|
SAN
MIGUEL BUKID HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., herein represented by its
PRESIDENT, MR. EVELIO BARATA, Petitioner, - versus - THE CITY OF
MANDALUYONG, represented by the HON. MAYOR BENJAMIN ABALOS, JR.; A.F. CALMA GENERAL
CONSTRUCTION, represented by its President, ARMENGO F. CALMA,
Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 153653 Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: October 2,
2009 |
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PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking nullification of the Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated April 16, 2002[1]
and May 14, 2002,[2] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 69827, dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
Petitioner San Miguel
Bukid Homeowners Association, Inc. (formerly known as Bukid Neighborhood
Landless Association), an association of urban poor dwellers of San Miguel
Bukid Compound, Plainview, Mandaluyong City, filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City a Complaint[3]
for specific performance and damages against respondents City of Mandaluyong
(City) and A.F. Calma General Construction (Calma). It is alleged therein that pursuant to the
City’s Land for the Landless Program, petitioner and the City entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), whereby the City purchased lots and then transferred
the same to petitioner with a first real estate mortgage in favor of the
City. Subsequently, the City and Calma
entered into a Contract Agreement for the latter to construct row houses and
medium-rise buildings on the aforementioned lots within 540 calendar days for
the benefit of petitioner’s members. In
June 1995, Calma began construction, but in June 1996, work on the project was
stopped. The period of 540 days elapsed
sometime in November 1996, but the houses and buildings were not yet
completed. Petitioner’s letters sent to
the Mayor of the City requesting an update on the project remained unanswered. Hence, petitioner filed the complaint praying
that the City and Calma be ordered to perform their respective undertakings and
obligations under the Contract Agreement and to pay petitioner attorney’s fees,
exemplary damages and litigation expenses.
The City filed an Answer[4]
within the extended period granted by the trial court. The City’s main defense was that the MOA had
already been abrogated due to petitioner’s failure to secure a loan from the
Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation, and that petitioner had no standing or
personality to institute the action, as it was not a party to the Contract
Agreement.
Calma did not file an Answer.
On
In its Order[5]
dated
The matter was elevated by petitioner to the CA via a petition for certiorari. However, in the assailed Resolution[7]
dated
Hence, petitioner came to this Court seeking the issuance of a writ of certiorari against the CA, on the
following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN
IT HELD THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
PETITIONER WHO SIGNED THE
VERIFICATION/CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM
SHOPPING “DID NOT APPEAR TO BE DULY AUTHORIZED TO DO SO,” WHEN IN FACT THE SAID
REPRESENTATIVE WAS DULY AUTHORIZED BY THE PETITIONER CORPORATION’S BOARD OF
DIRECTORS.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
APPLYING THE RULING IN BA SAVINGS BANK VS. SIA (336 SCRA 484) AGAINST THE
PETITIONER AND DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHEN IT HELD THAT THE LACK OF
CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING IS GENERALLY NOT CURABLE BY THE SUBMISSION
THEREOF AFTER THE FILING OF THE PETITION, WHEN IN TRUTH, WHAT WAS SUBMITTED BY
PETITIONER WITH THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS NOT A CERTIFICATION AGAINST
FORUM SHOPPING BUT A SECRETARY’S CERTIFICATE OF A BOARD RESOLUTION CONFIRMING
AND RATIFYING THE AUTHORITY OF THE REPRESENTATIVE TO ACT AS SUCH.[9]
The petition is doomed to fail.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states
that certiorari may be resorted to when there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, in Abedes v. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court held that:
x x x for a petition for certiorari or prohibition to be granted, it must set out and demonstrate, plainly and distinctly, all the facts essential to establish a right to a writ. The petitioner must allege in his petition and has the burden of establishing facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate and that (a) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction; and, (c) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. These matters must be threshed out and shown by petitioner.[11]
The Resolutions of the CA which petitioner seeks
to nullify are orders of dismissal. In Magestrado v. People,[12] the Court explained that an order of
dismissal is a final order which is a proper subject
of an appeal, not certiorari. This was reiterated in Pasiona v. Court of Appeals,[13]
where it was emphasized
that if what is being assailed is
a decision, final order or resolution of the CA, then appeal to this Court is via
a verified petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In cases where
an appeal was available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground
therefor is grave abuse of discretion.[14]
The existence and availability of the right of appeal are
antithetical to the availability of the special civil action for certiorari,
although where it is shown that the appeal would be
inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the
injurious effects of the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and
ineffectual, the extraordinary writ of certiorari may be granted.[15]
Clearly, since the
present case involves a final order of dismissal issued by the CA, the proper
course of action would have been to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Although there are exceptions to the general
rule, petitioner utterly failed to allege and prove that the extraordinary
remedy of the writ of certiorari
should be granted, because an appeal, although available, would be inadequate,
insufficient and not speedy enough to address the urgency of the matter. There is nothing in the petition to show that
this case qualifies as an exception to the general rule. The circumstances prevailing in this case reveal
that whatever grievance petitioner may be suffering from the dismissal of its
petition with the CA could be properly addressed through a petition for review
on certiorari.
On the ground alone that
petitioner resorted to an improper remedy, the present petition is already dismissible
and undeserving of the Court’s attention.
However, even on the merits, the petition must be struck down.
In Fuentebella v. Castro,[16]
the Court categorically stated that “if the real party-in-interest is a
corporate body, an officer of the
corporation can sign the certification against forum shopping so long as he has
been duly authorized by a resolution of its board of directors.”[17] In this case, the Certificate of Board
Resolution attached to the petition for certiorari
filed with the CA reads as follows:
x x x in a meeting of the Board of Directors of the SAN MIGUEL BUKID HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, held on 7 November 1999, the following resolution was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly of the Association:
RESOLVED, that the ASSOCIATION re-file its Complaint
for Specific Performance with Damages against the CITY GOVERNMENT OF
MANDALUYONG and A.F. CALMA GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION in order to enforce
their obligations under the CONTRACT AGREEMENT for a housing project in favor
of the ASSOCIATION;
RESOLVED, further, that MR. EVELIO D. BARATA,
President of the ASSOCIATION, be authorized
to initiate, sign, file and prosecute the COMPLAINT.[18]
Evidently,
petitioner only authorized its President, Evelio Barata, to initiate, sign,
file and prosecute the Complaint for specific performance.
Certiorari, as
a special civil action, is an original action invoking the original
jurisdiction of a court to annul or modify the proceedings of a tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[19]
It is an original and
independent action that is not part of the trial or the proceedings on the
complaint filed before the trial court.[20]
The petition for certiorari before the
CA is, therefore, a separate and distinct action from the action for specific
performance instituted before the RTC, as the writ of certiorari being
prayed for is directed against the judicial or quasi-judicial body, not against
the private parties in the original action for specific performance. Such being the case, the November 7 1999
Resolution of the Board of Directors of petitioner association is not and cannot be considered as an
authorization for its President, Evelio Barata, to initiate, sign, file and
prosecute another case for the special civil action of certiorari. The CA was, thus, correct in dismissing the
petition for lack of authority of Evelio Barata to sign the Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping in representation of petitioner.
The submission of a Secretary’s Certificate with the Motion for
Reconsideration is also insufficient to cure the initial defect. Said Certificate stated that petitioner’s
Board of Trustees approved a Resolution at a meeting held on
In Athena Computers, Inc. v. Reyes, the Court stressed that “certiorari,
being an extraordinary remedy, the party who seeks to avail of the same must
strictly observe the rules laid down by the law.” x x x.
x x x x
x
x x subsequent compliance does not ipso facto entitle a party to a
reconsideration of the dismissal order.
As the Court aptly observed in Batoy
v. Regional Trial
x x
x the requirement under
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory. The subsequent compliance with said requirement does not excuse a party’s
failure to comply therewith in the
first instance. In those cases where this Court excused the non-compliance
with the requirement of the submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping,
it found special circumstances or compelling reasons which made the
strict application of said Circular clearly unjustified or inequitable. x
x x [22] (Emphasis supplied)
As
in the present case, such special circumstances or compelling reasons are
absent.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69827, dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner, with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Sergio L. Pestaño, concurring; rollo, p. 70.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner, with Associate Justices Sergio L. Pestaño and Danilo B. Pine, concurring; id. at 79-80.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 27-31.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Supra note 1.
[8] Supra note 2.
[9] Rollo, pp. 31-32.
[10] G.R. No. 174373,
[11]
[12] G.R. No. 148072,
[13] G.R. No. 165471,
[14]
[15] Magestrado v. People, supra note 12, at 136.
[16] G.R.
No. 150865,
[17]
[18] CA rollo, p. 26. (Emphasis and underscoring ours.)
[19] Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 1, and Rule 56-A.
[20] Tible and Tible Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings and Loan Association, G.R. No. 155806, April 8, 2008, 550 SCRA 562, 574, citing Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holding Corporation, 436 SCRA 123 (2004).
[21]
[22]