THIRD DIVISION
|
EATS-CETERA FOOD SERVICES
OUTLET and/or SERAFIN RAMIREZ, Petitioners, - versus - MYRNA B. LETRAN and MARY
GRACE ESPADERO, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 179507
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: October
2, 2009 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition
for review on certiorari assailing
the December 13, 2006 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA), as well as its August 30, 2007 Resolution,[2]
denying the motion for partial reconsideration filed by petitioners in CA-G.R.
SP No. 92551. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution,
affirmed the July 18, 2005 Resolution[3]
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) with respect to Myrna B.
Letran’s complaint but modified it with respect to Mary Grace Espadero’s
(Espadero) complaint declaring petitioners liable for her illegal dismissal.
Petitioners are now assailing the CA’s decision only with respect to its ruling
on Espadero’s case.
The factual antecedents follow.
Espadero had been employed by Eats-cetera Food Services
Outlet since June 30, 2001 as cashier. On November 20, 2002, when she reported
for duty, Espadero discovered that her time card was already punched in. After
asking around, she found out that a certain Joselito Cahayagan was the one who
punched in her time card. Espadero, however, failed to report the incident to her
supervisor, Clarissa Reduca (Reduca). This prompted Reduca to report the
incident to the personnel manager, Greta dela Hostria. Espadero contended that
she was dismissed outright without being given ample opportunity to explain her
side. She claimed that on November 21, 2002, petitioners called her and asked
her to make a letter of admission as a condition for her reemployment.
Espadero, thus, wrote:
Dear Sir/Madam,
Ako po ay humihingi ng paumanhin sa aking nagawang
pagkakamali. Hindi ko po alam na pina in po ng aking kasama sa trabaho ang
aking time card. Di ko agad nasabi sa supervisor. Nagpapasalamat din po ako kay
Januarylyn Paq (some text missing) at Nida Tendenilla sa kanilang ginawa dahil
dito maituwid po ang aking pagkakamali.
Gumagalang,
Mary
Grace Espadero[4]
After writing the letter,
Espadero was told to wait for an assignment. The following day, on November 22,
2002, the company issued a Memorandum[5]
terminating her for violation of Rule 24 of the company rules and regulations.[6]
Because of this, Espadero decided to file a complaint for illegal dismissal
before the NLRC.
Petitioners, however, maintained that the company rules and
regulations, as well as the corresponding penalties in case of violation thereof,
were made known to Espadero before and upon her actual employment as cashier.
They also argued that contrary to her claim, petitioners gave Espadero ample
opportunity to explain her side. To prove their contention, petitioners
presented the affidavit of supervisor Reduca stating thus:
On
November 20, 2002, someone else punched in the respective time cards of the
said Mary Grace Espadero and Fritzie Eviota, but the said employees
deliberately failed to inform her (sic) about it, [which is] a gross violation
of Rule # 24 of the company’s Rules and Regulations. The matter was immediately
reported to our Personnel Manager, Ms. GRETA V. DELA HOSTRIA. She then issued
separate memorandum each for Mary Grace Espadero and Fritzie Eviota “to explain
in writing, within 72 hours, why no disciplinary action should be taken[”]
against them.
She
personally handed over to Mary Grace Espadero and Fritzie Eviota their
individual memoranda for their acknowledgement, but they requested a little
time more before returning the duly acknowledged cop[ies] as, allegedly, they
would be going over the same first. While they were able to submit their
respective written explanations anent the aforesaid incident, they never
returned the duly acknowledged cop[ies] of my (sic) memoranda to me.[7]
Petitioners also claimed that they
conducted an impartial investigation of the incident and found substantial
evidence that Espadero was in cahoots with a co-worker in punching in her time
card.[8]
For this reason, petitioners decided to terminate her.
On January 31, 2005,
Labor Arbiter Luis D. Flores rendered a Decision[9]
declaring petitioners liable for illegally terminating Espadero. The Labor
Arbiter faulted petitioners for their failure to prove that Espadero
deliberately caused another person to punch in her time card on her behalf, and
said that no hearing or investigation was conducted to prove that Espadero was
in cahoots with somebody in the alleged dishonest act prior to her dismissal.[10]
Petitioners were ordered to reinstate Espadero and to pay her full backwages
from the date of dismissal up to actual reinstatement.
Upon appeal, the NLRC
reversed the Labor Arbiter’s findings. It ratiocinated that Espadero was duly
afforded her right to due process as can be gleaned from Reduca’s affidavit,
the contents of which were never denied nor rebutted by Espadero.[11]
Aggrieved, respondents
filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA. On December 13, 2006, the CA rendered a ruling affirming the
Labor Arbiter’s pronouncement that Espadero was not afforded due process. The
appellate court also observed that the punishment of dismissal was too harsh
and unjustified.[12]
Petitioners now come
before this Court via this Rule 45
petition. It is their contention that Espadero’s infraction constitutes serious
misconduct, considering that Espadero’s job requires a higher degree of
honesty.
There are essentially two
issues to be resolved: first, whether Espadero was afforded her right to due
process prior to being dismissed from her job; and second, whether Espadero’s
infraction was serious enough to warrant the penalty of dismissal.
The petition is impressed
with merit.
Article 282 of the Labor
Code includes serious misconduct, fraud and willful breach of trust among the
just causes for termination.[13]
But prior to termination on such grounds, the employer must satisfy both
substantive and procedural due process. Not only must the employee be afforded
a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in
support of his defense, but the dismissal must be for a just or authorized
cause as provided by law.[14]
The procedural
requirements are set forth in Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of
Book VI of the Labor Code, to wit:
SEC. 2. Security of Tenure. x x x.
x x x x
(d) In all cases of termination
of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially
observed:
For termination of employment
based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(i)
A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during
which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires
is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut
the evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the
employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify his termination.
Reduca’s affidavit avers that Espadero was notified by the
personnel manager and was asked to explain her side within 72 hours. As there
was no duplicate copy, the only copy of the notice to explain remained with
Espadero. While it may be highly suspicious for a personnel manager not to keep
a copy of such an important document, Reduca’s averment that the only copy of
the notice to explain was handed to Espadero herself was never denied nor
controverted by the latter. Wittingly or not, the averment is deemed to have
been admitted by Espadero. This being so, petitioners may be said to have
sufficiently complied with the first notice requirement, i.e., that the employee must first be given a notice to explain her
side.
Petitioners likewise complied with the second notice
requirement. On November 22, 2002, Greta dela Hostria, as personnel manager,
issued a Memorandum stating with clarity the reason for Espadero’s dismissal.
It reads:
MEMORANDUM
TO : Mary
Grace Espadero – CB Manila
FROM : Personnel
Department
RE : As
stated
DATE : November
22, 2002
We received your explanation
regarding [you] not reporting to your immediate supervisor that somebody have (sic)
punched in your Time Card last November 20, 2002. After a thorough
investigation of the incident, we found that you violated Rule # 24 which
states:
“Punching/Signing of timecards for other employees or requesting another
employee to punch/sign his Time Card Record, which is punishable by DISMISSAL.”
Because of this we regret that we
are terminating your services effective November 22, 2002 as provided by [the] company[’s]
Rules and Regulations.
(Sgd.) GRETA V. DELA HOSTRIA
Personnel Manager
NOTED:
(Sgd.) SERAFIN T. RAMIREZ
Vice-President[15]
Substantively, we also sustain petitioners’ reasoning that
Espadero’s position as a cashier is one that requires a high degree of trust
and confidence, and that her infraction reasonably taints such trust and
confidence reposed upon her by her employer.
A position of trust and confidence has been defined as one
where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the
custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer’s property[16]
and/or funds.[17] One
such position is that of a cashier. A cashier is a highly sensitive position
which requires absolute trust and honesty on the part of the employee.[18]
It is for this reason that the Court has sustained the dismissal of cashiers
who have been found to have breached the trust and confidence of their
employers. In one case, the Court upheld the validity of the dismissal of a
school cashier despite her 19 years of service after evidence showed that there
was a discrepancy in the amount she was entrusted to deposit with a bank.[19]
In Metro Drug
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[20]
we explained:
Loss
of confidence as a ground for dismissal does not entail proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the employee’s misconduct. It is enough that there be “some basis” for
such loss of confidence or that “the
employer has reasonable grounds to believe, if not to entertain the moral
conviction[,] that the employee
concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his
participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded by his position.[21]
The rule, therefore, is that if there is sufficient
evidence to show that the employee occupying a position of trust and confidence
is guilty of a breach of trust, or that his employer has ample reason to
distrust him, the labor tribunal cannot justly deny the employer the authority
to dismiss such employee.[22]
In the instant case, petitioners cannot be faulted for losing
their trust in Espadero. As an employee occupying a job which requires utmost
fidelity to her employers, she failed to report to her immediate supervisor the
tampering of her time card. Whether her failure was deliberate or due to sheer
negligence, and whether Espadero was or was not in cahoots with a co-worker,
the fact remains that the tampering was not promptly reported and could, very likely,
not have been known by petitioners, or, at least, could have been discovered at
a much later period, if it had not been reported by Espadero’s supervisor to
the personnel manager. Petitioners, therefore, cannot be blamed for losing
their trust in Espadero.
Moreover, the peculiar nature of Espadero’s position
aggravates her misconduct. Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong
conduct; the transgression of some established or definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. The misconduct, to be serious,
must be of such a grave character and not merely trivial or unimportant. To
constitute just cause for termination, it must be in connection with the
employee’s work.[23]
With the degree of trust expected of Espadero, such infraction can hardly be
classified as one that is trivial or unimportant. Her failure to promptly
report the incident reflects a cavalier regard for the responsibility required of
her in the discharge of the duties of her position.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The December 13, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals, as well as its August
30, 2007 Resolution with respect to Mary Grace Espadero’s case, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the National Labor Relations Commission’s
Resolution dated July 18, 2005 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court), concurring; rollo, pp. 52-66.
[2]
[3] Rollo, pp. 128-143.
[4]
[5] CA rollo, p. 46.
[6] Rule 24 of the company rules and regulations provides:
Punching, signing of time cards for other employees, or requesting another employee to punch in or sign his time card records, which is punishable by DISMISSAL. (Rollo, p. 98.)
[7] CA rollo, p. 88. (Emphasis removed.)
[8] Rollo, p. 86.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Article 282 of the Labor Code provides in full:
ART. 282. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER
An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
[14] Gonzales v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 131653, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 195, 204.
[15] Supra note 5.
[16] Panday v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 67664, May 20, 1992, 209 SCRA 122, 125.
[17] Gonzales v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 14, at 208.
[18] Garcia v. NLRC, 327 Phil. 648, 651 (1996).
[19]
[20] 227 Phil. 121 (1986).
[21]
[22]
[23] Philippine Long Distance Company v. The Late Romeo F. Bolso, G.R. No. 159701, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 550, 560.