DIONISIO IGNACIO, G.R. No.
182259
LYDIA ARCIAGA and
EUGENIA DELA CRUZ,
Petitioners, Present:
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,
- versus - Carpio Morales,
Nachura,*
Brion, and
Abad, JJ.
PEOPLE
OF THE
Respondent. Promulgated:
October 12, 2009
x
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
ABAD,
J.:
The Case
Petitioners[1]
seek by this petition for review[2] to
set aside the Decision[3] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30235 dated March 18, 2008, which affirmed the
Decision[4] of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City[5] in
Criminal Case 98-1648 dated January 25, 2006 that found them guilty of estafa
through falsification of a public document.
The Facts
Before his wife Damasa Navaro died, Lorenzo
dela Cruz had four children with her, namely, Alejandro,[6]
Apparently, Ayala Land, Inc. (
Atty. Hicoblino M. Catly, who
represented the plaintiffs in the case, succeeded in negotiating a settlement
with
The witnesses from the opposite
sides: Brigida and Atty. Catly for the prosecution, and petitioners Ignacio, Arciaga,
and Eugenia dela Cruz for the defense, substantially agreed that on May 13, 1997
they went as instructed to the Makati offices of Ayala Land to sign the documents
of settlement, particularly the Memorandum of Agreement between the parties and
their joint motion for judgment based on a compromise. Brigida and petitioners Ignacio, Arciaga, and
Eugenia dela Cruz uniformly testified that they were unable to properly read
and understand the documents they signed.
They were just told to sign or thumbmark the papers and they would then be
paid. Nor were they able to consult
Atty. Catly before signing the same.
Atty. Catly testified that he noticed
several irregularities in the documents, particularly the non-inclusion of his
attorney’s fees and the addition of certain persons in the documents who were
not parties to the case. The lawyers of
Although Brigida’s name appeared in both
the memorandum of agreement and the joint motion, the documents referred to her
as an heir of Leon Argana. Nowhere did
it appear that she was also one of Lorenzo’s heirs.
Under the memorandum of agreement, Lorenzo’s
individual heirs got the following amounts from
1.
Dionisio Ignacio P 9,086,345.98
2.
Alejandro dela
Cruz P 5,332,562.30
3.
P
5,332,562.30
4.
Eugenia dela Cruz P 5,332,562.30
5.
Melchor dela Cruz P 1,185,000.25
6.
Gertrudez dela
Cruz P 1,185,000.25
As it happened, P500,000.00 which represented her share as an heir of
Leon Argana.
Petitioner Ignacio admitted that, speaking
for Lorenzo’s heirs, it was he who gave the names of Lorenzo’s six heirs to
Atty. Catly.[13]
On January 25, 2006 the trial court rendered
judgment finding petitioners Dionisio Ignacio, Alejandro dela Cruz, Lydia
Arciaga, and Eugenia dela Cruz guilty of the crime charged for failing, in
conspiracy with one another, to disclose to those who prepared the settlement
documents that Brigida was one of Lorenzo’s heirs, too, in fact his surviving wife,
thereby depriving her of her just share in his estate. The court sentenced each of the petitioners,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer the penalty of 11 years and
1 month of prision mayor as minimum
to 20 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum. It also ordered them to pay Brigida
P3,922,004.76 in actual damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals fully
affirmed the trial court’s decision, hence, this petition.
The Issue
The core issue in this case is
whether or not, in signing the joint motion for judgment based on a compromise,
which motion failed to state the fact that Brigida was one of Lorenzo’s heirs,
and in their thereby profiting from such compromise, petitioners are guilty of
estafa through falsification of public documents.
Discussion
In its comment,[14]
the Office of the Solicitor General assails the petition for raising questions
of fact that are not proper for a petition for review under Rule 45. But a question is factual when the contending
parties cannot agree that a thing exists or has actually happened. On the other hand, a question is legal when the contending parties assume that a thing
exists or has actually happened but disagree on its legal significance or
effect on their rights.
Here, no genuine questions of fact are
involved since the factual versions of the opposing parties are essentially not
in conflict. Indeed, they tend to lend credence
to each other’s claims. Actually, what
petitioners gripe about are the legal implications that the trial court and the
Court of Appeals drew from those facts.
These are questions of law that are proper subject of a petition for
review under Rule 45.
The information in this case alleges
that the four accused heirs of Lorenzo by Damasa, the petitioners in this case,
defrauded their deceased father’s second wife, Brigida, “by deliberately
omitting to disclose the truth” in the joint motion for judgment based on a
compromise submitted to the court for approval that she was Lorenzo’s surviving
wife and by making her place her thumbmark on the document with that fatal
omission, resulting in her being deprived of her just share of P3,922,004.76
from Ayala Land.
The Court of Appeals held that
petitioners, as Brigida’s relatives by affinity, not only took advantage of her
ignorance and lack of education but also betrayed the trust that she reposed on
them when they made her affix her thumbmark on the defective joint motion. But nowhere in the records does it appear that
petitioners took part in negotiating the settlement or were conscious of the
fact that the final settlement papers deprived Brigida of her rightful share in
Lorenzo’s estate. In fact, although Brigida
testified that she thought the documents covered only the lot belonging to her
father, Leon Argana, she did not say that it was the petitioners who made her adopt
such assumption.
Parenthetically, the instruction for
Brigida to go to the offices of
Clearly, it was not petitioners who prepared
Brigida’s mind so she would place her thumbmarks on the joint motion for
judgment based on a compromise or who informed her as to what it was all about. Indeed, it appears that petitioners were in no
better position than she was with respect to the documentations. They all testified that they signed with no opportunity
to really read and understand what the documents contained. They were apparently too trusting and just
wanted to get the sums promised them.
Besides, Brigida’s own son and
daughter, Melchor and Gertrudez, acquiesced in and signed the joint motion that
supposedly omitted to mention the fact that their mother was, like them, an
heir of Lorenzo. Since the prosecution
theorized that petitioners conspired in knowingly allowing such omission to
stand on the document, then Brigida should have criminally charged her own
children with the same offense. They had
a greater responsibility in protecting their mother. But she did not. That her own children signed the joint motion
on the same occasion[17] and
got their share of the money, without giving their mother the slightest hint
that something was amiss, indicates that petitioners’ good faith and innocence animated
all those concerned.
Petitioner Ignacio of course admitted
that it was he who gave Atty. Catly the names of Lorenzo’s six descendants who
were to inherit from him. But there is
no evidence that Ignacio acted in bad faith.
It may be assumed that Brigida’s children, Melchor and Gertrudez who
signed the joint motion along with Ignacio, proportionately benefited from the
omission of their mother’s name in the list of Lorenzo’s heirs. That these two did not then object that the
settlement had left out their mother to her prejudice indicates that no
covetousness prompted the omission.
It does not help the prosecution’s
case that petitioners had no hand in the actual preparation of either the memorandum
of agreement or the joint motion. All
that had been established is that Dionisio gave the names of Lorenzo’s six descendants-heirs
to Atty. Catly. The latter, as prosecution
witness, testified that he, too, did not take part in the preparation of the
documents. The
The Court of Appeals points out that petitioners
took no steps to rectify certain irregularities in the documents that Atty.
Catly, their counsel in the civil action, called to their attention, indicating
a knowing guilt. But it should be
observed that these so-called “irregularities” referred merely to the
non-inclusion of his attorney’s fees and the addition of persons whom he did
not think were parties to the action. These
supposed irregularities had nothing to do with Brigida’s right as Lorenzo’s heir.
Why a larger share for Ignacio? Ignacio explained that the settlement did not
follow the simple formula of just dividing the amount
Besides, one of the essential
elements of the complex crime of estafa with falsification of public document
is that the untruthful statement, which the offender has made in a document, be
a perversion of truth with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.[20] This key element of the falsification aspect
of the crime is not here present because, as stated above, all the signatories
to the settlement documents simply assumed, when they signed such documents,
that these reflected what was right.
Although the Court has not found
sufficient evidence to hold petitioners criminally liable for estafa through
falsification of a public document, it finds them civilly liable for having
unduly received more than their fair and legal share of Lorenzo’s estate at
Brigida’s expense. Unfortunately, however,
the trial court simply ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay
Brigida P3,922,004.76 by way of actual damages without stating its basis
for arriving at this amount. The Court
of Appeals itself adopted this figure also without explanation.
But the award of P3,922,004.76
to Brigida is not supported by the evidence on record. Apparently, the trial court simply added up
the shares that petitioners and Brigida’s children got out of the settlement with
P27,454,033.38,
the presumptive estate of Lorenzo. It
then divided this amount by seven, which is the number of Lorenzo’s heirs
consisting of the four petitioners, Brigida’s two children, and Brigida herself,
to arrive at a one-seventh individual share of P3,922,004.76 per
heir.
But there is no evidence on record
that Lorenzo alone owned the property subject of the settlement with
The trial court must also take into
account the fact that Brigida’s own children also benefited from the exclusion
of their mother in the partition of Lorenzo’s estate. But since her children are not parties to the
case, Brigida must take recourse against them in an appropriate suit for the
recovery of what had been unduly paid them, if she is so minded. Petitioner’s liability, on the other hand,
should be limited to their proportionate share of Brigida’s losses.
Further, there is evidence on record
that the legal expenses incurred in the suit and in its eventual settlement had
been incorporated into the share that
WHEREFORE, the
Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30235 and ACQUITS petitioners of the crime of which they were charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court also SETS ASIDE the award of P3,922,004.76 by way of actual
damages awarded to Brigida Argana Vda. De dela Cruz and DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, from which
this case emanated to receive further evidence to ascertain whether or not the
property subject of settlement belonged to Lorenzo dela Cruz alone or to the conjugal
partnership of the first or second marriage and award damages to Brigida as the
evidence warrants.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, per Special Order No. 730 dated October 5, 2009.
[1] Eugenia dela Cruz died during the pendency of the appeal as evidenced by a Certified True Copy of the Certificate of Death, attached to the Petition, marked as Annex “C”; rollo, p. 58.
[2] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 109-118. Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon, and concurred in by Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Lucenito N. Tagle.
[4] Records, pp. 276-282.
[5] Branch 58.
[6] Alejandro was charged in the information but died during the pendency of the trial.
[7] All surnamed dela Cruz
[8] Also surnamed dela Cruz.
[9] Raffled to Branch 58.
[10] Records, pp. 198-212, Exhibit “A” for the Prosecution.
[11]
[12]
[13] TSN,
[14] Rollo,
pp. 92-111, dated
[15] TSN,
[16]
[17] TSN,
[18] TSN,
[19] TSN,
[20] Daan v.
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. Nos. 163972-77,
[21] Records, p. 59.