SECOND DIVISION
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MONTANO
PICO and ROSITA PICO, Petitioners, - versus - CATALINA ADALIM-SALCEDO and URBANO SALCEDO, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 152006 Present: *YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., **CARPIO-MORALES, Acting Chairperson, BRION, ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: October
2, 2009 |
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D E C I S I
O N
BRION, J.:
In their
Petition for Review on Certiorari,[1]
petitioners Montano Pico and Rosita Pico (collectively Picos) assail the Court of Appeals (CA) decision[2] in
CA-G.R. CV No. 50278, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Tandag, Surigao del Sur.
The RTC decision, in turn, declared respondent
spouses Catalina Salcedo (Catalina) and
Urbano Salcedo (collectively Salcedos)
as the owners of the entire Lot No. 1188 Cad. 392-D, covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5930,
and ordered the Picos to vacate the portion of
BACKGROUND FACTS
The present
petition originated from an action for recovery of possession and quieting of
title filed by the Salcedos against the Picos with the RTC of Tandag, Surigao
del Sur on
In the
complaint, the Salcedos claimed that Catalina bought coconut lands situated in Barangay
Bioto,
The Salcedos narrated that while the
Picos were occupying the first lot, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey on
the property. Since the Salcedos were in
In their second cause of action, the
Salcedos alleged that the Picos also laid claim to a 1,247-square meter portion
of the land covered by OCT No. 5930 (second
lot), which the Picos maintained they bought from a certain Vicente Diaz. Thus,
the Salcedos prayed that the RTC render a decision declaring them the rightful
owners of both properties.
In their
Answer, the Picos denied that Jose Pico was a tenant of Catalina, insisting that
Jose had always owned the first lot. While admitting that Catalina bought lands
from
The Picos also denied Catalina’s
claim that she was absent at the time the property was surveyed, asserting that
the cadastral survey conducted on the property was done with the knowledge of
all the adjoining owners, including the Salcedos.
As to the second lot, the Picos
insisted that they legally bought the land from Vicente Diaz, the lawful owner,
on March 7, 1977; Vicente Diaz, in turn, purchased the second lot from
On
After both
parties presented their evidence, the RTC issued a decision[3] on
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the [Salcedos] as the owners pro
indiviso of the entire lot no. 1188 Cad. 392-D covered by the Original
Certificate of Title No. 5930 in the name of Catalina Adalim and, as such,
entitled to recover the possession of any portion thereof occupied or possessed
by the [Picos] or anyone acting for and in behalf;
2. Ordering the [Picos] to vacate and turn over
peacefully to the [Salcedos] the possession of their occupied portion of Lot
No. 1188 Cad. 392-D [second lot];
3. Declaring the [Picos] and their co-heirs, if
any, as the owners of pro diviso of
4. The respective claims for damages of the
plaintiffs and the defendants are dismissed.
NO
COSTS.
SO
ORDERED.
Both parties appealed this decision
with the CA.
On
The Picos
moved for a reconsideration of the decision, which the CA subsequently denied
in its Resolution dated
Hence, this petition.
THE PETITION
As only the
Picos assail the CA decision, the sole question we are asked to resolve is --
who owns the portion of land registered in Catalina’s name, but is currently in
the Picos’ possession?
In their
petition, the Picos insist that they were able to prove that they legally
acquired the second lot by preponderance of evidence given that they presented
the following: (a) the Deed of Sale which proved that Vicente Diaz had sold the
second lot to the Picos; (b) Vicente Diaz’s “Declaracion Jurada,” where Vicente
Diaz swore to the fact that he had lawfully acquired the second lot from
Teodorico Plaza sometime in 1954; (c) Teodorico Plaza’s attestation that he
bought the second lot in 1932 when he was still single; and (d) the testimony
of Pociano Ajos, who testified that he knew about the sale of the second lot
between Vicente Diaz and the Picos.
While
On the other
hand, the Salcedos claim that the Picos merely filed the present petition for
delay, arguing that the petition presents no new matter for the Court’s
consideration. The Salcedos also point out that the issues raised by the Picos
are factual questions, which the Court cannot review on appeal by certiorari.
THE COURT’S RULING
We
deny the petition for lack of merit.
The petition
raises mere questions of fact.
In a
petition for review on certiorari, we
are limited to reviewing errors of law absent any showing that the findings of
fact of the appellate court are not supported by the records.[7]
A question of law exists
when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises
as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of
the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.[8]
In asking
us to declare them as the lawful owners of the second lot, the Picos are in
effect praying that we overturn the factual findings made by the RTC, which findings
have already been affirmed by the CA. In other words, we are asked to substitute
our own judgment for those of the trial court and the appellate court by
conducting another evaluation of the evidence.
We have consistently declared that
factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are
binding and conclusive on this Court and will generally not be reviewed on
appeal[9]
as this Court is not a trier of facts.[10]
It is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, subject to
certain exceptions,[11]
none of which is present in this case. As
we said in Zaragoza vs. Nobleza:[12]
Whether
the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to
contrary evidence submitted by an adverse party, may be said to be strong,
clear and convincing, whether certain documents presented by one side should be
accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious
character by the other side, whether inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a
party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight –
all these are issues of fact which may not be passed upon in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Property
covered by
Even if we were to review the facts
of the case, we would still find no reason to grant the petition.
As found by the RTC, the survey of
the lots was conducted from
A title, once
registered, cannot be defeated, even by adverse, open and notorious possession.[13] The
title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice.
No one can plead ignorance of the registration.[14]
Hence, while the
Picos’ may have been in open, notorious, and continuous possession of the second
lot from the time it was purchased in 1977 until the present time, such possession no matter how long could not
ripen into ownership as the second lot is part of registered land.
Even the Picos
admit the indefeasible nature of
We note that the Picos have not shown
any evidence to support their claim of fraudulent registration. Also telling is
the Picos’ inaction to correct this alleged fraudulent registration. As we
observed earlier, OCT No. 5930 was
issued in Catalina’s name and transcribed in the Registration Book for the
We therefore see no reason to overturn
the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50278 dated
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice Acting Chairperson |
|
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice |
MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
Designated additional Member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 691
dated
* * Designated Acting Chairperson of the
Second Division per Special Order No. 690 dated
[1] Under
Rule 45. Dated
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria (dismissed), with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola (deceased) and Jose L. Sabio, Jr.; dated
[3]
[4] Supra note 2.
[5] Rollo, pp. 30-31.
[6] Section 55.
xxx
That in all cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title: xxx
[7] Bernaldez v. Francia, G.R. No. 143929,
[8] Bukidnon Doctors’ Hospital v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 161882, July 8, 2005, 463 SCRA 222, citing Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 375 SCRA 145 (2002).
[9] Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil.
554 (2001); Garrido v. Court of Appeals,
421 Phil. 872 (2001);
[10] First Metro Investment Corp. v. Este
[11] The exceptions are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion.
[12] G.R. No. 144560,
[13] Omandam v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128750, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 483; Cervantes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118982, February 19, 2001, 352 SCRA 47; Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142056, April 19, 2001, 356 SCRA 768; Heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, Phil. 815 (1998).
[14]Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915);
St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. v. Cleofas,
G.R. No. L-47385,