SECOND DIVISION
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ARNEL SAGANA, |
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G.R. No.161952 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,* J. |
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CARPIO MORALES, |
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versus - |
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Acting Chairperson, |
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BRION, |
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ABAD, JJ. |
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RICHARD A. FRANCISCO, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent, ** |
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October 2, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
It is, at times, difficult to reconcile
the letter of the law with its spirit. Thus, it is not altogether surprising
that two competing values are usually discernable in every controversy – the
principle of dura lex sed lex versus
the notion that technicalities should yield to broader interests of
justice. In our rules of procedure, for
instance, judges often struggle to find a balance between due process
considerations and a liberal construction to secure a just disposition of every
action. In such cases, where a measure
of discretion is permitted, courts must tread carefully, with due consideration
of the factual milieu and legal principles involved. In so doing, we take steps - sometimes
tentative, sometimes bold - to apply prior experience and precedent towards an
eventual just resolution. It is these
principles that animate our decision in the instant case.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari[1] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the 13 August 2003 Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66412 which reversed and set aside
the 20 September 1999 Decision[3]
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99 in Civil Case No.
Q-94-22445 and held that there was no valid service of summons to respondent
Richard A. Francisco.
On P300,000.00 as actual damages, P150,000.00
as moral damages, P50,000.00, exemplary damages, and P50,000.00
as attorney’s fees.
On
On
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[8] stating
that after the Server’s Return was filed, he exerted efforts to locate the
respondent, and it was confirmed that respondent indeed lived at
Thus, on
On
In the meantime, on
In the Affidavit of Merit[15]
submitted together with the Manifestation and Motion, Michael Francisco
asserted that he was 19 years of age; that his brother, herein respondent
Richard Francisco, had left their residence in March 1993; and that respondent would
just write his family without informing them of his address, or would just call
by phone.
Thereafter, petitioner and movant
Michael Francisco submitted their respective Opposition, Reply, and Rejoinder. In his Rejoinder, petitioner attached a copy
of an Affidavit[16]
prepared by respondent Richard A. Francisco dated
On
It
should be considered that earlier, plaintiff had already sent numerous
pleadings to defendant at his last known address. As also pointed out by [petitioner]
in his Opposition, movant has not adduced evidence, except his affidavit of
merit, to impugn the service of summons thru him. Movant herein also admits
that defendant communicates with him through telephone. Movant, therefore,
being a person of sufficient age and discretion, would be able, more likely
than not, to inform defendant of the fact that summons was sent to him by the
court.[18]
Having failed to file an answer or any
responsive pleading, respondent was declared in default and petitioner was
allowed to present evidence ex parte.
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and
hereby orders defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (PhP35,000.00) as and for actual damages, the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND
PESOS (PhP15,000.00) as and for moral damages, the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(PhP10,000.00) for exemplary damages and the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(PhP20,000.00) as attorney’s fees.
No
further costs.
SO
ORDERED.[20]
On 23 November 1999, respondent Richard
A. Francisco filed a Notice of Appeal, claiming that he received a copy of the trial
court’s Decision on 9 November 1999; that the same was contrary to the law,
facts, and evidence, and praying that his appeal be given due course.[21]
On
I
The
court a quo erred in assuming jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant-appellant despite the irregularity of the substituted service of
summons by the court process server.
II
The
court a quo erred in awarding actual damages in the amount of THIRTY
FIVE-THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000.00) to the plaintiff-appellee although only
SEVENTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P17,000.00) was duly supported by receipts.
III
The
court a quo likewise erred in awarding unreasonable moral damages in the amount
of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00); exemplary damages in the amount
of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00); and attorney’s fees in the amount
of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
despite the fact that there is no factual and substantive basis for all these.[23]
On 15 August 2002, the Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution[24]
ordering the parties to personally appear for the conduct of preliminary
conference to consider amicably settling the appeal, pursuant to Sec. 1(a),
Rule 7 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals and the Court’s
Resolution A.M. No. 02-2-17-SC dated 16 April 2002 regarding the Pilot Testing
of Mediation in the Court of Appeals.
Respondent was furnished[25]
a copy of this Resolution at his address at
On
In brief, the Court of Appeals found
that there was no valid service of summons for the following reasons:
1. Except
for the notation made by the process server on the summons, no proof of service
by way of a Process Server’s Return was prepared;
2. The process
server failed to state the specific facts and circumstances that would justify
valid substituted service of summons, to wit: (a) the impossibility of service of summons
within a reasonable time, (b) the efforts exerted to locate the respondent, and
(c) it was served on a person of sufficient age and discretion residing
therein.
3. Petitioner failed to prove
that, at the time summons was served, respondent actually lived in
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[28] where
he alleged that respondent did, in fact, reside at
Hence, petitioner filed this Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising
the sole issue of whether there was valid service of summons upon the
respondent.
The
petition is meritorious. Under the
circumstances obtaining in this case, we find there was proper substituted
service of summons upon the respondent.
Section
8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court, the rules of procedure then in
force at the time summons was served, provided:
Section 8. Substituted service. – If
the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person
of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.
Jurisprudence has long established that
for substituted service of summons to be valid, the following must be
demonstrated: (a) that personal service of summons within a reasonable time was
impossible; (b) that efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) that the
summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at
the party's residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party's
office or regular place of business.[30] It is likewise required that the pertinent
facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer's
return.[31]
In this case, personal service of
summons was twice attempted by the trial court, although unsuccessfully. In the
first attempt, the resident of the house refused to receive the summons; worse,
he would not even give his name. In the
second attempt, respondent’s own brother refused to sign for receipt of the
summons, and then later claimed that he never received a copy, despite his participation
in the proceedings. The trial
court also thrice attempted to contact the respondent through his place of
work, but to no avail. These diligent
efforts to locate the respondent were noted in the first sheriff's return, the
process server's notation, as well as the records of the case.
Clearly, personal service of summons
was made impossible by the acts of the respondent in refusing to reveal his
whereabouts, and by the act of his brother in claiming that respondent no
longer lived at
Undeniably, no Sheriff’s Return was
prepared by process server Jarvis Iconar; the only record of the second service
of summons was Mr. Iconar’s handwritten notation in the summons itself. However, the information required by law and
prevailing jurisprudence, that is, that personal service was impossible because
of the claim that respondent no longer lived at the stated address, that
efforts were exerted to locate the respondent through the multiple attempts to
serve summons, and that summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and
discretion, were already in the records of the trial court.
Moreover, we find the claim that
respondent moved out of their residence in March 1993 without informing his
brother or parents his whereabouts, despite regular calls and letters, simply
incredulous. What makes this version of events even more implausible is
respondent’s admission that he received a copy of the trial court's Decision of
Respondent also wishes us to believe
that it was pure chance that he and his brother were assisted by the same
lawyer, Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, and yet it never occurred to respondent’s own
brother or lawyer to inform him about the receipt of summons. All these militate against respondent’s
self-serving declaration that he did not reside at
In view of the foregoing, we find that
substituted service of summons was validly made upon respondent through his
brother.
We do not intend this
ruling to overturn jurisprudence to the effect that statutory requirements of
substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully, and that
any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered
ineffective.[32]
However, an overly strict application of
the Rules is not warranted in this case, as it would clearly frustrate the
spirit of the law as well as do injustice to the parties, who have been waiting
for almost 15 years for a resolution of this case. We are not heedless of the widespread and flagrant practice whereby defendants
actively attempt to frustrate the proper service of summons by refusing to give
their names, rebuffing requests to sign for or receive documents, or eluding
officers of the court. Of course it is to be expected that defendants try to
avoid service of summons, prompting this Court to declare that, “the sheriff
must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on
the defendant.”[33]
However, sheriffs are not expected to be
sleuths, and cannot be faulted where the defendants themselves engage in
deception to thwart the orderly administration of justice.
The purpose of summons is two-fold: to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to notify the
defendant that an action has been commenced so that he may be given an
opportunity to be heard on the claim against him. Under the circumstances of this case, we find
that respondent was duly apprised of the action against him and had every
opportunity to answer the charges made by the petitioner. However, since respondent refused to disclose
his true address, it was impossible to personally serve summons upon him. Considering that respondent could not have
received summons because of his own pretenses, and has failed to provide an
explanation of his purported “new” residence, he must now bear the
consequences.[34]
WHEREFORE, the
Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The P35,000.00 as actual
damages, P15,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
ROBERTO
A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional member per Special Order No. 691 dated
**
The Court
of Appeals and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 99,
[1] Rollo,
pp. 10-22.
[2]
[3] Records, pp.
113-116; penned by Judge Ma. Theresa Dela Torre-Yadao.
[4]
[5]
[6] Ibid
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Ibid.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] CA rollo, p. 10.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] Umandap v. Sabio Jr., G.R. No. 140244,
[31] Jose v. Boyon, G.R. No. 147369,
[32] Pioneer International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr.,
G.R. No. 156848,
[33] Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
130974,
[34] Robinson v. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584,