PEOPLE OF THE
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G.R. No.
174859
Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, *carpIO, **CHICO-NAZARIO, BRION, and ABAD,
JJ. Promulgated: October 30, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
We review in this appeal the
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant
before the RTC with the crime of rape under an Information that reads:
x x x
That on or about the 21st day of March 1997 in the evening, at Barangay Matindeg, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with lewd design armed with a bladed weapon, and with violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one [AAA][3] against her will who is a mentally retarded girl.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The appellant pleaded not guilty to
the charge.[5] The prosecution presented
the following witnesses in the trial on the merits that followed: Dr. Cristina D. Peñanueva (Dr. Peñanueva); Francisco
Umipig (Francisco); Dr. Danilo L. Labay
(Dr. Labay); and AAA. The appellant himself testified and presented
his defense.
Dr. Peñanueva, an OB/GYN physician at
the Paulino J. Garcia Memorial Research and
x x x x
INTERNAL EXAMINATION:
hymen had healed laceration at 1, 4, 7, 9 and
Vagina admits one and two fingers with ease; cervix is firm, uterus is small.
Adnexae, negative.
Preg. Test negative[7]
On cross examination, Dr. Peñanueva
stated that she found no abrasions on AAA’s body; and maintained that the
healed lacerations could have been caused by a penis.[8]
Francisco testified that he has been
a resident of Barangay Matindeg,
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija for 10 years. He
recalled that at around
On cross examination, Francisco maintained
that the appellant was armed with a knife when he came out of the hut.[12] AAA
ran away while he and appellant were talking.[13] He
advised the appellant – after the latter pleaded to him not to report the
incident – to go home and to meet him the next day.[14] Francisco
also confirmed that he executed a sworn statement before the police on
On further cross examination,
Francisco admitted that AAA is his relative. He also recalled that AAA was
putting on her panty as she came out of the hut.[16]
Dr. Labay, Medical Officer III at the
On cross examination, Dr. Labay stated
that he examined AAA upon the orders of the RTC. He explained that he continued the examination
started by the hospital’s Chief Forensic Psychiatrist, Dr. Isagani Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales); Dr. Rowena R. Belen (Dr. Belen) likewise conducted a separate
psychiatric evaluation on the victim.[19] Dr. Labay also recalled that AAA became
teary-eyed while being asked about the rape.[20]
AAA declared on the witness stand
that the appellant had raped her. When asked to elaborate, she explained that
the appellant removed her clothes and shorts and poked a knife at her. The
appellant removed her panty, held her hands, and then inserted his penis into
her vagina. She cried but did not shout
because she was afraid.[21] She maintained that she did not give her
consent to the appellant’s act of inserting his penis into her private part.[22]
AAA further stated that she resides
in Curpa, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija together with her mother Juanita and three
cousins.[23] She slipped out of their house in the evening
of
The appellant was the sole defense
witness and gave a different version of the events. He narrated that at around
On cross examination, the appellant
explained that he was in Barangay
Matindeg because he was vacationing in the house of his grandparents. In the evening of
The RTC convicted the appellant of
the crime of rape in its decision dated
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, this Court hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to pay [AAA]:
1. P50,000.00
civil indemnity; and
2. P50,000.00
in moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[34]
The records of the case were
originally transmitted to this Court on appeal.
Pursuant to our ruling in People
v. Mateo,[35] we endorsed the case and
the records to the CA for appropriate action.
The CA, in its decision of
The CA added that the inconsistencies
in AAA’s statements were not unusual because of her mild mental retardation. These inconsistencies, too, referred only to minor
or trivial matters whose presence gave AAA’s statements added credibility, as
it showed that she had not been coached nor had her testimony been rehearsed.
The CA further held that the presence
of deep healed (instead of fresh) lacerations does not negate the fact of rape as
the slightest penetration of the male organ is sufficient to consummate the
crime of rape. It added that the absence
of signs of struggle does not also negate rape, and explained that physical
resistance does not need to be established when force and intimidation were
brought to bear on the victim who submitted herself to the rapist’s bestial
desire out of fear for her life.
In his brief,[36]
the appellant argues that the lower courts erred in convicting him despite the
prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He contends
that the trial court erred in giving credence to AAA’s incredible testimony.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny
the appeal for lack of merit.
Sufficiency of the
Prosecution Evidence
Rape is defined
and penalized under Article 335[37]
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,[38]
which provides:
ARTICLE 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and
3. When
the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
x x x x
Thus, for the charge of rape to
prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, (2)
through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under
12 years of age or was demented. Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape;[39] as
she is in the same class as a woman deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious.[40] Proof of force or
intimidation is not necessary when the victim is a mental retardate,
as she is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of
sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the latter’s mental retardation.[41]
In
the present case, the prosecution established the elements of rape under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. First, AAA positively identified the appellant as her rapist; she was
certain and never wavered in her identification. To directly quote from the records:
FISCAL FLORO FLORENDO
Q: Do you know a person by the name of Jofer Tablang?
[AAA]
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Would you like to get out [sic] of this room and see if he is present?
(Witness pointed to a man seated on the left side of the Court wearing yellow t-shirt and maong pants when asked his name answered Jofer Tablang).
Q: Do you still remember what Jofer Tablang did to you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you please tell this Honorable Court what did he do to you?
A: “Ni-rape nya ako.”
x x x
Q: By
the term “ni-rape nya ako” what do you mean?
A: Ginalaw nya ako. He removed my clothes.
Q: Who removed your clothes?
A: He was the one, sir.
Q: What is the name of the person who removed your clothes?
A: Jofer Tablang, sir.
Q: After Jofer Tablang removed your clothes, what did he do next?
A: He removed my shorts, sir.
x x x
Q: After Jofer Tablang removed your shorts, what did he do next if there was any?
A: He poked me a knife, sir. [sic]
x x x
Q: Now, when he pointed a knife at you, did he do anything else?
A: I shouted, sir.
Q: Why did you shout?
A: I was afraid, sir.
x x x x[42]
Q: You
said that you were raped by Jofer Tablang when I asked you what you mean by
being raped and you said ginalaw nya ako, were you raped at that same incident
when Jofer removed you shorts?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did he do that or how were you abused?
A: He laid me down sir, and he removed my panty.
Q: After removing your panty, what did he do next?
A: He held my hands, sir.
Q: And then?
A: I cried, sir.
x x x x
Q: Do you have a private organ?
A: There is, sir. [sic]
Q: Do you know where is that? Will you please point to your private organ?
(Witness is glancing and slightly pointing to the place where her private organ is located).
Q: Will
you please tell this Honorable Court what did the accused Jofer Tablang do with
your private organ?
x x x
A: He
inserted (ipinasok), sir.
Q: What
did Jofer Tablang insert into your private organ?
A: His
penis, sir.
Q: What
did you do when he inserted his penis into your private organ?
A: None, sir.
Q: You did not cry?
A: I cried, sir.
Q: You did not shout?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why did you not shout?
A: I was afraid, sir.
Q: Why were you afraid?
A: I was afraid because he was holding a knife, sir.
x x x
Q: When
Jofer Tablang inserted his penis into your private organ, did you give your consent?
x x x
A: No, sir.[43] [Emphasis ours]
In asserting that
the appellant raped her by inserting his penis into her private part, we note the
trial court’s observation that the victim broke down and cried on the witness
stand while recalling her ordeal. These,
to our mind, are stirring signs of the truth of her allegations. We additionally do not see from the records
any indication that AAA’s testimony should be seen in a suspicious light. Given
the victim’s mental condition, we find it highly improbable that she had simply
concocted or fabricated the rape charge against the accused. Nor do we find it
likely that she was coached into testifying against appellant considering her
limited intellect. In her mental state, only a very startling event would leave
a lasting impression on her so that she would be able to recall it later when
asked.[44] As we explained in the similar case of People v. Balatazo:[45]
Given the low I.Q. of the victim, it is impossible to believe that she could have fabricated her charges against appellant. She definitely lacked the gift of articulation and inventiveness. Even with intense coaching, assuming this happened as appellant insists that the victim’s mother merely coached her on what to say in court, on the witness stand where she was alone, it would eventually show with her testimony falling into irretrievable pieces. But this did not happen. During her testimony, she proceeded, though with much difficulty, to describe the sexual assault in such a detailed manner. Certainly, the victim’s testimony deserves utmost credit.
Second, a judicious
consideration of the evidence will show that the mental
condition of the victim was sufficiently established. Dr. Labay testified that he
conducted a mental status examination on AAA and found her to be suffering from
“mild mental retardation, with mental age between 9-12 years of age.” Dr.
Labay’s diagnosis was corroborated by the Psychological Report of Dr. Belen
which showed that AAA’s mental age was between 9-12 years old, and that AAA’s
mental capacity belongs to the Mild Mental Retardation range.
The sum total of these testimonial and documentary pieces of
evidence proves beyond doubt that the victim was a mental retardate
at the time she was raped by the appellant. We
note that even the defense did not dispute her mental retardation. Thus, we agree with the lower court’s findings
that AAA was suffering from a mild mental retardation. In People v. Orbita,[46]
we held that carnal knowledge of a woman who is so weak in intellect to the
extent that she is incapable of giving consent constitutes rape.
The Appellant’s Defenses
The appellant denied raping AAA and argues
that the courts a quo erred in giving
credence to the victim’s vague testimony.
We do not find this defense meritorious.
As
we have repeatedly ruled, we accord the trial judge’s assessment of the
credibility of witnesses great respect in the absence of any attendant grave
abuse of discretion; the trial court had the advantage of actually examining
both real and testimonial pieces of evidence, including the demeanor of the
witnesses, and is in the best position to rule on the matter. The rule finds an even greater application
when the trial court’s findings are sustained by the CA. In the present case, we see no reason to depart from the trial court’s assessment of AAA’s testimony.[47]
As a mental retardate, the victim’s testimony could not be
expected to be flawless and precise as her quoted testimony shows. What is important, however, is that she was
able to make known her perception and communicate her ordeal, albeit with some difficulty,
and positively identify her rapist. We
see no basic contradiction in what the victim can and cannot do as a mental
retardate. Dr. Labay categorically
testified that AAA was capable of identifying her rapist, although she had
difficulty elaborating the details of the rape.
Even a mental retardate or feeble-minded person qualifies as
a competent witness if she can perceive and, perceiving, can make known her perception
to others. In People v. Maceda,[48]
we held that the mental unsoundness of the witness at the
time of the event testified to affects only her credibility. As long as the
witness can convey ideas by words or signs and gives sufficiently intelligent
answers to the questions propounded, she is a competent witness even if she is
a mental retardate. In People v. Salomon,[49]
this Court held that “[a] mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness. As in the case of other
witnesses, acceptance of one’s testimony depends on its nature and
credibility.” In People v. Gerones,[50]
the Court allowed the victim to testify, even if she had the mental age of a 9 or 10-year old. Likewise, in People v. Antonio,[51]
the Court allowed the testimony of a 24-year old woman who had the mental age of a seven-year old child, because the Court was convinced
that “she was capable of perceiving and making her perception known.”
The appellant
also contends that Dr. Peñanueva’s findings showing that AAA had healed, instead
of fresh lacerations belie her claim of rape.
We do not find this argument
persuasive.
The
absence of fresh lacerations does not negate sexual intercourse. In fact,
rupture of the hymen is not essential as the mere introduction of the male
organ in the labia majora of the
victim’s genitalia consummates the crime.[52]
In the present case, AAA might have had
difficulty in describing the particular part of her vagina that was actually
touched. What is required for a
consummated crime of rape, however, is the mere touching of the labia by the penis; AAA even went beyond this minimum requirement as she testified
that the appellant’s penis was inserted
into her vagina. Our ruling in People v. Ortoa[53] on
this point is particularly instructive:
A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. Even the fact that the hymen of the victim was still intact does not rule out the possibility of rape. Research in medicine even points out that negative findings are of no significance, since the hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus. In any case, for rape to be consummated, full penetration is not necessary. Penile invasion necessarily entails contact with the labia. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. [Emphasis supplied]
In sum, we find
no merit in the appellant’s denial. It is settled that denial is an inherently
weak defense. It cannot prevail over positive identification, unless supported
by evidence of lack of guilt. In this
case, the appellant’s mere denial cannot overcome the victim’s positive
declaration that she had been raped and the appellant was her rapist.
The Proper Penalty
The applicable
provision of the Revised Penal Code covering the crime of Rape is Article 335, as
amended, which provides that when the woman is
under twelve years of age or is demented, the crime of rape shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the
crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
The Information specifically alleged
the use of a bladed weapon in the commission of the rape. The prosecution duly
proved this allegation from the testimonies of AAA and Francisco. Under Article
335 quoted above, the use of a deadly weapon qualifies the rape so that the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua
to death. Since reclusion perpetua and
death are two indivisible penalties, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
applies; when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of a deed, as in this case, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The
lower courts were therefore correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellant.
Proper
Indemnity
The
award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon
the finding that rape took place. Thus, we affirm the award
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the victim.[54]
The victim is likewise entitled to moral damages without need of
proof; from the nature of the crime we can assume that she has suffered moral
injuries entitling her to such award. Pursuant to current jurisprudence, we
affirm as correct the award of P50,000.00
as moral damages.[55]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, we AFFIRM the
Costs against appellant Jofer Tablang.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
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ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated additional Member of the Second
Division in lieu of Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, per Special
Order No. 757 dated
**
Designated additional Member of the Second Division in lieu of Associate
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, per Special Order No. 759 dated
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, and concurred in by Associate
Justice Renato C. Dacudao and Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa; rollo, pp. 2-26.
[2] Penned by Judge Ismael P. Casabar.
[3] The Court shall withhold the real name of the victim-survivor and shall use fictitious initials instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed. (People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 425-426, citing Sec. 40, Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children; Sec. 63, Rule XI, Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9262, Otherwise Known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004.”)
[4] Records, p. 18.
[5]
[6] TSN,
[7]
[8]
[9] TSN,
[10]
[11]
[12] TSN,
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] TSN,
[17] TSN,
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] TSN,
[22] TSN,
[23]
[24] TSN,
[25]
[26]
[27] TSN,
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32] TSN,
[33]
[34] CA rollo, p. 17.
[35] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[36] CA rollo, pp. 22-40; rollo, pp. 22-24.
[37] The crime subject of Criminal Case No. 1492-G
was committed in March 1997, or before Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, was repealed by Republic Act No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape Law of
1997, which took effect on
[38] Amended by Republic Act No. 7659, entitled An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Heinous Crimes Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Laws, and for Other Purposes, which took effect on December 31, 1993.
[39] People v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 177294,
[40] See People v. Pagsanjan, G.R. No. 139694,
[41] See People v. Dela Paz, supra.
[42] TSN,
[43] TSN,
[44] See People
v. Diunsay-Jalandoni, G.R. No. 174277,
[45] G.R. No. 118027,
[46] G.R. No. 136591,
[47] People v. Dela Paz, supra.
[48] G.R. No. 138805,
[49] G.R. No. 96848,
[50] G.R. No. 91116,
[51] G.R. No. 107950,
[52] See People
v. Almacin, G.R. No. 113253,
[53] G.R. No. 174484,
[54] See People
v. Jumawid, G.R. No. 184756,
[55] See People
v. Baldo, G.R. No. 175238,