THIRD DIVISION
SPOUSES SANTIAGO E. G.R.
No. 162473
IBASCO AND
MILAGROS
IBASCO and PRIME Present:
FEEDS, INC.,
Petitioners, CARPIO,
J., Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - NACHURA,
and
PERALTA, JJ.
PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF CAMARINES NORTE,
and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Promulgated:
Respondents. October 12, 2009
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CARPIO, J.:
This resolves
the petition for review[1] of the Decision,[2] dated 23
December 2003, and the Resolution, dated 12 March 2004, of the Court of Appeals. The Decision affirmed the dismissal
of petitioners’
complaint for an injunctive writ to stop foreclosure proceedings while the
Resolution denied reconsideration.
In 1980, petitioner
Santiago E. Ibasco (Ibasco) obtained a P600,000 loan from respondent
Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP) to fund his business.
The loan was secured by four parcels of land[3] located in Camarines Norte which Ibasco
mortgaged to PDCP.[4] Ibasco defaulted in his loan payments, which,
by November 1984, had ballooned to P1,077,515.58. To collect on the
security, PDCP, on 23 November 1984, filed with respondent Camarines Norte
Provincial Sheriff a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.
To enjoin the foreclosure proceedings and collect damages against PDCP, Ibasco, joined by his wife, Milagros Ibasco, and an assignee of one of the mortgaged lands (covered by TCT No. T-14584), petitioner Prime Feeds, Inc. (petitioners), sued PDCP in the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 38 (trial court) for injunction and damages.[5] Petitioners anchored their cause of action on the contention that PDCP delayed the release of the loan, triggering a series of events causing Ibasco’s business to flounder.
In its Answer, PDCP defended the validity of the mortgage contract and
insisted on its right to collect on the security to satisfy Ibasco’s debt.
After
initially issuing a temporary restraining order halting the foreclosure
proceedings, the trial court, in its Decision dated 27 April 1994, dismissed
the complaint for lack of merit. The trial court found that PDCP released the
loan on time and rejected as baseless petitioners’ claim for damages.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which,
however, affirmed the trial court’s ruling in its Decision dated 23 December
2003. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied in the Resolution
of 12 March 2004.
Hence,
this petition.
The
petition lacks merit.
First. The Court
of Appeals’ Decision is already final, precluding this review. Petitioners
received the Decision, dated 23 December 2003, on 26 January 2004. Hence,
petitioners had until 10 February 2004 within which to seek reconsideration.
However, petitioners sought reconsideration only on 1 March 2004, 20 days
beyond the prescriptive period. Thus, in its Resolution of 12 March 2004, the
Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration outright for
having been filed late.[6]
Second. Even if
the Court waives the jurisdictional defect to reach the merits of this
petition, the Court of Appeals’ ruling stands.
A writ of injunction will lie upon proof that the
applicant is entitled to the relief.[7] For the writ to issue here, forever barring
PDCP from collecting on the loan security, petitioners must prove the nullity
of the mortgage contract. As an accessory contract, the mortgage agreement
derives its validity from the principal contract of loan.[8] Petitioners assail the validity of the loan
agreement on the sole ground that PDCP delayed the release of the loan
proceeds. This argument is analytically weak, factually baseless, and legally
indefensible.
The claim of delay in the release of the loan proceeds
concerns the implementation of the
loan contract, and not its intrinsic
validity.[9] At any rate, PDCP, as found by the lower
courts, released the loan on time. Indeed,
the delay petitioners invoked covered the negotiation stage for the loan
agreement, as it took sometime for PDCP to approve Ibasco’s
loan application.[10] Lastly, any delay PDCP may have incurred in
releasing the loan was cured when Ibasco accepted the loan proceeds without
protest. Thus, not only did petitioners fail to prove their entitlement to the
injunctive relief, they conjured a flimsy excuse to forestall PDCP’s
collection of a just debt.[11]
WHEREFORE,
we RESOLVED to DENY the petition for lack of merit. The Decision dated 23 December
2003 and the Resolution dated 12 March 2004 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that
the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
[2]Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Danilo B. Pine, concurring.
[3] Covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-12550, T-11799, T-11800 and
T-14584.
[4] In the mortgage contract dated 15 October 1980 and its supplement, dated 15 April 1982 (Records, pp. 33-45).
[5] Actual, moral and exemplary.
[6] Petitioners
sought an extension of time within which to seek reconsideration but the Court
of Appeals denied their motion in the Resolution dated 2 March 2004.
[7] Sec.
3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: “Grounds for issuance
of preliminary injunction.
A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That
the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or
acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either
for a limited period or perpetually;
x x x x” (Emphasis supplied).
[8] Filipinas Marble Corporation v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,
226 Phil. 109 (1986).
[9] Unlike
a claim for lack of consideration (see Naguiat
v. Court of Appeals, 459 Phil. 237 [2003]).
[10] This
was due in part to the misrepresentations of a PDCP employee whose services
PDCP terminated.
[11] PDCP’s
petition for foreclosure of mortgage has been pending with respondent Camarines
Norte Provincial Sheriff for more than
23 years.