay San
Juan), Antipolo City,[7]
covered by Homestead Application No. V-38136 (E-V-33129) in Danga’s name,[8]
approved on
However, Danga, previous to the
transfer of his rights over the property to respondent, transferred the very
same rights to Josefina delos Reyes (Delos Reyes). Delos Reyes was able to secure the issuance,
on
During an ocular inspection conducted
pursuant to DENR 4 Case No. 5723, DENR Region IV observed that certain portions
of the 143,417-square-meter property were occupied by petitioner and several
other persons.
Thus, on
Respondent alleged in her Complaint
that she became the owner of the 143,417-square-meter property by virtue of the
Transfer of Rights dated
Respondent avowed that
sometime in June 2000, petitioner and the other defendants in Civil Case No.
68-00 deprived her of possession of certain portions of her property. Taking advantage of respondent’s absence due
to her lingering sickness, petitioner and his co-defendants unlawfully entered
said portions by means of stealth and strategy, and without respondent’s
knowledge and consent. Up to the present
time, petitioner and his co-defendants remain in illegal possession of portions
of respondent’s property, despite respondent’s repeated demands that possession
of said portions be restored to her.
Petitioner even went as far as assigning security men to the portions of
the property he occupied to prevent respondent from recovering possession
thereof.
In his Answer to
respondent’s Complaint, petitioner claimed to be the owner and occupant of the
two parcels of land, which respondent averred to be part of her property. In fact, petitioner was already granted Free
Patent Nos. 045802-91-204 and 045802-91-203 for these two parcels of land, and
pursuant to which, he was issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. P-619[10]
and P-620[11] in his name
on
Petitioner further
maintained that he never saw respondent occupy her alleged property. Respondent herself failed to introduce
evidence of her prior physical possession of the property. Petitioner also did not receive from
respondent any demand to vacate prior to the latter’s filing of the Complaint
for Forcible Entry before the MTCC.
Lastly, petitioner argued
that respondent was guilty of forum shopping, because DENR 4 Case No. 5723 was
still pending before DENR Region IV.
The three other
defendants in Civil Case No. 68-00, namely, Viola, Magsino, and Pestano,
asserted in their Answer that respondent had no cause of action against them,
as respondent filed her Complaint for Forcible Entry before the MTCC more than
two years after the afore-named defendants’ occupation of their respective
parcels of land. Respondent not only
failed to allege prior physical possession of the parcels of land now occupied
by the defendants, respondent also did not establish with certainty that said
parcels were really within her property.
The three defendants presented object evidence such as trees and other
growing plants to prove their long possession of their respective parcels of
land.
Datu, the other defendant
in Civil Case No. 68-00, alleged in his Answer that he was the bonafide and lawful possessor and
occupant of two parcels of land in Barrio San Isidro (formerly known as Barrio
Pinagbarilan and now known as Barangay San Juan), Antipolo City. He had been in peaceful, continuous, and adverse
possession of said parcels of land for a period of 15 years. He denied that these parcels of land were
within respondent’s property. Also, the
Complaint for Forcible Entry was filed by respondent beyond the one year period
set by law.
Before the MTCC could render judgment
in Civil Case No. 68-00, DENR Region IV issued on
In the case of the first transfer of right in favor of [Delos Reyes], we are of the considered opinion that the same is bereft of validity. Firstly, the transfer of right was done sans the consent of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources; secondly, then Director of Lands, Abelardo Palad is no longer allowed under Executive Order No. 192 to issue an Order for the transfer of rights involving public land applications; and thirdly, [Delos Reyes] is not qualified nor an eligible homesteader about to succeed transferor, [Danga], as contemplated for (sic) under Section 20 of the Public Land Act.
x x x x
It is evident from the records of the case that the transfer of right executed by [Danga] in favor of Josefina delos Reyes was never sanctioned nor had the prior consent or approval of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources.
x x x x
On the other side of the fence, this Office is impressed by the fact that [herein respondent] laid her claims over the land in dispute. Although, the adverted transfer of rights may have been executed in a much later date, we believe, however, that this fact will not militate against her claims thereon. The findings in the ocular inspection that she was ascertained an occupant of the contested area is a clear act of an exercise of dominion to the exclusion of others. x x x. We opine that [respondent’s] overt act in occupying controverted land and filing instant protest for the cancellation of the transfer of rights in favor of [Delos Reyes], speaks well of a claimant who is in a better position to fit in the shoes of grantee, Gabriel Danga.
x x x While some appear to have occupied and cultivated portions thereof in the persons of Messrs. [herein petitioner], Juanito Magsino, Jesus Viola and Mrs. Evelyn Pestano, these undertaking, however, will not merit any scant consideration. As we have herein clarified, and to reiterate with, well settled is the doctrine that “the approval of the application for the homestead has the effect of segregating the land from the public domain and divesting the Bureau of Lands of the control and possession of the same.” Applying the same rule in this particular instance, we hold that the property in question is no longer considered a public land where the actual possession and cultivation are condition sine qua non. (Emphases supplied.)
The DENR Region IV
finally adjudged:
WHEREFORE, In Light of All Foregoing
Considerations, it is hereby resolved, as it is resolved, that the claim of
[herein respondent] Rosita dela Paz over
[Respondent] Rosita dela Paz, is hereby ORDERED to file her Homestead Application over said Lot 10008, within sixty (60) days upon approval of the Order of Transfer of Rights by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources.[14] (Emphases supplied.)
Since no
appeal or motion for reconsideration of the foregoing DENR Region IV Resolution
had been filed, it became final and executory per Order[15] of DENR
Region IV dated
Respondent then filed a
Free Patent Application covering the 143,417-square-meter property. However, considering respondent’s assignment
of a portion of her property to Remedios, respondent submitted a request for
the subdivision of said property, together with the proposed Subdivision Plan. On
On
Respondent’s appeal of
the aforesaid MTCC Decision before the RTC was docketed as Civil Case No.
04-361. Respondent presented before the
RTC the free patent and certificate of title issued in her name for the
property. The RTC, in its Decision dated
Petitioner and his
co-defendants in Civil Case No. 04-361 separately moved for the reconsideration
of the aforesaid RTC judgment, but they were all denied in the RTC Order[21]
dated
Petitioner, by himself,
filed a Petition for Review of the RTC Decision dated
Petitioner now comes
before this Court raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE CLAIM OF THE
RESPONDENT THAT SHE WAS ABLE TO FULLY ESTABLISH EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP AND
PHYSICAL POSSESSION OVER THE [143,417-SQUARE METER PROPERTY], HEAVILY RELYING
ON THE DENR RESOLUTION DATED 30 OCTOBER 2000, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF CLEAR,
CONVINCING AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE [HER] CLAIM AND DESPITE THE FACT
THAT IT WAS PETITIONER LEE WHO HAD BEEN FOR A LONG TIME IN PRIOR, PHYSICAL,
ADVERSE, UNINTERRUPTED AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF
[PORTIONS OF THE SAID 143,417-SQUARE METER PROPERTY].
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE [143,417-SQUARE-METER PROPERTY] IS
NO LONGER CONSIDERED A PUBLIC LAND, AS POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP OF THE SAID
PROPERTY WERE LODGED WITH THE RESPONDENT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS
PETITIONER LEE WHO HAS THE LEGAL RIGHT TO POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP OF THE
[PORTIONS OF THE SAID PROPERTY].
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT VALIDLY ACQUIRED HER TITLE OVER THE
[143,417-SQUARE METER PROPERTY] FROM THE PREVIOUS HOMESTEAD GRANTEE, GABRIEL
DANGA, DESPITE THE FACT THAT BY VIRTUE OF THE ADVERSE, PUBLIC, CONTINUOUS AND
UNINTERRUPTED POSSESSION OF [PORTIONS OF THE SAID PROPERTY] BY PETITIONER, HE
IS ACTUALLY THE ONE LEGALLY ENTITLED TO CLAIM POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP OVER
[SUCH PORTIONS].
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE REJECTION OF RESPONDENT’S HOMESTEAD
APPLICATION PERMANENTLY BARS HER FROM FILING ANOTHER APPLICATION, THIS TIME FOR
FREE PATENT, AND FROM BEING GRANTED SUCH FREE PATENT OVER THE [ENTIRE
143,417-SQUARE METER PROPERTY].
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR AND VIOLATED THE RULES WHEN IT ALLOWED THE
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OF TITLES AND PATENTS BEFORE THE [RTC] EVEN FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, DESPITE MISERABLE FAILURE OF RESPONDENT TO PRESENT THE
SAME BEFORE THE [MTCC].
Primarily, this case stemmed from a
forcible entry case filed by respondent against petitioner. A forcible entry case is an ejectment
suit. In ejectment suits or ejectment
proceedings, the only issue involved is: who is entitled to physical or material possession of the
premises, that is, to possession de facto, not possession de jure?
Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in
the action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession.[22] The main thing to be proven in an action for
forcible entry is prior possession and that the same was lost through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, so that it behooves the court to
restore possession regardless of title
or ownership.[23]
The character of the property
involved, as to whether it is still public land or not, is also of no
moment. Even public lands can be the
subject of forcible entry cases. The
Court, in David v. Cordova,[24]
categorically declared that the land spoken of in Section 1, Rule 70[25]
of the Rules of Court includes all kinds
of land. The Court applied the well-known
maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish. The Court also
stressed that ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings only intended to
provide an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved. To repeat, the sole
issue to be resolved is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or
material possession of the premises or possession de facto.[26] Hence, it does not matter that the land in
dispute belongs to the government, and the government did not authorize either
the plaintiff or defendant to occupy said land.[27] The issue of possession may still be
litigated between the plaintiff and the defendant.
This brings the Court to the
fundamental issue in the case at bar: who, between respondent and petitioner,
has the right to possess the two parcels of land presently occupied by the
latter, but which the former insists to be part of her bigger property?
In actions for forcible entry, two
allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the
property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.[28]
There is no issue that
respondent was able to sufficiently allege in her Complaint before the MTCC the material facts constituting forcible
entry and, as a result, the MTCC duly acquired jurisdiction over her
Complaint. Respondent alleged prior
possession in her Complaint, claiming that she had acquired possession of the
143,417-square meter property since 19 October 1990, when Danga executed the
Transfer of Rights over said property in her favor; that she introduced
improvements on the property by planting trees; and that she also repaired the nipa hut Danga built on said property,
where she would stay for rest “off and on.”
Respondent further narrated in her Complaint that petitioner and the
other named defendants, taking advantage of respondent’s absence because of
lingering illness, entered into portions of the 143,417-square meter property
“unlawfully,” “without respondent’s knowledge and consent,” and “by means of
stealth and strategy.” Respondent
additionally claimed that petitioner assigned security men to prevent the
former from recovering possession of the portion of her property being occupied
by the latter.
Indeed,
respondent’s allegations in her Complaint were enough for the MTCC to acquire
jurisdiction over respondent’s forcible entry case against petitioner and his
co-defendants. However, mere allegation
or claim is not proof.[29] Respondent still needs to prove, by preponderance
of evidence, the allegations in her Complaint before she could be entitled to
the ejectment of petitioner from the property.
Hence, the
Court must now ask whether respondent was able to discharge the quantum of
proof required of her in this case.
Obviously,
the foregoing question is shrouded by a conflict in factual perception, a
conflict that is ordinarily not subject to a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. But the Court is
constrained to resolve it, because the factual findings of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the MTCC. Thus, the Court will rule herein on factual
issues as an exception to the general rule.[30]
It is a
basic rule in civil cases, including an action for forcible entry, that the
party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, which simply means “evidence which is of greater weight, or more
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.” Hence,
parties who have the burden of proof must produce such quantum of evidence,
with plaintiffs having to rely on the strength of their own evidence, not on
the weakness of the defendant’s.[31]
After an
exhaustive review of the evidence on record, the Court finds that respondent
was not able to satisfactorily prove her prior physical possession, nor her
being deprived thereof by petitioner through force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, and stealth. It is noteworthy that absence alone of prior
physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible entry case already warrants
the dismissal of the complaint.[32]
In the present case, respondent, to
establish her supposed prior physical possession of the 143,417-square meter
property, which included the two parcels of land now being occupied by petitioner,
relied on (1) the DENR Region IV Resolution dated 30 October 2000 in DENR 4
Case No. 5723; (2) the notarized Transfer of Rights dated 29 October 1990
executed by Danga in respondent’s favor; and (3) the Tax Declaration in
respondent’s name, covering the 143,417-square-meter property, on file with the
Antipolo City Assessor’s Office, together with the real property tax clearance
for the year 2001 from the Antipolo City Treasurer’s Office.
The Court stresses that DENR 4 Case
No. 5723 before DENR Region IV involved respondent’s Formal Protest against Delos
Reyes’ homestead patent application covering the same 143,417-square meter
property. The central issue in said
administrative case was who between respondent and Delos Reyes had a better
right to file a homestead application for the property. The Resolution dated 30 October 2000 of DENR
Region IV in DENR 4 Case No. 5723 – canceling Delos Reyes’ application for
homestead patent and ordering respondent to file her application for homestead
application – was not determinative at all of the issue of who between
respondent and petitioner had prior physical possession of the two parcels of
land, which both are now claiming to be their own.
The very general statements of DENR
Region IV in a Resolution dated 30 October 2000 – that the occupation and
cultivation by petitioner and his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 68-00 of
portions of the 143,417-square-meter property merited “scant consideration,”
because Danga’s approved homestead application already removed the entire
property from public domain – themselves deserve little weight in the case
before us. Again, in an action for
forcible entry, as the one at bar, it does not matter whether the land is
public or private. What are essentials
are that the plaintiff had prior physical possession of the land; and that he
was unlawfully deprived thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and
stealth.
Moreover, in an ocular inspection
conducted in relation to DENR 4 Case No. 5723, DENR Region IV even acknowledged
that the southern portion of the 143,417-square-meter property was then already
being occupied by petitioner, allegedly since 1980, and that said
portion was fully enclosed with steel post and barbwire, planted to mangoes,
mahogany tress, and assorted fruit-bearing trees.[33]
Finally, on this matter, the
Resolution dated
Given the foregoing, there is nothing
in the DENR Region IV Resolution dated
The notarized Transfer of Rights
dated
The Tax Declaration and real property
tax clearance for the entire 143,417-square-meter property in the name of
respondent do not constitute sufficient evidence of prior physical possession either. These pieces of documentary evidence covered
only tax year 2001. More importantly,
the tax declaration and real property tax payment may constitute proof of a
claim of title over,[34]
but not necessarily of actual possession of, the property so declared or for
which the realty tax was paid.
In contrast, petitioner submitted as
evidence Free Patents No. 045802-91-204 and No. 045802-91-203 granted in his
favor over the two parcels of land he had been occupying, by virtue of which,
OCTs No. P-619 and No. P-620 were issued in his name on
The
subsequent issuance on
In
addition, the free patents and OCTs were issued to respondent and her assignee
on
SECTION
34. Offer of Evidence. – The court
shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
In view of
the fact that respondent failed to substantiate with preponderance of evidence
her prior possession of the two disputed parcels of land, she cannot
consequently claim, and this Court cannot make a finding, that she has been
subsequently ousted from said property or dispossessed of the same by
petitioner.
The
Court finds no reason to disturb petitioner’s possession of the two parcels of
land. The Court has consistently held
that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party
in peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand,
violence, or terror. Courts will always
uphold respect for prior possession.[39] Whatever may be the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the
security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a
better right lawfully ejects him.[40]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant Petition for Review, is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 25 January 2008 and
Resolution dated 1 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97334,
affirming the Decision dated 4 April 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. 04-361, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 3 May 2004 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Antipolo City, in Civil Case No.
68-00, dismissing respondent’s Complaint for Forcible Entry is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* Per
Special Order No. 755, dated
** Per
Special Order No. 753, dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico with Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring; rollo, pp. 67-84.
[2]
[3] Now deceased and substituted by her surviving sister, Remedios dela Paz-Mendoza, and the latter represented by Eduardo dela Paz; CA rollo, pp. 470-472.
[4] Penned by Judge Bayani Y. Ilano; rollo, pp. 224-226.
[5] Penned by Presiding Judge Antonio M. Olivete; rollo, pp. 197-199.
[6] Rollo, p. 91.
[7] Formerly Antipolo, Rizal.
[8] Rollo, p. 103.
[9] As evidenced by Technical Description of Lot No. 10008, Mcad-585, Lungsod Silangan Cadastre, Barangay San Juan, Antipolo City, which was approved on 31 January 1989, and verified to be correct by Isidro R. Gellez, Chief of the Technical Standards and Services Section on 25 September 1992, rollo, p. 105.
[10] CA rollo, p. 162.
[11]
[12] It has not been established that petitioner’s two parcels of land are indeed part of respondent’s property.
[13] Rollo, pp. 167-173.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Records, pp. 517-518.
[20]
[21] Rollo, p. 324.
[22] Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 494 Phil. 603, 618-619 (2005).
[23] Domalsin
v. Valenciano, G.R. No. 158687,
[24] G.R. No. 152992, 27 July 2005, 464 SCRA 384, 402, citing Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., et al., 104 Phil. 688, 690 (1958).
[25] SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year, after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
[26] David v. Cordova, supra note 24.
[27]
[28] Spouses Tirona v. Alejo, 419 Phil. 285, 299 (2001).
[29] Sadhwani v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 54, 67 (1997).
[30] Montanez
v.
[31] Buduhan
v. Pakurao, G.R. No. 168237,
[32] Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, 489 Phil. 200, 208 (2005).
[33] Rollo, p. 168; Investigation Report of the DENR Region IV, Manila-CENRO, Antipolo City, dated 25 August 2000, rollo, pp. 295-298.
[34]
[35] Section 44 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended by Republic Act No. 6940 (which took effect on
Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen
of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twelve (12) hectares and
who, for at least thirty (30) years prior to the effectivity of this
amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself
or through his predecessors-in-interest a tract or tracts of agricultural
public lands subject to disposition, who shall have paid the real estate tax
thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled,
under the provisions of this Chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for
such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twelve (12) hectares.
c
[36] Director of Lands v. De Luna, 110 Phil. 28, 31 (1960).
[37] Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 982, 1004 (1996).
[38] Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan v. Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan, G.R. No. 149145, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA 229.
[39] Pajuyo
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364,
[40]