|
PEOPLE OF THE Appellee, - versus - RODOLFO LOPEZ, Appellant. |
G.R.
No. 179714 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., PERALTA, and BERSAMIN,* JJ. Promulgated: October 2, 2009 |
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PERALTA, J.:
Rape is particularly odious, one which figuratively scrapes the bottom
of the barrel of moral depravity, when committed against a minor.[1] This present case is no less reviling and
vilifying, for yet another life of an innocent child is forever shattered.
This is an appeal from the
Decision[2]
dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No.
00650, affirming the Decision[3]
dated October 13, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Labo, Camarines
Norte, Branch 64, in Criminal Case No. 98-0296, finding appellant Rodolfo Lopez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape, as defined in
and penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act (RA) 8353.
The facts, as culled from the
records, are the following:
On June 11, 1998, around 5
o'clock in the afternoon, AAA[4]
left her house to collect credit,
leaving behind her daughter BBB, who was then four years old[5]
and appellant Rodolfo Lopez, an employee of her husband.[6]
The following day, or on
BBB, on
Subsequently, an Information
dated
That on or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
June 11, 1998 at Barangay XXX, XXX, Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design
and motivated by bestial lust and by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one
BBB, a four (4)–year-old girl, against her will to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon
arraignment on
The prosecution presented the
testimonies of AAA, BBB and Dr. Marcelito B. Abas, who testified as to the
facts earlier narrated. The testimonies
of Carlos Ibasco, the principal of
On the other hand, the defense
presented the sole testimony of appellant Lopez, who denied raping BBB and
further stated that on the day that the alleged incident happened, he saw the
six-year-old brother of BBB inside the room where the latter slept. He claimed that the said brother inserted his
finger in the vagina of his sister.[13] He added that after the parents of BBB
arrived home at around
Thereafter, the trial court found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, accused RODOLFO LOPEZ is hereby sentenced to suffer the
supreme penalty of DEATH. He is also
ordered to pay the victim, BBB, civil indemnity in the amount of Seventy- Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), moral damages in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
SO
ORDERED.
The case
was appealed to this Court due to the imposition of the death penalty. However, on September 21, 2004, in conformity
with the decision promulgated on July 7, 2004 in G.R. Nos. 147678-87, entitled The
People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo y Garcia, modifying the pertinent
provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, more particularly Sections
3 and 10 of Rule 125 and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct
appeals from the RTCs to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the
resolution of this Court en banc dated September 19, 1995, in “Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court” in cases similarly involving the death penalty,
pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules of procedure in all courts
under Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution, and allowing an intermediate
review by the CA before such cases are elevated to this Court, this Court
transferred the case to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
On
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated
Costs
de oficio.
SO
ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant Lopez filed a
Manifestation[15]
dated
According
to appellant Lopez, the sole error committed by the trial court was:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT
To support the above argument,
appellant claims that, instead of scrutinizing with utmost care and diligence
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court assailed the
testimony of the appellant and looked at the same with disfavor. He further stated that a great portion of the
appealed decision dwelt on the rationalization of the trial court in
discrediting the evidence of the defense and not much was said why it gave
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The appellee countered the above
argument of appellant by asserting that the prosecution was able to establish
the guilt of the same appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It also added that the trial court did not
rely on the weakness of the defense evidence, but rather on the strength of the
prosecution in coming up with a verdict of conviction.
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Statutory
rape is defined in and penalized by Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353, which was in effect at the time of
the commission of the crime in this particular case:
Article
266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1)
By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
x x x x
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Appellant focuses his argument on
the manner in which the decision of the RTC was written. According to him, a fastidious reading of the
appealed decision by an impartial and prudent mind will easily have the
impression that his conviction was based not on the strength of the prosecution's
evidence but rather on the weakness of the defense. A careful reading of the assailed decision,
however, shows the contrary.
Although the assailed decision
discussed thoroughly the weakness of the evidence of the defense, it was also
clear in its appreciation of the evidence presented by the prosecution and in
finding that the appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. Thus, as ruled by the RTC:
The
testimony of the victim herself was direct and straightforward after she was warned
that if she tells a lie, God will punish her.
When asked if Rodolfo Lopez was inside the courtroom, her reply was
“Yes, ma'am” and since there was no other man in the courtroom, his lawyer
admitted that while the victim pointed to Rodolfo Lopez and when the Prosecutor
asked her:
Pros.
Velarde: What did your “kuya” do to you?
A: He raped me, ma'am.
Q: When you say you were raped, the penis of
“Kuya” was placed in your vagina?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Where is
your pipi (vagina)?
Interpreter:
The victim pointed to her sexual organ.[19]
Even during the cross-examination
and clarificatory questions from the court, the victim was consistent in her
testimony, thus:
Atty. Dizon
Q: Do you
still recall when did Rodolfo Lopez place his penis in your vagina?
Witness
A: No, sir.
Q: Where did the accused place his -
Where in your house, in particular, did
the accused place his penis inside your vagina?
A: In our house, sir.
Q: How did the accused place his penis inside
your vagina?
A: He removed my panty, sir.
Q: After the accused removed your panty, it was
his finger that was inserted in your vagina, is that correct?
A: No, sir.
Q: What was placed by the accused in your vagina
after he removed your panty?
A: His penis, sir.
Q: When you say, the accused placed his penis in
your vagina, you are telling us that the accused just placed his penis just on
top of your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
x
x x x
Court
Q: Where is here your “Kuya”?
Interpreter: The witness pointed to the accused.
Court
Q: What was placed inside your vagina?
A: His penis, sir.
Q: Is it not that he just placed his penis on
top of your vagina?
A: It was inserted in my vagina, sir.[20]
This Court has repeatedly held that the evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses by the trial court is accorded the highest respect on appeal, because the court below had the opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth. This assessment is binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a clear showing that it was reached arbitrarily, or that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.[21]
Since the
trial judge had the direct and singular opportunity to observe the facial
expression, gesture and tone of voice of the complaining witness while
testifying, it was fully competent and in the best position to assess whether
the witness was telling the truth.[22] This Court has also ruled that testimonies of victims of tender age are credible,
more so if they are without any motive to falsely testify against their
offender. Their revelations that they were raped, coupled with their
willingness to undergo public trial where they could be compelled to describe
the details of the assault on their dignity by their own father, cannot be
easily dismissed as concoctions. It would be the height of moral and
psychological depravity if they were to fabricate sordid tales of sexual
defloration − which could put him behind bars for the rest of his life
− if they were not true.[23]
It must be
remembered that under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, the gravamen of the
offense of statutory rape as provided
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is the carnal knowledge of a woman
below twelve years old.[24]
The only elements of statutory
rape are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (2) that such woman is under twelve (12) years of age. It is not necessary to prove that the victim
was intimidated or that force was used against her, because in statutory
rape the law presumes that the victim, on account of her
tender age, does not and cannot have a will of her own.[25]
The first element of the crime of statutory rape was duly proven by the
prosecution with the testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings
that the victim indeed showed signs of having been raped. When the consistent and forthright testimony
of a rape victim is consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis
to warrant a conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have
been established.[26] Anent the second element, with the
presentation of the victim's Certificate of Live Birth[27]
categorically showing that she was born on
For his defense, appellant Lopez
merely denied committing the crime and even pointed an accusatory finger to the
six-year-old brother of the victim, whom the former allegedly saw fingering the
same victim. However, it is a time-honored principle that the positive and
categorical assertions of a witness generally prevail over bare denials.
Affirmative testimony from a credible witness is stronger and more trustworthy
than a bare self-serving testimony.[29]
Hence, considering the above
discussion, it is more than apparent that the trial court did not err in
finding appellant Lopez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Statutory Rape.
The unconscionable taker of a
child's innocence must now suffer the well-deserved consequence of his ungodly deed.
The trial court imposed the
penalty of Death, applying the provisions of Article 266-B of RA 8353, which
provides that:
The
death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
x
x x x
2)
When the victim is a child below seven years old.
The CA, however, correctly
reduced the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua pursuant to RA 9346.[30] While RA 9346 prohibited the imposition of
the death penalty and the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua, the appellant is, however, no longer eligible
for parole.[31]
On pecuniary liability, this Court ruled in People of the Philippines
v. Sarcia[32]
that:
The
principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People
v. Salome[33]
and People v. Quiachon[34] is the penalty provided by law or imposable for
the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually
imposed on the offender.
Regarding
the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome explained the basis
for increasing the amount of said civil damages as follows:
The
Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to
Sally in accordance with the ruling in People v. Sambrano which states:
As to
damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the
attending qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the death
penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be Php75,000.00 . . .
Also, in rape cases, moral damages are warded without the need of proof other
than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral
injuries entitling her to such an award.
However, the trial court's award of Php50,000.00 as moral damages should
also be increased to Php75,000.00 pursuant to current jurisprudence on
qualified rape.”
It should
be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still
death and the offense is still heinous.
Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still Php75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award
of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence, correctly
awarded the following amounts; Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is
awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of
the death penalty; Php75,000.00 as moral damages because the victim is
assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of
moral damages even without proof thereof, x x x.
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on
the appellant because of the prohibition in R. A. No. 9346, the civil
indemnity of Php75,000.00 is still proper because, following the
ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the
actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense. The Court
declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows “not only a reaction to
the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial
fluctuations over time but also the expression of the displeasure of the court
of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.”
The litmus test therefore, in the
determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime
committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty,
regardless of whether the penalty actually is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
In view of the above-quoted decision, this Court modifies the amount of
damages awarded by the trial court. The civil indemnity of P75,000.00
awarded by the trial court shall remain the same, while the moral damages shall
be increased to P75,000.00 corresponding to the penalty of death without
need of proof. The award of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00
is decreased to P30,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[35]
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated January 26, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 00650, affirming with modification
the Decision dated October 13, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Labo,
Camarines Norte, Branch 64, in Criminal Case No. 98-0296, finding appellant
Rodolfo Lopez, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape,
as defined in and penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 8353, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that appellant is not eligible for parole and that he is ordered to pay P75,000.00
as moral damages and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages, in addition to the amount of P75,000.00 awarded by the trial
court as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Raffle dated May 27, 2009), per Special Order No. 712 dated September 28, 2009.
[1] People v. Jalosjos, 421 Phil. 43, 54
(2001), citing People v. Sangil, 276 SCRA 532 (1997).
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong, with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Celia C. Librea-Lealogo, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 105-122.
[3] Penned by Presiding/Executive Judge Franco T. Falcon; records, pp. 208-219.
[4] This
is pursuant to the ruling of this Court in People of the Philippines v.
Cabalquinto (G.R. No. 167693,
The Supreme Court took note of the legal mandate on
the utmost confidentiality of proceedings involving violence against women and
children set forth in Sec. 29 of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as
Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act; Sec. 44 of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004; and Sec. 40 of A.M.
No. 04-10-11-SC, known as Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children
effective November 15, 2004.
[5] Per her Birth Certificate, (Exhibit “B”).
[6] TSN,
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] TSN,
[11] TSN,
[12] TSN,
[13] TSN,
[14]
[15] Rollo, pp. 23-24.
[16] CA rollo, pp. 40-48.
[17] Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[18] CA rollo, pp. 70-96.
[19] CA rollo, p. 58.
[20] TSN,
[21] People
v. Ruales, 457 Phil. 160, 169 (2003),
citing People v. Moralde, 443 Phil. 369 (2003).
[22] People v. Somodio, 427 Phil. 363, 377
(2002), citing People v. Padilla, 301 SCRA 265, 270-71 (1999).
[23] People
v. Abellera, G.R. No. 166617, July 3, 2007, 526 SCRA 329, citing People v. Buada, 439 Phil. 857 (2002); People v. Caliso, 439 Phil. 492 (2002); People v. Fucio, G.R. Nos. 151186-95, February 13, 2004, 422 SCRA 677; and People v.
Olivar, 458 Phil. 375 (2003).
[24] People
v. Alegado, G.R. Nos. 93030-31,
[25]
[26] People
of the Philippines v. Elister Basmayor
y Grascilla, G. R. No. 182791, February 10, 2009, citing People v.
Limio, 429 SCRA 611 (2004).
[27] Exhibit B; records, p. 5.
[28] People v. Jalosjos, supra note 1, at 84.
[29] People
v. Ruales, supra note 20,
at 173, citing People v. Besmonte, 557 Phil. 555 (2003).
[30] An Act Prohibiting the Imposition
of Death Penalty in the
[31] People of the
[32] G.R. No. 169641,
[33] G.R. No. 169077,
[34] G.R. No. 170236,
[35] People of the