FIRST DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus - ARTURO F.
DUCA, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 171175
Present: CORONA,*
J., VELASCO, JR.,** LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION,***
and BERSAMIN, JJ. Promulgated: October 30, 2009
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D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
Before
this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside and annul the Decision[1]
dated November 23, 2005 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312.
The CA decision reversed
the decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
The facts as found by the
CA are quoted as follows:
It
appears that Arturo Duca, together with his mother, Cecilia Duca, were charged
of the crime of Falsification of Official Document defined and penalized under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code in an Information which reads:
“That on
or about December 10, 2001 in the Municipality of San Fabian, Province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused confederating together and mutually abiding each other, with
intent to cause damage, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously cause the preparation of a Declaration of Real Property over a
bungalow type residential house covered by Property Index No.
013-32-027-01-116131 of the Municipal Assessor’s Office of San Fabian,
Pangasinan by making it appear that the signature appearing on the sworn
statement of owner is that of Aldrin F. Duca when the truth of the matter is
not because the latter was abroad at that time having arrived in the Philippines
only on December 12, 2001, and it was accused Arturo F. Duca who affixed his
own signature thereon to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned private
complainant Pedro Calanayan.”
Upon
being arraigned, both the accused pleaded ‘not guilty’. Then trial on the merits ensued.
The
evidence for the prosecution shows that sometime in 1999, Pedro Calanayan
(hereinafter “Calanayan”), private complainant herein, filed an action for
ejectment and damages against Cecilia F. Duca, Ruel F. Duca, Arsenio F. Duca
and Vangie F. Duca before the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. 960
(SF-99). The case was decided in favor
of Calanayan. There being no appeal
interposed by the aforesaid defendants, the said decision became final and
executory. On November 22, 1999, a writ
of execution was issued by the MCTC to enforce the decision. On February 29, 2000, the money judgment was
likewise satisfied with the public auction of the lot owned by Cecilia Duca
covered by TCT No. 233647. On March 1,
2000, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of Jocelyn Barque, the highest
bidder in the auction sale.
On
October 19, 2001, Cecilia Duca filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity
of Execution and Damages with prayer for Writ of Injunction and Temporary
Restraining order against Sheriff IV Vinez Hortaleza and Police Officers
Roberto Vical, Alejandre Arevalo, Emilio
When
the said case was heard, Cecilia Duca testified to the effect that the house
erected on the lot subject of the ejectment case is owned by her son Aldrin
Duca. In support of such claim she
presented Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 (Exhibit “B”). At the back of
the said exhibit is a sworn statement showing that the current and fair market
value of the property, which is a bungalow, is P70,000.00 with the signature
affixed on top of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca and subscribed and sworn
to before Engr. Reynante Baltazar, the Municipal Assessor of San Fabian,
Pangasinan, on December 10, 2001. The
signature on top of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca is that of Arturo
Duca. According to the prosecution, Arturo
made it appear that the signature is that of his brother Aldrin who was out of
the country at that time. Aldrin arrived
in the
Both
accused denied that they falsified the signature of Aldrin Duca. Cecilia testified that she had no
participation in the execution as she was in
On
the other hand, Arturo testified that the signature atop the name Aldrin Duca
was his. However, he intersposed the
defense that he was duly authorized by the latter to procure the said tax
declaration.
On
April 3, 2003, the MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto rendered a decision,
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE,
the Court finds the accused Arturo F. Duca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of falsification defined and penalized under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes upon said accused a prison term of two
years, four months and one day to six (6) years of Prision Correccional and a
fine of P2,000.00. Accused Cecilia is
acquitted for lack of evidence.
The
accused Arturo F. Duca is hereby ordered to pay to the complaining witness
actual damages in the amount of P60,000.00 moral damages of P150,000.00 plus
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus cost.
SO
ORDERED.”
Dissatisfied
with the decision, Arturo Duca appealed.
On March 24, 2004, the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 44, rendered a
decision, disposing the case as follows:
“WHEREFORE,
the decision dated April 3, 2003 of the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan convicting accused Arturo F. Duca of
the crime of Falsification defined and penalized under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code and imposing upon said accused an imprisonment of two years,
four months and one day to six (6) years of Prision Correccional and a fine of
P2,000.00, and ordering him to pay to the complaining witness actual damages in
the amount of P60,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P150,000.00 plus
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus cost, is AFFIRMED.
x x x.
SO ORDERED.”[5]
Aggrieved with
the ruling of the RTC, Duca elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review.
On November 23, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision
acquitting Duca of the crime charged and reversing the RTC decision. The CA held:
However,
the prosecution failed to establish the fact that Arturo was not duly
authorized by Aldrin in procuring the tax declaration. On the contrary, the
defense was able to establish that Arturo Duca was duly authorized by his
brother Aldrin to secure a tax declaration on the house erected on the land
registered under their mother’s name.
xxx xxx xxx
From the
foregoing testimony, it can be deduced that Arturo could not have falsified the
Tax Declaration of Real Property under Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116B1
(Exhibit “B”) by making it appear that Aldrin Duca, his brother, participated
in the accomplishment of the said document since he was actually acting for and
in behalf of the latter. It must be noted that as early as June 2001, Arturo
has already been authorized by Aldrin; albeit verbally, to register the house
in the latter’s name as he cannot do it personally as he was abroad. This
authority of Arturo was confirmed by the latter’s execution of an Affidavit
dated January 19, 2002 confirming the procurement of the said tax declaration
(Exhibit “6”) as well as a Special Power of attorney executed on June 17, 2002
(Exhibit “7”). Thus, what appeared to be defective from the beginning had
already been cured so much so that the said document became valid and binding
as an official act of Arturo.
If Arturo did not state in the Tax Declaration
in what capacity he was signing, this deficiency was cured by Aldrin’s
subsequent execution of Exhibits “6” and “7”.
The RTC’s
conclusion that the special power of attorney executed by Aldrin was a mere
afterthought designed to extricate Arturo from any criminal liability has no
basis since from the very start, it has been duly established by the defense
that Aldrin had verbally instructed Arturo to cause the execution of Exhibit
“B” for the purpose of registering his house constructed on his mother’s lot
for taxation purposes.[6]
Hence, the instant petition anchored on
this sole ground:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AND HAD ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION WHEN IT RESOLVED PRIVATE
RESPONDENT ARTURO F. DUCA’S APPEAL WITHOUT GIVING THE PEOPLE OF THE
Petitioner argues that the
prosecution was denied due process when the CA resolved the respondent’s appeal
without notifying the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,
of the pendency of the same and without requiring the Solicitor General to file
his comment. Petitioner contends that
once the case is elevated to the CA or this Court, it is only the Solicitor
General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the
People. Thus, the CA gravely abused its
discretion when it acted on respondent’s appeal without affording the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard.
Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent should be
considered void for being violative of due process.
In his Comment,[8]
respondent argues that there was no denial of due process because the
prosecution was properly represented by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
and a private prosecutor who handled the presentation of evidence under the
control and supervision of the Provincial Prosecutor. Since the control and supervision conferred
on the private prosecutor by the Provincial Prosecutor had not been withdrawn,
the Solicitor General could not claim that the prosecution was not afforded a
chance to be heard in the CA. According
to the respondent, he should not be prejudiced by the Provincial Prosecutor’s
failure to inform the Solicitor General of the pendency of the appeal.
The petition is impressed
with merit.
The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the
Supreme Court is solely vested in
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code explicitly provides, viz.:
SEC.
35. Powers
and Functions. – The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and
its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis supplied)
Jurisprudence has been consistent
on this point. In the recent case of Cariño v. De Castro,[9] it
was held:
In criminal proceedings on appeal in
the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the
specific powers and functions of the OSG was to “represent the
government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings.” This provision has been
carried over to the Revised Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title
III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without doubt,
the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the
Likewise, in City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina,[11]
the Court made the following pronouncement:
Under
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all criminal actions commenced by
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
the fiscal. The fiscal represents the
People of the
And in Labaro v.
Panay,[13] the Court
held:
The OSG
is the law office of the Government authorized by law to represent the
Government or the People of the Philippines before us and before the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings, or before any court, tribunal, body, or
commission in any matter, action, or proceeding which, in the opinion of the
Solicitor General, affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may
require.[14]
Indeed, in criminal cases,
as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the appellate
counsel of the People of the
Pertinently, Saldana v. Court of Appeals, et al.[16] ruled as follows:
When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated (Uy vs. Genato, L-37399, 57 SCRA 123 [May 29, 1974]; Serino vs. Zoa, L-33116, 40 SCRA 433 [Aug. 31, 1971]; People vs. Gomez, L-22345, 20 SCRA 293 [May 29, 1967]; People vs. Balisacan, L-26376, 17 SCRA 1119 [Aug. 31, 1966]).
The cardinal precept is that where
there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the
State’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdiction issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, L-300026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed
over or disregarded at will. Where the
denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered
in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370, [May 25,
1973] 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage,
L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]).
Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be
regarded as a ‘lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at
sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head’ (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).[17]
The State, like the
accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be
given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this
Court is that a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly
or collaterally. A decision is void for
lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to
be heard.[18]
The assailed decision of
the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor General the
chance to file his comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the
State of its right to refute the material allegations of the said petition
filed before the CA. The said decision
is, therefore, a nullity. In Dimatulac v. Villon,[19]
we held:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.[20]
Further, the CA should
have been guided by the following provisions of Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 42 of
the 1997 Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. – A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to extend fifteen (15) days.
Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent appealed to the CA from
the decision of the RTC via a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The respondent was mandated under Section 1,
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to serve copies of his petition for review upon
the adverse party, in this case, the People of the Philippines through the OSG.
Respondent failed to serve a copy of his
petition on the OSG and instead served a copy upon the Assistant City
Prosecutor of Dagupan City.[21] The service of a copy of the petition on the
People of the Philippines, through the Prosecutor would be inefficacious for
the reason that the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People
of the Philippines in appeals before the CA and the Supreme Court. The respondent’s failure to have a copy of his
petition served on the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, is a
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided in Section 3,
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the
CA has no other recourse but to dismiss the petition. However, the CA, instead of dismissing
respondent’s petition, proceeded to resolve the petition and even acquitted
respondent without the Solicitor General’s comment. We, thus, find that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering
its assailed decision.
On a procedural matter,
the Court notes that petitioner filed
the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without filing a motion for
reconsideration with the CA. It is
settled that the writ of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as a
general rule, must be filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom
the writ of certiorari is sought. Ordinarily,
certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an
opportunity to correct its assigned errors.[22] This rule, however, is not without
exceptions. In National Housing v. Court of Appeals,[23]
we held:
However, in Progressive Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held that while generally a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before resorting to certiorari in order to give the lower court an opportunity to rectify its errors, this rule admits of exceptions and is not intended to be applied without considering the circumstances of the case. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is not a condition sine qua non when the issue raised is purely one of law, or where the error is patent or the disputed order is void, or the questions raised on certiorari are the same as those already squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower court.[24] (emphasis supplied)
The CA decision being void for lack of
due process, the filing of the instant petition for certiorari without a motion
for reconsideration is justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition
for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the CA in CA-G.R.
CR No. 28312 is hereby SET
ASIDE and the case
is REMANDED to the CA for further
proceedings. The CA is ordered to decide
the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ARTURO
D. BRION Associate Justice |
LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T
I O N
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Acting
Chairperson, First Division
C E R T I F I C
A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Acting Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
* Acting Chairperson as per Special Order No. 724.
** Additional member as per Special Order
No. 719.
*** Additional
member as per Special Order No. 725-A.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion (ret.), with Associate Justices Noel J. Tijam and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, concurring; rollo, pp. 17-24.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 39-43.
[3] Entitled, “People of the Philippines v. Arturo F. Duca.”
[4] CA rollo, pp. 25-36.
[5] Rollo, pp. 17-20.
[6] Id. at 22-24.
[7] Id. at 6.
[8] Id. at 27-30.
[9] G.R. No. 176084, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 688.
[10] Id. at 695.
[11] L-83996, October 21, 1988, 166 SCRA 614.
[12] Id. at 616.
[13] G.R. No. 129567, December 4, 1998, 299 SCRA 714.
[14] Id. at 720-721.
[15] CA rollo, pp. 47-48.
[16] G.R. No. 88889, October 11, 1990, 190 SCRA 396.
[17] Id. at 403.
[18] Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109557, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 246, 254-255.
[19] G.R. No. 127107, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 679.
[20] Id. at 714.
[21] CA rollo, p. 22.
[22] Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115104, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 602, 611.
[23] G.R. No. 144275, July 5, 2001, 360 SCRA 533.
[24] Id. at 537.