Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
NIEVA M.
MANEBO, Petitioner, - versus - SPO1 ROEL D. ACOSTA and NUMERIANO SAPIANDANTE,
Respondents. |
G.R. No.
169554 Present: QUISUMBING,* J., CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO,
PERALTA,
and ABAD,** JJ. Promulgated: October
28, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed
in this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision[1]
dated
The antecedents
of this case are as follows:
On
Severino
Sardia (Sardia), who was standing in front of his house at Barangay San Mariano, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, heard several gunshots
and saw two men with short firearms run out of the Kaibigan Foundation, Inc.
Chapel. The two men immediately boarded an owner-type jeep without a plate
number parked along
A
complaint for murder was filed by Nieva Manebo (Manebo), sister of the victim,
against respondents Acosta and Sapiandante before the Special Action Unit (SAU)
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The
findings of the SAU recommending the filing of a murder case against respondents
and a certain John Doe was referred to the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor
(OCSP), Department of Justice (DOJ), for preliminary investigation.[3] Respondents, in turn, filed directly with the
DOJ
a counter-charge of perjury, offering
false witness and violation of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1829 against
Manebo, Bagasan, and Sardia.[4]
Respondents
denied the accusations against them. Respondent Acosta claimed that on May 4,
2000, he was on a special assignment in San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, pursuant to
a directive issued by Police Chief Inspector Fernando Galang; that there was no
reason for him to kill the victim, as he had no grudge against her; that
Bagasan's description of him did not fit
his physical attributes; that there was a substitution of witness, considering that the person beside
the victim when she was shot was identified in the police report as Liza
Gragasan and not Flordeliza Bagasan. Respondent Acosta also presented the
affidavits of his witnesses corroborating his claim that he was in San
Leonardo, Nueva Ecija at the time of the shooting incident.
Respondent
Sapiandante denied that he was the driver of the get-away vehicle, as he did
not know how to drive nor was he a holder of a driver's license; that Sardia
had a grudge against him because of the dismissal of the case filed by the
former against him; and that respondent Acosta never testified for him in a
case, contrary to Sardia's claim.
On
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the foregoing Joint Resolution be approved and the attached information for murder against respondents SPO1 Roel D. Acosta, Bgy. Captain Numeriano R. Sapiandante, and a certain John Doe be filed before the proper court and that the counter-charge for perjury, offering false witness, and violation for P.D. 1829 against Severino S. Sardia, Flordeliza Bagasan and Nieva M. Manebo be dismissed for lack of merit.[6]
On the same day, an Information[7]
for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27,
That on or about May 4, 2000, at around 6:30 p.m. in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said three (3) accused, two (2) being armed, conspiring, confederating and acting together, and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with malice, intent to kill and treachery, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one BERNADETTE M. DIMATULAC, with accused SPO1 Roel D. Acosta suddenly and unexpectedly firing several shots at her with the use of his firearm and accused John Doe and Numeriano Sapiandante, acting as back-up and driver, respectively, thereby inflicting upon the said BERNADETTE M. DIMATULAC mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Respondents
filed their motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution[8]
dated
On
In
the meantime, the herein murder case filed in the RTC of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 27, was transferred to the RTC of Manila, Branch 18, and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 01-196354. Alias
warrants of arrest[9]
for respondents were issued on
On
WHEREFORE,
the appealed resolution is hereby REVERSED. The Chief State Prosecutor is
directed to move for the withdrawal of the information filed against
respondents and to report the action taken hereon within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof.[11]
In so ruling, the DOJ said:
Undoubtedly, denial and alibi are inherently weak for they can easily be fabricated and is invariably received with caution. Truly, alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of an accused. Nevertheless, this judicial dictum presupposes the absence of any doubt as to the positive identification of the accused. In other words, the prosecution is not relieved of the required quantum of proof simply because the defense invoked is alibi. Where questionable, alibi assumes strength and significance which is the situation in the present case.
Immediately after receiving a call from a certain Marlon de Guzman regarding the incident, Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Peter Guibong led the investigation of the case and prepared a report. In the course thereof, it was gathered that the victim was shot while watching television in the company of one Liza Gragasan. Still in a state of shock, Gragasan was then not available to provide any information as regards the incident. Nonetheless, PCI Guibong sent a formal letter to Gragasan to provide information on the shooting incident. Gragasan never responded to the invitation.
Comes now, instead, a certain Flordeliza Bagasan who executed an affidavit after more than four (4) months alleging that she was seated beside the victim and witnessed the actual shooting. In turn, Bagasan gave a description of the assailant which, admittedly, does not fit the physical attributes of respondent Acosta. Complainant Manebo could only ascribe the variance to the insinuation that respondent Acosta, short of undergoing plastic surgery, altered his image to avoid being recognized. This is rather too strenuous to be believed.
Under the circumstances, Bagasan's presence at the crime scene when the crime was being committed is highly suspect. Bagasan's delayed testimony coupled with an erroneous description, casts a thick cloud of doubt on her credibility. Such testimony deserves no consideration at all.
The same is true with the testimony of witness Sardia as regards the alleged participation of respondent Sapiandante. Sardia was not among those mentioned in the police report. Surprisingly, his testimony was likewise belatedly executed. Granting that he was already a resident of the barangay where the incident occurred, no reason was given as to why it took him a long period of time to give a statement about the killing. Fear could not have been the reason because as early as June 1998, he filed a complaint for attempted murder against Sapiandante which was later dismissed. As it were, the victim, involved in several criminal incidents, likewise filed a number of cases rooted from the complaint of one Alicia Yambot against Sardia as reported by PCI Guibong. Sardia's testimony may also not be given credence with respect to respondent Acosta since he did not witness the actual shooting of the victim.
All told, the evidence against respondents Acosta and Sapiandante lack the required quantum of proof sufficient to indict them for the offense charged.[12]
Pursuant
to the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw
the Information.
Petitioner
filed an appeal[13]
with the Office of the President (OP) which, on
Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the OP in an Order[15]
dated
Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 43 with the CA.
Meanwhile,
the RTC of Manila, Branch 18, issued an Order[16]
dated
On
The
CA said that the OP committed no error in affirming the resolution of the DOJ Secretary; that courts will not interfere
in the conduct of preliminary investigations and leave to the investigating
prosecutor a sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what
constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing
of information against the offender. The CA found that all was not lost for
petitioner, since the denial of her petition did not mean an automatic
dismissal of the information following the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, as
the RTC was mandated to independently evaluate the merits of the case; and it may
agree or disagree with the recommendation of the DOJ Secretary, since reliance
on the latter alone would be an abdication of the RTC's duty and jurisdiction
to determine a prima facie case.
Hence,
this petition, which raises the following issues:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Justice committed grave errors in the appreciation of facts and of laws in recommending the dismissal of the complaint based solely on the matters, which are best, determined during a full-blown trial.
Whether or not the
Secretary of Justice may disregard the provisions of Department Circular No. 70
dated
Whether or not there is probable cause to charge the respondents for the crime of murder.[17]
We shall first resolve the second issue, where petitioner
claims that the appeal filed by respondents with the Secretary of Justice
should have been denied for their failure to comply with Sections 5 and 6 of
Department Circular No. 70[18]
issued by the Department of Justice on
Section 5. Contents of the Petition.
x x x x
If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, a copy of the motion to defer proceedings filed in court must also accompany the petition.
x x x x
Section 6. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. - The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall constitute sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Respondents filed their petition for review with the DOJ
Secretary on
The
first and third issues refer to the question of whether the CA erred in
affirming the ruling of the Office of the President, which adopted the finding
of the DOJ Secretary that there was no probable cause to indict respondents for
murder.
Ordinarily, the determination of
probable cause is not lodged with this Court.
Its duty in an appropriate case
is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as
the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.[21]
However, this Court may ultimately
resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the
records of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly
administration of justice.[22]
We find that the present case warrants
the application of the exception.
Probable
cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and
strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of the crime subject of the
investigation.[23]
Being based merely on opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import
absolute certainty.[24]
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare
suspicion but less than evidence to justify a conviction.[25]
To determine the existence of
probable cause, there is a need to conduct a preliminary investigation.[26]
A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case.[27]
Its purpose
is to
determine
whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof.[28]
It is a means of discovering which
person or persons may be reasonably charged with a crime.
The
conduct of a preliminary investigation is executive in nature.[29]
As we have said, the Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of
the exercise of the public prosecutor’s function, unless there is a showing of
grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in his findings.[30] Grave abuse of discretion implies a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or a
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[31]
It must have been so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
In this case, we find that the DOJ committed a manifest error
in finding no probable cause to charge respondents with the crime of murder.
In
reversing the findings of the prosecutor, the DOJ Secretary found that the
police report prepared after the killing incident stated that the person seated
beside the victim, who was watching television when shot, was Liza Gragasan.
However, the DOJ Secretary continued that more than four months after the
incident, a witness appeared in the person of Flordeliza Bagasan who claimed to
be seated beside, and witnessed the actual shooting of, the victim. The DOJ
Secretary found Flordeliza's description of respondent Acosta different from
the latter's physical attributes. He then ruled that Flordeliza's delayed testimony, coupled with her
erroneous description of respondent Acosta, cast a cloud of doubt on her
credibility.
The
DOJ Secretary also did not give credence to witness Sardia's testimony on
respondent Sapiandante's participation in the incident. He found that Sardia
was not among those mentioned in the police report, and that his testimony was
likewise belatedly executed without any reason given for such delay; that fear
could not have been Sardia's reason, since in June 1998, he had already filed a
complaint for attempted murder against respondent Sapiandante, which was later
dismissed; and that Sardia did not witness the actual shooting of the victim.
We are not persuaded.
While the initial police report
stated that the name of the person who was seated beside the victim when the
latter was shot was Liza Gragasan, such report would not conclusively establish
that Liza Gragasan could not have been Flordeliza Bagasan, the witness who
executed an affidavit four months after the incident. Notably, Flordeliza's
nickname is Liza, and her surname Bagasan sounds similar to Gragasan. Under the rule of idem
sonans, two names are said to be "idem sonantes" if the
attentive ear finds difficulty in distinguishing them when pronounced.[32] The question whether a name sounds the same
as another is not one of spelling but of pronunciation.[33]
While the surname Bagasan was incorrectly written as Gragasan, when read, it
has a sound similar to the surname Bagasan. Thus, the presence of Bagasan at
the crime scene was established, contrary to the conclusion arrived at by the
DOJ Secretary.
The execution of
Bagasan's affidavit four months after the incident should not be taken against
her, as such reaction is within the bounds of expected human behavior. Notably,
the police report stated that during the conduct of the investigation, Bagasan
was shocked after the incident and could not possibly be interviewed. Initial
reluctance to volunteer information regarding a crime due to fear of reprisal
is common enough that it has been judicially declared as not affecting a
witness' credibility.[34]
Bagasan’s action revealed a spontaneous and natural reaction of a person who
had yet to fully comprehend a shocking and traumatic event.[35]
Besides, the workings of the human mind
are unpredictable. People react differently to emotional stress. There is
simply no standard form of behavioral response that can be expected from anyone
when confronted with a strange, startling or frightful occurrence.[36]
Moreover, a witness' delay in reporting what she knows about a crime does
not render her testimony false or incredible, for the delay may be explained by
the natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case.[37]
The DOJ Secretary's
finding that the description given by Bagasan did not fit the physical
attributes of respondent Acosta is not persuasive, since Bagasan was able to
positively identify respondent Acosta. She did so when a cartographic sketch of
respondent Acosta was shown to her and later when she was asked to identify him
from among the three pictures of men shown to her during the investigation at
the NBI. Notably, there was nothing in
the records that showed that Bagasan was impelled by any improper motive in
pointing to respondent Acosta.
The identification
made by Bagasan, with respect to respondent Acosta was corroborated by another
witness, Sardia, who saw Acosta with another unidentified male companion
rushing out of the chapel where the killing incident took place. Sardia was familiar with the face of
respondent Acosta, since the latter was a witness in a case of frustrated
murder against Sapiandante. Although Sapiandante denied in his
counter-affidavit that respondent Acosta ever became such witness, this
allegation should be proven during the trial of the case. Sardia was also able to positively identify
Sapiandante as the driver of the get-away vehicle.
The DOJ Secretary did not also find the statements given by
Sardia as credible, as the latter was not among those mentioned as a witness in
the police report.
We do not agree.
The failure of the
police report to mention Sardia's name as a witness would not detract from the
fact that he saw respondent Acosta with an unidentified man running away from
the chapel and riding the waiting get- away vehicle driven by Sapiandante.
Entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of the
performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such
entries and should not be given undue significance or probative value for they
are usually incomplete and inaccurate.[38]
The matter of assigning value to the declaration of a witness is best done by the trial court, which can assess such testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witness at the trial stage.[39]
Finally, we also do
not agree with the DOJ Secretary's finding that since Sardia's affidavit was
also belatedly executed, the same is not credible. As we have said, witnesses
are usually reluctant to volunteer information about a criminal case or are
unwilling to be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations due to a
variety of valid reasons.[40]
Fear of reprisal and the natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a
criminal case are sufficient explanations for a witness'
delay in reporting a crime to authorities.[41]
The DOJ ruling -- that fear could not have
been the reason, because as early as 1998 Sardia had already filed a complaint
for attempted murder against Sapiandante, which was already dismissed -- is
merely speculative.
We need not over-emphasize that in a
preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether
there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.[42]
Considering the foregoing, we find that the CA erred in affirming the DOJ's
finding of the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for murder.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
Designated to sit as an
additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per
Special Order No. 755 dated
** Designated
to sit as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 753 dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Estela M Perlas-Bernabe, concurring; rollo, pp. 163-169.
[2] “Liza
Gragasan” was the name stated in the police report.
[3] Docketed as I.S. No. 2000-1709, rollo, pp. 39-40.
[4] Docketed as I.S. No. 2000-1930 per
Joint Resolution dated
[5] Rollo, pp. 92-100.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] OP Case No. 03-G-460. Pursuant to Memorandum
Circular No. 58, which provides that the DOJ
Secretary's resolution is appealable
administratively to the Office of the President
(OP) for offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua.
[14] Rollo, pp. 134-135.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal.
[19] Rollo, pp. 122-124.
[20]
[21] See Maca-angcos Alawiya v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 164170,
[22]
[23] Chan
v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 147065,
[24]
[25]
[26]
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Hon. Secretary of Justice Raul M.
Gonzales, Oliver T. Yao and Diana T. Yao,
G.R. No. 180165,
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32] People v. Salas, G.R. No. 115192, March 7, 2000, 327 SCRA 319, 333, citing Martin v. State, 541 S.W. 2d 605, 606.
[33] See Dojillo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 166542, July 25, 2006, 496 SCRA 484, 499, citing Cecilio v. Tomacruz, 62 Phil. 689 (1935).
[34] Ingal v. People, G.R. No. 173282, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 632, 650, citing People v. Roma, 471 SCRA 413, 429 (2005).
[35]
[36]
[37] People v. Ubaldo, 419 Phil. 718, 729 (2001).
[38] People v. Paragua, 326 Phil.
923, 929 (1996).
[39] See People v. Mangahas, 370 Phil. 411, 425 (1999).
[40] People
v. Aguila, G.R. No. 171017,
[41]
[42] Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company v. Hon. Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales, Oliver T.
Yao and Diana T. Yao, supra note
26.