Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
HECTOR T. HIPE, Petitioner, - versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and MA. CRISTINA L. VICENCIO, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 181528 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING,* YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO,* CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BRION,** PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: October
2, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify and
enjoin the implementation of the January 30, 2008 Resolution[1] issued by the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc, which
affirmed the July 11, 2007 Resolution[2] issued by its Second
Division.
Petitioner Hector T. Hipe and respondent Ma. Cristina L. Vicencio
were candidates for the mayoralty post in Catubig,
On
In a
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Verified Appeal is hereby dismissed for being filed out of time.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Subsequently, on
In the challenged Resolution,[11] the COMELEC En Banc held that the ruling of the MBOC
had already attained finality considering that the filing of the Verified
Appeal with the COMELEC was five days late. It stated that the filing of the
Verified Appeal should have been made within the inextendible period of five
days from the filing of the written and verified notice of appeal with the
MBOC, with which petitioner Hipe failed to comply. Further, the COMELEC En
Banc held that it was already deprived of proper jurisdiction to entertain
the instant case since the case should no longer be considered as a
pre-proclamation controversy, but should rather be ventilated in an election
protest. In addition, the COMELEC En Banc
stated that the ruling of the MBOC was amply supported by the affidavits of the
Members of the Board of Election Inspectors, and that the MBOC retained
sufficient discretion to avail itself of all available means to ascertain the
results of the elections through witnesses, as well as through an examination
of the election returns themselves.
The dispositive portion
of the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES, to deny the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by Appellant-Movant Hector Hipe. The questioned Resolution dated July 11, 2007, issued by the Second Division of the Commission on Elections for the exclusion of seven (7) election returns in favor of the appellee, Maria Cristina L. Vicencio, therefore, stands and remains valid.
SO
ORDERED.[12]
Aggrieved, Hipe filed this petition.
Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its challenged Resolution dated January 30, 2008, which affirmed the Resolution dated July 11, 2007 issued by its Second Division dismissing petitioner Hipe’s appeal for being filed out of time.
The petition is partly meritorious.
Appeal Should Be Given Due Course
In its En Banc Resolution, the COMELEC held that the ruling of the MBOC
had already become final and executory; and thus, its Second Division had not
acquired appellate jurisdiction to act on Hipe’s verified appeal. In support of
its ruling, the COMELEC En Banc
relied on the Certification issued by Renato I. Madronio, Acting Election
Officer II, Catubig, Northern Samar, attesting that hard or printed copies of
the MBOC’s ruling to exclude the seven contested election returns were received
by Atty. V.B. Desales, counsel for the KAMPI-Liberal Party Coalition, at 10:37
p.m. on May 19, 2007 at the provincial Election Supervisor’s Office.[13]
On this basis, the COMELEC En Banc
opined that when petitioner Hipe filed the Verified Appeal on
We disagree. Indeed, there is a
disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed;[14]
and that, corollary thereto, it is presumed that in its disposition of the
contested election returns, the MBOC has regularly performed its official duty
of issuing a written ruling on the prescribed form, authenticated by the
signatures of its members as required under Section 20(d) of Republic Act No. 7166.[15]
In fact, the alleged issuance and service upon the supposed counsel of
petitioner Hipe of the written ruling of MBOC was even supported by the aforementioned
Certification of the Chairperson of the MBOC.
The records would, however, reveal
that Atty. Venerando B. Desales, the counsel who was supposedly furnished the alleged
written ruling of the MBOC, has denied under oath that he ever received a copy
of the alleged written ruling.[16]
He even categorically denied in his Affidavit that he was the counsel of
petitioner Hipe.[17]
Notably, nothing in the Status of
Canvass Report[18]
or in the Minutes of the Proceedings of the MBOC on
On the contrary, a perusal of the
Minutes of the Proceedings of the MBOC on May 19, 2007 would reveal that Election
Officer Madronio even notified the counsels of petitioner Hipe that, as of that
time, the Municipal COMELEC Office still did not have the prescribed form of
the ruling, and that they would still have to get the prescribed forms in
Catarman.[20]
This militates against Madronio’s statement in his Certification that hard or
printed copies of the ruling of the MBOC were furnished to Atty. Desales on
that same day.
When a plaintiff’s
case depends upon the establishment of a negative fact, and the means of
proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, then the burden
of proof is upon the party averring the negative fact.[21]
In the case at bar,
petitioner Hipe asserted the negative fact, that is, that no copy of the written ruling of the MBOC was sent
to him or his counsel. Thus, petitioner Hipe has the burden of proof to
show that he was not furnished with a copy of the written ruling of the MBOC,
which he was able to successfully prove in the instant case. Be that as it
may, it then becomes incumbent upon respondent Vicencio to prove otherwise.
This is because the
burden of evidence is shifted if the party upon whom it is lodged was able to
adduce preponderant evidence to prove its claim.[22]
Significantly, other than Madronio’s statement in his Certification that hard or printed copies of
the ruling of the MBOC were furnished to Atty. Desales on
Furthermore, the COMELEC has the discretion to
construe its rules liberally and, at the same time, suspend the rules or any of
their portions in the interest of justice.[23]
As aptly stated by Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento in his Dissenting Opinion:[24]
It is
well settled that election laws should be reasonably and liberally construed to
achieve their purpose – to effectuate and safeguard the will of the electorate in
the choice of their representatives. The courts frown upon any interpretation
that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of votes
in any election but also the correct ascertainment of the results thereof.
Disputes in the
outcome of elections involve public interest. Technicalities and procedural
barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their
elective officials. Laws governing such disputes must be liberally construed to
the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not
be defeated by mere technicalities. Hence, it is submitted that there is a need
to suspend the procedural rules and resolve the merits of the case to promote
justice and safeguard the will of the electorate of Catubig,
Accordingly,
the COMELEC should have not dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Hipe on
the ground of belated filing.
The Exclusion of the Seven Election Returns
Was Amply Supported by Evidence
Nevertheless, even if we entertain
petitioner Hipe’s appeal from the decision of the MBOC on the questioned
election returns, the Court still rules in favor of respondent Vicencio.
Petitioner Hipe claims that no
proof was presented nor was there any showing that the seven election returns
in question were defective.[25]
Such contention is not persuasive.
The COMELEC, after a judicious evaluation of the documents on
record, upheld the findings of the MBOC to exclude the subject election returns
on the basis of the affidavits of the members of the Board of Election
Inspectors. What exactly these documents and evidence are upon which the
COMELEC based its resolution, and how they have been appreciated in respect of
their sufficiency, are beyond this Court’s scrutiny.[26] The rule that factual
findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice
except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in
support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns
the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC—created
and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself—on a level higher
than statutory administrative organs.[27] The factual finding of
the COMELEC is, therefore, binding on the Court. As found by the COMELEC En
Banc:
Besides, we do not agree that the exclusion of the seven (7) election returns in question were not supported by any iota of evidence. This is amply supported by the affidavits of the Members of the Board of Election Inspectors; they were all made in clear and unequivocal language by public officers who are presumed to have performed such duties in the ordinary and regular execution thereof. A careful re-examination of the evidence on record reveals that there is sufficient justification to uphold the MBOC ruling to exclude the subject election returns. The MBOC retains sufficient discretion to avail itself of all available means to ascertain the results of the elections through witnesses as well as examination of the election returns themselves. Where there is no abuse of discretion the MBOC is presumed to have acted within its powers and its decision should be treated with some amount of respect.[28]
This is especially true in the instant case considering that,
as noted by the COMELEC En Banc in
its questioned Resolution, one of the witnesses petitioner Hipe previously
presented later on recanted her testimony and admitted that she had made her
previous statement as to the regularity of the conduct of the May 14, 1007
elections only out of fear due to threats upon her person.[29] As correctly observed by
the COMELEC En Banc:
We also note that even one of the witnesses presented by the appellant, Melanie Robion, Chairman of the BEI for precinct No. 0037B, later on recanted her testimony. This spells doom to the appellant’s cause as it even impacts on the veracity and truthfulness of the other affidavits that the appellant submitted. We are reminded of the legal principle that a falsity in one is a falsity in all, “Falsus in Onum, Falsus in Omnibus” and would now be more inclined to believe the assertions made by the appellee instead of those presented by the appellant, who has now been unmasked to have been less than truthful at one time or another.[30]
Considering the foregoing discussion,
there is ample evidence to support the findings of the COMELEC that the seven
election returns in question should be excluded. The contention of petitioner
Hipe that said election returns were excluded from the canvass merely on the
basis of pure procedural technicalities is, therefore, unfounded.
Respondent Vicencio Substantially Complied with the
Requirement that Objections Be Made in Writing
Petitioner Hipe contends that the
written petition to exclude the election returns was filed beyond the
prescribed time or almost 24 hours after the oral petition to exclude was
manifested by the counsels of respondent Vicencio; hence, the latter’s
objections were raised out of time.[31]
This contention is without merit.
While the records reveal that respondent Vicencio manifested
her oral objections on May 15, 2007 at around 7:00 p.m.,[32] filed the written
objections on May 16, 2007 at 6:40 p.m., and submitted the documentary evidence
in support of the protest at 2:45 p.m. only on the following day, the Court
nevertheless considers the foregoing acts of Vicencio as substantial compliance
with the requirement that objections be reduced into writing.
In Marabur v. COMELEC,[33] we held that while
respondent failed to submit his written objections, respondent’s submission of
his formal offer of evidence, including the evidence itself, within the
prescribed period constituted substantial compliance with the requirement that
objections be reduced into writing.
Notably, the relaxation of the rules becomes all the more
necessary in the instant case, considering that respondent Vicencio has even
filed his written objections within the prescribed period; and soon thereafter,
the documentary evidence in support of the written objections.
Technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed
to stand in the way if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the
electorate’s true will in the choice of its elective officials.[34]
It should be borne in mind that the object of the canvass is to determine
the result of the elections based on the official election returns. In order
that the result of the canvass would reflect the true expression of the
people’s will in the choice of their elective officials, the canvass must be
based on true, genuine, correct––nay, untampered––election returns.[35] It is in these proceedings
that the COMELEC exercises its supervisory and administrative power in the
enforcement of laws relative to the conduct of elections, by seeing to it that
the canvass is based on the election returns as actually certified by the
members of the board of inspectors.[36]
Taking into consideration the findings of the COMELEC En Banc that there was ample evidence to
support the exclusion of the seven election returns in question based on the
grounds raised by respondent Vicencio, this should suffice in upholding the
latter’s proclamation, absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC En Banc, in order
not to frustrate the electorate’s will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
The January 30, 2008 COMELEC En Banc Resolution
and the July 11, 2007 COMELEC Second Division Resolution are hereby SET
ASIDE insofar as they dismissed petitioner Hipe’s appeal. The January 30,
2008 COMELEC En Banc Resolution is,
however, AFFIRMED insofar as it declared the exclusion of the seven
election returns of Precinct Nos. 0037B, 0052A, 0053A, 0058A, 0080A, 0081A and
0082A to be valid.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
(On official leave)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(On official leave)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
(On leave)
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[7]
[15] An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
[22] Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Royeca, G.R. No. 176664, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 207; citing Asian Transmission Corporation v. Canlubang Sugar Estates, G.R. No. 142383, August 29, 2003, 410 SCRA 202.
[23] Abainza v. Arellano, G.R. No. 181644, December 8, 2008, 573 SCRA 332, 340; citing Suliguin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166046, March 23, 2006, 485 SCRA 227.
[26] Dagloc v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 154442-47, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 574, 594; citing Sison v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134096, March 3, 1999, 304 SCRA 170, 179.