PEOPLE
OF THE
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G.R.
No. 176527
Present: * **CARPIO-MORALES, Acting Chairperson, ***NACHURA,
BRION, and ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: October 9, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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We review in this
appeal the
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The
prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of murder under
the following Information:[3]
That on or about the 1st day of June, 2000, at about 6:30 in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a .357 caliber Magnum revolver S&W (Homemade), with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, did then and there attack, assault and shot one Jacinto T. Bayron, hitting him on his [sic] vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries, as a consequence of which said Jacinto T. Bayron died instantaneously.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The appellant
pleaded not guilty to the charge upon arraignment.[4] The prosecution presented the following
witnesses in the trial on the merits that followed: Jose Secula (Jose); Gaudioso Quilaton (Gaudioso); Sergio Bayron (Sergio); and Dr. Rene Enriquez Cam (Dr. Cam). The appellant, Carlito Moalong
(Carlito), and Police Senior
Inspector Mutchit Salinas (P/Sr. Insp.
Salinas) took the witness stand for the defense.
Jose, a
security guard of PROBE Security Agency, testified that he was outside his
employer’s branch office at the
On cross
examination, Jose clarified that he did not see the actual shooting; he only
saw the victim’s lifeless body after the appellant had been arrested.[8] On re-direct, Jose stated that before the
appellant was brought to the police station, the latter told him that he had shot
a fellow driver.[9]
Gaudioso, a store
assistant at Healthy Options, narrated that he boarded a jeep at the waiting
shed at the
On cross
examination, Gaudioso recalled that there were three other passengers at that
time inside the jeep. He immediately turned his head towards the passenger’s
side when he heard the first shot; two more shots followed. He got scared and
jumped off the jeep together with the other passengers. He later returned and
found that the driver was already dead.[15]
On re-direct, he
reiterated that he was the only passenger at the jeep’s front seat, and that
the appellant was seated at the jeep’s rear seats. He maintained that the
appellant shot Bayron.[16]
Sergio, the victim’s brother, testified
that Bayron was a jeep driver earning more or less P500.00 daily. He further
stated that the funeral and burial expenses for his brother amounted to P100,000.00.
He also added that Bayron had a common-law wife and had a 1 ½ year-old son with
her.[17]
Dr. Cam, the
Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Cebu City,
testified that he conducted a post-mortem examination on the victim’s body on
June 2, 2000,[18] and made the following
findings:
NECROPSY REPORT
x x x x
GUNSHOT WOUNDS:
1) ENTRANCE: 1.0 x 1.3 cms., ovaloid edges, with an area of tattooing around the wound, 8.0 x 10.0 cms., contusion collar widest supero-laterally, located at the right side of the face, below the right eye, 3.5 cms. x x x
2) ENTRANCE: 0.9 x 1.0 cm., ovaloid, edges inverted, contusion collar widest infero-posteriorly, located at the right side of the head, just in front of the right ear x x x
3) ENTRANCE: 0.6 x 0.8 cm. ovaloid, edges inverted, contusion collar widest, supero-medially, located at the right side of the head, occipital area, 4.0 cms., above 13.0 cms., behind the right external auditory meatus, x x x
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Hematoma, scalp, frontal area and right parietal.
Hemorrhage, intracranial, intracerebral, subdural, subarachnoidal, massive, generalized
Internal Organs, congested
Stomach, empty
CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT WOUNDS OF THE HEAD
Remarks: Two (2) bullets were recovered and submitted to Firearm Investigation Section for Ballistic Examination.[19]
On cross-examination, Dr. Cam stated that the distance
between the muzzle of the gun and the entrance wounds was two feet, more or
less.[20]
The defense presented a different
version of events.
Carlito testified that he was with the
appellant at the parking lot of the
The jeepney dispatcher soon after
called Bayron as it was his jeep’s turn to load passengers.[23] Bayron and his companion boarded the jeep;
Bayron sat at the driver’s seat while his companion proceeded to the passengers’
seats at the rear. The appellant
followed them into the jeep and sat behind Bayron. There were 5-7 passengers on
board the jeep, one of them at the front seat beside Bayron. Bayron then drove
away, leaving the parking area.[24] According
to Carlito, he learned of Bayron’s death at
On cross examination, Carlito
testified that he went to Ayala on
The appellant stated that he was a
driver plying the Ayala-Colon route. At around
The appellant further narrated that Bayron
went to the jeep’s driver’s seat after the dispatcher called him. Roel followed
Bayron but sat on the rear passenger seat. The appellant also got into the jeep
and sat across Roel because he was bothered by what was happening between Bayron
and Roel.[32] He asked Roel to get off the jeep so they
could settle their differences, but Roel instead drew a gun from his waist.[33] The
appellant and Roel wrestled for the gun which discharged while they were
grappling for its possession. Thereafter, Roel immediately alighted from the
jeep. The appellant followed but was unable to catch up with Roel.[34]
On cross examination, the appellant
recalled that he read a newspaper at the parking lot after conversing with Lito.
At that point, Bayron and Roel came; Roel pointed a finger at him and blamed
him for his (Roel’s) arrest for illegal possession of firearms.[35] Bayron went to board his jeep when the
dispatcher called him; Roel followed him inside the jeep. The appellant then also
boarded the jeep, sitting across Roel to “clear the matter” with him.[36]
When the jeep was already on its way, Roel suddenly drew a gun from his waist.
The appellant held Roel’s hand, but the gun went off while they were grappling
for its possession. He did not notice if anyone had been hit. The passengers,
including Roel, ran out of the jeep.[37] The
appellant saw the gun on the ground and picked it up. The appellant tried to
follow Roel, but the latter was able to board another jeep. Thereafter, the
security guards arrested appellant and then turned him over to the police.[38]
P/Sr. Insp. Salinas testified that he
conducted a paraffin test on the appellant at the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory
on
On cross examination, P/Sr. Insp.
Salinas explained that the absence of gunpowder nitrates was not conclusive
proof that person did not fire a gun. According to him, a person could remove
traces gunpowder nitrates by washing his hands.[40]
The RTC convicted the appellant of
the crime of murder in its decision of
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing facts and circumstances, accused Samsom B. Villasan is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby imposed the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Jacinto Bayron in the sum of P50,000.00
and to pay the costs.
The accused is, however, credited in full during the whole period of his detention provided that he will signify in writing that he will abide by all the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.
SO ORDERED.[41]
The appellant
directly appealed to this Court in view of the penalty of reclusion perpetua that the RTC imposed. We referred the case to
the Court of Appeals for intermediate review pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.[42]
The CA
affirmed the RTC Decision in toto in
its
In his brief,[44]
the appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny
the appeal but modify the awarded indemnities.
Sufficiency of
Prosecution Evidence
An established
rule in appellate review is that the trial court’s factual findings, including
its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of
their testimonies, as well as the conclusions drawn from the factual findings,
are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect.
These factual findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are
affirmed by the CA. Despite the RTC and
the CA’s unanimity in the findings of fact, we nevertheless carefully
scrutinized the records of this case, as the penalty of reclusion perpetua demands no less than this kind of scrutiny.[45]
Gaudioso, in
his
FISCAL VICTOR LABORTE:
Q: At about
GAUDIOSO QUILATON:
A: Yes, I can remember.
Q: Please tell the Court where you were at that particular date and time.
A: When I went out of my work place, I boarded a jeep.
Q: In what place did you board the jeep?
A: At the waiting shed at the Ayala, where the jeepney stop is located.
Q: Where is this Ayala situated, in what city?
A:
Q: Were you the only one who boarded that jeepney?
A: We were four (4), sir.
Q: I see. In what particular seat of the jeepney were you seated?
A: Front seat, sir.
Q: While you were on board that jeepney, what happened?
A: First, the driver had conversation.
Q: With whom did that driver have conversation?
A: The one who shot. [sic]
Q: So, what happened afterwards, while that man and the jeepney driver were talking with each other?
A: First, I heard there was a request that he would be boarding a jeepney because his jeep conked up. [sic]
Q: Who made that request?
A: That one person who shot. [sic]
Q: And what happened afterwards, after that request was made by the person to the driver?
A: He was able to board.
Q: And then what happened next?
A: Then I heard one (1) gunshot.
Q: And what did you do when you heard that gunshot?
A: I turned towards my back.
Q: And what did you see, if any, when you turned your head?
A: When I turned back, there were two (2) gunshots I heard, two (2) gunshots. [sic]
Q: You only heard two (2) gunshots?
A: Three (3), sir: the first one, and then followed by two (2) gunshots.
Q: Who caused that gunshot?
A: That person who shot the driver.
Q: Did
you actually see that person shot the driver?
A: Yes.
Q: How far were you to that person who shot the driver?
A: Very near.
Q: How near?
A: Two (2) “dangaw” only, which may be loosely translated as thumb and forefinger extended, is less than, from the thumb to the forefinger, because he was sitting at my back. [sic]
Q: Was
the driver hit?
A: Yes,
he was hit.
Q: In
what portion of his body was the driver hit?
A: On his head.
Q: Now,
if that person, whom you said you saw shot the driver, is in the courtroom now,
can you point to him?
A: Yes,
I can.
Q: Please point to that person.
A: That man, third (3rd) from the left.
(Witness pointed to the person who stood up and identified himself as Samson Villasan)
x x x x
Q: Now you told the Court Mr. Witness that you were the only one seated at the front of the jeepney, Right?
A: Yes.
Q: And three other passengers were at the back of the jeepney?
A: Yes.
Q: And one of the three passengers at the back shot the driver?
.
A: That’s right, sir.
Q: Is
that person whom you saw shot the driver inside the courtroom now?
A: He is around.
Q: Can you point to him again?
A: Yes.
Q: Please do.
A: That person.
(Witness pointing to the person who stood up and identified himself as Samson Villasan).
x x x x[46] [Emphasis supplied]
Time and again, we have ruled that the credibility of witnesses is
a matter best left to the determination of the trial court as this tribunal had
the actual opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude. The trial court’s assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is binding on this Court, except when that tribunal overlooked
facts and circumstances of weight and influence that can alter the result.[47]
We carefully scrutinized the records of this case and found no
reason to disbelieve Gaudioso’s straightforward narration of the events
surrounding Bayron’s death. Nor did we see anything on record indicating any
improper motive that could have led Gaudioso to falsely testify against the
appellant. In fact, the appellant never imputed any ill motive on Gaudioso. To
reiterate, Gaudioso and the appellant were in the same jeep during the shooting incident; there was light inside the jeep. More importantly, Gaudioso saw the actual shooting because he was “very near” the appellant when the
latter shot Bayron. To Gaudioso, what he
witnessed must have been a shocking and startling event he would not forget in
a long, long time. Under these
circumstances, we entertain no doubt on the positive identification of the
appellant as the assailant.
The Appellant’s Defenses
The appellant sought to exculpate
himself by claiming that the shooting of Bayron was accidental; and that he (appellant)
was not sure who pulled the trigger because the gun went off when he and Roel
were grappling for its possession.
We do not find the appellant’s claim
of accidental shooting believable as it contradicts the available physical
evidence provided by Dr. Cam that the victim suffered three gunshot wounds on the face
and head. Dr. Cam’s Necropsy Report corroborated by
the Autopsy Report of the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes showing that the victim
suffered a total of three gunshot
wounds, supported the testimony of Gaudioso that the appellant shot the victim thrice. Jose notably also testified that
he heard three successive gunshots. These
pieces of evidence are clearly inconsistent with the appellant’s claim that the
victim’s shooting was accidental and that only one shot was fired.
The nature, number and location of the victim’s gunshot wounds also
belie the appellant’s claim of accidental shooting. The three wounds, all sustained in the head
and the face from shots coming from the rear, are clearly indicative of a
determined effort to end the victim’s life.
The appellant nonetheless claims that his identity as the
assailant was not proven with certainty as no trace of gunpowder nitrates was found
in his hand.
We do not find the appellant’s claim
persuasive.
While the appellant tested negative
for gunpowder nitrates, Forensic Chemist Salinas testified that a paraffin test
is not conclusive proof that one has not fired a gun. This view is fully in
accord with past findings and observations of this Court that paraffin tests, in general, are inconclusive;
the negative findings in paraffin tests do not conclusively
show that a person did not discharge a firearm.[48] Our
ruling in People v. Teehankee, Jr.[49]
on this point is particularly instructive:
Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has “… proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that
it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites
on the hand. It cannot be
established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites
was the discharge of a firearm. The
person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the
same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks,
fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and
alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may
also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are
present in the products of combustion of tobacco.” In
numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring about
the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands
after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the
direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. x x
x x [Emphasis ours]
In sum, the positive, clear and
categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses deserve full merit in both
probative weight and credibility over the negative results of the paraffin test
conducted on the appellant.
The Crime Committed
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of
murder as follows:
Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1.
With treachery, x x x
In
convicting the appellant of murder, the courts a quo appreciated treachery.
This circumstance exists when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, method or forms which tend directly and
especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from
the defense that the offended party might make. This definition sets out what
must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity
for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption
of this means of execution.[50] The essence of this qualifying circumstance is
in the elements of suddenness and surprise, and the lack of expectation that
the attack would take place, thus depriving the victim of any real opportunity
for self-defense while ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
offender.[51]
The evidence in this case showed that
the appellant briefly talked with Bayron as the latter sat on the jeep’s driver’s
seat preparatory to driving off. Thereafter, the appellant entered the jeep through
its rear entrance, and sat behind Bayron. Not long after Bayron started his
jeep, the appellant shot him three times, hitting him in the head and at the side
of the face. This manner and mode of attack by the appellant, to our mind, indicate
treachery. The appellant’s attack came without
warning, and was swift and sudden.
The appellant attacked Bayron from behind; the unsuspecting victim had no expectation of the coming attack
and was totally defenseless against it. From
these facts, the appellant clearly and purposely DENIED the victim of any real chance to defend
himself and secured the commission of the crime without risk to himself.[52]
In People v. Vallespin,[53]
we explained:
The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself,
thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim. It can exist even if the
attack is frontal, if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no
opportunity to defend himself against such attack. In essence, it means that the offended party was not given an
opportunity to make a defense.
No Evident Premeditation
The
Information alleged that the crime was committed with evident premeditation. We do
not find any evidentiary support for this allegation.
Evident premeditation, like other qualifying circumstances, must be established by clear and positive evidence showing that
planning and preparation took place prior
to the killing. For
evident premeditation to be appreciated, the prosecution must
show the following: (1) the time the accused determined to commit the crime;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to this determination;
and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the resolve to kill and its
execution that would have allowed the killer to reflect on the consequences of his
act.[54] Significantly,
the prosecution did not even attempt to prove the presence of these elements. In People v. Sison,[55]
we held that evident premeditation should not be appreciated where there is
neither evidence of planning or preparation to kill nor of the time when the
plot was conceived.
The Proper Penalty
The
crime of murder qualified by treachery is penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659) with reclusion perpetua to death.
While evident premeditation was
alleged in the Information, this circumstance was not adequately proven. Hence,
in the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the commission of
the felony, the courts a quo correctly sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua, conformably with
Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
Civil Liability
The grant of
civil indemnity as a consequence of the crime of murder requires no proof other
than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the appellant’s
responsibility therefor. While the RTC and the CA commonly awarded P50,000.00
as death indemnity to the murder victim’s heirs, prevailing jurisprudence
dictates an award of P75,000.00.[56]
Hence, we modify the award of civil indemnity to this extent, to be paid by the
appellant to the victim’s heirs.
Moral damages
are likewise mandatory in cases of murder and homicide. We award P50,000.00
as moral damages to the victim’s heirs in accordance with prevailing rules.[57]
The heirs of the victim are likewise entitled to exemplary
damages since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was firmly established. When a crime is committed with an
aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of P25,000.00
as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the
New Civil Code.[58]
The lower courts were correct in not
awarding actual damages to the victim’s heirs because they failed to present any
supporting evidence for their claim. To be entitled to actual damages, it is
necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable certainty, based
on competent proof and the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. In
the absence of proof, jurisprudence dictates an award of P25,000.00 as
temperate damages for the victim’s heirs on the reasonable assumption that when
death occurs, the family of the victim incurred expenses for the wake and the funeral.[59]
We cannot award indemnity for loss of earning capacity to
the victim’s heirs because no documentary evidence was presented to
substantiate this claim. As a rule, documentary evidence should be
presented to substantiate a claim for this type of damages. While there are exceptions to the rule, these
exceptions do not apply; although self-employed, Bayron did not earn less than
the current minimum wage under current labor laws.[60]
WHEREFORE, in
light of all the foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM
the
(1) the awarded civil indemnity is INCREASED
to P75,000.00;
(2) the appellant is ORDERED to PAY
the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) the appellant is ORDERED to PAY
the heirs of the victim P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(4) the appellant is ORDERED to PAY
the heirs of the victim P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO*
Acting Chief Justice
* Designated additional Member of the Second
Division per Special Order No. 718 dated
** Designated Acting Chairperson of the Second
Division per Special Order No. 690 dated
***
Designated additional Member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 730
dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, and concurred in by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.; rollo, pp. 4-12.
[2] Penned by Judge Galicano Arriesgado; CA rollo; pp. 23-31.
[3]
[4] Records, pp. 14-15.
[5] TSN,
[6]
[7]
[8] TSN,
[9]
[10] TSN,
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] TSN,
[16]
[17] TSN,
[18] TSN,
[19] Records, p. 37-A.
[20] TSN,
[21] TSN,
[22]
[23]
[24] TSN,
[25]
[26] TSN,
[27]
[28]
[29] TSN,
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35] TSN,
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39] TSN,
[40]
[41] CA rollo, pp. 30-31.
[42] Per our Resolution dated
[43] CA rollo, pp. 4-12.
[44]
[45] See People
v. Ballesteros, G.R. No. 172696,
[46] TSN,
[47] See People
v. Nueva, G.R. No.173248,
[48] People
v. Baltazar, G.R. No. 129933,
[49] G.R. Nos. 111206-08,
[50] See People
v. Garcia, G.R. No. 174479,
[51] See People
v. Felipe, G.R. No. 142205,
[52] See People
v. Balisoro, G.R. No. 124980,
[53] G.R. No. 132030,
[54] See People
v. Aytalin, G.R. No. 134138,
[55] G.R.
No. 172752,
[56] People
v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 173477,
[57] See People
v. Honor, G.R. No. 175945,
[58] See People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 176385,
[59] See People
v. Abrazaldo, G.R. No. 124392,
[60] The current daily minimum wage rate in Region
VII (non-agriculture) as of August 2009 is P222.00-P267.00.
* Designated Acting Chief Justice from