GREGORIO DESTREZA, G.R. No. 176863
Petitioner,
Present:
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,
- versus - Carpio,*
Chico-Nazario,**
Brion, and
Abad, JJ.
ATTY. MA. GRACIA RIÑOZA-PLAZO
and MA. FE ALARAS, Promulgated:
Respondents.
October 30, 2009
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ABAD, J.:
This is a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the decision[1]
and resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals
that affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[3] of
Nasugbu, Batangas, in the action for nullification of deed of absolute sale and
the corresponding transfer certificate of title that respondents filed against
petitioner.
The
Facts and the Case
The evidence on record shows that on
November 16, 1989 Pedro L. Riñoza (Riñoza) died,[4]
leaving several heirs, which included respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo (Plazo)[5]
and Ma. Fe R. Alaras (Alaras).[6]
In the course of settling Riñoza’s
estate, respondent Plazo wrote a letter[7]
dated April 30, 1991 to the Registry of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas requesting
for certified true copies of all titles in Riñoza’s name, including a sugarland
located at Barangay Utod, Nasugbu, Batangas covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) 40353. When she delivered the
letter, Plazo also asked that she be shown the originals of the titles but they
were not available. To inquire on the
matter, she talked to the Register of Deeds, Atty. Alexander Bonuan. According to Bonuan, he had the titles in his
personal files and there were no transactions involving them.[8]
On June 5, 1991 respondent Plazo wrote
a letter to Bonuan, reiterating her request for copies of the titles. Since the latter was abroad, it was the acting
Register of Deeds who granted her request and furnished her with certified true
copies of the titles, except that of TCT 40353 which was missing.[9]
On the same day, in an effort to find
TCT 40353, respondent Plazo found another title, TCT 55396, at the Assessor’s
Office covering the same Utod sugarland and canceling the missing TCT
40353. The new title, entered on July
18, 1989, was in the name of petitioner Gregorio M. Destreza and his wife
Bernarda Butiong.
Respondent Plazo also went to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of
Finally, respondent Alaras testified
that on August 1, 1989, her late father, Riñoza, gave her the title of a land that
he wanted to mortgage to her uncle. Riñoza
told her that the land was about five hectares and was located at Barangay
Utod, Nasugbu, Batangas. She did not,
however, look at the number of the title.
A week later, unable to secure a mortgage from her uncle, she returned
the title to her father and never saw it again.[11]
Their discovery prodded respondents
Plazo and Alaras to file a complaint[12]
against the Destreza spouses and the Register of Deeds before the RTC of
Nasugbu on December 26, 1991 and an amended complaint[13]
on September 20, 1993. They claim serious
irregularities in the issuance of TCT 55396 to petitioner Destreza. They asked, among others, that TCT 55396 be
nullified, that TCT 40353 be restored, and that the Destrezas be ordered to
reconvey the land to the Riñoza estate.
In his answer,[14]
Register of Deeds Bonuan denied that TCT 40353 was missing since he had the
title safe in his office and no transaction affecting it had been
recorded. With regard to TCT 55396, he
explained that the new title had not yet been released to the Destreza spouses
because they were yet to submit certain required documents. Bonuan claimed that during his lifetime, the
late Riñoza, asked him for a photocopy of TCT 55396. As a courtesy to the ex-mayor, Bonuan gave him
a copy.
In compliance with the RTC’s order,
Bonuan gave the court certified copies of TCTs 40353[15]
and 55396[16] as well as the duplicate
original of the deed of absolute sale[17]
dated June 15, 1989 between Riñoza and the Destreza spouses.
On the part of the Destreza spouses, petitioner
Destreza testified that on June 16, 1989 he bought the Utod sugarland from
Riñoza through Toribio Ogerio, a common kumpadre. He paid him P100,000.00.[18] Destreza did not get a copy of the deed of
sale nor a receipt for the payment but Riñoza accompanied him to the Register
of Deeds. After about a month, but not
later than July 15, 1989, Destreza returned to the Register of Deeds and got a
copy of TCT 55396 in his name.[19]
After the sale, petitioner Destreza
immediately took possession of the land, plowing and planting on it even until
the case was filed. No communication or
demand letter from respondents Plazo and Alaras disturbed his occupation until
he received the summons for suit.[20]
The RTC found after hearing that TCT
55396 was yet inexistent on July 15, 1989 when petitioner Destreza claims he
already received a copy from the Register of Deeds. It declared that the deed of sale between
Riñoza and Destreza is not a public document for the failure of the notary
public to submit his report to the RTC notarial section. Thus, the RTC found no basis for the
cancellation of TCT 40353 and the issuance of TCT 55396 in the name of the
Destreza spouses.[21]
The RTC nullified the Deed of Sale and
TCT 55396 and ordered the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas to restore TCT
40353 in the name of the late Riñoza.
The trial court, however, ordered the estate of Riñoza to pay the
Destreza spouses P60,000.00. And
it ordered the latter to vacate and deliver possession of the Utod sugarland to
respondents Plazo and Alaras, acting for Riñoza’s estate, within five days from
receipt of the payment mentioned.[22]
The
Destreza spouses appealed[23]
to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV 73031, contending that the notary
public's failure to submit a copy of the instrument to the notarial section is
not sufficient to nullify the deed of sale and TCT 55396. On October 31, 2006 the CA rendered a
decision,[24] affirming with
modification the October 1, 2001 Judgment[25]
of the RTC. Although the CA found that
the deed of sale may be presumed regularly executed despite the notary's
failure to report the transaction to the RTC Notarial Section, Destrezas
themselves destroyed such presumption when they failed to prove its authenticity
and genuineness. Further, the Destrezas’
claim that they paid Riñoza P100,000.00 when the price stated in the
deed of sale was only P60,000.00 placed the veracity of the deed in
doubt.[26] Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision with
the modification that Riñoza’s estate did not have to pay any amount to the
Destrezas.[27] The CA denied the latter’s motion for
reconsideration.[28]
Destreza seeks this Court’s review of
the decision and resolution of the CA.
Destreza insists that (1) the presumption of due execution and
authenticity of the notarized deed is not destroyed by their failure to present
further witnesses and documents; (2) respondents Plazo and Alaras had the
burden to prove the invalidity of the deed of sale; and (3) respondents’
evidence failed to overcome the presumption of authenticity and due execution
of the notarized deed of absolute sale executed by Riñoza.[29]
Issues
The core issue in this case is whether
or not sufficient evidence warranted the nullification of the deed of sale that
the late Riñoza executed in favor of the Destrezas.
Ruling
The CA held that the Destrezas could
not just rely on the deed of sale in their favor or on the TCT issued in their
names. They needed to present further
evidence to prove the authenticity and genuineness of that deed. Having failed to do so, the CA theorized that
it was justified in annulling that deed of sale and the corresponding TCT. Said the CA:
Verily,
the sugarland deed should have been admitted as evidence since, being a
public document, it has in its favor the presumption of authenticity. Nevertheless, even though the same is
presumed authentic still, the presumption may be rebutted by convincing
evidence. The Destreza Spouses,
on their own, destroyed this presumption.
We explain.
To strengthen their case, the Destreza
Spouses could have presented as witnesses the notary public, the
eyewitnesses to the signing of the sugarland deed, or an expert to prove the
authenticity and genuineness of all the signatures appearing on the said
instrument; they did not. Worse, in
claiming that what they paid for the sugarland is one million pesos, and not
six hundred thousand pesos (PhP600,000.00) as indicated in the deed, they,
themselves, placed in doubt the veracity of the deed.[30]
Moreover,
the sugarland deed was supposed to be executed in 1989. Yet, the Destreza Spouses failed to
present any tax receipts or tax declarations in their names. As held by the Supreme Court, tax receipts
and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of the
property for which such taxes have been paid.
Not only did the Destreza Spouses fail to present any
evidence to bolster their claim that they really paid the purchase price for
the sugarland, but they even failed to explain what documents are lacking
resulting to the non-release of TCT No. T-55396.
The
above circumstances, coupled with the fact that the Destreza Spouses
failed to present any proof showing payment of the purchase price, does not sit
well with this Court. As previously
stated, We find it hard to believe that one would not ask for, or keep,
receipts for considerable amounts given.
x x x.[31]
At the outset, the ruling of the CA
was correct. Indeed, the notarized deed
of sale should be admitted as evidence despite the failure of the Notary Public
in submitting his notarial report to the notarial section of the RTC
Manila. It is the swearing of a person
before the Notary Public and the latter’s act of signing and affixing his seal
on the deed that is material and not the submission of the notarial report.
Parties
who appear before a notary public to have their documents notarized should not
be expected to follow up on the submission of the notarial reports. They should not be made to suffer the
consequences of the negligence of the Notary Public in following the procedures
prescribed by the Notarial Law. Thus,
the notarized deed of sale executed by Riñoza is admissible as evidence of the
sale of the Utod sugarland to the Destrezas.
Furthermore, it will be shown later that the Destrezas did not fabricate
the sale of the Utod sugarland as may be suggested by the failure of the Notary
Public to submit his notarial report because there are evidence which show that
Riñoza really consented to the sale.
The CA, however, made a mistake with
regard to the assignment of the burden of proof. No rule requires a party, who relies on a
notarized deed of sale for establishing his ownership, to present further
evidence of such deed’s genuineness lest the presumption of its due execution
be for naught. Under the rules of
evidence, “Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as
provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgment being prima
facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved.”[32]
Here,
Atty. Crispulo Ducusin notarized the deed of sale that Riñoza acknowledged as
his free act and deed on June 17, 1989.
By signing and affixing his notarial seal on the deed, Atty. Ducusin
converted it from a private document to a public document.[33] As such, the deed of sale is entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. And
since Riñoza, the executor of the deed, is already dead, the notarized deed of
absolute sale is the best evidence of his consent to the sale of the Utod
sugarland to the Destreza spouses.
Parenthetically, it is not disputed that the Destrezas immediately and
openly occupied the land right after the sale and continuously cultivated it from
then on.
The burden of proof is the duty of a
party to present such amount of evidence on the facts in issue as the law deems
necessary for the establishment of his claim.[34] Here, since respondents Plazo and Alaras
claim, despite the Destrezas’ evidence of title over the property and open
possession of it, that grave and serious doubts plague TCT 55396, the burden is
on them to prove such claim. Only when
they are successful in doing so will the court be justified in nullifying the
notarized deed of sale that their father Riñoza executed in favor of the
Destrezas.
But more than plausible evidence was
required of Plazo and Alaras. An allegation of fraud with regard to the
execution of a notarized deed of absolute sale is a grave allegation. It cannot be declared on mere
speculations. In fact, to overcome the
presumption of regularity and due execution of a notarized deed, there must be
clear and convincing evidence showing otherwise. The burden of proof to overcome the
presumption lies on the one contesting the same.[35] Without such evidence, the presumption
remains undiminished.[36]
The Court’s present task, therefore,
is to determine if respondents Plazo and Alaras’ evidence that their father did
not sell the subject land to the Destrezas is clear and convincing.
1. Plazo and Alaras point out that Destreza’s
acquisition of a copy of TCT 55396 is questionable. Destreza said that he got a copy of the TCT
on July 15, 1989 but such TCT was entered into the registry of title only on
July 18, 1989. Moreover, Bonuan, the
Register of Deeds, testified that he had not yet issued that TCT to the
Destrezas because of some lacking documents.
He did, however, say that he released a copy of it to ex-mayor Riñoza
upon the latter’s request.
These
circumstances may appear perplexing but the problem is that they did not touch
the validity of the deed of sale. And it
does not help that the trial did not really address them. Plazo and Alaras did
not confront petitioner Gregorio Destreza regarding these circumstances when he
took the witness stand. It would be pure
speculation to declare that the Destrezas defrauded Riñoza based solely on them.
At
any rate, Section 57 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration
Decree, provides that an owner who wants to convey his registered land shall
execute and register a deed of conveyance in a form sufficient in law. The Register of Deeds shall then make out in
the registration book a new certificate of title to the new owner and shall
prepare and deliver to him an owner's duplicate certificate. The Register of Deeds shall note upon the
original and duplicate certificate the date of transfer, the volume and page of
the registration book in which the new certificate is registered and a
reference by number to the last preceding certificate. The original and the
owner's duplicate of the grantor's certificate shall be stamped “canceled.”
Here, the supposed irregularity lies
in the release of a copy of the title to the Destrezas even before it had been
entered into the books of the Register of Deeds. Furthermore, the Destrezas were able to
acquire a copy of it when they still needed to submit some registration
requirements. But the premature release
of a copy of the registered title cannot affect the validity of the contract of
sale between Riñoza and the Destrezas.
Registration only serves as the operative act to convey or affect the
land insofar as third persons are concerned.
It does not add anything to the efficacy of the contract of sale between
the buyer and the seller. In fact, if a
deed is not registered, the deed will continue to operate as a contract between
the parties.[37]
Furthermore, the declaration of Bonuan
that he furnished ex-mayor Riñoza with a copy of TCT 55396 strengthens the case
of the Destrezas. It shows that Riñoza
knew of and gave consent to the sale of his Utod sugarland to them considering
that he even helped facilitate the registration of the deed of sale. This negates any possible suggestion that the
Destrezas merely fabricated the sale of the Utod sugarland on the evidence that
the Notary Public failed to submit his notarial report. Whatever irregularity in registration may
have been incurred, it did not affect the validity of the sale.
2. Alaras
claims that on August 1, 1989, months after the sale of the Utod sugarland to
the Destrezas, her father Riñoza asked her to mortgage some land. He gave Alaras the title to it, impressing on
her that such title covered a land in Barangay Utod. But this does not prove that the sale of the
Utod sugarland to the Destrezas is void.
Alaras admitted that she did not see the number of the title handed to her. Nor did she identify in court any specific
title as the one she got. To be of value
to her cause, Alaras needed to testify that TCT 40353 remained uncancelled in her
father’s hands even after the supposed entry of TCT 55396 in the Registry of
Deeds.[38] But she did not so testify.
3. Plazo
and Alaras also question the testimony of Gregorio Destreza that he paid P100,000.00
to Riñoza when the figure appearing on the deed of sale was only P60,000.00. Again, this is not sufficient ground to
nullify such deed. The fact remains that
Riñoza sold his land to the Destrezas under that document and they paid for
it. The explanation for the difference
in the prices can be explained only by Riñoza and Gregorio Destreza. Unfortunately, Riñoza had died. On the other hand, Plazo and Alaras chose not
to confront Destreza regarding that difference when the latter took the witness
stand.
In sum, the Court finds the notarized
deed of sale that the late Pedro Riñoza executed in favor of the Destrezas
valid and binding upon them and their successors-in-interest. It served as authority to the Register of
Deeds to register the conveyance of the property and issue a new title in favor
of the Destrezas. That the Destrezas
occupied and cultivated the land openly for seven years before and after Riñoza’s
death negates any scheme to steal the land.
WHEREFORE, the appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 73031 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. We declare the Deed of Sale
valid and order the Registry of Deeds to register TCT 55396 in the name of
spouses Gregorio M. Destreza and Bernarda E. Butiong and issue the same upon
their compliance with the requirements of registration.
SO
ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo, per Special Order No. 757 dated October 12, 2009.
** Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, per Special Order No. 759 dated October 12, 2009.
[1]
Rollo, pp.
28-45; penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro and concurred in by
Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Aurora Santiago-Lagman.
[2]
[3]
Branch 14.
[4]
Records, p. 566.
[5]
Folder of Exhibits, p. F-41.
[6]
[7]
[8]
TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 9-11.
[9]
[10]
Folder of Exhibits, p. F-10.
[11]
TSN, May 15, 1997, pp. 5-8.
[12]
Records, pp. 1-26.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
TSN, May 4, 1999, pp. 4-5.
[19]
TSN, October 15, 1999, pp. 3-8.
[20]
TSN, May 4, 1999, pp. 9-10.
[21]
Rollo, pp. 76-77.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] The Court of Appeals erroneously
stated in its Decision that the values involved are one million pesos
(PhP1,000,000.00) and six hundred thousand pesos (PhP600,000.00) when the
actual value as verified from the records is one hundred thousand pesos (PhP
100,000.00) and sixty thousand pesos (PhP60,000.00), respectively.
[31]
Rollo, pp. 43-44.
[32]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 30.
[33]
Gonzales v. Ramos, 499 Phil. 345, 350 (2005).
[34]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 1.
[35]
Dela Cruz v. Spouses Sison, 492 Phil. 139, 146 (2005).
[36]
Ceballos v. Intestate Estate of the Late Emigdio Mercado, G.R.
No. 155856, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 323, 335.
[37]
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (1978), Sec. 51.
[38]
TSN, May 15, 1997, pp. 5-8.