THIRD
DIVISION
|
OPHELIA L. TUATIS, Petitioner, - versus
- SPOUSES ELISEO ESCOL and VISMINDA
ESCOL; HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 22ND DIVISION, CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY; REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 11, SINDANGAN, ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE; and
THE SHERIFF OF RTC, BRANCH 11, SINDANGAN, ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 175399 Present: QUISUMBING,* J., CARPIO, Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, PERALTA, and ABAD,** JJ. Promulgated: October 27, 2009 |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[1] under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court seeks the annulment of the following Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00737-MIN: (a) Resolution[2]
dated 10 February 2006 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction of herein petitioner Ophelia L. Tuatis (Tuatis); (b) Resolution[3] dated 25
July 2006 denying Tuatis’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 10
February 2006; and (c) Resolution[4]
dated 9 October 2006 denying Tuatis’ Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion
for Reconsideration. The instant
Petition further prays for the annulment of the Order[5] dated
The dispute
arose from the following factual and procedural antecedents:
On
Tuatis
alleged in her Complaint that sometime in November 1989, Visminda, as seller,
and Tuatis, as buyer, entered into a Deed of Sale of a Part of a
The
significant portions of the Deed of Sale by Installment stated:
That for and in
consideration of the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), Philippine
currency, the SELLER [Visminda[8]] hereby
SELLS to the BUYER [Tuatis], the above-described parcel of land under the
following terms and conditions:
1. That the BUYER [Tuatis] shall pay to the SELLER
[Visminda] the amount of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00), as
downpayment;
2. That the BUYER [Tuatis] shall pay to the SELLER
[Visminda] the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00), on or before
3. That the remaining balance of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00)
shall be paid by the BUYER [Tuatis] to the SELLER [Visminda] on or before
4. That failure of the BUYER [Tuatis] to pay the
remaining balance within the period of three months from the period stipulated
above, then the BUYER [Tuatis] shall return the land subject of this contract
to the SELLER [Visminda] and the SELLER [Visminda] [shall] likewise return all
the amount paid by the BUYER [Tuatis].[9]
Tuatis
claimed that of the entire purchase price of P10,000.00, she had paid
Visminda P3,000.00 as downpayment.
The exact date of said payment was not, however, specified. Subsequently, Tuatis paid P3,000.00 as
installment on P1,000.00 installment on P3,000.00 on
In the
meantime, Tuatis already took possession of the subject property and
constructed a residential building thereon.
In 1996,
Tuatis requested Visminda to sign a prepared absolute deed of sale covering the
subject property, but the latter refused, contending that the purchase price
had not yet been fully paid. The parties
tried to amicably settle the case before the Lupon Barangay, to no avail.[11]
Tuatis
contended that Visminda failed and refused to sign the absolute deed of sale
without any valid reason. Thus, Tuatis
prayed that the RTC order Visminda to do all acts for the consummation of the
contract sale, sign the absolute deed of sale and pay damages, as well as
attorney’s fees.
In her
Answer,[12]
Visminda countered that, except for the P3,000.00 downpayment and P1,000.00
installment paid by Tuatis on P4,000.00 she had received from Tuatis.
After
trial, the RTC rendered a Decision[14] on
Under the facts and circumstances, the evidence for
[Tuatis] has not established by satisfactory proof as to (sic) her compliance
with the terms and conditions setforth (sic) in [the Deed of Sale by
Installment] x x x.
x x x x
In contracts to sell, where ownership is retained by
the seller and is not to pass until the full payment, such payment, as we said,
is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach,
casual or serious, but simply an event that prevented the obligation of the
vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force x x x.
x x x x
As the contract x x x is clear and unmistakable and
the terms employed therein have not been shown to belie or otherwise fail to
express the true intention of the parties, and that the deed has not been
assailed on the ground of mutual mistake which would require its reformation,
[the] same should be given its full force and effect.
EVIDENCE (sic) at hand points of no full payment of
the price, hence No. 4 of the stipulation applies[,] which provides:
“That failure (sic) of the Buyer [Tuatis] to pay the
remaining balance within the period of three months from the period stipulated
above, then the Buyer [Tuatis] shall return the land subject of this Contract
to the Seller [Visminda] and the Seller [Visminda] [shall] likewise return all
the (sic) amount paid by the Buyer [Tuatis].”
This stipulation is the law between the [Buyer] and
[Seller], and should be complied with in good faith x x x.
[Tuatis] constructed the building x x x in bad faith
for, (sic) she had knowledge of the fact that the Seller [Visminda] is still
the absolute owner of the subject land.
There was bad faith also on the part of [Visminda] in accordance with
the express provisions of Article 454 [of the New Civil Code][15] since
[she] allowed [Tuatis] to construct the building x x x without any opposition
on [her] part and so occupy it. The
rights of the parties must, therefore, be determined as if they both had acted
in bad faith. Their rights in such cases
are governed by Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the
The RTC
decreed the dismissal of Tuatis’ Complaint for lack of merit, the return by
Tuatis of physical possession of the subject property to Visminda, and the
return by Visminda of the P4,000.00 she received from Tuatis.
Tuatis
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 65037. In a Resolution[17] dated
Visminda
filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution[19] before
the RTC on
Tuatis
thereafter filed before the RTC on P502,073.00,[22] but
the market value of the entire piece of land measuring 4.0144 hectares, of
which the subject property measuring 300 square meters formed a part, was only
about P27,000.00.[23] Tuatis maintained that she then had the right
to choose between being indemnified for the value of her residential building
or buying from Visminda the parcel of land subject of the case. Tuatis stated that she was opting to exercise
the second option.
On P4,000.00 to the office of the Clerk of Court of
the RTC, pursuant to the Decision of the trial court dated
In the
intervening time, the Writ of Execution issued on
On
On
Tuatis
immediately filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,[27] which was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 00737-MIN.
Tuatis sought in said Petition the annulment of the RTC Order dated
In a
Resolution[28]
dated
Tuatis
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[29] of the
Resolution dated
Tuatis
subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for
Reconsideration,[30] but
it was similarly denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
Hence,
Tuatis filed the instant Petition, principally arguing that Article 448 of the
Civil Code must be applied to the situation between her and Visminda.
According
to Tuatis, grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of their
jurisdiction, was committed by the RTC in issuing the Order dated P502,073.00, per assessment of the Municipal
Assessor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte; while the entire piece of land,
which includes the subject property, has a market value of only about P27,000.00,
based on Tax Declaration No. 12464 issued in the year 2000.[33] Such being the case, Tuatis posits that she
is entitled to buy the land at a price to be determined by the Court or,
alternatively, she is willing to sell her house to Visminda in the amount of P502,073.00.
In
addition, Tuatis attributes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Court of Appeals for dismissing
outright her Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and subsequently denying her Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court
grants the present Petition but for reasons other than those proffered by
Tuatis.
Procedural deficiencies of Tuatis’ Petition before the Court of Appeals
It is true
that Tuatis committed several procedural faux pas that would have,
ordinarily, warranted the dismissal of her Petition in CA-G.R. No. 00737-MIN
before the Court of Appeals.
In its Resolution dated 10 February
2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed outright the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by Tuatis for
failure to comply with the following requirements for such a petition: (a) to
completely pay the required docket fees, (b) to attach a certified true or
authenticated copy of the assailed RTC Order dated 26 September 2005, and (c)
to indicate the place of issue of her counsel’s IBP and PTR Official Receipts.
Section 3,
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for original cases
filed before the Court of Appeals and the effect of non-compliance therewith,
relevant portions of which are reproduced below:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of
non-compliance with requirements. – x x x.
x x x x
It shall be
filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service
thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court
indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly
legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order,
resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record
as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent
thereto. The certification shall be
accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly authorized
representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or
office involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other requisite number of copies of the
petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents
attached to the original.
x x x x
The petitioner
shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the
clerk of court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time
of the filing of the petition.
The failure of
the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphases ours.)
The sound
reason behind the policy of the Court in requiring the attachment to the
petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, or quo
warranto of a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of
the assailed judgment or order, is to ensure that the said copy submitted for
review is a faithful reproduction of the original, so that the reviewing court
would have a definitive basis in its determination of whether the court, body,
or tribunal which rendered the assailed judgment or order committed grave abuse
of discretion.[34] Also, the Court has consistently held
that payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is jurisdictional and
is necessary for the perfection of an appeal.[35]
Indeed, the
last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 states that non-compliance with any of the
requirements stated therein shall constitute sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition. However, the
Court, in several cases,[36]
also declared that said provision must not be taken to mean that the petition
shall be automatically dismissed in every instance of non-compliance. The power conferred upon the Court of Appeals
to dismiss an appeal, or even an original action, as in this case, is
discretionary and not merely ministerial. With that affirmation comes the
caution that such discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance
with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances
obtaining in each case.[37]
It must be
borne in mind that the rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than
frustrate, the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of court dockets
is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be met at the expense of
substantial justice. Technical and
procedural rules are intended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of
justice; and a deviation from the rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed
to attain that prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is
the core reason for the existence of courts.[38]
Hence, technicalities must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. A litigation is not a game of technicalities. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage, of justice.[39]
In this
case, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in focusing on the procedural deficiencies of Tuatis’ Petition and
completely turning a blind eye to the merits of the same. The peculiar circumstances of the present
case and the interest of substantial justice justify the setting aside, pro
hac vice, of the procedural defects of Tuatis’ Petition in CA-G.R. No.
00737-MIN.
Perusal of the RTC Decision dated
The
RTC, in the body of its Decision
dated
Article 448 of the Civil Code,
referred to by the RTC, provides:
ART. 448. The owner
of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right to appropriate as
his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the
building or trees. In such case, he
shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the
lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (Emphases supplied.)
According
to the aforequoted provision, the landowner can choose between appropriating the building by paying the
proper indemnity for the same, as provided for in Articles 546[41]
and 548[42]
of the Civil Code; or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land, unless
its value is considerably more than that of the structures, in which case the
builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent.[43]
The Court
notes, however, that the RTC, in the dispositive
portion of its
WHEREFORE, premises studiedly considered,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1)
DISMISSING
the Complaint for lack of merit;
(2)
ORDERING
[Tuatis] to return the physical possession of the land in question to
[Visminda]; and,
(3) ORDERING
[Visminda] to return the P4,000.00 she received as evidenced by Exhibit
“B” and Exhibit “C” [44] to [Tuatis].[45]
utterly
failed to make an adjudication on the rights of Tuatis and Visminda under
Article 448 of the Civil Code. It would
seem that the decretal part of said RTC judgment was limited to implementing the
following paragraph in the Deed of Sale by Installment:
4. That failure of the BUYER [Tuatis] to pay the remaining
balance within the period of three months from the period stipulated above,
then the BUYER [Tuatis] shall return the land subject of this contract to the
SELLER [Visminda] and the SELLER [Visminda] [shall] likewise return all the
amount paid by the BUYER [Tuatis].[46]
without considering
the effects of Article 448 of the Civil Code.
It was this
apparent incompleteness of the fallo of
the RTC Decision dated
Finality of the RTC Decision dated
The Court
has not lost sight of the fact that the RTC Decision dated
Nothing is
more settled in law than that when a final judgment is executory, it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. The
judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the
court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on considerations of
public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments must become final at some definite point in time. The only recognized exceptions are the
corrections of clerical errors or the making of the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries, in which case there is no prejudice to any party, and, of course,
where the judgment is void.[47]
Equally well-settled is the rule that
the operative part in every decision is the dispositive portion or the fallo,
and where there is conflict between the fallo and the body of the
decision, the fallo controls.
This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order,
while the opinion in the body is merely a statement, ordering nothing.[48]
Jurisprudence also provides, however,
that where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or a mistake in the
dispositive portion of the decision, the Court may clarify such an ambiguity by
an amendment even after the judgment has
become final. In doing so, the Court
may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties and the findings of fact and
the conclusions of law expressed in the text or body of the decision.[49] Therefore, even after the RTC Decision
dated
If the Court does not act upon the
instant Petition, Tuatis loses ownership over the building she constructed, and
in which she has been residing, allegedly worth P502,073.00,
without any recompense therefor whatsoever; while Visminda, by returning
Tuatis’ previous payments totaling P4,000.00, not just recovers the
subject property, but gains the entire building without paying indemnity for
the same. Hence, the decision of the Court to give due course to the Petition
at bar, despite the finality of the RTC Decision dated 29 April 1999, should
not be viewed as a denigration of the doctrine of immutability of final
judgments, but a recognition of the equally sacrosanct doctrine that a person
should not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another's
expense.
Furthermore,
the Court emphasizes that it is not even changing or reversing any of the
findings of fact and law of the RTC in its Decision dated
Applying Article 448 and other related provisions of
the Civil Code
Taking into consideration the
provisions of the Deed of Sale by Installment and Article 448 of
the Civil Code, Visminda has the following options:
Under the first option,
Visminda may appropriate for herself the building on the subject property after
indemnifying Tuatis for the necessary[50]
and useful expenses[51]
the latter incurred for said building, as provided in Article 546 of the Civil
Code.
It is worthy to mention
that in Pecson v. Court of Appeals,[52]
the Court pronounced that the amount to be refunded to the builder under
Article 546 of the Civil Code should be the current market value of the
improvement, thus:
The
objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the
parties involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera
vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila [40 Phil. 717 (1920)] that the said provision was formulated in
trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece
of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such a way as
neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to
him. Guided by this precept, it is
therefore the current market value of the improvements which should be made the
basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private
respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued
income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be
allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment
building upon which the trial court should base its finding as to the amount of
reimbursement to be paid by the landowner. (Emphasis ours.)
Until
Visminda appropriately indemnifies Tuatis for the building constructed by the
latter, Tuatis may retain possession of the building and the subject property.
Under the second
option, Visminda may choose not to appropriate the building and, instead, oblige
Tuatis to pay the present or current fair value of the land.[53]
The P10,000.00 price of the
subject property, as stated in the Deed of Sale on Installment executed in
November 1989, shall no longer apply, since Visminda will be obliging Tuatis to
pay for the price of the land in the exercise of Visminda’s rights under
Article 448 of the Civil Code, and not under the said Deed. Tuatis’ obligation will then be statutory,
and not contractual, arising only when Visminda has chosen her option under
Article 448 of the Civil Code.
Still under the second option, if the present or current value of the land, the subject
property herein, turns out to be considerably more than that of the building built
thereon, Tuatis cannot be obliged to pay for the subject property, but she must
pay Visminda reasonable rent for the same.
Visminda and Tuatis must agree on the terms of the lease; otherwise, the
court will fix the terms.
Necessarily, the RTC should conduct
additional proceedings before ordering the execution of the judgment in Civil
Case No. S-618. Initially, the
RTC should determine which of the aforementioned options Visminda will choose. Subsequently, the RTC should
ascertain: (a) under the first option, the amount of indemnification Visminda
must pay Tuatis; or (b) under the second option, the value of the subject
property vis-à-vis that of the building, and depending thereon, the price of,
or the reasonable rent for, the subject property, which Tuatis must pay
Visminda.
The Court
highlights that the options under Article 448 are available to Visminda, as the owner of the subject property. There is no basis for Tuatis’ demand that, since
the value of the building she constructed is considerably higher than the
subject property, she may choose between buying the subject property from
Visminda and selling the building to Visminda for P502,073.00. Again, the choice of options is for Visminda, not
Tuatis, to make. And, depending on
Visminda’s choice, Tuatis’ rights as a builder under Article 448 are limited to
the following: (a) under the first option, a right to retain the building and
subject property until Visminda pays proper indemnity; and (b) under the second
option, a right not to be obliged to pay for the price of the subject property,
if it is considerably higher than the value of the building, in which case, she
can only be obliged to pay reasonable rent for the same.
The rule that the choice under
Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to the owner of the land is in accord with
the principle of accession, i.e.,
that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner,
the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive.[54] The landowner cannot refuse to exercise
either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from
the land.[55]
The raison d’etre for this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted
in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes
necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to
the owner of the land. In view of the
impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has
provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire
the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the
builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized
to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the
principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.[56]
Visminda’s Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution cannot be deemed as an expression of her choice to recover
possession of the subject property under the first option, since the options
under Article 448 of the Civil Code and their respective consequences were also
not clearly presented to her by the
As a final note, the directives given
by the Court to the trial court in Depra
v. Dumlao[57] may
prove useful as guidelines to the RTC herein in ensuring that the additional
proceedings for the final settlement of the rights of the parties under Article
448 of the Civil Code shall be conducted as thoroughly and promptly as
possible.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court:
(1)
GRANTS the instant Petition;
(2)
ANNULS AND SETS ASIDE (a) the Resolution dated
(3)
DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11, to conduct further proceedings to
determine with deliberate dispatch: (a) the facts essential to the proper
application of Article 448 of the Civil Code, and (b) respondent Visminda
Escol’s choice of option under the same provision; and
(4)
Further
DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11, to undertake the implementation of respondent
Visminda Escol’s choice of option under Article 448 of the Civil Code, as soon
as possible.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Per
Special Order No. 755, dated
** Per
Special Order No. 753, dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 4-22.
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja
and Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal, concurring; rollo,
pp. 38-39.
[3] Rollo, pp. 45-46.
[4]
[5]
[6] CA rollo, pp. 17-20.
[7]
[8] In the
Deed of Sale of a Part of a
[9] CA rollo, p. 21.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] The
payments were each evidenced by a certification signed by Visminda that she
received the aforesaid amounts from Tuatis, which were marked as Exhibits B and C, respectively, in the proceedings before the RTC; CA rollo, p. 22.
[14] Penned by
Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena; CA rollo,
pp. 30-54.
[15] Although
the Decision mentioned Article 454 of the New Civil Code, the same was
apparently erroneous since the applicable provision was Article 453 of the said
code, which provides:
ART. 453.
If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built,
planted or sowed on the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of
such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had
acted in good faith.
It
is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the
act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
[16] CA rollo, pp. 49-54.
[17] Penned
by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz with Associate Justices Cancio C.
Garcia and Renato C. Dacudao, concurring. Records, p. 123.
[18] Records,
p. 124.
[19]
[20] CA rollo, pp. 76-77.
[21]
[22]
[23] This
amount was derived from Tax Declaration No. 12464, covering the subject
property. (CA rollo, p. 62.)
[24] Records, p. 176.
[25] CA rollo, p. 66.
[26]
[27] Impleaded
therein were the spouses Eliseo and Visminda Escol, the RTC of Sindangan,
Zamboanga
[28] CA rollo, pp. 81-82.
[29]
[30]
[31] Section
2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2.
Second motion for reconsideration.
– No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the
same party shall be entertained.
[32] ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown
or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the
building or trees. In such case, he
shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the
lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
[33] CA rollo, p. 62.
[34] Durban
Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan, G.R. No. 167136, 14 December 2005, 477
SCRA 801, 808; Quintano v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
144517, 13 December 2004, 446 SCRA 193, 202-203.
[35] Carlos v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 134473,
[36] In Garcia v. Philippine
Airlines, Inc. (G.R. No. 160798, 8 June 2005, 459 SCRA 768, 780), the Court
held that “if, upon its initial review of the petition, the Court of Appeals is
of the view that additional pleadings, documents or order should have been
submitted and appended to the petition, it has the following options: (a)
dismiss the petition under the last paragraph of [Section 3,] Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court; (b) order the petitioner to submit the required additional
pleadings, documents, or order within a specific period of time; or (c) order
the petitioner to file an amended petition appending thereto the required
pleadings, documents or order within a fixed period.” (See also Lao v. Court of Appeals [382
Phil. 583, 604 (2000)]; Paras v. Judge Baldado [406 Phil. 589, 596
(2001)]; Hilario v. People [G.R. No. 161070,
Similarly, in La Salette College v. Pilotin (463 Phil. 785, 794 [2003]), the Court recognized that, notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances. (See also Public Estates Authority v. Yujuico [404 Phil. 91, 101 (2001); Jose v. Court of Appeals [447 Phil. 159, 165 (2003); Villamor v. Court of Appeals [478 Phil. 728, 735-736 (2004), citing Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals [400 Phil. 395, 401-402 (2000)].)
[37] Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 432 Phil. 733, 741-742 (2002).
[38] General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442 Phil. 425, 428 (2002).
[39] Aguam v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 587, 595 (2000).
[40] In accordance with Article 453 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the
part of the person who built, planted or sowed on the land of another, but also
on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be
the same as though both had acted in good faith.
It
is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the
act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part. (Emphasis ours.)
[41] ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
[42] ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.
[43] Macasaet v. Macasaet, 482 Phil. 853, 874
(2004).
[44] Exhibits
B and C are the certifications signed by Visminda, stating that she indeed
received the amounts of P3,000.00
and P1,000.00 from Tuatis on
[45] CA rollo, p. 54.
[46]
[47] Mayon Estate Corporation v.
Altura, G.R. No. 134462,
[48] Mendoza,
Jr. v. San Miguel Foods, Inc., G.R. No. 158684, May 16, 2005, 458
SCRA 664, 676-677, cited in Florentino v.
Rivera, G.R. No. 167968, 23 January
2006, 479 SCRA 522, 528-529.
[49] Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
82606,
[50] Necessary expenses have been
variously described by the Spanish commentators as those made for the
preservation of the thing (4 Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p.
258); as those without which the thing would deteriorate or be lost (Scaevola's
Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 408); as those that augment the income
of the things upon which they are expanded (4 Manresa's Comentarios al
Codigo Civil, p. 261; 8 Scaevola's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p.
416). Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for cultivation,
production, upkeep, etc. (4
[51] Useful expenses are incurred to give greater utility or productivity to the thing. (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. II (1992 ed.), p. 294.
[52] 314 Phil. 313, 324-325 (1995).
[53] See Depra v. Dumlao, G.R. No. L-57348,
[54] Philippine National Bank v. De Jesus,
458 Phil. 454, 459 (2003).
[55] Technogas Philippines Manufacturing
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 471, 482 (1997).
[56] Depra v. Dumlao, supra note 53 at 483.
[57] The fallo in Depra v. Dumlao (ibid.) reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial Court is hereby
set aside, and this case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo for further proceedings consistent with Articles 448 and 546 of the
Civil Code, as follows:
1. The trial Court
shall determine
a) the present fair
price of DEPRA's 34 square-meter area of land;
b) the amount of the
expenses spent by DUMLAO for the building of the kitchen;
c) the
increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square
meters may have acquired by reason thereof, and
d) whether
the value of said area of land is considerably more than that of the kitchen
built thereon.
2. After
said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the Regional
Trial Court shall render judgment, as follows:
a) The
trial Court shall grant DEPRA a period of fifteen (15) days within which to
exercise his option under the law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to
appropriate the kitchen as his own by paying to DUMLAO either the amount of the
expenses spent by DUMLAO for the building of the kitchen, or the increase in
value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square meters may have
acquired by reason thereof, or to oblige DUMLAO to pay the price of said area.
The amounts to be respectively paid by DUMLAO and DEPRA, in accordance with the
option thus exercised by written notice of the other party and to the Court,
shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen (15) days from such notice of the
option by tendering the amount to the Court in favor of the party entitled to
receive it;
b) The
trial Court shall further order that if DEPRA exercises the option to oblige
DUMLAO to pay the price of the land but the latter rejects such purchase
because, as found by the trial Court, the value of the land is considerably
more than that of the kitchen, DUMLAO shall give written notice of such
rejection to DEPRA and to the Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of
DEPRA's option to sell the land. In that event, the parties shall be given a
period of fifteen (15) days from such notice of rejection within which to agree
upon the terms of the lease, and give the Court formal written notice of such
agreement and its provisos. If no agreement is reached by the parties, the
trial Court, within fifteen (15) days from and after the termination of the
said period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of the lease,
provided that the monthly rental to be fixed by the Court shall not be less
than Ten Pesos (P10.00) per month, payable within the first five (5)
days of each calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall not be more
than two (2) years, counted from the finality of the judgment, considering the
long period of time since 1952 that DUMLAO has occupied the subject area. The
rental thus fixed shall be increased by ten percent (10%) for the second year
of the forced lease. DUMLAO shall not make any further constructions or
improvements on the kitchen. Upon expiration of the two-year period, or upon
default by DUMLAO in the payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive months,
DEPRA shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease, to recover his land, and
to have the kitchen removed by DUMLAO or at the latter's expense. The rentals
herein provided shall be tendered by DUMLAO to the Court for payment to DEPRA,
and such tender shall constitute evidence of whether or not compliance was made
within the period fixed by the Court.
c) In
any event, DUMLAO shall pay DEPRA an amount computed at Ten Pesos (P10.00)
per month as reasonable compensation for the occupancy of DEPRA's land for the
period counted from 1952, the year DUMLAO occupied the subject area, up to the
commencement date of the forced lease referred to in the preceding paragraph;
d) The
periods to be fixed by the trial Court in its Decision shall be inextendible,
and upon failure of the party obliged to tender to the trial Court the amount
due to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall be entitled to an
order of execution for the enforcement of payment of the amount due and for
compliance with such other acts as may be required by the prestation due the
obligee.
No costs.