SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
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ELISEO
EDUARTE y COSCOLLA, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 176566 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, CARPIO MORALES,* NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: October 2, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For Resolution is accused-appellant’s Motion for
Reconsideration, Compassion and Reduction of Penalty dated
On
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition
is DENIED. The Decision dated 12 August
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26716 affirming the conviction
of Eliseo Eduarte y Coscolla for the crime of Robbery and sentencing him to
suffer the prison term ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8
years [of] prision mayor as maximum,
is hereby affirmed in toto. He is ordered to pay private complainant
Catherine Navarra the amount of P8,875.00
by way of restitution.[1]
In
this instant motion, accused-appellant, being aware that it is no longer
practicable to change the Court’s verdict guilty against him or to shake the
Court’s faith in the credibility of his accuser, instead pleads, out of
compassion for him and his family, that we reduce the maximum period of his
sentence from eight years to six years in order that he may apply for probation
and continue to work as a messenger at Unilever Philippines, where he has been
employed since 1994 or for more than 15 years.
Accused-appellant
discloses that he is the sole breadwinner of his family. If he is imprisoned, there will be no one to
support his wife and two children. If
his wife, who is a plain housewife, works as a domestic helper or nanny for
other people’s children, no one will be left at home to care for their
children.
Accused-appellant stresses that,
except for this case, he has no previous criminal record. He appends several Certifications,[2] in
addition to those he already attached during trial, issued by his immediate
superiors at Unilever
Accused-appellant further emphasizes
that since the imposable penalty on him under the Indeterminate Sentence Law
ranges from a minimum of arresto mayor
maximum (4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months) to a maximum of prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day
to 8 years), his prayer for the reduction of his maximum penalty to six (6)
years, so that he may be eligible for probation, is not too much to ask
considering that only one (1) day separates 6 years from the minimum of the
maximum penalty (6 years and 1 day to 8 years) imposable by law for the offense
charged.
Counsel for accused-appellant
believes that the ends of justice and the best interests of the public and that
of accused-appellant and his family will be served by allowing
accused-appellant to avail himself of the benefits of probation. Counsel for accused-appellant, who personally
knows the latter, asserts that accused-appellant is not a vagrant or a
good-for-nothing bum in need of correctional treatment that can be provided by
putting him in a penal institution. In
fact, he has, for the past fifteen years, been steadily and gainfully employed
in a reputable corporation where his immediate superiors have vouched for his
good character and conduct.
The penalty for simple robbery, the
felony committed by accused-appellant, is provided for in Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code. Said article reads:
ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
x x x x
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases.
The penalty
prescribed under Article 294(5) is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, that
is, four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[3]
the penalty imposable should be an indeterminate penalty whose minimum term
should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2) months, and whose maximum term should be the
proper period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, or
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years, taking into
account the proven modifying circumstance.
In our decision dated
After taking a second hard look at the
records and transcripts of stenographic notes (TSN), as well as the state of
affairs of accused-appellant’s life, we opt to modify the penalty imposed on him.
We first determine the minimum term of
the indeterminate sentence to be imposed on accused-appellant. The minimum term is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2) months. Under
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court may impose a minimum
term which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code. In determining
the minimum penalty, the law confers upon the courts in fixing the penalties
the widest discretion that the courts have ever had. The determination of the minimum term is left
entirely within the discretion of the court to fix it anywhere within the range
of the penalty next lower without reference to the periods into which it may be
subdivided.[4] In the exercise of Our discretion, and
considering the circumstances (i.e., gainfully employed for the past 15
years in a reputable company and involvement in civic activities) that have
arisen after the commission of the felony, we lower the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor.
We now go to
the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
As mentioned in Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum term shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code. In the instant case, the maximum term has a
range of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, or
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. The maximum term of the indeterminate penalty
is broken down as follows:
Minimum: 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years, 1
month and 10 days
Medium: 6 years, 1 month and 11 days to 8 years and
20 days
Maximum: 8 years and 21 days to 10 years
In our
decision, we affirmed the maximum term of eight (8) years imposed by the Court
of Appeals, which is in the medium period (6 years, 1 month and 11 days to 8
years and 20 days) of the maximum term, considering that we did not find any
modifying circumstance.
In
the case before us, accused-appellant was arrested by the police without
resistance. Even before
accused-appellant was arrested, he suggested to private complainant that they
go to the police station.[5] In addition, when private complainant and her
friend left accused-appellant to seek the assistance of the police,
accused-appellant, despite having the opportunity to flee, did not leave.[6] The confluence of these circumstances justifies
the appreciation of a mitigating circumstance of similar nature and analogous
to that of number 7 of Article 13 (voluntary surrender) in favor of
accused-appellant. If accused-appellant
really wanted to abscond, he could have readily done so. This, he did not do. We therefore pronounce that accused-appellant
is entitled to a mitigating circumstance under number 10 of Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code.
With
the attendance of one mitigating circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence must be imposed in its minimum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to
6 years, 1 month and 10 days).
We,
therefore, modify the penalty imposed on accused-appellant to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, Motion for Reconsideration, Compassion and Reduction of
Penalty is GRANTED and our Decision
promulgated on 16 April 2009 is hereby MODIFIED by reducing the indeterminate
sentence imposed on accused-appellant to four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional, as maximum.
SO
ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA C. CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice |
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ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Associate Justice Conchita C. Carpio Morales was
designated to sit as additional member replacing Associate Justice Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr., per Raffle dated
[1] Rollo, p. 149.
[2] Annexes
“A” to “D.”
[3] SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an
offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum of which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be
less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
[4] People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109, 116
(1933).
[5] TSN,
[6] TSN,