SECOND DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - CRISTINO CAÑADA, Accused-Appellant. |
|
G.R. No.
175317 Present: *YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., **CARPIO-MORALES, Acting Chairperson, BRION, ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: October
2, 2009 |
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D E C I S I
O N
BRION, J.:
We review in
this appeal the
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The prosecution
charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of rape under an
Information[2] that reads:
That on or about the 28th day of November, 1998, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Km.19, Barangay Matarling, Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above-named accused, armed with a scythe, entered the toilet where one [AAA],[3] a minor of 15 years old, was answering the call of nature, and by means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grabbed her left wrist tightly and ordered her to keep quiet, removed her short pants and panty, pushed her down to the floor, mounted on top of her and tried to insert his penis into her vagina, thus penetrating the labia majora of her female organ, causing 2 cm. abrasion inferior aspect of (R) labia majora and 0.2 cm. laceration (L) inferior aspect of posterior fourchette, against her will.
Contrary to law.
The
appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.[4]
The prosecution presented the following witnesses in the trial on the merits
that followed: AAA; BBB; SPO2 Samuel Omoso (SPO2
Omoso); and Dr. Jesus Raniel Mon (Dr.
Mon). The appellant and Guadalupe Cañada (Guadalupe) took the witness stand for the defense.
AAA
testified that she is 15 years old and the eldest daughter of her mother (BBB)
from her first marriage. She resides in a house located at Campo Daan,
Lantawan, Isabela, Basilan together with her six (6) siblings, BBB, and the
appellant. The appellant is the second husband of BBB.[5] At
around
AAA
recalled that while the appellant was raping her, BBB called her name. AAA did
not respond because the appellant had a scythe to her neck. After raping her,
the appellant threatened to kill her and BBB if she reported the incident to
anyone. The appellant then allowed her to leave the comfort room.[8]
AAA told BBB about the incident only on
On cross
examination, AAA stated that the house of the appellant’s mother is located 20
meters from their (her and BBB’s) house. The toilet where the rape happened was
made of sawali; it had no door and
bowl.[11]
She narrated that when the appellant entered the toilet, he immediately grabbed
her left wrist and pushed her with his left hand, which caused her to fall on
the floor. The appellant then pointed a scythe to her neck, and threatened to
kill her.[12] The appellant then spread
her legs, lowered her shorts and panty, and then inserted his penis into her
vagina.[13]
She felt pain when blood came out of her vagina. Afterwards, the appellant told
her not to reveal the incident to anyone, and then ordered her out of the
toilet.[14] BBB was still calling her when she went out of
the toilet; BBB was then near the window of their house. BBB noticed her crying
when she went inside the house, but did not tell her that the appellant had
raped her because she was afraid that the appellant would kill them. She only
told BBB during the school camping on
On re-direct
examination, AAA testified that the appellant always carries a scythe because
he is a tuba-gatherer.[17]
On re-cross, AAA confirmed that the appellant is her stepfather;[18]
and that after the incident, the appellant constantly warned her not to tell
the incident to anybody.[19]
BBB
declared on the witness stand that AAA is her daughter, and the appellant is
her second husband.[20]
At around
On cross
examination, BBB recalled that she saw the appellant block the way of her
daughter while the latter was on her way to the comfort room. She suspected
that the appellant might do something to AAA,[24]
so she called her name. AAA did not answer.[25] She
then saw the appellant push her daughter towards the wall of the comfort room.[26] She
did not see what happened next, as she felt nervous and returned inside the
house to drink water. Thereafter, AAA went inside their house crying. BBB
inquired what the appellant did to her, but AAA refused to talk.[27]
At around
SPO2 Omoso,
the police investigator of the Lantawan Police Station, testified that AAA and
BBB came to the police station on
Dr.
Mon, the Medico-Legal Officer of the
MEDICO-LEGAL REPORT
x x x
PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
- 2 cm. abrasion inferior aspect of (R) labia majora
- 0.2 cm. laceration (L) inferior aspect of posterior fourchette[31]
Dr. Mon stated that these lacerations
and abrasions could have been caused by a hard object like a penis.[32]
The defense presented a different
version of the events.
The appellant declared on the witness
stand that he is the husband of BBB, but forgot the year they were married.
They reside in Barangay Matarling,
Lantawan together with the children of BBB from her previous marriage.[33]
They have no neighbors except his mother, whose house is more or less 10 meters
from their house.[34]
He works as a copra processor at the coconut plantation of Tony Macario (Tony) located about three (3) kilometers
from their house.[35]
He testified that at around
On cross examination, the
appellant recalled that he and BBB got married in 1987.[39] He has been working in the plantation of Tony
for three years; and always brings his “kinabasi”
to work.[40] According to him, his
upset stomach started on the evening of
Guadalupe confirmed that she is the
appellant’s mother, while AAA is the appellant’s stepdaughter. She stated that
her house is 15 meters away from the house of BBB.[43] She woke up early on
On cross examination, Guadalupe
narrated that she learned that the appellant was being accused of rape when he (appellant)
was already detained in jail.[48] She maintained that the appellant did not rape
AAA.[49]
The RTC convicted the
appellant of rape in its decision of
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court finding accused Cristino Cañada guilty as principal beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B paragraph 2, of R.A. 8353, otherwise known as “The Anti-Rape Law” hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties of the law.
And, in line with recent jurisprudence,
accused is likewise condemned to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00
as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[50]
The records of
this case were originally transmitted to this Court on appeal. Pursuant to our
ruling in People v. Mateo,[51]
we endorsed the case and the records to the CA for appropriate action and
disposition.
The CA, in its
decision[52] dated
In his brief,[53]
the appellant argued that the RTC erred in convicting him of the crime charged
despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
He maintains that the trial court failed to fully consider all the relevant
facts and circumstances of the case.
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to deny the appeal for lack
of merit, but we modify the awarded indemnities.
Sufficiency of
Prosecution Evidence
The Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353,[54]
defines and penalizes Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, as follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
x x x x
Thus, for the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished the act through force,
threat or intimidation, or when
she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when she
was under 12 years of age or was demented.
In her testimony, AAA positively
identified the appellant as her rapist; she never wavered in this
identification. To directly quote from the records:
PROSECUTOR SALUSTIANO LEGASPI:
Q: Do you know Cristino Cañada?
[AAA]:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why?
A: Because he was the one who raped me.
x x x
Q: You
said a while ago that at
A: I was to answer the call of nature.
x x x
-: After you were through excreting your bowel, was there an unusual incident, if any, that happened?
A: He went inside the toilet and pushed me.
Q: You said that he went inside the comfort room and pushed you. To whom are you referring?
A: Cristino Cañada.
Q: What happened to you when he pushed you?
A: He pushed me and then poked me with a
scythe (witness is crying), and removed my short pants and panty and succeeded
in having sexual intercourse with me.
Q: You said that the accused not only pushed you but poked a scythe, commonly called “sanggot”. To what part of your body did he poke the scythe?
A: At my neck.
Q: You said that at the time he pushed, what part of your body did he push you? [sic]
A: Towards my back.
Q: And, according to you, he poked this scythe to your neck. Which came ahead the pushing or the poking of the scythe at your neck?
A: He poked me first with a scythe and then he
raped me.
Q: How did he manage to rape you?
A: He removed my pants and then my panty and
then poked me with a scythe and then raped me.
Q: He was able to succeed in raping you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In what position did he consummate the rape?
A: He was lying.
Q: While he was raping you as you said while poking a scythe at your neck, what did you do?
A: I wanted to stand but cannot do so because I was afraid because I was poked with a scythe.
Q: When the accused entered inside the comfort room and poked the scythe on your neck, did you have any conversation with him?
A: Yes, sir, that if I am going to shout, he will kill me.
x x x x
ATTY. ALVIN MANZANARIS:
Q: So you just let him do what he wanted to do, is that correct?
[AAA]:
A: Yes, sir, because I was afraid because I was poked with a scythe.
Q: So when he was removing your short pants he was trying to molest you, he was trying to poke the scythe at you all the time, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x
Q: Did he try to insert his penis in your
genital?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was he able to insert your [sic] penis?
A: Yes.
Q: And how deep was the penetration?
A: I did not anymore see how deep the penetration was because I was afraid.
x x x
Q: You said he was able to insert his penis
into your vagina. Did you feel any pain?
A: Yes, I felt pain.
Q:
And did blood come out of your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x[55] [Emphasis ours]
AAA’s
testimony strikes us to be clear, convincing and credible. It was furthermore corroborated by the
medico-legal report and testimony of Dr. Mon. We note that at the initial
phases of AAA’s testimony, she broke down on the witness stand when the
prosecution started to ask questions dealing directly with the incident. This,
to our mind, is an eloquent and moving indicium of the truth of her
allegations. We additionally do not see from the records any indication that AAA’s
testimony should be seen in a suspicious light. In fact, AAA testified that the
appellant was good to her and treated her like a daughter. We have held, time and again, that
testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature, as in this case,
deserve full credence considering that no young woman, especially one of tender
age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private
parts, and thereafter testify about her ordeal in a public trial, if she had
not been motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against
her.[56]
The
prosecution positively established the elements of rape required under Article
266-A. First, the appellant succeeded
in having carnal knowledge with the victim. AAA was steadfast in her assertion
that the appellant raped her; that
the appellant succeeded in inserting his
penis into her private part, as a result of which “she felt pain.” She further
stated that blood came out of her vagina.
As earlier stated, AAA’s testimony was corroborated by the medical findings of
the examining physician. In People v. Oden,[57]
we held:
In
rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim, if credible and
free from fatal and material inconsistencies and contradictions, can be the
basis for the prosecution and conviction of an accused. The rule can no less be
true than when a rape victim testifies against her own
father; unquestionably, there would be reason to give it greater weight than
usual. In any event, matters affecting
credibility are best left to the trial court with its peculiar opportunity to
observe the deportment of a witness on the stand as against the reliance by an
appellate court on the mute pages of the records of the case. The spontaneity
with which the victim has detailed the incidents of rape, the tears she has
shed at the stand while recounting her experience, and her consistency almost
throughout her account dispel any insinuation of a rehearsed testimony. The
eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings attesting
to her non-virgin state, should be enough to confirm the truth of her charges.
Second, the
appellant employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. As an element of rape, force, threat or intimidation need not be
irresistible, but just enough to bring about the desired result. Further, it
should be viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the
commission of the crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the
unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient
if it produces fear in the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with
death.[58]
In the present case, AAA
categorically stated that the appellant pushed her, poked a scythe at her neck,
and threatened to kill her if she made a noise. Undoubtedly,
fear and helplessness gripped AAA. To our mind, the appellant’s overt acts were
sufficient to subdue and overpower the victim’s resistance.
The Appellant’s
Defenses
In his
defense, the appellant denied raping the victim, and insisted that he merely
pushed AAA and ordered her to go out of the toilet.
The appellant’s defense of denial
must crumble in light of AAA’s positive and specific testimony. We have
consistently held that positive identification of the accused, when categorical
and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of the
appellant whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. Such denial and alibi are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of any weight in law.[59]
Against the victim’s positive
declaration, all that the appellant has to offer is his self-serving claim that
he did not rape the victim; that he merely pushed AAA and told her to go out of
the comfort room. He presented Guadalupe to corroborate this claim. However, Guadalupe’s
testimony was not consistent with his story on material points; she even
contradicted the appellant’s claim that AAA was already inside the toilet when
he (the appellant) entered. According to
Guadalupe, AAA was already a few meters from the toilet and on her way home
when the appellant entered the toilet. We thus give little weight to the
appellant’s denial. To be believed, denial must be supported by strong evidence
of non-culpability; otherwise it is self-serving and unworthy of belief.
We also reject
the appellant’s claim that it was improbable for him to have raped AAA in a “small
and obnoxious” comfort room situated merely 10 meters from their house.
The fact that the
appellant chose to perpetrate his lustful act in a confined, cramped and filthy
place that was also near the house of BBB, is not unbelievable. Time and again,
the Court has ruled that lust is no respecter of time and place. Rape, in fact,
can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks along the
roadsides, in school premises, in a house where there are other occupants, in
the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping, and even in
places which to many would appear unlikely and high risk venues for its
commission. Besides, there is no rule that rape can be
committed only in seclusion.[60] Thus,
we explained in People v. Watimar:[61]
[F]or
rape to be committed, it is not necessary for the place to be ideal, or the
weather to be fine, for rapists bear no respect for locale and time when they
carry out their evil deed. Rape may be committed even when the rapist and the
victim are not alone, or while the rapist’s spouse was asleep, or in a small room where other family
members also slept, as in the instant case. The
presence of people nearby does not deter rapists from committing their odious
act. x x x
The court has time and again held that ‘the evil in man has no
conscience. The beast in him bears no
respect for time and place, driving him to commit rape anywhere – even in
places where people congregate such as parks, along the road side, within
school premises, and inside a house
where there are other occupants. Rape does not necessarily have
to be committed in an isolated place and can in fact be committed in places
which to many would appear to be unlikely and high-risk venues for sexual
advances. Indeed, no one would think that rape would happen in a public place
like the comfort room of a movie house and in broad daylight.
The appellant further argues that the 6-day delay by AAA in
reporting the rape to BBB impaired her credibility.
The initial reluctance of rape victims to publicly reveal the sexual assault they suffered is
neither unknown nor uncommon. Understandably, a young girl will expectedly be hesitant
or disinclined to come out in public and relate a painful and horrible
experience of sexual violation.[62] Due
to this recognition, we have repeatedly ruled that delay
in reporting an incident of rape is not necessarily an indication that the charge is
fabricated,[63] particularly when the
delay can be attributed to fear instilled by threats from one
who exercises ascendancy over the victim.
In People v. Coloma,[64] we considered an eight-year delay in reporting the long history of rape by the victim’s father as understandable and insufficient to
render the complaint of a 13-year old daughter incredible. People
v. Santos[65] is
likewise a noteworthy case on the present issue as we categorically ruled that a
four-year delay in reporting a rape did not necessarily taint a victim’s
testimony when the reason for the delay was satisfactorily explained. In People v. Dimaano,[66]
we held that strong
apprehensions brought about by fear, stress, or anxiety can leave the offended
party doubtful, distrustful and unsure of the proper steps to take in responding
to the sexual assault she suffered.
In the present case, the records reveal that AAA had been
constantly warned by the appellant that he would kill her and BBB if she
reported the incident to anybody. The threat was duly reinforced and
made very real by the scythe poked at her neck at the time she was ravished. It
was furthermore made by her stepfather who exercised ascendancy over her. Under
these circumstances, we hold that a delay of six days in reporting the rape is
justified.
The Proper Penalty
The applicable provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (effective
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
x x x x
Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
x x x x
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
x x x
The Information specifically alleged the use of a
deadly weapon – a scythe – in the commission of the rape. The prosecution duly
proved this allegation. Under Article 266-B quoted above, the
use of a deadly weapon qualifies the rape so
that the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Since
reclusion perpetua and death are two indivisible penalties, Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code applies; when there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, as in this case, the
lesser penalty shall be applied.[67]
The courts a quo were therefore
correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on the appellant.
It bears noting that under Article 266-B, paragraph
1, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed when
the victim is under 18 years old and
the offender is a “parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third degree, or the common law spouse of
the parent of the victim.” Minority and relationship constitute special
qualifying circumstances which, when alleged in the Information and proved
during trial, warrant the imposition of the death penalty on the malefactor.
AAA’s Certificate of Live Birth clearly
shows that she was born on
. . .Although the prosecution
established that Mary Joy was the daughter of Melita, it failed to offer the
marriage contract of the appellant and Melita which would establish that Mary
Joy is the stepdaughter of the appellant. The testimony of Melita and even the
admission of the appellant regarding their marriage do not meet the required
standard of proof. The Court cannot rely on the disputable presumption that
when a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, they are presumed to
be married. Relationship as a qualifying circumstance in rape must not only be
alleged clearly. It must also be proved beyond reasonable doubt, just as the
crime itself. Neither can it be argued that without the marriage contract, a
common-law relationship between the appellant and Melita was still proved and
this should qualify the crime at bar. To be sure, what the Information alleged
is that the appellant is the stepfather of Mary Joy. It made no mention of a
common-law relationship between the appellant and Melita. Hence, to convict
appellant with qualified rape on the basis of the common-law relationship is to
violate his right to be properly informed of the accusation against him.
Thus, we cannot impose the death penalty on the appellant.
Proper Indemnity
The award of
civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon the finding that rape took
place. Moral damages, on the other hand, are awarded to rape victims without
need of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the victim
suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent. Thus, this Court
affirms the awards of P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral
damages, based on prevailing jurisprudence.[69]
In addition, we also award exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00.[70] The
award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code to
set a public example and serve as deterrent against elders who
abuse and corrupt the youth.[71]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM the P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Costs against appellant Cristino Cañada.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA
CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Acting Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated additional Member of the Second
Division per Special Order No. 691 dated
* *
Designated Acting Chairperson of the Second Division per Special Order No. 690
dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Ramon B. Garcia and concurred in by Associate Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr.; rollo, pp. 5-19.
[2] CA rollo, p. 9.
[3] The Court shall withhold the real name of the
victim-survivor and shall use fictitious initials instead to represent her.
Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other
information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well as
those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed. (People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693,
[4] Records, pp. 25-26.
[5] TSN,
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] TSN,
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] TSN,
[30] TSN,
[31] Records, p. 9.
[32] TSN,
[33] TSN,
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43] TSN,
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50] CA rollo, p. 28.
[51] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[52] Rollo, pp. 5-19.
[53] CA rollo, pp. 64-80.
[54] The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
[55] TSN,
[56] People
v. Perez, G.R. No. 182924,
[57] G.R. Nos. 155511-22,
[58] See People
v. Oliver, G.R. No. 123099,
[59] See People
v. Mingming, G.R. No. 174195,
[60] See People
v. Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388-90,
[61] G.R. Nos. 121651-52,
[62] See People
v. Sinoro, G.R. Nos. 138650-58,
[63] See People
v. Velasquez, G.R. Nos. 132635 and 143872-75,
[64] G.R. No. 95755,
[65] G.R. Nos. 135454-56,
[66] G.R. No. 168168,
[67] See People
v. Orilla, G.R. Nos. 148939-40,
[68] G.R. Nos. 135452-53, October 5,
2001, 366 SCRA 655; see also People v.
Aguilar, G.R. No. 177749, December 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 509; People v. Santos, G.R. No. 145305, June
26, 2003, 405 SCRA 87.
[69] See People v. Jumawid, G.R. No. 184756, June 5, 2009; People v. Baldo, G.R. No. 175238, February 24, 2009.
[70]
See People v. Jumawid, supra;
see also People v. Anguac, G.R. No.
176744,
[71]
See People v. Canares, G.R. No.
174065,