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PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, Petitioners, -
versus - MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE,
for herself and in behalf of INGRID
D’LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK D’WIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS
VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 160708
Present: Quisumbing, Acting C.J., Chairperson, Carpio
Morales, BRION, and BERSAMIN,* ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: October 16, 2009 |
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QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:
For review are the Decision[1] dated
Simply stated,
the facts as found by the Court of Appeals[4] are as follows:
Respondent
Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children, who are also parties
to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the
spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as
Through their
joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their
movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house
and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the
petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two
lots without Mary Ann’s consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale[5] dated
On
When Mary Ann
and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from
entering it. They waited outside the gate
until evening under the rain. They
sought help from the Talomo Police Station, but police authorities refused to
intervene, saying that it was a family matter.
Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to
her children, so much so that one flunked at school. Thus, respondents Mary Ann and her children
filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and
Attorney’s Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction[7] against Pedro and herein
petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City.
During the
trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that
they bought the house and lot from Pedro, and that her husband, petitioner
Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when they bought the property.
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1.
The sale of lot 8
covered by TCT No. 26471 by defendant Pedro Abrille appearing in the Deed of
Sale marked as Exh. “E” is void as to one half or 277.5 square meters
representing the share of plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille.
2.
That sale of
3.
That sale of the
house mentioned in the Deed of Sale (Exh. “A”) is valid as far as the one half
of the house representing the share of defendant Pedro Abrille is concerned but
void as to the other half which is the share of plaintiff Mary Abrille because
she did not give her consent/sign the said sale.
4.
The defendants
shall jointly pay the plaintiffs.
4. A. Seventeen Thousand Pesos (P17,000.00) representing the
value of the movables and belonging[s] that were lost when unknown men
unceremoniously and without their knowledge and consent removed their movables
from their house and brought them to an apartment.
4. B. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P 100,000.00) to plaintiff
Mary Abrille as moral damages.
4. C. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to each of the four
children as moral damages, namely:
a) Ingrid
Villa Abrille – Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), b) Ingremark Villa
Abrille – Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), c) Ingresoll Villa Abrille
– Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and d) Ingrelyn Villa Abrille –
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
5. Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages by way of example and
correction for the public good.
6. The
costs of suit.[8]
On
appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision, thus:
WHEREFORE,
the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1.
The sale of lot
covered by TCT No. 26471 in favor of defendants spouses Wilfredo and Patrocinia
Ravina is declared valid.
2.
The sale of lot
covered by TCT No. 88674 in favor of said defendants spouses Ravina, together
with the house thereon, is declared null and void.
3. Defendant
Pedro Abrille is ordered to return the value of the
consideration for the lot covered by TCT No. 88674 and the house thereon
to co-defendants spouses Ravina.
4. Defendants
spouses Ravina [a]re ordered to reconvey the lot and house covered by TCT No.
88674 in favor of spouses Pedro and Mary Villa Abrille and to deliver
possession to them.
5.
Plaintiffs are
given the option to exercise their rights under Article [450] of the New Civil
Code with respect to the improvements introduced by defendant spouses Ravina.
6.
Defendants Pedro
Villa Abrille and spouses Ravina are ordered to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiffs as follows:
a) One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) to plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille as
moral damages.
b) Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages to each of the four
children, namely: Ingrid Villa Abrille, Ingremark Villa Abrille, Ingresoll
Villa Abrille and Ingrelyn Villa Abrille.
c)
Ten Thousand (P10,000.00)
as exemplary damages by way of example and correction for the public good.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied,
petitioners filed this petition.
Petitioners argue that:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED x x x THE
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS
PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE NOT INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE,
THE SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONERS PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES, THE
SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.[10]
In
essence, petitioners assail the appellate court’s declaration that the sale to
them by Pedro of the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 is null and void. However, in addressing this issue, it is
imperative to determine: (1) whether the subject property covered by TCT No.
T-88674 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property, and (2) whether
its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Ann’s consent.
Petitioners
assert that the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was the exclusive
property of Pedro having been acquired by him through barter or exchange.[11] They allege that the subject lot was acquired
by Pedro with the proceeds of the sale of one of his exclusive properties. Allegedly, Pedro and his sister Carmelita
initially agreed to exchange their exclusive lots covered by TCT No. T-26479
and TCT No. T-26472, respectively.
Later, however, Pedro sold the lot covered by TCT No. T-26472 to one
Francisca Teh Ting and purchased the property of Carmelita using the proceeds
of the sale. A new title, TCT No.
T-88674, was issued thereafter. Thus,
petitioners insist that the subject lot remains to be an exclusive property of
Pedro as it was acquired or purchased through the exclusive funds or money of
the latter.
We are not persuaded.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, “All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.”
There is
no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an
exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to
Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by
TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann.
No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through
exchange or barter. The presumption of
the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the
subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.[12] Petitioners’ bare assertion would not suffice
to overcome the presumption that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during the marriage
of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal.
Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been
constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a
loan from DBP to construct the house.
Significantly,
a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code
that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent
of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the
authority of the court. Article 124 of
the Family Code, the governing law at the time the assailed sale was
contracted, is explicit:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed
as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The
particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to
annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or
encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the
consent of the wife is null and void.
Hence, just
like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without
knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is
void. If the sale was with the knowledge
but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such
sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from
the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the
case.[13]
Here,
respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five
(5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale
pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot
covered by TCT No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which
he can dispose of freely without Mary Ann’s consent.
On the second
assignment of error, petitioners contend that they are buyers in good faith.[14] Accordingly, they need not inquire whether
the lot was purchased by money exclusively belonging to Pedro or of the common
fund of the spouses and may rely on the certificates of title.
The
contention is bereft of merit. As
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, a purchaser in good faith is one who
buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right
to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same
at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest
of some other person in the property.[15] To establish his status as a buyer for value
in good faith, a person dealing with land registered in the name of and
occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on the face of the
seller’s certificate of title. But for a
person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller
whose capacity to sell is restricted, such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the
Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family Code, he must show that he
inquired into the latter’s capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a
buyer for value in good faith.[16]
In the
present case, the property is registered in the name of Pedro and his wife,
Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny
knowledge that during the time of the sale in 1991, Pedro was married to Mary
Ann. However, Mary Ann’s conformity did
not appear in the deed. Even assuming
that petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the
exclusive property of Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Ann’s lawyer of her
objection to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase the property
without Mary Ann’s written consent. Moreover,
the respondents were the ones in actual, visible and public possession of the
property at the time the transaction was being made. Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners knew
that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject properties and yet they
failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the
protection accorded to purchasers in good faith.
Now, if a
voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is
proper. The relationship between the
parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled must always be
characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing.[17] Hence, in consonance with justice and equity
and the salutary principle of non-enrichment at another’s expense, we sustain
the appellate court’s order directing Pedro to return to petitioner spouses the
value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 and the house
thereon.
However, this court rules that petitioners cannot claim reimbursements
for improvements they introduced after their good faith had ceased. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner Patrocinia Ravina made improvements and renovations on the house and
lot at the time when the complaint against them was filed. Ravina continued introducing improvements
during the pendency of the action.[18]
Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides that, “(h)e who builds, plants or
sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown
without right to indemnity.”[19]
On the last issue, petitioners claim that the
decision awarding damages to respondents is not supported by the evidence on
record.[20]
The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her
children were removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. On
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: “Every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.”[22] When a right is exercised in a manner that
does not conform with such norms and results in damages to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be held
responsible. Similarly, any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damages caused.[23] It is
patent in this case that petitioners’ alleged acts fall short of these
established civil law standards.
WHEREFORE, we deny
the instant petition for lack of merit.
The Decision dated
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Acting Chief Justice |
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WE CONCUR: CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
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ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
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ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
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C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Acting Chief Justice |
* Additional member per Special Order No. 761.
[1] Rollo, pp. 44-70. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired member of this Court), with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court) concurring.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, pp. 47-54. Penned by Judge Jesus V. Quitain.
[4] With editorial changes for brevity.
[5] Records, pp. 144-145. Exh. “T”.
[6] CA rollo, p. 53.
[7] Records, pp. 1-7.
[8] CA rollo, pp. 53-54.
[9] Rollo, pp. 68-69.
[10]
[11]
[12] See Castro v. Miat, G.R. No. 143297,
[13] M. Sta.
Maria, Persons and Family Relations
Law, p. 511 (4th
ed., 2004).
[14]
Rollo, p. 32.
[15] San Lorenzo Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124242,
SCRA 99, 117.
[16] Bautista
v. Silva, G.R. No. 157434,
[17] Heirs
of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares, G.R. No. 143826,
[18] Rollo, p. 63.
[19] Lumungo
v. Usman, No. L-25359,
[20] Rollo, p. 36.
[21] CA rollo, p. 53.
[22] Civil Code, Art. 19.
[23] Civil Code, Art. 21.