Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
HEIRS
OF THE LATE JOAQUIN LIMENSE, namely: CONCESA LIMENSE, Surviving Spouse; and
DANILO and JOSELITO, both surnamed Limense, children, Petitioners, - versus - RITA VDA. DE RAMOS, RESTITUTO RAMOS,
VIRGILIO DIAZ, IRENEO RAMOS, BENJAMIN RAMOS, WALDYTRUDES RAMOS-BASILIO, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 152319 Present:
QUISUMBING,* J., CARPIO,
J., Chairperson, chico-nazario, PERALTA, and ABAD,** JJ. Promulgated: October 28, 2009
|
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D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.,
This is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated December 20, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589 affirming in toto the Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, dated September 21, 1990 in
Civil Case No. 83-16128.
The
antecedent facts are as follows:
Dalmacio
Lozada was the registered owner of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 12,
Block No. 1074 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 7036 issued at the City of Manila on June 14,
1927,[3]
containing an area of 873.80 square meters, more or less, located in Beata Street,
Pandacan, Manila.
Dalmacio
Lozada subdivided his property into five (5) lots, namely: Lot Nos. 12-A, 12-B,
12-C, 12-D and 12-E. Through a Deed of Donation dated
Under
the said Deed of Donation, the lots were adjudicated to Dalmacio's daughters in
the following manner:
a. Lot No. 12-A
in favor of Isabel Lozada, married to Isaac Limense;
b. Lot No. 12-B
in favor of Catalina Lozada, married to Sotero Natividad;
c. Lot No. 12-C
in favor of Catalina Lozada, married to Sotero Natividad;
Isabel Lozada, married to Isaac Limense; and Salud Lozada, married to Francisco Ramos, in equal parts;
d. Lot No. 12-D
in favor of Salud Lozada, married to Francisco Ramos;
and
e. Lot No. 12-E
in favor of Isabel Lozada, married to Isaac Limense,
and Felicidad Lozada, married to Galicano Centeno.
By
virtue of the Deed of Donation executed by Dalmacio Lozada, OCT No. 7036, which
was registered in his name, was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) bearing Nos. 40041, 40042, 40043, 40044, and 40045
were issued in favor of the donees, except TCT No. 40044, which remained in his
name. These new TCTs were annotated at the back of OCT No. 7036.[5]
TCT
No. 40043, which covered Lot No. 12-C, was issued in the name of its co-owners
Catalina Lozada, married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel Lozada, married to Isaac
Limense; and Salud Lozada, married to Francisco Ramos. It covered an area of
68.60 square meters, more or less, was bounded on the northeast by Lot No.
12-A, on the southwest by Calle Beata, and on the northwest by Lot No. 12-D of
the subdivision plan. In 1932, respondents' predecessor-in-interest constructed
their residential building on Lot No. 12-D, adjacent to Lot No. 12-C.
On
On
October 1, 1981, Joaquin Limense secured a building permit for the construction
of a hollow block fence on the boundary line between his aforesaid property and
the adjacent parcel of land located at 2759 Beata Street, Pandacan, Manila,
designated as Lot No. 12-D, which was being occupied by respondents. The fence,
however, could not be constructed because a substantial portion of respondents'
residential building in Lot No. 12-D encroached upon portions of Joaquin
Limense's property in Lot No. 12-C.
Joaquin
Limense demanded the removal of the encroached area; however, respondent
ignored both oral and written demands. The
parties failed to amicably settle the differences between them despite referral
to the barangay. Thus, on
Joaquin
Limense prayed that the RTC issue an order directing respondents, jointly and
severally, to remove the portion which illegally encroached upon his property on
Lot No. 12-C and, likewise, prayed for the payment of damages, attorney’s fees
and costs of suit.
Respondents,
on the other hand, averred in their Answer[8]
that they were the surviving heirs of Francisco Ramos,[9]
who, during his lifetime, was married to Salud Lozada, one of the daughters of
Dalmacio Lozada, the original owner of Lot No. 12. After subdividing the said lot, Dalmacio
Lozada donated Lot No. 12-C in favor of his daughters Catalina, married to
Sotero Natividad; Isabel, married to Isaac Limense; and Salud, married to
Francisco Ramos. Being the surviving heirs of Francisco Ramos, respondents
later became co-owners of Lot No. 12-C.
After
trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision[10]
dated
The
Court finds that an apparent easement of right of way exists in favor of the
defendants under Article 624 of the Civil Code. It cannot be denied that there
is an alley which shows its existence. It is admitted that this alley was
established by the original owner of
The
Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which forms the
alley, he knew that said lot could serve no other purpose than as an alley.
That is why even after he acquired it in 1969, the lot continued to be used by
defendants and occupants of the other adjoining lots as an alley. The existence
of the easement of right of way was therefore known to plaintiff who must
respect the same in spite of the fact that his transfer certificate of title
does not mention the lot of defendants as among those listed therein as
entitled to such right of way. It is an established principle that actual
notice or knowledge is as binding as registration.[11]
Aggrieved
by said decision, Joaquin Limense filed a notice of appeal. The records of the
case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals (CA). During the pendency of the
appeal with the CA, Joaquin Limense died in 1999.[12]
The
CA, Seventh Division, in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589, in its Decision[13]
dated December 20, 2001 dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Frustrated
by this turn of events, petitioners, as surviving heirs of Joaquin Limense,
elevated the case to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari[14] raising
the following issues:
1. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN HOLDING, LIKE THE TRIAL COURT DID, THAT RESPONDENTS' LOT 12-D HAS AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY OVER JOAQUIN LIMENSE'S LOT 12-C?
2. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN FAILING TO HOLD, LIKE THE TRIAL COURT DID, THAT THE PROTRUDING PORTIONS OF RESPONDENTS' HOUSE ON LOT 12-D EXTENDING INTO JOAQUIN LIMENSE'S LOT 12-C CONSTITUTE A NUISANCE AND, AS SUCH, SHOULD BE REMOVED?
Petitioners aver that the CA erred in ruling
that since Lot No. 12-C was covered by two TCT's, i.e., TCT Nos. 40043 and 96886, and there was no evidence on record
to show how Joaquin Limense was able to secure another title over an already
titled property, then one of these titles must be of dubious origin. According
to the CA, TCT No. 96886, issued in the name of Joaquin Limense, was spurious
because the Lozada sisters never disposed of the said property covered by TCT
No. 40043. The CA further ruled that a co-ownership existed over Lot No. 12-C
between petitioners and respondents. Petitioners countered that TCT No. 96886,
being the only and best legitimate proof of ownership over Lot No. 12-C, must
prevail over TCT No. 40043.
Respondents allege that it was possible
that TCT No. 96886, in the name of Joaquin Limense, was obtained thru fraud,
misrepresentation or falsification of documents because the donees of said
property could not possibly execute any valid transfer of title to Joaquin
Limense, as they were already dead prior to the issuance of TCT No. 96886 in
1969. Respondents further allege that petitioners
failed to produce proof substantiating the issuance of TCT No. 96886 in the
name of Joaquin Limense.
Apparently,
respondents are questioning the legality of TCT No. 96886, an issue that this
Court cannot pass upon in the present case. It is a rule that the validity of a torrens
title cannot be assailed collaterally.[15] Section 48 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 provides
that:
[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.
In the case at
bar, the action filed before the RTC against respondents was an action for
removal of obstruction and damages. Respondents
raised the defense that Joaquin Limense's title could have been obtained
through fraud and misrepresentation in the trial proceedings before the RTC.
Such defense is in the nature of a collateral attack, which is not allowed by
law.
Further, it has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not
thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished,
except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, the reliance on
registered titles would be lost. The title became indefeasible and
incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the time of its registration
and issuance. Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that “upon the expiration of said
period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title
shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of
registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against
the applicant or other persons responsible for the fraud.”[16] It has, therefore, become an ancient rule that the
issue on the validity of title, i.e.,
whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose.[17] In the present case, TCT No. 96886 was
registered in 1969 and respondents never instituted any direct proceeding or
action to assail Joaquin Limense's title.
Additionally, an examination of TCT
No. 40043 would readily show that there is an annotation that it has been “CANCELLED.”[18]
A reading of TCT No. 96886 would
also reveal that said title is a transfer from TCT No. 48866[19]
and not TCT 40043. Thus, it is possible
that there was a series of transfers effected from TCT No. 40043 prior to the
issuance of TCT No. 96886. Hence, respondents' position that the issuance
of TCT No. 96886 in the name of Joaquin Limense is impossible, because the
registered owners of TCT No. 40043 were already dead prior to 1969 and could
not have transferred the property to Joaquin Limense, cannot be taken as proof
that TCT No. 96886 was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation or
falsification of documents.
Findings of fact of
the CA, although generally deemed conclusive, may admit review by this Court if
the CA failed to notice certain relevant facts that, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion, and if the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension
of facts.[20] As with the present case, the CA's
observation that TCT No.
96886 is of dubious origin, as TCT No. 40043 does not appear to have been disposed of by Catalina, Isabel and
Salud Lozada, is improper and constitutes an indirect attack on TCT No. 96886. As we see it, TCT
No. 96886, at present, is the best proof of Joaquin Limense’s ownership over
Lot No. 12-C. Thus, the CA
erred in ruling that respondents and petitioners co-owned Lot No. 12-C, as said
lot is now registered exclusively in the name of Joaquin Limense.
Due to the foregoing, Joaquin Limense, as the registered
owner of Lot 12-C, and his successors-in-interest, may enclose or fence his
land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any
other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.[21]
However,
although the owner of the property has the right to enclose or fence his
property, he must respect servitudes constituted thereon. The question now is
whether respondents are entitled to an easement of right of way.
Petitioners contend that respondents
are not entitled to an easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-C, because
their Lot No. 12-D is not duly annotated at the back of TCT No. 96886 which
would entitle them to enjoy the easement, unlike Lot Nos. 12-A-1, 12-A-2,
12-A-3, 12-A-4, 12-A-5, and 12-A-6. Respondents,
on the other hand, allege that they are entitled to an easement of right of way
over Lot No. 12-C, which has been continuously used as an alley by the heirs of
Dalmacio Lozada, the residents in the area and the public in general from 1932
up to the present. Since petitioners are fully aware of the long existence of
the said alley or easement of right of way, they are bound to respect the same.
As defined, an easement is a real
right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the
latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to
be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement.[22]
Easements may be continuous or
discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent.
Continuous easements are those the use
of which is or may be incessant, without the intervention of any act of man.
Discontinuous easements are those which are used at intervals and depend upon
the acts of man. Apparent easements are those which are made known and are
continually kept in view by external signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of
the same. Non-apparent easements are those which show no external indication of
their existence.[23]
In the present case, the easement of
right of way is discontinuous and apparent. It is discontinuous, as the use
depends upon the acts of respondents and
other persons passing through the property. Being an alley that shows a
permanent path going to and from
Being a discontinuous and apparent
easement, the same can be acquired only by virtue of a title.[24]
In the case at bar, TCT No. 96886,
issued in the name of Joaquin Limense, does not contain any annotation that Lot
No. 12-D was given an easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-C. However,
Joaquin Limense and his successors-in-interests are fully aware that Lot No.
12-C has been continuously used and utilized as an alley by respondents and residents
in the area for a long period of time.
Joaquin Limense's Attorney-in-Fact,
Teofista L. Reyes, testified that respondents and several other residents in
the area have been using the alley to reach
Atty. Manuel B.
Tomacruz:
Q:
Mrs. Witness, by virtue of that
Deed of Donation you claim that titles were issued to the children of Dalmacio
Lozada namely Salud Lozada, Catalina Lozada and Isabel Lozada, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q:
And after the said property was
adjudicated to his said children the latter constructed their houses on their
lots.
A: Yes, sir.
Q:
As a matter of fact, the herein
defendants have constructed their houses on the premises alloted to them since
the year 1932?
A:
Yes, sir, they were able to
construct their house fronting
Q:
And that house they have
constructed on their lot in 1932 is still existing today?
A:
Yes, sir and they still used the
alley in question and they are supposed to use
Q: They are using the alley?
A:
Yes, sir, they are using the alley
and they do not pass through
Q: And they have been using the alley since
1932 up to the present?
A:
Yes, sir they have been using the
alley since that time. That was their mistake and they should be using
Q:
As a matter of fact, it is not only
herein defendants who have been using that alley since 1932 up to the present?
A: Yes, sir they are using the alley up to
now.
Q:
As a matter of fact, in this
picture marked as Exh. “C-1” the alley is very apparent. This is the alley?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And there are houses on either side of
this alley?
A: Yes, sir.
Q:
As a matter of fact, all the
residents on either side of the alley are passing through this alley?
A: Yes, sir, because the others have permit
to use this alley and they are now allowed to use the alley but the Ramos's
family are now [not] allowed to use this alley.[25]
In Mendoza v. Rosel,[26]
this Court held that:
Petitioners
claim that inasmuch as their transfer certificates of title do not mention any
lien or encumbrance on their lots, they are purchasers in good faith and for
value, and as such have a right to demand from
respondents some payment for the use of the alley. However, the Court of
Appeals found, as a fact, that when respondents acquired the two lots which
form the alley, they knew that said lots could serve no other purpose than as
an alley. The existence of the easement of right of way was therefore
known to petitioners who must respect the same, in spite of the fact that their
transfer certificates of title do not mention any burden or easement. It is an
established principle that actual notice or knowledge is as binding as
registration.
Every buyer of a registered land who
takes a certificate of title for value and in good faith shall hold the same
free of all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate. It has
been held, however, that “where the party has knowledge of a prior existing
interest that was unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same
land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of
registration as to him.”[27]
In the case at bar, Lot No. 12-C has
been used as an alley ever since it was donated by Dalmacio Lozada to his
heirs. It is undisputed that prior to and after the registration of TCT No.
96886, Lot No. 12-C has served as a right of way in favor of respondents and
the public in general. We quote from the RTC's decision:
x x x It cannot
be denied that there is an alley which shows its existence. It is admitted that
this alley was established by the original owner of
The Court also finds that
when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which forms the alley, he knew that said
lot could serve no other purpose than as an alley. That is why even after he
acquired it in 1969 the lot continued to be used by defendants and occupants of
the other adjoining lots as an alley. x
x x[28]
Thus, petitioners are bound by the
easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-C, even though no registration of the
servitude has been made on TCT No. 96886.
However, respondents’ right to have
access to the property of petitioners does not include the right to continually
encroach upon the latter’s property. It
is not disputed that portions of respondents' house on Lot No. 12-D encroach
upon Lot No. 12-C. Geodetic Engineer Jose Agres, Jr. testified on the
encroachment of respondents' house on Lot No. 12-C, which he surveyed.[29]
In order to settle the rights of the parties relative to the encroachment, We
should determine whether respondents were builders in good faith.
Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with
no technical meaning or statutory definition; and it encompasses, among other
things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of a design to
defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual’s personal good faith is a concept of his own mind and,
therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations alone.
It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances
which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good
faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s
right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach
another. Applied to possession, one is considered in good
faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.[30]
Good faith is always presumed, and
upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of
proof.[31]
It is a matter of record that respondents' predecessor-in-interest constructed
their residential building on Lot No. 12-D, adjacent to Lot No. 12-C, in 1932.[32]
Respondents' predecessor-in-interest owned the 1/3 portion of Lot No. 12-C at
the time the property was donated to them by Dalmacio Lozada in 1932. The Deed
of Donation executed by the late Dalmacio Lozada, dated
I
hereby grant, cede and donate in favor of Catalina Lozada married to Sotero
Natividad, Isabel Lozada married to Isaac Simense and Salud Lozada married to
Francisco Ramos, all Filipinos, of legal age, the parcel of land known as Lot
No. 12-C, in equal parts.[33]
The portions of Lot No. 12-D,
particularly the overhang, covering 1 meter in width and 17 meters in length;
the stairs; and the concrete structures are all within the 1/3 share alloted to
them by their donor Dalmacio Lozada and, hence, there was absence of a showing
that respondents acted in bad faith when they built portions of their house on
Lot No. 12-C.
Using the above parameters, we are
convinced that respondents' predecessors-in-interest acted in good
faith when they built portions of their house on
Articles 448 and 546 of the New Civil
Code provide:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has
been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged
to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.
The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and, in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to
every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed
therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the
possessor in good faith with the same right
of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the
option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in
value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
In Spouses Del Campo v. Abesia,[34]
this provision was applied to one whose house, despite having been built at the
time he was still co-owner, overlapped with the land of another. In that case,
this Court ruled:
The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon the land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership.
However, when, as in this case, the ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. x x x[35]
In
other words, when the co-ownership is terminated by a partition, and it appears
that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion
pertaining to another co-owner, but the encroachment was in good faith, then
the provisions of Article 448 should apply to determine the respective rights
of the parties. In this case, the co-ownership was terminated due to the
transfer of the title of the whole property in favor of Joaquin Limense.
Under the foregoing provision,
petitioners have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of
respondents upon payment of indemnity to respondents, as provided for in
Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, petitioners may oblige respondents to
pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is
considerably much more than the value of the portion of the house of
respondents built thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. Respondents
shall then pay the reasonable rent to petitioners upon such terms and
conditions that they may agree. In case
of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course,
respondents may demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at their
own expense, if they so decide.[36]
The choice belongs to the owner of the
land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession that the accessory
follows the principal and not the other way around.[37] Even as the option lies with the landowner,
the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot,
for instance, compel the owner of the building to instead remove it from the
land.[38]
The obvious benefit to the builder
under this article is that, instead of being outrightly ejected from the land,
he can compel the landowner to make a choice between two options: (1) to
appropriate the building by paying the indemnity required by law, or (2) to sell
the land to the builder.[39]
The raison d’etre for this provision has been enunciated, thus:
Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.[40]
In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao,[41]
this case must be remanded to the trial court to determine matters necessary
for the proper application of Article 448 in relation to Article 546.
Such matters include the option that petitioners would take and the amount of
indemnity that they would pay, should they decide to appropriate the
improvements on the lots.
Anent the second issue, although it
may seem that the portions encroaching upon respondents' house can be
considered a nuisance, because it hinders petitioners' use of their property,
it cannot simply be removed at respondents' expense, as prayed for by
petitioner. This is because respondents built the subject encroachment in good
faith, and the law affords them certain rights as discussed above.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
1. No
co-ownership exists over Lot No. 12-C, covered by TCT No. 96886, between
petitioners and respondents.
2. The case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 15,
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
Designated to sit as an
additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per
Special Order No. 755 dated
** Designated to sit as an additional
member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. per Special
Order No. 753 dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Teodoro P. Regino, concurring; rollo, pp. 29-35.
[2]
[3] Records, p. 231.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] In their answer, respondents referred to Francisco Ramos as “Francisco Ramos, Sr.”
[10] Records, pp. 311-314.
[11]
[12] Rollo, p. 27.
[13]
[14]
[15] Vda. de Gualberto v. Go, G.R.
No. 139843,
[16]
[17] Tanenglian v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 173415,
[18] Records, p. 239.
[19]
[20] Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168 (1997).
[21] New Civil Code, Art. 430.
[22] Quimen v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 969, 976 (1996), citing 3 Sanchez Roman 472.
[23] New Civil Code, Art. 615.
[24] New Civil Code, Art. 622.
[25] TSN,
[26] 74 Phil. 84 (1943). (Emphasis supplied).
[27] Private Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136897, November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 591, 607.
[28] Rollo, p. 55.
[29] TSN,
[30] Elvira T. Arangote v. Spouses Martin and Lourdes S. Maglunob, and Romeo Salido, G.R No. 178906, February 18, 2009; Heirs of Marcelino Cabal v. Cabal, G.R. No. 153625, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 301, 315-316.
[31] New Civil Code, Art. 527; Ballatan v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 408, 419 (1999).
[32] Direct
Examination of Ms. Rita Vda. de Ramos by Atty. Meneses, TSN,
Q: How about the land which was donated to the defendants
therein, namely Lot No. 12-D, what
happened to this land?
A:
That is where our house is located.
Q:
When did you construct your house on that land?
A:
Sometime in 1932.
Q:
And that house is still existing today?
A:
Yes, sir.
[33] Records, p. 228. (Emphasis supplied.)
[34] No. L-49219,
[35] Spouses Del Campo v. Abesia, supra, at 382-383.
[36]
[37] Ochoa v. Apeta, G.R. No.
146259,
[38] Philippine National Bank v. De Jesus, 458 Phil. 454, 459 (2003).
[39] Tecnogas Philippines Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 471, 482 (1997).
[40] Rosales v. Castelltort, G.R No.
157044,
[41] 221 Phil. 168 (1985), cited in Macasaet v. Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 154391-92, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 625.