Republic of the
Supreme Court
EN BANC
|
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, -
versus - CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR., Respondent. |
G.R. No. 173615
Present:
Puno, C.J.,
* Quisumbing,** CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, chico-nazario, velasco, jr.,* nachura, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: October
16, 2009 |
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DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
In this petition for review,[1]
the Philippine National Bank assails the January 3, 2006 Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50084, which reversed Resolution Nos.
980716 and 983099 issued by the Civil Service Commission, respectively dated
April 14, 1998 and December 7, 1998, and referred the case back to said office
for further proceedings. The assailed
Resolutions, in turn, dismissed respondent Cayetano A. Tejano’s appeal from the
resolution of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank which
found him guilty of grave misconduct in connection with a number of
transactions with certain corporate entities.
The
case stems from a number of alleged irregular and fraudulent transactions made
by respondent Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr. supposedly with the participation of
eight (8) other employees of petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) in its
branch in Cebu City — namely Ma. Teresa Chan, Marcelino Magdadaro, Douglasia
Canuel, Novel Fortich, Jacinto Ouano, Quirubin Blanco, Manuel Manzanares and
Pedrito Ranile. Respondent, together
with the other employees, allegedly committed grave misconduct, gross neglect
of duty, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
acts violative of Republic Act No. 3019, relative to the corporate accounts of
and transactions with Pat International Trading Corporation (PITC), Khun Tong
International Trading Corporation (KITC), Pat Garments International
Corporation (PGIC), Aqua Solar Trading Corporation, Dacebu Traders and
Exporters, Mancao Mercantile Co., Inc. and V&G Better Homes
Subdivision. All of these transactions
transpired at the time that PNB was still a government-owned and controlled
corporation.
Respondent,
who was then the Vice-President and Manager of the bank, and the eight other
employees were administratively charged before the PNB Management Hearing
Committee on February 24 and
The PNB Board of Directors
differed. In its Resolution No. 88[5]
dated
It
appears that only herein respondent sought reconsideration but the Board of Directors,
in its Resolution No. 107,[7]
denied the same. Thereafter, on
In
the meantime, on
Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration[12] on
which the CSC required petitioner to comment.
In its Comment, petitioner theorized that even granting respondent’s
appeal was filed on time, the same must, nevertheless, be dismissed on account
of the privatization of PNB which thereby removed the case from the jurisdiction
of the CSC. The CSC found this argument
meritorious and, subsequently, in its Resolution No. 983099[13] dated
Respondent elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals on petition for review,[14]
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 50084.
Before the appellate court,
respondent, on the one hand, ascribed error to the CSC in denying due course to
his appeal on the basis of the privatization of PNB inasmuch as the incident
subject of the case had transpired way back in 1992, when the bank was still a
government-owned and controlled corporation.
He particularly noted that the CSC, before the privatization of the
bank, had already acquired jurisdiction over the appeal upon the filing thereof
and subsequent submission of the memorandum on appeal. This, according to
respondent, negated petitioner’s theory that the CSC could no longer assume
jurisdiction and dispose of the appeal on the merits, especially considering
that jurisdiction once acquired generally continues until the final disposition
of the case.[15] On the other hand, petitioner argued in
essence that although the jurisdiction to act on the appeal must continue until
the final disposition of the case, this rule admits of exceptions as where, in the
present case, the law must be construed in a way as to operate on actions
pending before its enactment.[16]
The Court of Appeals found merit in
respondent’s appeal. On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, Resolution No. 980716 dated
so
ordered.[17]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.[18] Hence, it filed the instant petition for
review bearing the same issue as that raised previously.
At the core of the controversy is the question of whether E.O. No. 80 has the effect of removing from the jurisdiction of the CSC the appeal of respondent which was already pending before the CSC at the time the said law converted PNB into a private banking institution. Petitioner is insistent that, indeed, the law does have that effect, and this argument is perched on Section 6 of E.O. No. 80, which materially provides that the bank would cease to be a government-owned and controlled corporation upon the issuance of its articles of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission and would no longer be subject to the coverage of both the CSC and the Commission on Audit.[19] Petitioner believes that while indeed jurisdiction ordinarily continues until the termination of the case, it advances the opinion that the rule does not apply where the law provides otherwise or where the said law intends to operate on cases pending at the time of its enactment.[20]
For
his part, respondent submits that Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 does not provide for
the transfer of jurisdiction over his pending appeal from the CSC to another
administrative authority, and that neither does the provision authorize its
retroactive application in a way that would deprive the CSC of jurisdiction
over cases already pending before it prior to its effectivity.[21]
Additionally, he invokes estoppel against petitioner inasmuch as the latter has
actively participated in the proceedings before the CSC and, hence, was already
barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction, and alleges that petitioner’s
present recourse was taken merely to cause delay in the final resolution of the
controversy.[22]
We
draw no merit in the petition.
In essence, Section 6 of E.O. No. 80,
also known as the Revised Charter of PNB, treats of the effects of
converting the bank into a private financial and banking institution. It states:
Section 6. Change in Ownership of the Majority of the Voting Equity of the Bank. - When the ownership of the majority of the issued common voting
shares passes to private investors, the stockholders shall cause the adoption
and registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the appropriate
Articles of Incorporation and revised by-laws within three (3) months from such
transfer of ownership. Upon the issuance
of the certificate of incorporation under the provisions of the Corporation
Code, this Charter shall cease to have force and effect, and shall be deemed
repealed. Any special privileges granted to the Bank such as the authority to
act as official government depositary, or restrictions imposed upon the Bank,
shall be withdrawn, and the Bank shall thereafter be considered a privately
organized bank subject to the laws and regulations generally applicable to
private banks. The Bank shall likewise cease to be a government-owned or controlled
corporation subject to the coverage of service-wide agencies such as the
Commission on Audit and the Civil Service Commission.
The
fact of the change of the nature of the Bank from a government-owned and
controlled financial institution to a privately-owned entity shall be given
publicity.[23]
In a language too plain to be
mistaken, the quoted portion of the law only states no more than the natural,
logical and legal consequences of opening to private ownership the majority of
the bank’s voting equity. This is very evident in the title of the section
called Change in Ownership of the
Majority of the Voting Equity of the Bank. Certainly, the
transfer of the majority of the bank’s voting equity from public to private
hands is an inevitable effect of privatization or, conversely, the
privatization of the bank would necessitate the opening of the voting equity
thereof to private ownership. And as the
bank ceases to be government depository, it would, accordingly be coming under
the operation of the definite set of laws and rules applicable to all other
private corporations incorporated under the general incorporation law. Perhaps the aspect of more importance in the
present case is that the bank, upon its privatization, would no longer be
subject to the coverage of government service-wide agencies such as the CSC and
the Commission on Audit (COA).
By no stretch of intelligent and
reasonable construction can the provisions in Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 be
interpreted in such a way as to divest
the CSC of jurisdiction over pending disciplinary cases involving acts
committed by an employee of the PNB at the time that the bank was still a
government-owned and controlled corporation.
Stated otherwise, no amount of reasonable inference may be derived from
the terms of the said Section to the effect that it intends to modify the
jurisdiction of the CSC in disciplinary cases involving employees of the
government.
Sound indeed is the rule that where the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation or even
construction.[24] This is based on the presumption that the
words employed therein correctly express its intent and preclude even the
courts from giving it a different construction.[25] Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 is explicit in terms. It speaks for itself. It does not invite an interpretation that
reads into its clear and plain language petitioner’s adamant assertion that it
divested the CSC of jurisdiction to finally dispose of respondent’s pending
appeal despite the privatization of PNB.
In the alternative, petitioner
likewise posits that the portion of Section 6 of the E.O. No. 80, which states
that the PNB would no longer be subject to the coverage of both the COA and the
CSC, must be understood to be applicable to cases already pending with the CSC
at the time of the bank’s conversion into a private entity. We are not swayed.
While there is no denying that upon its privatization,
the bank would consequently be subject to laws, rules and regulations
applicable to private corporations — which is to say that disciplinary cases
involving its employees would then be placed under the operation of the Labor Code
of the Philippines — still, we cannot validate petitioner’s own interpretation
of Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 that the same must be applied to respondent’s
pending appeal with the CSC and that, resultantly, the CSC must abdicate its
appellate jurisdiction without having to resolve the case to finality.
It is binding rule, conformably with
Article 4 of the Civil Code, that, generally, laws shall have only a
prospective effect and must not be applied
retroactively in such a way as to apply to pending disputes and cases. This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim
lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward and not backward.)[26] The rationale against retroactivity is easy to
perceive: the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and, hence, is
unconstitutional.[27] Although the rule admits of certain well-defined
exceptions[28]
such as, for instance, where the law itself expressly provides for
retroactivity,[29]
we find that not one of such exceptions that would otherwise lend credence to
petitioner’s argument obtains in this case.
Hence, in other words, the fact that Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 states
that PNB would be removed from the coverage of the CSC must be taken to govern
acts committed by the bank’s employees after privatization.
Moreover, jurisdiction is conferred
by no other source than law. Once
jurisdiction is acquired, it continues until the case is finally terminated.[30] The disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC over
government officials and employees within its coverage is well-defined in
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807,[31]
otherwise known as The Civil Service
Decree of the
It bears to stress on this score that the CSC was able
to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent merely upon its filing,
followed by the submission of his memorandum on appeal. From that point, the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC at
once attached, thereby vesting it with the authority to dispose of the case on
the merits until it shall have been finally terminated.
Petitioner, however, takes exception.
It notes that, while indeed the general rule is that jurisdiction continues
until the termination of the case and is not affected by new legislation on the
matter, the rule does not obtain where the new law provides otherwise, or where
said law is intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment. Again, petitioner insists that E.O. No. 80 is
a new legislation of a character belonging to one of the exceptions inasmuch as
supposedly Section 6 thereof expressly sanctions its application to cases
already pending prior to its enactment — particularly that provision which
treats of the jurisdiction of the CSC.[33]
The argument is unconvincing.
In Latchme Motoomull v. Dela Paz,[34] the Court had dealt with a situation
where jurisdiction over certain cases was transferred by a supervening
legislation to another tribunal. Latchme involved a perfected appeal from
the decision of the SEC and pending with the Court of Appeals at the time P.D.
No. 902-A was enacted which transferred appellate jurisdiction over the
decisions of the SEC from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. On
the question of whether the tribunal with which the cases were pending had lost
jurisdiction over the appeal upon the effectivity of the new law, the Court
ruled in the negative, citing the earlier case of Bengzon v. Inciong,[35] thus:
The rule is that where a court has already
obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to
proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new
legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The
exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed
to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its
enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no
retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to
the enactment of the statute.[36]
Petitioner derives support from the
exceptions laid down in the cases of Latchme
Motoomull and Bengzon quoted
above. Yet, as discussed above, the
provisions in Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 are too clear and unambiguous to be
interpreted in such a way as to abort the continued exercise by the CSC of its
appellate jurisdiction over the appeal filed before the privatization of PNB became
effective. Suffice it to say that
nowhere in the said Section can we find even the slightest indication that
indeed it expressly authorizes the transfer of jurisdiction from the CSC to
another tribunal over disciplinary and administrative cases already pending
with the said Commission even prior to the enactment of the law.
All told, the Court finds that no error was committed
by the Court of Appeals in reversing the twin resolutions issued by the
CSC. The Court also agrees that because
the merits of respondent’s appeal with the said Commission have not been completely
threshed out, it is only correct and appropriate to remand the case back to it
for further proceedings.
With this disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary
to discuss the other issues propounded by the parties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 3, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 50084, which reversed and set aside CSC Resolution Nos. 980716 and
983099 and ordered the remand of the case to the CSC for further proceedings,
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
On Official Leave
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Acting Chief Justice |
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
RENATO C.
CORONA
Associate
Justice |
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
On Official
Leave PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice |
|
On leave MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
* On official leave.
** Acting Chief Justice.
*** On leave.
[1] Filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring; rollo, pp. 10-29.
[3] Rollo, pp. 112-131.
[4] Memorandum for Respondent, rollo, p. 100. The Hearing Committee disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the respondents are hereby found guilty as follows:
a. Cayetano Tejano, Jr. — Grave
Misconduct in connection with the misappropriation of bank funds in the V&G
account. He is likewise found guilty of
gross neglect in extending unwarranted credit accommodation to PITC, PGIC and
KITC. However, pursuant to Section 17, Rule
14 of the Civil Service Rules Implementing Executive Order No. 292, the latter
administrative offense is hereby considered as an aggravating circumstance.
b. Ma. Teresa Chan, Marcelino
Magdadaro, Douglas Canuel, Quirubin Blanco, Manuel Manzanares, Jacinto Ouano,
Pedrito Ranile, Novel Fortich — Simple Neglect in connection with the unwarranted
credit accommodation to PITC, PGIC and KITC, insofar as their respective
participation in any, two or all accounts appear.
ACCORDINGLY, it is
respectfully recommended that respondents be meted the following penalties,
taking into consideration the mitigating circumstances:
a. Cayetano, Jr. — Forced
resignation with benefits;
b. Ma. Teresa Chan, Marcelino
Magdadaro, Douglas Canuel, Quirubin Blanco, Manuel Manzanares, Jacinto Ouano,
Pedrito Ranile, Novel Fortich—one (1) month suspension.
As to the supplemental charges, it is respectfully recommended that the same be dismissed.
[5] Rollo, p. 64.
[6]
RESOLVED, to approve and
confirm the following:
a.
As to Respondent Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., Vice-President — After
finding him guilty of grave misconduct in connection with the misappropriation
of funds in the V&G account and gross neglect of duty in [giving]
unwarranted credit accommodations to PITC, PGIC and KITC with the latter second
grave offense of which he was found guilty to serve as aggravating circumstance
pursuant to Civil Service rules that he be meted out the penalty of forced
resignation without benefits;
b.
As to Respondents Ma. Teresa B. Chan, Assistant Vice-President, and
Douglasia R. Canuel, Assistant Department Manager II — After finding no
sufficient basis to hold them liable for the offense charged, that they be
exonerated.
c.
As to Respondents Marcelino A. Magdadaro, Assistant Department Manager
II; Novel G. Fortich, Assistant Department Manager II; Jacinto A. Ouano,
Assistant Department Manager I; Quirubin G. Blanco, Assistant Department
Manager I; Manuel A. Manzanares, Division Chief III; and Pedrito P. Ranile,
Acting Chief, Loans and Discount Office — After finding them guilty of the light
offense of neglect of duty in connection with the unwarranted credit
accommodations to PITC, PGIC and KITC, that they be meted out the penalty of
reprimand.
[7] Dated
[8] CA rollo, p. 233.
[9]
[10] Executive Order No. 80 is entitled “Providing for the 1986 Revised Charter of the Philippine National Bank.”
[11] Rollo, pp. 60-61.
[12] CA rollo, pp. 102-106.
[13] Rollo, pp. 62-63.
[14] Filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. CA rollo, pp. 6-15.
[15] CA rollo, pp. 8-14.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Rollo, pp. 38-39, 77-78.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] Emphasis ours.
[24] Estolas v. Mabalot, 431 Phil. 462, 469 (2002); Domingo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 112371, October 7, 1998, 297 SCRA 163, 168; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 103882 and 105276, November 25, 1998, 299 SCRA 199, 227.
[25] Espiritu
v. Cipriano, G.R. No.
L-32723,
[26] Land
Bank of the
[27] Land
Bank of the
[28] Exempted
from prospective application are laws remedial in nature (People v. Sumilang,
77 Phil. 764 [1947]; Guevarra v. Laico, 64 Phil. 144 [1937]; Laurel
v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 [1946]); penal statutes favorable to the accused who
is not a habitual delinquent (US v. Cuna, 12 Phil. 241 [1908]; U.S.
v. Soliman, 36 Phil 5 [1917]); emergency laws issued in the exercise of the
state’s police power (Valencia v. Surtido, G.R. No. L-17277,
[29] Civil Code, Art. 4; Camacho v. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil. 848 (1948).
[30] Bernarte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107741, October 18, 1996, 263 SCRA 323, 339; Alindao v. Joson, G.R. No. 114132, November 14, 1996, 264 SCRA 211, 221.
[31] It carries the title “Providing
for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with the
Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for
Other Purposes.”
[32] Section 37.
Disciplinary Jurisdiction.
(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more
than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion
in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A complaint
may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a
government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case
or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials
to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be
submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed
or other action to be taken.
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces,
cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under
their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed
is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding
thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head
is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the
department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be
executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be
executory only after confirmation by the department head.
(c) An investigation may be entrusted to regional director or similar
officials who shall make the necessary report and recommendation to the chief
of bureau or office or department within the period specified in Paragraph d of
the following Section.
(d) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent
shall be considered as having been under the preventive suspension during the
pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.
[33] Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[34] G.R. No. 45302,
[35] G.R. Nos. L-48706-07,
[36] Latchme Motoomull v. Dela Paz, supra note 34, at 753-754. (Emphasis ours.)