SECOND DIVISION
|
LAND BANK OF THE
Petitioner, - versus - J. L. JOCSON AND SONS, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 180803
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,* CARPIO MORALES, BRION, and ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: October
23, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Subject of
the present controversy is a 27.3808-hectare portion (the property) of two (2) parcels of tenanted
rice land located at
Barangay Magallon Cadre, Moises Padilla, Negros Occidental, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. T-72323 and T-72324 registered in the name of J. L. Jocson and Sons[1] (respondent).
The
property was placed under
the coverage of the government’s Operation Land Transfer[2] (OLT)
pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27[3]
and awarded to the tenant-beneficiaries by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), which valued the compensation therefor in the total amount of P250,563.80
following the formula prescribed in P.D. No. 27 and Executive Order (E.O.) No.
228.[4]
The valuation was later increased to P903,637.03
after computing the 6% annual interest increment[5] due
on the property per DAR Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1994, which
amount respondent withdrew in 1997, without prejudice to the outcome of the
case it had filed hereunder to fix just compensation.
Finding the DAR’s offer of compensation
for the property to be grossly inadequate, respondent filed a complaint[6] on
July 18, 1997 before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Br. 46, sitting
as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), against the Land Bank (petitioner),[7]
the DAR, and the tenant-beneficiaries, for “Determination and Fixing of Just
Compensation for the Acquisition of Land and Payment of Rentals.”
The complaint prayed that petitioner
and the DAR be ordered to compute the just compensation for the property in
accordance with the guidelines laid down in Section 17 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6657[8] or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
In their respective Answers, petitioner and the DAR claimed that the property was acquired by the government under its OLT program and their valuation thereof constituted just compensation, having been made pursuant to the guidelines set by E.O. No. 228 and P.D. No. 27.
By Decision[9] of
May 19, 2003, the SAC, after noting the report contained in a Compliance[10] submitted
on February 29, 2000 of the Commissioners[11]
appointed to receive and evaluate
evidence on the amount of compensation to be paid to respondent, fixed the just
compensation at P2,564,403.58[12] (inclusive
of the P903,637.03 earlier withdrawn).
In arriving at the just compensation,
the SAC adopted a higher valuation (P93,657.00/hectare) which the DAR
had applied to a similar landholding belonging to one Pablo Estacion adjacent
to respondent’s. Thus the SAC disposed:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Both petitioner and the DAR filed
motions for reconsideration of the SAC Decision but the same were denied,[14]
prompting petitioner to appeal to the Court of Appeals[15] via
petition for review[16] pursuant
to Section 60[17] of R.A.
No. 6657 vis a vis Rule 42 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Assailing the SAC’s decision fixing the
amount of just compensation for respondent’s properties at P2,564,403.58
as a violation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, petitioner insisted that the SAC
erred in using P300.00 as the government support price (GSP) in 1992,
instead of P35.00 as provided under E.O. No. 228, considering that
respondent’s property was acquired under OLT pursuant to P.D. No. 27.
The appellate court dismissed
petitioner’s petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. It held that aside from the fact that the
SAC’s factual findings were not controverted, the main issue - whether
P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, as claimed by petitioner, or R.A. No. 6657, as
claimed by respondent, should govern in determining the value of the property -
involved pure questions of law and, as such, cognizable only by this Court.[18]
Its Motion for Reconsideration having
been denied,[19] the
present petition for review was filed, petitioner arguing that “the allegations
in petitioner LBP’s Petition for Review filed with the Court of Appeals raise
mixed questions of fact and law, . . . [hence,] cognizable by the Court of
Appeals.”[20]
The petition is partly impressed with
merit.
Gabatin v. Land Bank of
the Philippines[21] reiterated the settled rule
that a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court, and not
an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, is the appropriate mode of appeal from
decisions of RTCs acting as SACs. In Gabatin,
the Court sustained the appellate court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an
appeal from the SAC even if its dismissal had been sought on the ground that
the issues presented before the appellate court were purely legal in nature. Also
apropos is this Court’s ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon:[22]
Third, far from being
in conflict, Section 61 of RA 6657 can easily be harmonized with Section 60.
The reference to the Rules of Court means that the specific rules for petitions
for review in the Rules of Court and other relevant procedures in appeals filed
before the Court of Appeals shall be followed in appealed decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts. Considering that RA 6657 cannot and does not provide the
details on how the petition for review shall be conducted, a suppletory
application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court is necessary. In
fact, Section 61 uses the word “review” to designate the mode by which the
appeal is to be effected. The reference therefore by Section 61 to the Rules of
Court only means that the procedure under Rule 42 for petitions for review is
to be followed for appeals in agrarian cases. (Underlining supplied.)
Clearly,
jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the SAC resides in the Court of
Appeals via a Rule 42 petition for
review, which may raise either questions of fact, or of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law.[23]
AT ALL EVENTS, this Court resolves to exercise its mandate as
a court of justice and equity,[24] taking into
account that more than a decade has passed since the case was filed before the
SAC, and thus disposes of the lone substantive issue
raised – whether the SAC
erred in using P300.00 as the GSP in 1992.
Petitioner maintains that the SAC erred in adopting such GSP
rate in determining just compensation for rice and corn lands; and that the
factual question brought before the appellate court for resolution is: “What is
the GSP that must be used in valuing subject property? Is it THIRTY FIVE PESOS
(Php 35.00), as mandated under P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228? Or THREE HUNDRED PESOS
(Php 300.00), the alleged GSP for 1992?”[25]
What
petitioner essentially assails is the SAC’s application of R.A. No. 6657
in the valuation of properties acquired under P.D. No. 27’s OLT.
Citing National Power Corp. v. Gutierrez,[26]
petitioner argues that the determination of just compensation should be based
on the value of the land at the time it was taken by the government, and since it
is not disputed that respondent’s property falls under the coverage of OLT,
then P.D. No. 27 should apply vis a vis Section 2 of E.O. No. 228
which laid down the formula for determining the value of remaining unvalued
rice and corn lands subject to P.D. No. 27, to wit:
SECTION
2. Henceforth, the valuation of rice and corn lands covered by P.D.
No. 27 shall be based on the average gross production determined by the Barangay Committee on Land Production in accordance with
Department Memorandum Circular No. 26, Series of 1973, and related issuances
and regulations of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The average gross
production per hectare shall be multiplied by two and a half (2.5), the product
of which shall be multiplied by Thirty Five Pesos (P35.00), the
government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of
palay on October 21, 1972, or Thirty One Pesos (P31.00),
the government support price for one cavan of 50
kilos of corn on October 21, 1972, and the amount arrived at shall be the value
of the rice and corn land, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining
its cost to the farmer and compensation to the landowner.
Petitioner’s
interpretation is flawed. In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Chico,[27]
the Court declared in no uncertain terms that R.A. No. 6657 is the relevant
law for determining just compensation after noting several decided
cases[28]
where the Court found it more equitable to determine just compensation based on
the value of the property at the time of
payment. This was a clear departure from the Court’s earlier stance in Gabatin
v. Land Bank of the Philippines[29]
where it declared that the reckoning period for the determination of just
compensation is the time when the land was taken applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228.
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No.
228 vis a vis R.A. No. 6657 was applied to cases involving lands
placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 where payment of just compensation had not been completed. When in the interim R.A. No. 6657 was passed before
the full payment of just compensation, as in the case at bar, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on just compensation control.[30]
Discussing the retroactive
application of the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 for lands yet to be paid by the
government although expropriated under P.D. No. 27, this Court
in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Estanislao[31] ratiocinated:
Petitioner, citing Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines, contends that the
taking of the subject lots was deemed effected on
Petitioner further
contends that the fixing of the value of the land under E.O. 228, using the government support price
of P35 for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay as of
The petition is bereft of merit.
This Court held in Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad that seizure of
landholdings or properties covered by P.D. No. 27 did not take place on
Land Bank's
contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on
October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD
27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of
that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacañang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the
seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the
payment of just compensation.
Under the
factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still
incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to
be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before
the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and
the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having
only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling
in
x x x x
It would
certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline
provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's failure to determine the just compensation for a
considerable length of time. That just
compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27
or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just
compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and
ample.
In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessor's value and the volume and value of its produce. This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence.” (Emphasis and italics supplied; citations omitted)
The SAC’s
adoption of P300.00 as GSP
for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay for 1992 is thus in order, petitioner not
having adduced any evidence that a different or contrary figure should apply
for that period.
The
determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function, and the Court does not find the SAC to have acted capriciously
or arbitrarily in setting the price at P93,657.00 per hectare as the said amount does not
appear to be grossly exorbitant or otherwise unjustified. For the Court notes that the SAC properly took
into account various factors such as the nature of the land, when it is
irrigated, the average harvests per hectare (expressed as AGP based on three
normal crop years) at 117.73 cavans per hectare, and the higher valuation
applied by the DAR to a similar adjacent landholding belonging to Estacion. Petitioner
itself admits that a higher land valuation formula was applied to Estacion’s property
because it had been acquired under R.A. No. 6657.[32]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79663 are SET ASIDE. The
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
ARTURO T. BRION Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional member per Special
Order No. 757 dated
[1] A partnership with offices in
[2] The records do not indicate exactly what year the property was acquired and distributed to the tenant-beneficiaries by the DAR.
[3] Decreeing
The Emancipation Of Tenants From The Bondage Of The Soil, Transferring To Them
The Ownership Of The Land They Till And Providing The Instruments And Mechanism
Therefor, Promulgated On
[4] Declaring
Full Land Ownership To Qualified Farmer Beneficiaries Covered By Presidential
Decree No. 27: Determining The Value Of Remaining Unvalued Rice And
[5] Increment at 6% interest
compounded from 1972 to 1994 (22 years) totaling P653,073.23.
[6] Records, pp. 1-6.
[7] A government financial institution, organized and existing under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, as the duly designated financial intermediary of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. No. 6657, as amended.
[8] An
Act Instituting A Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program To Promote Social
Justice And Industrialization, Providing The Mechanism For Its Implementation,
And For Other Purposes, approved on
[9] Records, pp. 179-187.
[10]
[11] Commissioners Carlito R. Mamon and
Serlito M. De Los
[12] Land
value (LV) was arrived at by multiplying 117.73
cavans per hectare, the average gross
production (AGP) as determined by the Barangay
Committee on Land Production, by 2.5, the result of which was multiplied by P300,
the government support price (GSP) for one cavan of
50 kilos of palay as of 1992, equals P88,297.50
multiplied by 27.3808 hectares; Records, p. 186.
[13] Vide note 9 at 187.
[14] Vide
[15] Records indicate that the DAR had filed a separate petition for review with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 80153 which had already been decided on November 23, 2006 and awaiting entry of judgment, Vide May 10, 2007 Resolution; CA Rollo, pp. 227-228.
[16] CA rollo, pp. 8-32.
[17] Section 60. Appeals. - An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days (from) receipt of notice of the decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final.
[18] Vide
Decision of
[19] Vide,
Resolution of
[20] Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[21] G.R. No. 148223, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 176, 182 citing Land Bank v. De Leon, G.R. No. 143275, September 10, 2002, 388 SCRA 537.
[22] Supra note 21 at 545.
[23] Section 2, Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[24] Republic
v. Ballocanag, G.R. No. 163794,
[25] Rollo, p. 38.
[26] G.R. No. 60077,
[27] G.R. No. 168453,
[28] Lubrica v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No.
170220, November 20, 2006, 507 SCRA 415; Meneses v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. No. 156304,
[29] Supra note 21.
[30] Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of De Leon, G.R. No. 164025, May 8, 2009; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Gallego, Jr.,
G.R. No. 173226,
[31] G.R. No. 166777,
[32] Vide Petition for Review, CA rollo, pp. 19-20.