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RODOLFO A. ASPILLAGA, Petitioner, - versus - AURORA A. ASPILLAGA, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 170925
Present: Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,* CARPIO MORALES, BRION, and ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: October 26, 2009 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition
for review on certiorari assails the Decision[1]
dated
The facts
culled from the records are as follows:
Rodolfo
Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977 while they were students at the
Philippine Merchant Marine Academy and Lyceum of the
In 1980,
after
During trial,
expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba explained his psychiatric evaluation of the
parties as well as his recommendation that the petition be granted. In this report, he stated,
“x x x x
Psychiatric evaluation of petitioner, Rodolfo Aspillaga, showed that he is an intelligent adult male, who is egoistic and harbors an inner sense of inadequacy, helplessness and anxiety in losing agility. He, however, projects himself as dominant person, to cover his deep-seated insecurity and inadequacy. He tends to be suspicious and blames others for his mistakes. He claims for adulation, reassurance and attention from other people. These can be traced from an unhealthy familial relationship during the early maturational development specifically in the form of a domineering and protective maternal image.
Self-esteem was fragile.
Psychiatric evaluation of respondent, Aurora Apon Aspillaga, showed history of traumatic childhood experiences. Her parents separated when she was about one month old and was made to believe that she was the youngest daughter of her disciplinarian grandfather. Her surrogate sister maltreated her and imposed harsh corporal punishment for her slightest mistakes. She felt devastated when she accidentally discovered that she’d been an orphan adopted by her grandfather. Attempted incestuous desire by an uncle was reported.
Psychological
test results collaborated the clinical findings of sensitivity to
criticism. Tendency for self
dramatization and attention getting behavior.
Lapses in judgment and shallow heterosexual relationship was
projected. Sign of immaturity and desire
to regress to a lower level of development were likewise projected. Self-esteem was also low. Deep-seated sense of dejection, loneliness
and emptiness hamper her objectivity.
In summary, both petitioner and respondent harbor psychological handicaps which could be traced from unhealthy maturational development. Both had strict, domineering, disciplinarian role models. However, respondent’s mistrust, shallow heterosexual relationships resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with the obligation of marriage.
It is recommended that the petition to annul their marriage be granted, on the grounds existing psychological incapacitation of both petitioner and respondent, which will hamper their capacity to comply with their marital obligations. Dissolution of the marital bond will offer both of them, peace of mind.” [3]
On
On appeal,
the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated
Hence, this
petition raising the sole issue:
[WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT] CORRECTLY APPLIED THE DEFINITION OF “PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY” TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF THE PARTIES DURING THE CELEBRATION OF THEIR MARRIAGE.[5]
Simply
stated, the issue before us is whether the marriage is void on the ground of
the parties’ psychological incapacity.
The petition
must fail.
As early as 1995, in Santos v.
Court of Appeals,[6]
we categorically said that:
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.[7] (Emphasis supplied.)
In the
instant case, while the psychological examination conducted on respondent found
her to be mistrustful, to possess low self-esteem, given to having shallow
heterosexual relationships and immature, Dr. Maaba failed to reveal that these
personality traits or psychological conditions were grave or serious enough to
bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, Dr. Maaba was able to establish the
parties’ personality disorder; however, he failed to link the parties’
psychological disorders to his conclusion that they are psychologically
incapacitated to perform their obligations as husband and wife. We cannot see how their personality disorder
would render them unaware of the essential marital obligations or to be
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to a marriage.
The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper (as Dr. Maaba
puts it) their performance of their marital obligations does not mean that they
suffer from psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Mere difficulty is not
synonymous to incapacity. Moreover,
there is no evidence to prove that each party’s condition is so grave or is of
such nature as to render said party incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage. There is
likewise no evidence that the claimed incapacity is incurable and permanent.
Petitioner
had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with respondent,[8]
but failed to discharge it.
It must be stressed that
psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect”
in the performance of some marital obligations.[9] The intention of the law is to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.[10]
Noteworthy,
as aptly pointed out by the appellate court, Rodolfo and
As to
Rodolfo’s allegation that
At this
juncture while this Court is convinced that indeed both parties were both found
to have psychological disorders, nevertheless, there is nothing in the records
showing that these disorders are sufficient to declare the marriage void due to
psychological incapacity. We must
emphasize that said disorders do not manifest that both parties are truly incapacitated
to perform the basic marital covenants.
Moreover, there is nothing that shows incurability of these
disorders. Even assuming their acts
violate the covenants of marriage, such acts do not show an irreparably
hopeless state of psychological incapacity which will prevent them from undertaking
the basic obligations of marriage in the future. At the most, the psychiatric evaluation of
the parties proved only incompatibility and irreconcilable differences, which
cannot be equated with psychological incapacity as understood juristically.
As this Court
has repeatedly declared, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof
manifest themselves. Article 36 refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. The malady
must be so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[13]
As regards
respondent’s claim for support, we find no basis to award the same as it was
not passed upon by the trial court in view of the agreement of the parties on
the issue presented for resolution, which agreement, however, was not put into
writing.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. The assailed Decision
dated
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
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WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice |
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ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
* Additional member per Special Order No. 757.
[1] Rollo, pp. 17-25. Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court) concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] G.R. No. 112019,
[7]
[8] Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800,
[9] Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra at 207.
[10] Tongol v. Tongol, G.R. No. 157610,
[11]
[12]
[13] Paras v. Paras, G.R. No. 147824,