Republic
of the
SUPREME
COURT
THIRD DIVISION
|
AQUALAB
PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Petitioner, - versus
- HEIRS OF MARCELINO PAGOBO, namely:
PELAGIO PAGOBO, GONZALO PAGOBO, ANIANA PAGOBO, ALFREDO SALVADOR,
SAMUEL PAGOBO, REMEDIOS PAGOBO, VALENTINA PAGOBO, JONATHAN PAGOBO, VIRGILIO
PAGOBO, FELISA YAYON, SIMPLICIO YAYON, BARTOLOME YAYON, BERNARDINA YAYON, and
ISIDRA YAYON; HEIRS OF HILARION PAGOBO, namely: PABLO PAGOBO, ALFREDO PAGOBO, FELIX PAGOBO,
RUFINA P. DAHIL, BRIGIDA P. GODINEZ, HONORATA P. GODINEZ, MAXIMO PAGOBO,
ADRIANA PAGOBO, CECILIA PAGOBO, LILIA PAGOBO, CRESCENCIO PAGOBO, ROBERTO
PAGOBO, ALFONSO PAGOBO, CANDIDO PAGOBO, BARTOLOME PAGOBO, ELPIDIO PAGOBO,
PEDRO PAGOBO, ROGELIO PAGOBO, SHIRLEY P. CAÑETE, MILAGROS PAGOBO, JUANITO
PAGOBO, JR., ANTONIO PAGOBO, IRENEA PAGOBO, and ANIANO P. WAGWAG; HEIRS OF
ANTONIO PAGOBO, namely: GAUDENCIO
PAGOBO, LOTITA PAGOBO, ERNESTO PAGOBO, ROMANA P. DANIL, FELISA PAGOBO, CARMEN
PAGOBO, and SALUD PAGOBO; HEIRS OF MAXIMO PAGOBO, namely: RAMON PAGOBO, RODULFO PAGOBO, CRIPSIN
PAGOBO, and URBANO PAGOBO; HEIRS OF DONATA PAGOBO WAGWAG, namely: FELISA
WAGWAG, ANASTACIO WAGWAG, FILDEL WAGWAG, and NEMESIA WAGWAG; HEIR OF
AQUILINA PAGOBO: VICTOR PAGOBO; HEIRS
OF JUANITO PAGOBO EYAS, namely: MARCELO P. EYAS, ROCHI P. FLORES, and
ORDIE P. FLORES; HEIRS OF CATALINA PAGOBO, namely: RESTITUTO PAGOBO, CARLINA P. TALINGTING,
TEOFILO P. TALINGTING, and JUANITO P. TALINGTING, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 182673 Present: CARPIO,
J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,
and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: October
5, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
In
this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, Aqualab Philippines, Inc.
(Aqualab) assails the March 15, 2007 Decision[1]
and April 22, 2008 Resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 58540, which reversed the
September 30, 1997 Order[3]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 53 in Lapu-lapu City, Cebu. The RTC
dismissed Civil Case No. 4086-L for Partition, Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles, Reconveyance with
Right of Legal Redemption, Damages and Attorney’s Fees filed by
respondents.
The Facts
Subject
of the complaint initiated by respondents are Lots 6727-Q and 6727-Y of the
Opon Cadastre, situated in Punta Engaño,
LOT NO. 6727-Q
A
parcel of land (Lot 6727-Q of the subdivision on plan (LRC) Psd-117050, being a
portion of
LOT NO. 6727-Y
A
parcel of land (Lot 6727-Y of the subdivision on plan (LRC) Psd-117050, being a
portion of
Lot 6727-Q and Lot 6727-Y
used to
form part of
Incidentally,
on the same date that OCT RO-2246 was issued covering Lot 6727, OCT RO-1277[6]
was likewise issued also covering
Shortly
after OCT RO-1277 and OCT RO-2246 were issued,
subject Lots 6727-Q and 6727-Y were subsequently sold to Tarcela de
Espina who then secured Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 3294[8]
therefor on April 21, 1970. The purchase
by Tarcela de Espina of subject Lot 6727-Y from the heirs of Juan Pagobo and
subject Lot 6727-Q from one Antonio Alcantara was duly annotated on the
Memorandum of Incumbrances of both OCT RO-1277[9]
and OCT RO-2246.[10]
Subsequently,
Tarcela de Espina sold subject lots to Rene Espina who was issued, on September
28, 1987, TCT 17830[11]
for Lot 6727-Q and TCT 17831[12]
for Lot 6727-Y. Thereafter, Rene Espina
sold subject lots to Anthony Gaw Kache, who in turn was issued TCT 17918[13]
and TCT 18177,[14]
respectively, on November 9, 1987.
Finally, Aqualab acquired subject lots from Anthony Gaw Kache and was
issued TCT 18442[15] and TCT
18443,[16]
respectively, on May 4, 1988.
On
August 10, 1994, respondents, alleging that Aqualab has disturbed their peaceful occupation of subject lots in
1991, filed a Complaint[17]
for Partition, Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles, Reconveyance with
Right of Legal Redemption, Damages and Attorney’s Fees against Aqualab, the Register of Deeds
of Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, and, for being unwilling co-plaintiffs and alleged
refusal to have subject lots partitioned, the Heirs of Bernabe Pagobo,
namely: Anastacio Pagobo, Demetrio
Pagobo, Felix Pagobo, Olympia P. Tampus, Damasa Pagobo, Salud P. Maloloy-on,
Candida Pagobo, and Adriana P. Mahusay.
The Complaint pertinently alleged that:
ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CAUSE OF ACTION
4. Plaintiffs
are the absolute and legal owners and rightful possessors of Lot [no.] 6727-Q
and
x x x x
5. Ownership
and Possession by plaintiff’s [sic] predecessors-in-interest, and plaintiffs
herein, respectively, over the said land, have been peaceful, continuous [sic]
open, public and adverse, since the year 1936 or even earlier. Their peaceful possession was disturbed only
in 1991 as hereinafter described.
x x x x
15. In
the records with the office of the Registry of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, Lot No.
6727 of the Opon Cadastre has been subdivided in to THIRTY-FOUR (34) lots and
are denominated as Lots Nos. 6727-A to 6727-HH, respectively, as per subdivision
plan, a machine copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex “A”
hereof.
16. Defendants
Anastacio Pagobo, x x x are the surviving children and grandchildren,
respectively, of the late BERNABE PAGOBO and are herein joined as party-defendants
for being “unwilling co-plaintiffs”; and also because despite demands by
plaintiffs upon these aforenamed defendants for the partition of the aforesaid
land, the latter refused and still refuses to have the same partitioned.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT
AQUALAB PHILIPPINES, INC. AND
17. Sometime
in 1991, defendant Aqualab Philippines Inc. represented by Santiago Tanchan,
Jr., claiming ownership of Lot Nos. 6727-Q and 6727-Y, forcibly entered, and
without any court Order, and against the will of the plaintiffs, said Lot no.
6727-Q and Lot no. 6727-Y. The truth of
the matter is that these defendants despite full knowledge that absolute and
legal ownership of Lot no. 6727-Q and Lot no. 6727-Y belonged to plaintiffs, and
despite knowledge that peaceful, public and adverse possession were being
continuously exercised by plaintiff over said land for a period in excess of
THIRTY (30) years, did there and then, by the use of fraud and
misrepresentation and without informing the plaintiffs, caused the transfer
into the name of defendant Aqualab Philippines Inc., Lot no. 6727-Q and Lot no.
6727-Y, consisting of an area of ONE THOUSAND (1,000) SQUARE METERS and SIXTEEN
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN (16,167) SQUARE METERS, respectively. Lots No. 6727-Q and Lot no. 6727-Y are
presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 18442 and CTC No.
18443, respectively, copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes “B” and
“C”, respectively.
18. The
defendants entered into transactions of the lands subject matter of this case,
without the knowledge of plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest, and
defendants did so despite full knowledge that ownership of said lands belonged
to plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest; and that defendants entered
into said transactions despite full knowledge by them and their
predecessors-in-interest that the lots was [sic] covered by a homestead patent
and as such cannot be alienated within twenty-five (25) years from its issuance
on February 10, 1970.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
x x x x
20. Granting,
without necessarily admitting, that the transaction entered into by the
defendants are legal and binding; Plaintiffs then have not been duly notified
of the said sale and therefore, have the right to redeem the same under Article
1620 in relation to Article 1623 of the New Civil Code, and also under
Commonwealth Acts [sic] No. 141, as amended.[18]
On August 26, 1994, the heirs of
Bernabe Pagobo filed their Answer,[19]
asserting that subject
On September 12, 1994, Aqualab filed
its Motion to Dismiss[21]
on the grounds of: (1) prescription of the action for declaration of nullity of
documents, cancellation of transfer certificates of title, and reconveyance; and
(2) no cause of action for partition and legal redemption of the mother title
of subject lots, i.e., OCT
RO-2246 had already been subdivided and several conveyances made of the
subdivided lots.
Ruling
of the Trial Court
By Order dated September 30, 1997, the
RTC granted Aqualab’s motion and dismissed respondents’ complaint, disposing as
follows:
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing
considerations, defendant Aqualab’s motion to dismiss, being impressed with
merit, is hereby granted. The complaint
in the above-entitled case is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED. [22]
In
granting Aqualab’s motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that prescription
has set in. Moreover, the trial court
held that Aqualab is an innocent purchaser for value and, thus, its rights are
protected by law. Finally, it concluded
that legal redemption or reconveyance was no longer available to respondents.
Undaunted,
respondents appealed the above dismissal to the CA. The parties thereafter
filed their respective briefs.
Ruling
of the Appellate Court
The
CA saw things differently. On March 15,
2007, it rendered the assailed decision, reversing the September 30, 1997 Order
of dismissal by the RTC, declaring the sale of subject lots as null and void,
and remanding the case to the trial court for partition proceedings. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing premises, the Order of the Regional Trial Court
dismissing the instant Complaint for Partition, Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title, Reconveyance with
Right of Legal Redemption, Damages and Attorney’s Fees, and other Reliefs is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the instant appeal is GRANTED, hereby declaring the
sale of the homestead and TCT Nos. 18442 and 18443 under the name of Aqualab
null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds for the City of Lapu-lapu to
cancel both certificates of title and to issue new certificates of title over
Lots 6727-Q and 6727-Y under the name of appellants, and let this case be
REMANDED to the trial court for the presentation of evidence on the claim for
partition and for damages.
SO
ORDERED.[23]
The
CA resolved the following issues: (1) the propriety of the dismissal of the
complaint by the RTC; and, (2) whether respondents have the right to redeem
subject lots. The CA ruled that the
trial court erred in dismissing the complaint as the sale of subject lots to
Tarcela de Espina was void, thus making the subsequent conveyances ineffective
and no titles were validly transferred.
Moreover, it ruled that Aqualab is not an innocent purchaser for value,
and held that respondents, as heirs of the homestead grantee, never lost their
valid title to the subject lots.
Through the equally assailed April 22,
2008 Resolution, the CA denied Aqualab’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, we have this petition.
The
Issues
(A)
WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A RADICAL DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL AND
ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS THAT WOULD WARRANT THE REVERSAL OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION
(B)
WHETHER
OR NOT THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED COMPLAINT [SIC] ON THE GROUND OF LACK
OF CAUSE OF ACTION
(C)
WHETHER
OR NOT THE TRANSFERS OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY TO HEREIN PETITIONER’S
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST WERE VIOLATIVE OF THE FIVE (5) YEAR PROHIBITIVE PERIOD
UNDER SECTION 118 OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT SO AS TO WARRANT THEIR NULLIFICATION
(D)
WHETHER
OR NOT THE PETITIONER IS AN INNOCENT PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH
(E)
WHETHER
OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS’ CAUSE OF ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED WARRANTING THE DISMISSAL
OF THEIR COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION
(F)
WHETHER
OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS’ COMPLAINT CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK AGAINST THE
TITLES OF HEREIN PETITIONER’S PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST WARRANTING THE DISMISSAL
THEREOF
(G)
WHETHER
OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS’ APPEAL BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE BEEN
DISMISSED IN VIEW OF THE RESPONDENTS’ ADMISSION THAT THE CONVEYANCE OF THE
DISPUTED PROPERTY TO HEREIN PETITIONER WAS VALID
(H)
WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPRIVED THE PETITIONER OF ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT NULLIFIED THE PETITIONER’S TITLE AND OWNERSHIP OVER
SUBJECT PROPERTY WITHOUT TRIAL THEREBY DEPRIVING THE PETITIONER OF ITS PROPERTY
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW[24]
The
Court’s Ruling
The
petition is partly meritorious.
The
core issues raised in the instant petition are factual in nature and can be
summed up into two: first,
whether the action of respondents is barred by prescription; and second,
whether Aqualab is an innocent purchaser for value.
Hypothetical Admission
of Factual Allegations
in the Complaint
by Filing a Motion to Dismiss
In
filing a motion to dismiss, the movant hypothetically admits the truth of the
material and relevant facts alleged and pleaded in the complaint. The court, in resolving the motion to dismiss,
must consider such hypothetical admission, the documentary evidence presented
during the hearing thereof, and the relevant laws and jurisprudence bearing on
the issues or subject matter of the complaint.
Dismissal by Trial
Court on Prescription and
Finding Defendant
an Innocent Purchaser for Value
The
trial court ruled that prescription has set in, since respondents alleged in
the complaint fraud and misrepresentation in procuring the transfer of subject
lots, and such transfer was made on April 21, 1970, while the instant complaint
was filed only on August 10, 1994, or a little over 24 years. Relying on Buenaventura v. Court of
Appeals,[25] where
the Court held that an action for reconveyance of title due to fraud is
susceptible to prescription either within four or 10 years, the trial court
held that the instant action is definitely barred. It also ruled that even if a constructive
trust was created as averred by respondents, still, the instant action has
prescribed for a constructive trust prescribes in 10 years, relying on Tenio-Obsequio
v. Court of Appeals.[26]
Moreover,
the trial court, also relying on Tenio-Obsequio, agreed with Aqualab’s
assertion that it was an innocent purchaser for value, which merely relied on
the correctness of the TCTs covering subject lots, i.e., TCT 17918 and TCT 18177 in the name of Anthony Gaw Kache,
and, as such, Aqualab, as vendee, need not look beyond the certificate of title
and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said titles.
Finally,
the trial court concluded that respondents cannot invoke legal redemption under
Article 1620 in relation to Art. 1623 of the Civil Code and under Commonwealth
Act No. (CA) 141, as amended,[27]
for
Aqualab Hypothetically
Admitted the Fraudulent Conveyances
and Respondents’
Possession of Subject Lots
Respondents
aver that they are the absolute and lawful owners of subject properties, i.e.,
Lots 6727-Q and 6727-Y, over which they have had actual possession since 1936
or earlier until sometime in 1991, when Aqualab disturbed such possession.[28] While
the records show that respondents did not have in their names the certificate
of titles over subject lots, the factual assertion of open, peaceful, public,
and adverse possession is hypothetically admitted by Aqualab.
Moreover,
respondents allege that the conveyances of subject lots were fraudulently made
in violation of the restrictions on alienation of homesteads under CA 141, and
that said conveyances were made without their knowledge and, thus, asserting
their right to redeem the subject properties in line with the policy of CA 141
that the homestead should remain with the grantee and his family.[29] The alleged fraudulent conveyances were
likewise hypothetically admitted by Aqualab.
On
the other hand, Aqualab’s co-defendants, the heirs of Bernabe Pagobo, to
respondents’ complaint, filed their Answer asserting possession and ownership
over subject
It
is, thus, clear that by filing its motion to dismiss, Aqualab hypothetically
admitted the veracity of respondents’ continuous possession of subject lots
until 1991 when Aqualab disturbed such possession. Aqualab likewise hypothetically admitted the
fraudulent and illegal conveyances of subject lots.
In
its Motion to Dismiss, Aqualab moved for the dismissal of respondents’
complaint on the ground of prescription, that it is an innocent purchaser for
value whose rights are protected by law, and that the complaint failed to state
a cause of action for partition and legal redemption.
Prescription Is Not
Apparent
on the Face of
the Complaint
From
the foregoing premises, the trial court erred in finding prescription. Prescription, as a ground for a motion to
dismiss, is adequate when the complaint, on its face, shows that the action has
already prescribed.[30] Such is not the case in this instance. Respondents have duly averred continuous
possession until 1991 when such was allegedly disturbed by Aqualab. Being in possession of the subject
lots—hypothetically admitted by Aqualab—respondents’ right to reconveyance or
annulment of title has not prescribed or is not time-barred.
Verily,
an action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is
imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of
the acts.[31] And the prescriptive period for the
reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years, reckoned
from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title, if the plaintiff is
not in possession.[32] Thus, one who is in actual possession of a
piece of land on a claim of ownership
thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right.[33]
In
the instant case, as hypothetically admitted, respondents were in possession
until 1991, and until such possession is disturbed, the prescriptive period
does not run. Since respondents filed
their complaint in 1994, or three years after their possession was allegedly
disturbed, it is clear that prescription has not set in, either due to fraud or
constructive trust.
Besides,
if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property, remains in possession of
the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the
property does not run against him. In
such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the
nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.[34]
Thus,
the trial court’s reliance on
Aqualab Not an Innocent
Purchaser for Value Due to the Hypothetically Admitted Respondents’ Possession
of Subject Lots
In
the instant case, again based on the hypothetically admitted allegations in the
complaint, it would appear that Anthony Gaw Kache, Aqualab’s predecessor-in-interest,
was not in possession of subject lots.
Such a fact should have put Aqualab on guard relative to the possessors’
(respondents’) interest over subject lots.
A buyer of real property that is in the possession of a person other
than the seller must be wary, and a buyer who does not investigate the rights
of the one in possession can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith.[37]
Having
hypothetically admitted respondents’ possession of subject lots, Aqualab cannot
be considered, in the context of its motion to dismiss, to be an innocent
purchaser for value or a purchaser in good faith. Moreover, the defense of indefeasibility of a
The Complaint Sufficiently
States a Cause
of Action
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it
is abundantly clear to the Court that respondents’ complaint sufficiently
stated, under the premises, a cause of action.
Not lost on us is the fact that the RTC dismissed the complaint of
respondents on the grounds of prescription and in the finding that Aqualab is
an innocent purchaser for value of the subject lots. Quoting Philippine Bank of Communications
v. Trazo,[39]
the Court said in Bayot v. Court of Appeals[40]
that:
A cause of action is an act or
omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action
hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient
to constitute a cause of action
against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the
court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of
the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.[41]
Indeed,
to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must
show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.[42] However, a perusal of respondents’ Complaint
before the RTC, in light of Aqualab’s motion to dismiss which hypothetically
admitted the truth of the allegations in the complaint, shows that respondents’
action before the RTC has sufficiently stated a cause of action. Hypothetically admitting fraud in the
transfers of subject lots, which indisputably were first transferred in
apparent violation of pertinent provisions in CA 141 prohibiting alienation of
homesteads within five years from the grant of the homestead patent, and the
continuing possession of respondents until 1991 of the subject lots, the action
for reconveyance and nullification filed in 1994 not only sufficiently stated a
cause of action but also has not yet prescribed.
Given
the findings above, the trial court gravely committed an error of judgment in
granting Aqualab’s motion to dismiss.
The
appellate court was, thus, correct insofar as it reversed and set aside the
September 30, 1997 Order of dismissal of the trial court. Unfortunately, however, it went further, for
it did not merely remand the case for further proceedings, i.e., for trial on the merits, but it
also resolved and decided the case in favor of respondents without going into a
full-blown trial on the merits. This violated Aqualab’s right to due process.
The CA Committed
Reversible Error
in Deciding the Case
on the Merits
The
CA reversibly erred when it decided the case on the merits when what was
appealed thereto was a dismissal of the case through a motion to dismiss. There was no trial on the merits. Thus, its resolution of the case on the
merits had no factual basis. The
lynchpins in the resolution of the motion to dismiss are in the issues of
prescription and whether Aqualab is an innocent purchaser for value. On these two issues we ruled, as discussed
above, that based on the motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint,
and the pieces of documentary evidence on record, prescription has not yet set
in and that Aqualab is apparently not a purchaser in good faith for, as
hypothetically admitted, respondents had possession over subject lots until
1991.
Such
hypothetical admission, however, is not equivalent to or constitutive of a
judicial admission, for, after all, Aqualab has not yet filed its Answer. It was, therefore, erroneous for the CA to
decide the case on the merits. And much
less can the CA rule that Aqualab did not controvert respondents’ allegation of
disturbance in their possession. It was a hypothetically admitted fact but not
the factual finding of the trial court.
The Parties’ Assertions
and Allegations
Still Have to Be
Proved by Trial on the Merits
First,
the assertion of respondents that they had possession until 1991, a factual
issue, still had to be established on trial.
Indeed, he who asserts a fact has the burden of proving it. So, too, the contention of being an innocent
purchaser for value by Aqualab still has yet to be determined through a trial
on the merits. The hypothetical
admission applied against a defendant is relied upon by the court only to
resolve his motion to dismiss. Verily,
the burden of proving the purchaser’s good faith lies in the one who asserts
the same—it is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith.[43]
And
if Aqualab is found to be truly an innocent purchaser for value, its rights as
such is protected by law; more so in situations where there have been a series
of transfers of the subject lots, in which case, respondents’ rights, if any,
will be for damages from those who perpetrated the fraudulent conveyances.
No Factual and Legal
Bases for the
Cancellation of Certificates
of Title
Second,
and corollary to the first, given that there is no judicial factual finding
that Aqualab is not an innocent purchaser for value, it is legally and
factually without bases for the appellate court to order the cancellation of
the certificates of title covering subject lots in the name of Aqualab.
Third,
the issues of reconveyance or redemptive rights of respondents and their action
for partition have to be resolved by the trial court in light of its eventual
findings from a trial on the merits of the instant case.
We,
thus, hold that the instant case should proceed to trial for the parties to
adduce their respective evidence to support their contrary positions in the
defense of their asserted rights.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The CA’s Decision
dated March 15, 2007 and Resolution dated April 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No.
58540 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The RTC’s Order dated
September 30, 1997 dismissing Civil Case No. 4086-L is
likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is hereby REINSTATED, and petitioner Aqualab is REQUIRED within the period available
pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 16, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure TO FILE its answer before the trial
court. The trial court is ordered to
proceed with dispatch to the trial on the merits.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 27-40. Penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta and concurred in by Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Agustin S. Dizon.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] G.R. No. 50837, December 28, 1992, 216 SCRA 818.
[26] G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 550.
[27] “An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws Relative to Lands of the Public Domain,” otherwise known as the “Public Land Act,” approved on November 7, 1936.
[28] Paragraphs 5 and 17 of the Complaint.
[29] Paragraphs 18, 19, and 20 of the Complaint.
[30] Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc., G.R. No. 152575, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 51, 58; citing Marquez v. Baldoz, G.R. No. 143779, April 4, 2003, 400 SCRA 669.
[31] Llemos v. Llemos, G.R. No. 150162, January 26, 2007, 513 SCRA 128, 134; citing Delfin v. Billones, G.R. No. 146550, March 17, 2006, 485 SCRA 38, 47-48; Occeña v. Esponilla, G.R. No. 156973, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 116, 126.
[32] Heirs
of
[33] Id. at 409; citing Arlegui v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126437, March 6, 2002, 378 SCRA 322, 324.
[34] Aguirre v. Heirs of Lucas Villanueva, G.R. No. 169898, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 492, 494; citing Alfredo v. Borras, G.R. No. 144225, June 17, 2003, 404 SCRA 145, 163-164, 166.
[35] Supra note 25.
[36] Supra note 26.
[37] Raymundo v. Bandong, G.R. No. 171250, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 514, 530-531; citing Potenciano v. Reynoso, G.R. No. 140707, April 22, 2003, 401 SCRA 391.
[38] Samonte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104223, July 12, 2001, 361 SCRA 173, 183.
[39] G.R. No. 165500, August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA 242, 251-252.
[40] G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.
[41]
[42] Universal Aquarius, Inc. v. Q.C. Human Resources Management Corp., G.R. No. 155900, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 38, 47; citing Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro, G.R. No. 154830, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 153.
[43] Raymundo, supra note 37, at 529.