SECOND DIVISION
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REPUBLIC
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G.R.
No. 165332 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,* J., |
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- versus - |
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CARPIO
MORALES, |
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Acting Chairperson |
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BRION,
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ABAD,
JJ. |
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YANG
CHI HAO, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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October
2, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
As
early as 1913, we held in Herrera v.
Barretto[1] that:
The office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally
be used for any other purpose. It is truly an extraordinary remedy and, in this
jurisdiction, its use is restricted to truly extraordinary cases — cases in
which the action of the inferior court is wholly void; where any further steps
in the case would result in a waste of time and money and would produce no
result whatever; where the parties, or their privies, would be utterly
deceived; where a final judgment or decree would be nought but a snare and a
delusion, deciding nothing, protecting nobody, a judicial pretension, a
recorded falsehood, a standing menace. It is only to avoid such results as
these that a writ of certiorari is
issuable; and even here an appeal will lie if the aggrieved party prefers to
prosecute it.
We reiterate these well-established principles: that only
errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment, may be entertained in a petition
for certiorari; that certiorari
will not lie where an appeal may be taken or is lost through petitioner's own
doing; and that questions of fact are not decided by this Court.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is
the Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83787, dated
On
On
Accordingly,
in view of all the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is hereby granted.
The
decision of the Court dated
Petitioner
is hereby admitted as citizen of the Republic of the
SO
ORDERED.[7]
Thereafter, the OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the trial court in an Order[8]
dated
Instead of filing an ordinary appeal before the Court of
Appeals, the OSG filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, claiming that by reversing its original decision, the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In the herein assailed Resolution of
This petition for certiorari
faces outright dismissal.
x x x x
The
present recourse is an incorrect, improper, or a wrong legal remedy for the
simple reason that the order in question is a final order which disposed of the
case. Hence, the proper recourse therefrom is an ordinary appeal to be filed
within fifteen (15)[9] days from
In view of
such failure, the instant petition for certiorari cannot be given due
course, as it is settled law, that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal.[10]
The
OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution dated
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari. The OSG claims that there was no need to file
a regular appeal before the Court of Appeals because: (1) the Rules of Court
apply only in a suppletory manner in naturalization cases; (2) there was no
final decision to appeal, since a judgment in a naturalization case only becomes
final two years after the promulgation of the decision, when the Certificate of
Naturalization is issued; (3) the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over
the petition because the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) reported that
respondent did not reside at the address he provided in the petition; and (4) the
Order of the trial court granting the petition for naturalization was issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there being
no compliance by private respondent with
the legal requirements for naturalization, namely, good moral conduct,
possession of lucrative income, and absence of mental alienation or incurable
contagious disease.[12]
In his Comment,[13]
private respondent claims that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition
for being the wrong mode of remedy. He
also argues that as held by the trial court, he satisfactorily complied with
the requirements of good moral
conduct based on the testimonies
of witnesses and
clearances
issued by the NBI and police, prosecutor, and courts of P60,000.00 per year
because during that period, he was still a student. Upon graduation, however, he worked full-time
as Marketing Manager of Food Mart, Inc. with a monthly income of P60,000.00,
evidence of which had been presented before and assessed by the trial court. Private respondent disputes the findings of
the NBI that he was not known to his neighbors at
The OSG filed its Reply on 5 May
2005, insisting that its recourse to the remedy of certiorari was proper
considering that the trial court, in reconsidering and reversing its own
decision sans the submission of any new evidence, acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The OSG also argues that the NBI report,
even if belatedly submitted, clearly showed that respondent did not live in his
stated address, thus ousting the trial court of its jurisdiction.[14]
The petition lacks merit.
The trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it reconsidered its earlier decision and granted private
respondent’s petition for naturalization.
By grave abuse of discretion is
meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to
an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[15] It
also bears stressing that the true function of the writ of
certiorari is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from the arbitrary acts of courts.[16]
Viewed against these standards, we
find the trial court’s reversal of its decision after the filing of a Motion
for Reconsideration not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The reasons for granting the Petition for
Naturalization were enunciated in the Order dated
In opposing the motion, petitioner alleged that his
documentary and testimonial evidence undisputably and overwhelmingly satisfied
the requirement for good conduct; that his annual income from year 2000 to year
2002 was P60,000.00 because during that period he was still studying and
worked as a part-time employee only, but after graduation in October, 2002, and
working full time as marketing manager of Food Mart, his income rose to P60,000.00
a month, including his commission; and that the medical certificate he
presented proved that after a thorough medical check up he was found to be
“essentially normal”.
Considering the allegations in the opposition, the
court gave the Office of the Solicitor General an opportunity to file its
reply. However, as of this writing, no
reply was forthcoming. Hence, this
Order.
The Court is not convinced.
Petitioner was able to successfully overcome all the
grounds raised in the Motion for Reconsideration. Indeed, it is doubtful if the
Petitioner was likewise able to explain that for the
years 2000 to 2002, his income was only P60,000.00 annually because at
that time he was still studying and worked only as a part-time employee but
after graduating in October, 2002, when he worked already as full-time
marketing manager of Food Mart, his income rose to P60,000.00 a month,
including his commissions.[18]
We found no whimsicality or patent
abuse of discretion as would amount to “an evasion of positive duty or virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
law.”
Shorn of embellishment, the OSG
simply argues that the trial court erred in granting the petition for
naturalization because it failed to consider material evidence that would
warrant the denial of said petition. If,
indeed, there was error, this is simply an error of judgment in appreciation of
facts and the law. Besides, the trial
court has the discretion to reverse itself upon the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. Indeed, Section 3, Rule
37 of the Rules of Court is explicit in that a trial court may amend its
judgment or order “if it finds that the judgment or final order is contrary to
the evidence or law.” If a mistake was
committed by the trial court, it was in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Thus, the error is one of judgment, not of
jurisdiction; consequently, petitioner's remedy is appeal, not certiorari.
Petitioner had
readily
available remedies.
A basic requisite of the special
civil action of certiorari, which is
governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, is that there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Where appeal
is available, certiorari generally does not lie. Certiorari
cannot be used as a substitute for a lost or lapsed remedy of appeal.[19]
In this case, an appeal was not only
available, but also mandated by Sections 11[20]
and 12[21]
of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (1939), or the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended. Notably, in Keswani v. Republic,[22] we declared that the remedy from a
decision by the trial court admitting an individual as a Filipino citizen is
through an appeal to the Court of Appeals.[23]
Moreover, a decision granting a petition
for naturalization becomes executory only two years after its promulgation. On this matter, Section 1 of Republic Act No.
530 (1950)[24]
provides:
Section
1. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for Philippine
citizenship shall be heard by the courts until after six months from the
publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision granting
the application become executory until after two years from its promulgation
and after the court, on proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor
General or his representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during the
intervening time the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines, (2) has
dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not
been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules, (4)
or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to
any Government announced policies.
As such, petitioner is not without a
remedy to assail the grant of citizenship. In addition, it may also move to have the naturalization certificate cancelled in the
proper
proceedings, if it can be shown that the certificate was obtained fraudulently.[25]
The Supreme Court will not try
questions of fact.
Questions of fact are not proper in a Petition
brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Time and time again, we have stated that the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts,[26]
and this Court will decline to sift through the evidence submitted by the
parties, particularly here, where such evidence was not presented before the trial
court. It would be ludicrous indeed if
we were to determine, in the first instance, where respondent actually resides,
his true income, or his current mental state.
Such issues are best threshed out before the trial court; we have neither
the inclination or interest to resolve these factual matters here.
We end with an
admonition. It appears that the OSG
requested the NBI to conduct a confidential investigation in connection with
private respondent's petition for naturalization as early as
newly
discovered evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
DENIED. The Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
ROBERTO
A. ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional
member per Special Order No. 691 dated
[1] 25 Phil. 245, 271 (1913).
[2] Rollo, pp. 10-11; penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and concurred in by Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin (now a Member of this Court) and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo.
[3]
[4] Annex “D,” id at. 50-58.
[5]
[6] Annex “F,” id. at 66-68.
[7]
[8]
[9] Should be 30 days pursuant to Sec. 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 43 (1939) or the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended vis a vis Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129 which reads:
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire original record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 156160, December 9, 2004, 445 SCRA 655, 668; First Women's Credit Corporation and Katayama v. Perez, G.R. No. 169026, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 774, 777-778.
[16] Espinoza v. Provincial Adjudicator of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Office of Pampanga, G.R. No.
147525,
[17] CA rollo, pp. 25-27.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Tolentino
v. People, G.R. No. 170396,
[20] Section 11
provides that "[T]he final sentence may, at the instance of either of the
parties, be appealed to the Supreme Court."
[21] Section 12 reads in part: If, after the lapse of thirty days from and after the date on which the parties were notified x x x, no appeal has been filed, or if, upon appeal, the decision has been confirmed by the Supreme Court x x x.
[22] G.R. No. 153986,
[23] Sec Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 which provides for the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over all final judgments, resolutions, orders or awards of the Regional Trial Courts.
[24] An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization.
[25] Commonwealth Act No. 473 (1939), Sec. 18.
[26] Andrada v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 173231,