THIRD
DIVISION
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CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION,
Petitioner, - versus
- HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL
CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 182836 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: October 13, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1]
dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution[2]
dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming
the Resolution[3] dated 20
November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S.
Montaño (Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to
Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.
The antecedent facts of the case are
as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of
respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of
Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9
January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and
Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE
OF ABSENCE
x x x x
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to
grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of death of the
employee’s legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and
sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro
x x x x
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER
BENEFITS
x x x x
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company
shall grant death and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the
following manner:
x x x x
4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees legitimate dependents
(parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit
covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal
document to be presented (e.g. death
certificate).[4]
The claim was based on the death of
Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a
premature delivery on
Continental Steel immediately granted
Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave
and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.[7]
Seeking the reversal of the denial by
Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for bereavement and other death
benefits, the
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the
CBA.[10] The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.[11]
When the preliminary conferences
again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to
submit their respective Position Papers, [12]
Replies,[13] and
Rejoinders[14] to
Atty. Montaño.
The
The
The
Finally, the
On the other hand, Continental Steel
posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of
an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for
the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41
and 42[16]
of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it
never acquired juridical personality.
Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned
that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at
all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a
fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be
considered a dependent, since it
never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the
wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous.
Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the
legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both
parties. The failure of the Union to
have unborn child included in the
definition of dependent, as used in
the CBA – the death of whom would have qualified the parent-employee for
bereavement leave and other death benefits – bound the Union to the legally accepted
definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred
that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel
and Mayer Steel, referred to by the
On
Atty. Montaño identified the elements
for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the
benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees as provided
under Article X, Section 2 of the parties’ CBA, three (3) indispensable
elements must be present: (1) there is “death”; (2) such death must be of
employee’s “dependent”; and (3) such dependent must be “legitimate”.
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for
death and accident insurance as provided under Article XVIII, Section 4,
paragraph (4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be
present: (a) there is “death”; (b) such death must be of employee’s
“dependent”; (c) such dependent must be “legitimate”; and (d) proper legal
document to be presented.[18]
Atty. Montaño found that there was no
dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by
the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support;
he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or
aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent,
although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano
and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child,
legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby
rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P.
Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00),
representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five
Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total
amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully
abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed
with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[19]
under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty.
Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s claims for bereavement leave with pay
and other death benefits because no death
of an employee’s dependent had
occurred. The death of a fetus, at
whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since
what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that
of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its
contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It
asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said child’s
birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to bereavement leave and
other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision
dated
[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on
the legal sense in which the term “death” is used in the CBA fails to impress
the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the
grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve.
While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of
civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon
delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus
could never be contemplated as a “death” as to be covered by the CBA provision,
undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom
the dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation.
[Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to
the term “death of a legitimate dependent” as condition for granting bereavement
leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental Steel’s] theory,
there can be no experience of “death” to speak of. The Court, however, does not
share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than
“loss of human life”, especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement
leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latter’s
immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act
conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child. [Continental
Steel’s] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical
purposes only sadly misses this crucial point.[20]
Accordingly,
the fallo of the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental
Steel].[21]
In a Resolution[22]
dated
Hence,
this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is
clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die
and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.
We
are not persuaded.
As
Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X,
Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or
sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the
employee. The requisites for death and
accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the
death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a
married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4)
presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the
repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are
clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillano’s claim
for bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper
interpretation of the terms “death” and “dependent” as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear
and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or
construction of the same. Moreover,
Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the
The reliance of Continental Steel on
Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child
acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child
is considered born. Article 42 plainly
states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
First, the
issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on
natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code,
the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37.
Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do
acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil
personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and
capacity to act as a person are not in issue.
It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any
rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on
to or assumed by the child’s parents.
The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case
pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s
death.
Second,
Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death.
Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality
may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who
have acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.[24] Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die.
Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,[25]
that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise,
the unborn child can be considered a dependent
under the CBA. As Continental Steel
itself defines, a dependent is “one
who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself
without the power or aid of someone else.”
Under said general definition,[26]
even an unborn child is a dependent
of its parents. Hortillano’s child could
not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its
mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance.
Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent
may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for
the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must
have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child
shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus
in the mother’s womb.
The term legitimate merely
addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,[27]
we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.” (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,[28] we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the
Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child attaches upon his/her conception.
In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife
were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.
Also
incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth
element entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e.,
presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.
Given
the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death
benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same should have been
granted by Continental Steel.
We
emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an
employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said
employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and
sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case,
had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less
than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
Being
for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other
death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions
thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code
is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any
law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor.[29] In the
same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of
labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National
Labor Relations Commission,[30]
we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph
& Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183
SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests
of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and
compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal
Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights
of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution
dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S.
Montaño, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other
death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00)
and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively,
grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation.
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
|
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice |
|
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Acting Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and Sesinando E. Villon concurring; rollo, pp. 32-40.
[2]
[3] Penned by Atty. Allan S. Montaño, Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator; records, pp. 381-392.
[4] CA rollo, p. 26.
[5] Rollo, pp. 84-92.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] CA rollo, p. 60.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Id at 66-72.
[15] Records, pp. 46-53.
[16] Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.
[17] CA rollo, pp. 24-34.
[18]
[19]
Art. 262-A of the Labor Code as amended in relation to Section 7, Rule XIX of Department Order No. 40-03 series of 2003 provides that the decision, order, resolution or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties and that it shall not be subject of a motion for reconsideration.
[20] Rollo, pp. 38-39.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] Black’s Law Dictionary
[25] Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution reads in full:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
[26] As opposed to the more limited or precise definition of a dependent child for income tax purposes, which means “a legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted child chiefly dependent upon and living with the taxpayer if such dependent is not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, unmarried and not gainfully employed or if such dependent, regardless of age, is incapable of self-support because of mental or physical defect.”
[27] G.R. No. 153798,
[28] 483 Phil. 483, 491 (2004).
[29] Faculty
Association of Mapua Institute of Technology (FAMIT) v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 164060,
[30] 325 Phil. 618, 634-635 (1996).