EN BANC
|
FORT
BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Petitioner, - versus - COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REVENUE REGION NO. 8, and CHIEF,
ASSESSMENT DIVISION, REVENUE REGION NO. 8, BIR, Respondents. x-----------------------------------------x FORT
BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Petitioner, - versus - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, REVENUE DISTRICT OFFICER, REVENUE
DISTRICT NO. 44, TAGUIG and PATEROS, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE. Respondents.
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G.R.
No. 158885
G.R.
No. 170680
Present: PUNO,
C.J., QUISUMBING,* YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BRION,** PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD,
JJ. Promulgated: October 2,
2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
R E S O L U T I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is respondents’ Motion for
Reconsideration of our Decision dated April 2, 2009 which granted the
consolidated petitions of petitioner Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Tax
Appeals and the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are
hereby (1) restrained from collecting from petitioner the amount of P28,413,783.00
representing the transitional input tax credit due it for the fourth quarter of
1996; and (2) directed to refund to petitioner the amount of P347,741,695.74
paid as output VAT for the third quarter of 1997 in light of the persisting
transitional input tax credit available to petitioner for the said quarter, or
to issue a tax credit corresponding to such amount. No pronouncement as to costs.
The
Motion for Reconsideration raises the following arguments:
I
SECTION 100 OF THE OLD NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
(OLD NIRC), AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) NO. 7716, COULD NOT HAVE SUPPLIED
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TREATMENT OF REAL PROPERTIES OR REAL ESTATE DEALERS
ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE TREATMENT OF TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING OTHER COMMERCIAL
GOODS ON THE OTHER HAND, AS SAID DISTINCTION IS FOUND IN SECTION 105 AND,
SUBSEQUENTLY, REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 7-95 WHICH DEFINES THE INPUT TAX
CREDITABLE TO A REAL ESTATE DEALER WHO BECOMES SUBJECT TO VAT FOR THE FIRST
TIME.
II
SECTION 4.105.1 AND PARAGRAPH (A) (III) OF THE TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS OF REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 7-95 VALIDLY LIMIT THE 8% TRANSITIONAL
INPUT TAX TO THE IMPROVEMENTS ON REAL PROPERTIES.
III
REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 6-97 DID NOT REPEAL REVENUE
REGULATIONS NO. 7-95.
The instant motion for reconsideration
lacks merit.
The first VAT law, found in Executive
Order (EO) No. 273 [1987], took effect on January 1, 1988. It
amended several provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Old
NIRC). EO 273 likewise accommodated the
potential burdens of the shift to the VAT system by allowing newly
VAT-registered persons to avail of a transitional input tax credit as provided
for in Section 105 of the Old NIRC.
Section 105 as amended by EO 273 reads:
Sec. 105. Transitional Input Tax Credits. — A person who
becomes liable to value-added tax or any person who elects to be a
VAT-registered person shall, subject to the filing of an inventory as
prescribed by regulations, be allowed input tax on his beginning inventory of
goods, materials and supplies equivalent to 8% of the value of such inventory
or the actual value-added tax paid on such goods, materials and supplies,
whichever is higher, which shall be creditable against the output tax.
RA 7716 took effect on January 1,
1996. It amended Section 100 of the Old NIRC by imposing for the first time
value-added-tax on sale of real properties. The amendment reads:
Sec. 100. Value-added-tax on sale
of goods or properties. — (a) Rate and base of tax. — There shall be levied,
assessed and collected on every sale, barter or exchange of goods or
properties, a value-added tax equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or
gross value in money of the goods, or properties sold, bartered or exchanged,
such tax to be paid by the seller or transferor.
(1) The term 'goods or
properties' shall mean all tangible and intangible objects which are capable of
pecuniary estimation and shall include:
(A) Real properties held
primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of
trade or business; xxx
The provisions of Section 105 of the
NIRC, on the transitional input tax credit, remain intact despite the enactment
of RA 7716. Section 105 however was
amended with the passage of the new National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (New
NIRC), also officially known as Republic Act (RA) 8424. The provisions on the transitional input tax
credit are now embodied in Section 111(A) of the New NIRC, which reads:
Section 111. Transitional/Presumptive Input Tax Credits. –
(A) Transitional Input Tax Credits. - A person who becomes liable to value-added tax or any person who elects to be a VAT-registered person shall, subject to the filing of an inventory according to rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner, be allowed input tax on his beginning inventory of goods, materials and supplies equivalent for 8% of the value of such inventory or the actual value-added tax paid on such goods, materials and supplies, whichever is higher, which shall be creditable against the output tax. [Emphasis ours.]
The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) disallowed Fort Bonifacio Development
Corporation’s (FBDC) presumptive input tax credit arising from the land
inventory on the basis of Revenue Regulation 7-95 (RR 7-95) and Revenue
Memorandum Circular 3-96 (RMC 3-96).
Specifically, Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95 provides:
Sec.
4.105-1. Transitional input tax on beginning inventories. – Taxpayers who
became VAT-registered persons upon effectivity of RA No. 7716 who have exceeded
the minimum turnover of P500,000.00 or who voluntarily register even if
their turnover does not exceed P500,000.00 shall be entitled to a
presumptive input tax on the inventory on hand as of December 31, 1995 on the
following: (a) goods purchased for resale in their present condition; (b)
materials purchased for further processing, but which have not yet undergone
processing; (c) goods which have been manufactured by the taxpayer; (d) goods
in process and supplies, all of which are for sale or for use in the course of
the taxpayer’s trade or business as a VAT-registered person.
However, in the case of real estate dealers, the basis of the presumptive input tax shall be the improvements, such as buildings, roads, drainage systems, and other similar structures, constructed on or after the effectivity of EO 273 (January 1, 1988).
The transitional input tax shall be 8% of the value of the inventory or actual VAT paid, whichever is higher, which amount may be allowed as tax credit against the output tax of the VAT-registered person.
In the April 2, 2009 Decision sought
to be reconsidered, the Court struck down Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95 for being
in conflict with the law. It held that the
CIR had no power to limit the meaning and coverage of the term “goods” in Section 105 of the Old NIRC
sans statutory authority or basis and justification to make such limitation. This it did when it restricted the
application of Section 105 in the case of real estate dealers only to improvements
on the real property belonging to their beginning inventory.
A law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in relation to the whole law. It is the cardinal rule in statutory construction that a statute’s clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with other parts of the statute and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.[1]
In
construing a statute, courts have to take the thought conveyed by the statute
as a whole; construe the constituent parts together; ascertain the legislative
intent from the whole act; consider each and every provision thereof in the
light of the general purpose of the statute; and endeavor to make every part
effective, harmonious and sensible.[2]
The
statutory definition of the term “goods or
properties” leaves no room for doubt. It
states:
Sec. 100. Value-added tax on sale of goods or properties. – (a) Rate and base of tax. – xxx.
(1) The term ‘goods or properties’ shall mean all tangible and intangible objects which are capable of pecuniary estimation and shall include:
(A) Real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business; xxx.
The
amendatory provision of Section 105 of the NIRC, as introduced by RA 7716,
states:
Sec. 105. Transitional Input tax Credits. – A person who becomes liable to value-added tax or any person who elects to be a VAT-registered person shall, subject to the filing of an inventory as prescribed by regulations, be allowed input tax on his beginning inventory of goods, materials and supplies equivalent to 8% of the value of such inventory or the actual value-added tax paid on such goods, materials and supplies, whichever is higher, which shall be creditable against the output tax.
The
term “goods or properties” by the unambiguous terms of Section 100 includes
“real properties held primarily for sale
to costumers or held for lease in the ordinary course of business.” Having been defined in Section 100 of the
NIRC, the term “goods” as used in Section
105 of the same code could not have a different meaning. This has been explained in the Decision
dated April 2, 2009, thus:
Under Section 105, the beginning inventory of "goods" forms part of the valuation of the transitional input tax credit. Goods, as commonly understood in the business sense, refers to the product which the VAT-registered person offers for sale to the public. With respect to real estate dealers, it is the real properties themselves which constitute their "goods." Such real properties are the operating assets of the real estate dealer.
Section 4.100-1 of RR No. 7-95 itself includes in its enumeration of "goods or properties" such "real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business." Said definition was taken from the very statutory language of Section 100 of the Old NIRC. By limiting the definition of goods to "improvements" in Section 4.105-1, the BIR not only contravened the definition of "goods" as provided in the Old NIRC, but also the definition which the same revenue regulation itself has provided.
Section
4.105-1 of RR 7-95 restricted the definition of “goods”, viz:
However, in the case of real estate dealers, the basis of the presumptive input tax shall be the improvements, such as buildings, roads, drainage systems, and other similar structures, constructed on or after the effectivity of EO 273 (January 1, 1988).
As
mandated by Article 7 of the Civil Code,[3] an
administrative rule or regulation cannot contravene the law on which it is
based. RR 7-95 is inconsistent with
Section 105 insofar as the definition of the term “goods” is concerned. This is
a legislative act beyond the authority of the CIR and the Secretary of
Finance. The rules and regulations that
administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated
legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the
effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by
the legislature to the objects and purposes of the law, and should not be in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
To be
valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict, the
provisions of the enabling law. An implementing rule or regulation cannot
modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to implement. Any rule that is not consistent with the
statute itself is null and void. [4]
While
administrative agencies, such as the Bureau of Internal Revenue, may issue
regulations to implement statutes, they are without authority to limit the
scope of the statute to less than what it provides, or extend or expand the
statute beyond its terms, or in any way modify explicit provisions of the
law. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an
administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the
basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law
prevails.[5]
To recapitulate,
RR 7-95, insofar as it restricts the definition of “goods” as basis of transitional input tax credit under Section 105
is a nullity.
On
January 1, 1997, RR 6-97 was issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. RR 6-97 was basically a reiteration of the
same Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95, except that the RR 6-97 deleted the following paragraph:
However, in the case of real
estate dealers, the basis of the presumptive input tax shall be the
improvements, such as buildings, roads, drainage systems, and other similar
structures, constructed on or after the effectivity of E.O. 273 (January 1,
1988).
It is
clear, therefore, that under RR 6-97, the allowable transitional input tax
credit is not limited to improvements on real properties. The particular provision of RR 7-95 has
effectively been repealed by RR 6-97 which is now in consonance with Section
100 of the NIRC, insofar as the definition of real properties as goods is
concerned. The failure to add a specific
repealing clause would not necessarily indicate that there was no intent to
repeal RR 7-95. The fact that the
aforequoted paragraph was deleted created an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy between the provisions of RR 6-97 and RR 7-95.
We now
address the points raised in the dissenting opinion of the Honorable Justice
Antonio T. Carpio.
At the
outset, it must be stressed that FBDC sought the refund of the total amount of P347,741,695.74
which it had itself paid in cash to the
BIR. It is argued that the transitional
input tax credit applies only when taxes were previously paid on the properties
in the beginning inventory and that there should be a law imposing the tax
presumed to have been paid. The thesis
is anchored on the argument that without any VAT or other input business tax
imposed by law on the real properties at the time of the sale, the 8%
transitional input tax cannot be presumed to have been paid.
The
language of Section 105 is explicit. It
precludes reading into the law that the transitional input tax credit is
limited to the amount of VAT previously paid.
When the aforesaid section speaks of “eight percent (8%) of the value of such inventory” followed by the clause
“or the actual value-added tax paid on
such goods, materials and supplies,” the implication is clear that under
the first clause, “eight percent (8%) of the value of such inventory,” the law
does not contemplate the payment of any prior tax on such inventory. This is distinguished from the second clause,
“the actual value-added tax paid on the goods, materials and supplies” where
actual payment of VAT on the goods, materials and supplies is assumed. Had the intention of the law been to limit
the amount to the actual VAT paid, there would have been no need to explicitly
allow a claim based on 8% of the value of such inventory.
The
contention that the 8% transitional input tax credit in Section 105 presumes
that a previous tax was paid, whether or not it was actually paid, requires a
transaction where a tax has been imposed by law, is utterly without basis in
law. The rationale behind the provisions
of Section 105 was aptly elucidated in the Decision sought to be reconsidered,
thus:
It is apparent that the transitional input tax credit operates to benefit newly VAT-registered persons, whether or not they previously paid taxes in the acquisition of their beginning inventory of goods, materials and supplies. During that period of transition from non-VAT to VAT status, the transitional input tax credit serves to alleviate the impact of the VAT on the taxpayer. At the very beginning, the VAT-registered taxpayer is obliged to remit a significant portion of the income it derived from its sales as output VAT. The transitional input tax credit mitigates this initial diminution of the taxpayer’s income by affording the opportunity to offset the losses incurred through the remittance of the output VAT at a stage when the person is yet unable to credit input VAT payments.
As pointed out in Our Decision of April 2,
2009, to give Section 105 a restrictive construction that transitional input
tax credit applies only when taxes were previously paid on the properties in
the beginning inventory and there is a law imposing the tax which is presumed to
have been paid, is to impose conditions or requisites to the application of the
transitional tax input credit which are not found in the law. The courts must not read into the law what is
not there. To do so will violate the
principle of separation of powers which prohibits this Court from engaging in
judicial legislation.[6]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion
for Reconsideration is DENIED WITH
FINALITY for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
(On
official leave)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
|
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice
|
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice
|
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
|
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
|
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
|
|
(On leave) ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
** On sick leave.
[1]
The Civil Service Commission v. Joson,
G.R. No. 154674, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 773,786.
[2] Republic v. Reyes, No. L- 22550, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 170,173.
[3] Art. 7. xxx
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the constitution.
[4] Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, G.R. No. 154684, September 8, 2005, 469 SCRA 424, 436.
[5] Sunga v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 125629, March 25, 1998, 288 SCRA 78, 87.
[6] Alagad (Partido ng Maralitang-Lungsod) v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 136795, October 6, 2000, 342 SCRA
244, 291