THIRD DIVISION
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HEIRS OF JOSE SY BANG,
HEIRS OF JULIAN SY and OSCAR SY,[1] Petitioners, - versus - ROLANDO SY, ROSALINO SY,
LUCIO SY, ENRIQUE SY, ROSAURO SY, BARTOLOME SY, FLORECITA SY, LOURDES SY,
JULIETA SY, and ROSITA FERRERA-SY, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x |
G.R.
No. 114217
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ILUMINADA TAN, SPOUSES
JULIAN SY AND ROSA TAN, ZENAIDA TAN, and MA. EMMA SY, Petitioners, - versus - BARTOLOME SY, ROSALINO SY,
FLORECITA SY, ROLANDO SY, LOURDES SY, ROSAURO SY, JULIETA SY, and ROSITA
FERRERA-SY, Respondents. |
G.R. No.
150797 Present: CARPIO, J.
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: October
13, 2009 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court are two Petitions
for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. The first Petition, G.R. No. 114217, assails the Decision[2] dated
May 6, 1993 and the Resolution[3]
dated February 28, 1994 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 17686. On the other hand, the second Petition, G.R.
No. 150797, questions the Decision dated February 28, 2001 and the Resolution
dated November 5, 2001 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 46244.
The factual antecedents are as
follows:
G.R. No. 114217
On May 28, 1980, respondent Rolando
Sy filed a Complaint for Partition against spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada
Tan, spouses Julian Sy and Rosa Tan, Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, Oscar Sy,
Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy, Florecita Sy,
Lourdes Sy, Julieta Sy, Rosita Ferrera-Sy, and Renato Sy before the then Court
of First Instance of Quezon, Branch 2, docketed as Civil Case No. 8578.[4]
Respondents
Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy,
Julieta Sy, Lourdes Sy, and Florecita Sy are the children of Sy Bang by his
second marriage to respondent Rosita Ferrera-Sy, while petitioners Jose Sy
Bang, Julian Sy and Oscar Sy are the children of Sy Bang from his first
marriage to Ba Nga, and petitioners Zenaida Tan and Ma. Emma Sy are the children
of petitioner spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan.[5]
Sy
Bang died intestate in 1971, leaving behind real and personal properties,
including several businesses.[6]
During
an out-of-court conference between petitioners and respondents, it was agreed that the
management, supervision or administration of the common properties and/or the
entire estate of the deceased Sy Bang shall be placed temporarily in the hands
of petitioner Jose Sy Bang, as trustee, with authority to delegate some of his
functions to any of petitioners or private respondents. Thus, the function or
duty of bookkeeper was delegated by Jose Sy Bang to his co-petitioner Julian
Sy, and the duty or function of management and operation of the business of
cinema of the common ownership was delegated by petitioner Jose Sy Bang to
respondent Rosauro Sy.[7]
Herein
petitioners and respondents also agreed that the income of the three cinema
houses, namely, Long Life, SBS and Sy-Co Theaters, shall exclusively pertain to
respondents for their support and sustenance, pending the termination of Civil
Case No. 8578, for Judicial Partition, and the income from the vast parts of
the entire estate and other businesses of their common father, to pertain
exclusively to petitioners. Hence, since
the year 1980, private respondents, through respondent Rosauro Sy, had taken charge
of the operation and management of the three cinema houses, with the income
derived therefrom evenly divided among themselves for their support and
maintenance.[8]
On
March 30, 1981, the Judge rendered a First Partial Decision based on the
Compromise Agreement dated November 10, 1980, submitted in Civil Case No. 8578
by plaintiff Rolando Sy and defendants Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy. On April 2,
1981, the Judge rendered a Second Partial Decision based on the pretrial order
of the court, dated March 25, 1981, entered into by and between respondent Renato
Sy and petitioner spouses. Said First Partial Decision and Second Partial
Decision had long become final, without an appeal having been interposed by any
of the parties.[9]
On
June 8, 1982, the Judge rendered a Third Partial Decision,[10]
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders this Third Partial Decision:
(a) Declaring that all the properties, businesses or assets, their income, produce and improvements, as well as all the rights, interests or participations (sic) in the names of defendants Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan and their children, defendants Zenaida and Ma. Emma; both surnamed Sy, and defendants Julian Sy and his wife Rosa Tan, as belonging to the estate of Sy Bang, including the properties in the names of said defendants which are enumerated in the Complaints in this case and all those properties, rights and interests which said defendants may have concealed or fraudulently transferred in the names of other persons, their agents or representatives;
(b) Declaring the following as the heirs of Sy Bang, namely: his surviving widow, Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy and her children, Enrique, Bartolome, Rosalino, Rolando, Rosauro, Maria Lourdes, Florecita and Julieta, all surnamed Sy, and his children by his first wife, namely: Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy, Lucio Sy, Oscar Sy and Renato Sy;
(c) Ordering the partition of the Estate of Sy Bang among his heirs entitled thereto after the extent thereof shall have been determined at the conclusion of the proper accounting which the parties in this case, their agents and representatives, shall render and after segregating and delivering to Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy her one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal partnership between her and her deceased husband Sy Bang;
(d) Deferring resolution on the question concerning the inclusion for partition of properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando and Enrique, all surnamed Sy.
SO ORDERED.
On June 16, 1982, petitioners filed a
Motion to Suspend Proceedings and for Inhibition, alleging, among others, that
the Judge had patently shown partiality in favor of their co-defendants in the
case. This motion was denied on August
16, 1982.[11]
On July 4, 1982, petitioners filed a
Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition (Disqualification) and Mandamus
with Restraining Order with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 60957. The Petition for Prohibition and for
Inhibition was denied, and the Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order was
Noted.[12]
On August 17, 1982, the Judge issued
two Orders: (1) in the first Order,[13] Mrs.
Lucita L. Sarmiento was appointed as Receiver, and petitioners’ Motion for New Trial and/or
Reconsideration, dated July 9, 1982 and their Supplemental Motion, dated July
12, 1982, were denied for lack of merit; and (2) in the second Order,[14] the
Judge ordered the immediate cancellation of the lis pendens annotated at the back of the certificates of title in
the names of Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy.
On August 18, 1982, the trial court
approved the bond posted by the receiver, Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento, Bartolome
Sy, Rolando Sy and Rosalino Sy.[15]
While the Petition for Mandamus with
Restraining Order was pending before the First Division of the Supreme Court,
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 61519. A Temporary Restraining Order was issued on
August 31, 1982, to enjoin the Judge from taking any action in Civil Case No.
8578 and, likewise, restraining the effectivity of and compliance with the Resolution
dated August 16, 1982, the two Orders dated August 17, 1982, and the Order
dated August 18, 1982.
On September 2, 1982, petitioners
withdrew their Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order, docketed as G.R.
No. 60957.
On September 11, 1982, an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion was filed by Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento, the appointed
receiver, which was opposed by petitioners on September 24, 1982. [16]
After several incidents in the case,
the Court, on May 8, 1989, referred the petition to the CA for proper
determination and disposition.
The CA rendered the assailed Decision[17]
on May 6, 1993, denying due course to and dismissing the petition for lack of
merit. It held that Judge Puno acted
correctly in issuing the assailed Third Partial Decision. The CA said that the act of Judge Puno in
rendering a partial decision was in accord with then Rule 36, Section 4, of the
Rules of Court, which stated that in an action against several defendants, the
court may, when a judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of
them, leaving the action to proceed against the others. It found that the
judge’s decision to defer resolution on the properties in the name of Rosalino,
Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique would not affect the resolution on the
properties in the names of Jose Sy Bang, Iluminada, Julian, Rosa, Zenaida, and
Ma. Emma, since the properties were separable and distinct from one another
such that the claim that the same formed part of the Sy Bang estate could be the
subject of separate suits.
The CA also upheld the judge’s
appointment of a receiver, saying that the judge did so after both parties had
presented their evidence and upon verified petition filed by respondents, and
in order to preserve the properties under litigation. Further, the CA found proper the order to
cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated in the certificates of title in the names of Rosalino, Rolando and
Bartolome.
The Motion for Reconsideration was
denied on February 28, 1994.[18]
On April 22, 1994, petitioners filed
this Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The Court denied the Petition for
non-compliance with Circulars 1-88 and 19-91 for failure of petitioners to
attach the registry receipt. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration, and the Petition was reinstated on July 13, 1994.
In this Petition for Review,
petitioners seek the reversal of the CA Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
17686 and, consequently, the nullification of the Third Partial Decision and
orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 8578. They also pray for the Court to direct the
trial court to proceed with the reception of further evidence in Civil Case No.
8578.[19] In particular, petitioners allege that the CA
decided questions of substance not in accord with law when it upheld the trial
court’s Third Partial Decision which, they alleged, was rendered in violation
of their rights to due process.
Petitioners
narrate that the trial court initially gave them two trial days – May 26 and
27, 1982 – to present their evidence. However,
at the hearing on May 26, the judge forced them to terminate the presentation
of their evidence. On June 2, 1982,
following petitioners’ submission of additional documentary evidence, the trial
court scheduled the case for hearing on June 8 and 9, 1982, at 2 o’clock in the
afternoon “in view of the importance of the issue concerning whether all the
properties in the names of Enrique Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy, and Rolando
Sy and/or their respective wives (as well as those in the names of other party-litigants
in this case) shall be declared or included as part of the Estate of Sy Bang,
and in view of the numerous documentary evidences (sic) presented by Attys.
Raya and Camaligan.” At the June 8 hearing, petitioners presented additional
evidence. Unknown to them, however, the trial court had already rendered its
Third Partial Decision at 11 o’clock that morning. Thus, petitioners argue that said Third
Partial Decision is void.[20]
They
also question the trial court’s First Order dated August 17, 1982 and Order
dated August 18, 1982 granting the prayer for receivership and appointing a
receiver, respectively, both allegedly issued without a hearing and without showing
the necessity to appoint a receiver. Lastly, they question the Second Order
dated August 17, 1982 canceling the notice of lis pendens ex parte and
without any showing that the notice was for the purpose of molesting the
adverse parties, or that it was not necessary to protect the rights of the
party who caused it to be recorded.[21]
On
May 9, 1996, Rosita Ferrera-Sy filed a Motion for Payment of Widow’s Allowance.
She alleged that her deceased husband,
Sy Bang, left an extensive estate. The
properties of the estate were found by the trial court to be their conjugal properties.
From the time of Sy Bang’s death in 1971
until the filing of the motion, Rosita was not given any widow’s allowance as provided in Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules
of Court by the parties in possession and control of her husband’s estate, or
her share in the conjugal partnership.[22]
In
their Comment on the Motion for Payment of Widow’s Allowance, petitioners argued
that Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the
same is granted only “during the settlement of the estate” of the decedent, and
this allowance, under Article 188 of the Civil Code (now Article 133 of the
Family Code), shall be taken from the “common mass of property” during the
liquidation of the inventoried properties.[23] Considering
that the case before the trial court is a special civil action for partition
under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, Rosita is not entitled to widow’s
allowance.
On
September 23, 1996, the Court granted the Motion for Payment of Widow’s
Allowance and ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay Rosita P25,000.00
as the widow’s allowance to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang, effective
September 1, 1996 and every month thereafter until the estate is finally
settled or until further orders from the Court.[24]
In
a Manifestation dated October 1, 1996, petitioners informed the Court that
Rosita and co-petitioner Enrique Sy had executed a waiver of past, present and
future claims against petitioners and, thus, should be dropped as parties to
the case.[25] Attached
thereto was a Sinumpaang Salaysay
wherein Rosita and Enrique stated that they were given P1 million and a
229-square meter parcel of land, for which reason they were withdrawing as
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 8578.[26]
Respondents,
except Enrique Sy, filed a Counter-Manifestation and Opposition to Drop Rosita
Sy as a Party.[27] They said
that it would be ridiculous for Rosita to give up her share in Sy Bang’s estate,
amounting to hundreds of millions of pesos, which had already been ordered
partitioned by the trial court, to the prejudice of her seven full-blooded
children. They alleged that Rosita was
not in possession of her full faculties when she affixed her thumbmark on the Sinumpaang Salaysay considering her age,
her frequent illness, and her lack of ability to read or write. Hence, they filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of P1 million allegedly given her.
In
their Reply to Counter-Manifestation,[28]
petitioners countered that respondents failed to present any concrete evidence
to challenge the Sinumpaang Salaysay.
Since the same was duly notarized, it
was a public document and presumed valid. They, likewise, alleged that the
Counter-Manifestation was filed without Rosita’s authorization as, in fact, she
had written her counsel with instructions to withdraw said pleading.[29] Further,
they averred that Rosita executed the Sinumpaang
Salaysay while in full possession of her faculties. They alleged that Rosita intended to oppose
the petition for guardianship and they presented a copy of a sworn
certification from Rosita’s physician that “she (Rosita) is physically fit and
mentally competent to attend to her personal or business transactions.”[30]
On
the other hand, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s
September 23, 1996 Resolution. It alleged that Rosita and Enrique executed their
Sinumpaang Salaysay on August 29,
1996. However, this development was made
known to the Court only on October 1, 1996; hence, the Court was not aware of
this when it issued its Resolution. Petitioners prayed for the reconsideration
of the September 23, 1996 Resolution and dropping Rosita and Enrique as parties
to the case.[31]
In their Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration, respondents maintained that the Court should not consider the
Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents alleged that Rosita thumbmarked the Sinumpaang Salaysay without
understanding the contents of the document or the implications of her acts. Respondents also tried to demonstrate that
their mother would thumbmark any document that their children asked her to by
exhibiting four documents each denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay and thumbmarked by Rosita. One purported to disown the earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay. The second was a
reproduction of the earlier Sinumpaang
Salaysay with the amount changed to P100.00, the Transfer
Certificate of Title number changed to 12343567, and the size of the property
to “as big as the entire Lucena City.” The
third purported to bequeath her shares in the conjugal partnership of gains to
Rosauro, Bartolome, Rolando, and Rosalino, while refusing to give any
inheritance to Florecita, Lourdes, Julieta, and Enrique. Lastly, the fourth contradicted the third in
that it was in favor of Florecita,
The Court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration on November 18, 1996.[33]
Petitioners
filed a Supplement to their Memorandum, additionally arguing that the Third
Partial Decision did not only unduly bind the properties without due process,
but also ignored the fundamental rule on the indefeasibility of
G.R. No. 150797
Meanwhile, on September 30, 1996,
respondents filed a Joint Petition for the Guardianship of the Incompetent
Rosita Ferrera-Sy before the RTC of Lucena City, Branch 58 (Guardianship court),
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 96-34. On May 19, 1997, Rosauro Sy, who sought to be
named as the special guardian, filed before the Guardianship court a Motion to
Order Court Deposit of Widow’s Allowance Ordered by the Supreme Court.[35] Then, he filed a Motion before this Court
seeking an Order for petitioners to pay Rosita P2,150,000.00 in widow’s
allowance and P25,000.00 every month thereafter, as ordered by this Court
in its September 23, 1996 Resolution. He
also prayed for petitioners’ imprisonment should they fail to comply therewith.[36]
On
July 8, 1997, the Guardianship court issued an Order, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Mr. Jose Sy Bang and his
wife Iluminada Tan; and their children, Zenaida Sy and Ma. Emma Sy; and Julian
Sy and his wife Rosa Tan, are hereby ordered to deposit to this Court, jointly
and severally, the amount of P250,000.00 representing the widow’s
allowance of the incompetent Rosita Ferrera Sy corresponding the (sic) periods from
September 1, 1996 to June 30, 1997, and additional amount of P25,000.00
per month and every month thereafter, within the first ten (10) days of each
month.[37]
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
was denied. Rosauro, the appointed guardian, then asked the Guardianship court
to issue a writ of execution. Meanwhile,
on December 10, 1997, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46244 to annul
the July 8, 1997 Order and October 9, 1997 Resolution of the Guardianship
court.[38]
In
a Decision[39] dated February
28, 2001, the CA ruled in respondents’ favor, finding “nothing legally
objectionable in private respondent Rosauro Sy’s filing of the motion to order
the deposit of the widow’s allowance ordered by the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
114217 or, for that matter, in the public respondent’s grant thereof in the
order herein assailed. More so, when the
public respondent’s actions are viewed in the light of the Supreme Court’s
denial of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of its resolution dated
September 23, 1996.”[40] Thus it held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed resolution dated September 23, 1996 (sic) is AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Their
Motion for Reconsideration having been denied on November 5, 2001,[41] petitioners filed this Petition for Review[42]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying for this Court to reverse the CA’s
February 28, 2001 Decision and its Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, and to declare the Guardianship court to have exceeded its
jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the widow’s allowance in Special
Proceedings No. 96-34.[43] They argued that the Guardianship court’s
jurisdiction is limited to determining whether Rosita was incompetent and, upon
finding in the affirmative, appointing a guardian. Moreover, under Rule 83, Section
3, of the Rules of Court, a widow’s allowance can only be paid in an estate
proceeding. Even if the complaint for
partition were to be considered as estate proceedings, only the trial court
hearing the partition case had the exclusive jurisdiction to execute the
payment of the widow’s allowance.[44]
They raised the following issues:
The Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the
I
The trial court,
acting as a
II
The payment of widow’s allowance cannot be implemented at [the] present because the estate of Sy Bang – the source from which payment is to be taken – has not been determined with finality.
III
The Order of the trial court purporting to enforce payment of widow’s allowance unduly modified the express terms of this Honorable Court’s Resolution granting it.[45]
Petitioners,
likewise, question the Guardianship court’s omission of the phrase “to be taken
from the estate of Sy Bang” from the July 8, 1997 Order. They interpreted this
to mean that the Guardianship court was ordering that the widow’s allowance be
taken from their own properties and not from the estate of Sy Bang – an “undue
modification” of this Court’s September 23, 1996 Resolution.[46]
On
January 21, 2002, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 114217 and G.R.
No. 150797. The parties submitted their respective Memoranda on May 21, 2003
and June 19, 2003, both of which were noted by this Court in its August 11, 2003
Resolution.
Pending
the issuance of this Court’s Decision in the two cases, respondent Rosauro Sy
filed, on November 11, 2003, a Motion to Order Deposit in Court of Supreme
Court’s Ordered Widow’s Allowance Effective September 23, 1996 and Upon Failure
of Petitioners Julian Sy, et al. to
Comply Therewith to Order Their Imprisonment Until Compliance. He alleged that
his mother had been ill and had no means to support herself except through his
financial assistance, and that respondents had not complied with this Court’s
September 23, 1996 Resolution, promulgated seven years earlier.[47] He
argued that respondents’ defiance constituted indirect contempt of court. That
the Guardianship court had found them guilty of indirect contempt did not help
his mother because she was still unable to collect her widow’s allowance.[48]
Petitioners
opposed said Motion arguing that the estate from which the widow’s allowance is
to be taken has not been settled. They also reiterated that Rosita, together
with son Enrique, had executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay waiving all claims against petitioners. Hence, there was no legal ground to cite them
in contempt.[49]
On
April 4, 2005, this Court granted Rosauro’s Motion, to wit:
WHEREFORE,
the Court finds and so holds petitioner Iluminada
Tan (widow of deceased petitioner
Jose Sy Bang), their children and co-petitioners Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, Julian Sy and the latter’s wife Rosa Tan, GUILTY of
contempt of this Court and are collectively sentenced to pay a FINE equivalent to ten (10%) percent of
the total amount due and unpaid to Rosita Ferrera-Sy by way of a widow’s
allowance pursuant to this Court’s Resolution of September 13, 1996, and
accordingly ORDERS their immediate
imprisonment until they shall have complied with said Resolution by paying
Rosita Ferrera-Sy the amount of TWO MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
PESOS (P2,600,100.00), representing her total accumulated unpaid widow’s
allowance from September, 1996 to April, 2005 at the rate of TWENTY-FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) a month, plus six (6%) percent
interest thereon. The Court further DIRECTS
petitioners to faithfully pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy her monthly widow’s allowance
for the succeeding months as they fall due, under pain of imprisonment.
This Resolution is immediately EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.[50]
Iluminada,
Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid the court fine of P260,010.00 on April 5,
2005.[51]
Respondents,
except Rosauro Sy (who had died), filed a Motion for Execution[52]
before this Court on April 25, 2005. On the other hand, petitioner Rosa Tan
filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Clarification.[53] She alleged that, in accordance with Chinese
culture, she had no participation in the management of the family business or
Sy Bang’s estate. After her husband’s
death, she allegedly inherited nothing but debts and liabilities, and, having
no income of her own, was now in a quandary on how these can be paid. She asked the Court to consider that she had
not disobeyed its Resolution and to consider her motion.
Other petitioners, Iluminada, Zenaida
and Ma. Emma, also filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for
Clarification.[54] They stressed
that the P1 million and the piece of land Rosita had already received from
Jose Sy Bang in 1996 should form part of the widow’s allowance. They also argued that whatever allowance
Rosita may be entitled to should come from the estate of Sy Bang. They further
argued the unfairness of being made to pay the allowance when none of them
participated in the management of Sy Bang’s estate; Zenaida and Ma. Emma being minors
at the time of his death, while Iluminada and Rosa had no significant role in
the family business.
Respondents
then filed a Motion for Issuance of Order Requiring Respondents to Deposit with
the Supreme Court’s Cashier its Ordered Widow’s Allowance[55]
and a Motion for Execution of Resolution dated April 4, 2005.[56] Petitioners opposed the same.[57]
On
July 25, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution granting both of respondents’
motions and denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.[58]
Petitioners
Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma filed, on August 15, 2005, a Manifestation of
Compliance and Motion for Clarification.[59]
They maintained that the issues they had raised in the motion for
reconsideration had not been duly resolved. They argued that when this Court issued its
September 23, 1996 Resolution, it was not yet aware that Rosita had executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay, wherein she waived
her claims and causes of action against petitioners. They also informed this Court that, on April
17, 1998, the Guardianship court had issued an Order which recognized a
“temporary agreement” based on the voluntary offer of Jose Sy Bang of a
financial assistance of P5,000.00 per month to Rosita while the case was
pending. Moreover, as a manifestation of
good faith, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid the P430,000.00
out of their own funds in partial compliance with the Court’s Resolution. However, the same did not in any way
constitute a waiver of their rights or defenses in the present case. They
underscored the fact that the allowance must come from the estate of Sy Bang,
and not from Jose Sy Bang or any of the latter’s heirs, the extent of which
remained undetermined. They further asked the Court to adjudicate the liability
for the widow’s allowance to be equally divided between them and the other set
of petitioners, the heirs of Julian Sy.
On
August 30, 2005, respondents filed a motion asking this Court to issue an Order
for the immediate incarceration of petitioners for refusing to comply with the
Court’s resolution.[60]
They aver that the period within which petitioners were to comply with the
Court’s Resolution had now lapsed, and thus, petitioners must now be
incarcerated for failure to abide by said Resolution. They likewise asked the Court to refer
petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Vicente M. Joyas, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for violations of the Canons of Professional Responsibility
or to declare him in contempt of court. They
alleged that despite the finality of the Court’s denial of petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration, Atty. Joyas still filed a Manifestation with compliance
arguing the same points. Further, Atty.
Joyas is not petitioners’ counsel of record in this case since he never formally
entered his appearance before the Court.[61]
In
a Resolution dated September 14, 2005, the Court denied the motion to refer
Atty. Joyas to the IBP for being a wrong remedy.[62]
Petitioners
Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma then filed an Omnibus Motion,[63]
seeking an extension of time to comply with the Court’s Resolution and Motion
to delete the penalty of “fine” as a consequence of voluntary compliance. They insist that their compliance with the
order to pay the widow’s allowance should “obliterate, expunge, and blot out”
the penalty of fine and imprisonment. They alleged that for their failure to
comply with this Court’s Resolution, the RTC, P30,000.00.
They had appealed said order to the CA.
They
also tried to make a case out of the use of the terms “joint and several” in
the September 23 Resolution, and “collectively” in the April 5, 2005
Resolution. They argued that “joint and
several” creates individual liability for each of the parties for the full
amount of the obligation, while “collectively” means that all members of the
group are responsible together for the action of the group. Hence, “collectively” would mean that the
liability belongs equally to the two groups of petitioners. They requested for an additional 60 days to
raise the necessary amount. They also
asked the Court to hold their imprisonment in abeyance until their “just and reasonable
compliance” with the Court’s orders.
Barely
a month later, petitioners, through their new counsel, filed another
Manifestation stressing that Sy Bang’s marriage to Rosita Ferrera is void. They
claimed that respondents have falsified documents to lead the courts into
believing that Rosita’s marriage to Sy Bang is valid.
The
Omnibus Motion was denied in a Resolution dated October 17, 2005. Thereafter, respondents
filed a Motion to Immediately Order Incarceration of Petitioners,[64] which
petitioners opposed.[65]
In
a Resolution dated December 12, 2005,[66]
the Court issued a Warrant of Arrest[67]
against petitioners and directed the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
detain them until they complied with this Court’s April 4, 2005 and July 25,
2005 Resolutions.
Petitioner
Rosa Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion.[68] She
informed the Court that, to show that she was not obstinate and contumacious of
the Court and its orders, she had begged and pleaded with her relatives to
raise money to comply, but concedes that she was only able to raise a minimal
amount since she has no source of income herself and needs financial support to
buy her food and medicines. She obtained
her brother’s help and the latter issued six checks in the total amount of P650,000.00.
She also alleged that she was not
informed by her husband’s counsel of the developments in the case, and remained
unconsulted on any of the matters or incidents of the case. She reiterated that she had no participation
in the management of the Sy Bang estate and received nothing of value upon her
husband’s death. She prayed that the
Court would not consider her failure to raise any further amount as contempt or
defiance of it’s orders.
The motion was
denied in a Resolution dated January 16, 2006.
In
an Urgent Manifestation of Compliance with the Contempt Resolutions with
Payment of Widow’s Allowance with Prayer Reiterating the Lifting of Warrant of
Arrest on Humanitarian Grounds,[69]
petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma asked the Court to delete the
penalty of indefinite imprisonment considering their partial compliance and the
partial compliance of Rosa Tan. They
expressed willingness to deposit the widow’s allowance with the Supreme Court’s
Cashier pending the determination of Sy Bang’s estate. They reasoned that the
money to be deposited is their own and does not belong to Sy Bang’s estate. The deposit is made for the sole purpose of
deleting the penalty of indefinite imprisonment. They claim that they are not
willfully disobeying the Court’s order but are merely hesitating to comply
because of pending incidents such as the falsification charges against Rosita,
the resolution of the partition case, the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by
Rosita, and the pendency of Rosita’s guardianship proceedings, as well as
humanitarian considerations. Thus, they prayed for the Court to reconsider the
order of contempt and to recall the warrant of arrest.
On
February 15, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution[70]
lifting the warrant of arrest on petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida, Ma. Emma, and
Rosa Tan on the condition that they issue the corresponding checks to settle
the accrued widow’s allowance of Rosita Ferrera-Sy. They were also directed to
submit proof of their compliance to the Court within ten (10) days from notice.
In
a Manifestation[71] dated
February 28, 2006, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma informed the
Court that they had deposited the checks in favor of Rosita with the RTC,
Respondents
filed a Comment to the Manifestation arguing that the deposit of said checks, amounting
to P1,073,053.00, does not amount to full compliance with the Court’s
order considering that the accrued widow’s allowance now amounted to P4,528,125.00.
Then,
petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma filed a Motion to include Rosalino
Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for
the Payment of Widow’s Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang as they may also hold
Assets-Properties of the Estate of Sy Bang.[73] They
argued that it is denial of the equal protection clause for the Court to single
out only the two children of the first marriage – Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy –
and their heirs, as the ones responsible for the widow’s allowance. This
ruling, they aver, does not take into consideration the numerous and valuable
properties from the estate of Sy Bang being held in the names of Rosalino,
Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique. They alleged that two compromise agreements,
both approved by the trial court, transferred properties to Rolando and Renato.
They further alleged that respondents Rolando, Maria Lourdes, Florecita,
Rosalino, Enrique, and Rosita Ferrera-Sy have executed separate waivers and
quitclaims over their shares in the estate of Sy Bang for certain
considerations. However, out of respect
for the Court and their fear of incarceration, they complied with the Court’s
orders using their personal funds which they claim is unfair because they have
never participated in the management of the properties of Sy Bang. They prayed
that the Court pronounce that the liability for the widow’s allowance be
divided proportionately among the following groups: Iluminada, Zenaida, and Ma.
Emma; Rosa Tan; Rosalino Sy and wife Helen Loo; Bartolome Sy and wife Virginia
Lim; Rolando Sy and wife Anacorita Rioflorido; and the heirs of Enrique Sy, namely,
Elaine Destura and Edwin Maceda.
On
March 23, 2006, petitioners filed an Urgent Reply to respondents’ Comment on
the manifestation of compliance with Opposition[74]
to the motion filed by respondents for the Court to reiterate its order for the
NBI to arrest petitioners for failure to comply with the February 15, 2006
Resolution. They argued that they had fully complied with the Court’s orders. They alleged that on three occasions within
the period, they had tried to submit 12 postdated checks to the Court’s
cashiers, but the same were refused due to the policy of the Court not to issue
receipts on postdated checks. They then filed a motion before the RTC of Lucena
City praying for authority to deposit the checks with the trial court. The motion was denied but, on reconsideration,
was later granted. The checks are now in
the custody of the RTC. The only issue
respondents raise, they claim, is the amount of the checks. Hence, there is no basis for the Court to
direct the NBI to effect their arrest.
The
Court, in a Resolution dated March 29, 2006, required respondents to comment on
the motion to include some of them in the payment of widow’s allowance. Petitioners, on the other hand, were required
to comment on a motion filed by respondents for the Court to reiterate its
order to the NBI to arrest petitioners for failure to comply with the February
15, 2006 Resolution.[75]
Petitioners filed their Comment with
Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the March 29, 2006 Resolution.[76] They
reiterated their arguments in their Urgent Reply to respondents’ Comment on the
manifestation of compliance with Opposition. They further alleged that there is now a Resolution
by the Regional State Prosecutor, Region IV,
Respondents,
on the other hand, filed a Comment and Manifestation[77]
on why they should not be made to pay the widow’s allowance. They argued that the RTC had already decided
that the estate of Sy Bang was comprised of properties in the names of Jose Sy
Bang, Iluminada Tan, Zenaida, Ma. Emma, Julian Sy, and Rosa Tan, and the same
was affirmed by the CA. Pending the
resolution of the appeal before this Court, this Decision stands. Thus,
petitioners’ claim that the estate of Sy Bang is yet undetermined is false. They also claim that, contrary to petitioners’
claims of being poor, they still hold enormous properties of the Sy Bang estate,
which had been transferred in their names through falsification of public
documents, now subject of several cases which respondents filed against them
before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Respondents
further claim that the validity of their mother’s marriage to Sy Bang has been
recognized by the courts in several cases where the issue had been raised,
including the case for recognition of Rosita’s Filipino citizenship, the
guardianship proceedings, and the partition proceedings.
On
June 23, 2006, respondents filed a Motion for Substitution of Parties.[78] They
averred that Jose Sy Bang died on September 11, 2001, leaving behind his widow
Iluminada and 14 children, while Julian Sy died on August 28, 2004, leaving
behind his widow Rosa and eight children. The claims against Jose and Julian were not
extinguished by their deaths. It was the
duty of petitioners’ counsel, under Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court,
to inform the Court of these deaths within 30 days thereof. Petitioners’ counsel failed to so inform this
Court, which should be a ground for disciplinary action. Hence, respondents prayed that the Court
order the heirs of the two deceased to appear and be substituted in these cases
within 30 days from notice.
In
a Resolution[79] dated
July 5, 2006, the Court granted the motion for substitution and noted the
Comment and Manifestation on the Motion to include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy,
Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of
Widow’s Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang.
Respondents
then filed a Manifestation and Motion to Implement the Supreme Court’s
Resolutions of September 23, 1996, April 4, 2005, July 25, 2005, December 12,
2005, and February 15, 2006.[80]
They prayed that petitioners be given a last period of five days within which
to deposit with the Supreme Court Cashier all the accrued widow’s allowances as
of June 2006.
Petitioners
Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma opposed respondents’ manifestation and motion.[81]
They argued that the resolutions sought to be implemented were all issued prior
to the DOJ Resolution finding probable cause to file the falsification charges
against respondents. They contended that the criminal cases for falsification
expose Rosita as a mere common-law wife and not a “widow”; hence, there is no
legal justification to give her the widow’s allowance. They also reiterated their earlier arguments
against the grant of widow’s allowance.
Meanwhile,
Rosa Tan filed a Comment on the Substitution of Parties with Motion for
Reconsideration.[82] She argued that since the trial court had
already appointed a judicial administrator for the estate of Sy Bang, which includes
Julian Sy’s estate, the proper party to be substituted should be the
administrator and not Julian’s heirs who never exercised ownership rights over
the properties thereof.
The
Court denied the motion for reconsideration to the Resolution granting
substitution of parties for lack of merit on November 20, 2006.
The Court’s Ruling
G.R. No. 114217
Finding no reversible error therein,
we affirm the CA Decision.
The Third Partial Decision of the RTC
To review, the CA held, to wit:
The respondent Judge acted correctly inasmuch as his decision to defer the resolution on the question concerning the properties in the name of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando and Enrique, all surnamed Sy, will not necessarily affect the decision he rendered concerning the properties in the names of Jose Sy Bang and wife, Julian Sy and wife, Zenaida Sy and Maria Sy, considering that the properties mentioned were separable and distinct from each other, such that the claim that said properties were not their own, but properties of the late Sy Bang, could have been the subject of separate suits.[83]
We agree with the CA.
Section 4, Rule 36 of the Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 4. Several judgments. – In an action against several defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others.
The trial court’s Third Partial
Decision is in the nature of a several judgment as contemplated by the rule
quoted above. The trial court ruled on
the status of the properties in the names of petitioners (defendants below)
while deferring the ruling on the properties in the names of respondents
pending the presentation of evidence.
A several judgment is proper when the
liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct from that of his
co-parties, such that the claims against each of them could have been the
subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not
necessarily affect the other.[84]
Petitioners, although sued
collectively, each held a separate and separable interest in the properties of
the Sy Bang estate.
The pronouncement as to the
obligation of one or some petitioners did not affect the determination of the
obligations of the others. That the properties in the names of petitioners were
found to be part of the Sy Bang estate did not preclude any further findings or
judgment on the status or nature of the properties in the names of the other
heirs.
The trial court’s June 2, 1982 Order
reads:
IN view of the importance of the issue concerning whether all the properties in the name (sic) of Enrique Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy and/or their respective wives (as well as those in the names of the other parties litigants in this case), (sic) shall be declared or included as part of the Estate of Sy Bang, and in view of the numerous documentary evidences (sic) presented by Attys. Raya and Camaligan after the said question was agreed to be submitted for resolution on May 26, 1982, the Court hereby sets for the reception or for the resolution of said issue in this case on June 8 and 9, 1982, both at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon; notify all parties litigants in this case of these settings.[85]
It is obvious from the trial court’s
order[86]
that the June 8, 1982 hearing is for the purpose of determining whether
properties in the names of Enrique Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy, and Rolando
Sy and/or their respective wives are also part of the Sy Bang estate.
Hence, in the assailed Decision, the
trial court said:
[I]n fact, the Court will require further evidence for or against any of the parties in this case in the matter of whatever sums of money, property or asset belonging to the estate of Sy Bang that came into their possession in order that the Court may be properly guided in the partition and adjudication of the rightful share and interest of the heirs of Sy Bang over the latter’s estate; this becomes imperative in view of new matters shown in the Submission and Formal Offer of Reserve Exhibits and the Offer of Additional Documentary Evidence filed respectively by Oscar Sy and Jose Sy Bang, et al., thru their respective counsels after the question of whether or not the properties in the names of Enrique, Bartolome, Rosalino, and Rolando, all surnamed Sy, should form part or be included as part of the estate of Sy Bang, had been submitted for resolution as of May 26, 1982; the Court deems it proper to receive additional evidence on the part of any of the parties litigants in this case if only to determine the true extent of the estate belonging to Sy Bang.[87]
The trial court painstakingly
examined the evidence on record and narrated the details, then carefully laid
out the particulars in the assailed Decision. The evidence that formed the basis for the
trial court’s conclusion is embodied in the Decision itself – evidence presented
by the parties themselves, including petitioners.
However, notwithstanding the trial
court’s pronouncement, the Sy Bang estate cannot be partitioned or distributed
until the final determination of the extent of the estate and only until it is
shown that the obligations under Rule 90, Section 1,[88]
have been settled.[89]
In the settlement of estate
proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1)
after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the
widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations
only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the
court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.[90]
Settling the issue of ownership is
the first stage in an action for partition.[91]
As this Court has ruled:
The issue of
ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be resolved in order
to effect a partition of properties. This should be done in the action for
partition itself. As held in the case of Catapusan
v. Court of Appeals:
“In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint the “nature and extent of his title” to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties x x x.”[92]
Moreover, the Third Partial Decision
does not have the effect of terminating the proceedings for partition. By its
very nature, the Third Partial Decision is but a determination based on the
evidence presented thus far. There
remained issues to be resolved by the court. There would be no final
determination of the extent of the Sy Bang estate until the court’s examination
of the properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique. Based on the evidence presented, the trial
court will have to make a pronouncement whether the properties in the names of
Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique indeed belong to the Sy Bang estate. Only after the full extent of the Sy Bang estate
has been determined can the trial court finally order the partition of each of
the heirs’ share.
Appointment of Receiver
As to the issue of the judge’s
appointment of a receiver, suffice it to say that the CA conclusively found
thus:
The records show that the petitioners were never deprived of their day in court. Upon Order of the respondent Judge, counsel for the petitioners submitted their opposition to [the] petition for appointment of a receiver filed by private respondents. x x x.
Moreover, evidence on record shows that respondent Judge appointed the receiver after both parties have presented their evidence and after the Third Partial Decision has been promulgated. Such appointment was made upon verified petition of herein private respondents, alleging that petitioners are mismanaging the properties in litigation by either mortgaging or disposing the same, hence, the said properties are in danger of being lost, wasted, dissipated, misused, or disposed of. The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the appointment of a receiver in Civil Case No. 8578, in order to preserve the properties in litis pendentia and neither did he abuse his discretion nor acted arbitrarily in doing s. On the contrary, We find that it was the petitioners who violated the status quo sought to be maintained by the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 61519, by their intrusion and unwarranted seizures of the 3 theaters, subject matter of the litigation, and which are admittedly under the exclusive management and operation of private respondent, Rosauro Sy.[93]
Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens
Next, petitioners question the trial
court’s Order canceling the notice of lis
pendens.[94]
Section 77
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, provides:
SEC. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration thereof.
At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice of lis pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding section, the notice of lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof.
The filing of a notice of lis
pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the
litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment in
order to prevent the final judgment from being defeated by successive
alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land
subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will
promulgate subsequently.[95]
While the
trial court has an inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens,
such power is to be exercised within the express confines of the law. As provided in Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on
two grounds: (1) when the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title
of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect
the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.[96]
This
Court has interpreted the notice as:
The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal-like the continuance or removal of a preliminary attachment of injunction-is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.[97]
The CA found, and we affirm, that Rosalino,
Bartolome and Rolando were able to prove that the notice was intended merely to
molest and harass the owners of the property, some of whom were not parties to
the case. It was also proven that the
interest of Oscar Sy, who caused the notice to be annotated, was only 1/14 of
the assessed value of the property. Moreover, Rosalino, Bartolome and Rolando were
ordered to post a P50,000.00 bond to protect whatever rights or interest
Oscar Sy may have in the properties under litis
pendentia.[98]
G.R. No. 150797
In G.R. No. 150797, petitioners are
asking this Court to reverse the CA’s February 28, 2001 Decision and its
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration, and to declare the
Guardianship court to have exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit
of the widow’s allowance in Special Proceedings No. 96-34.
We find merit in petitioners’
contention.
The court hearing the petition for
guardianship had limited jurisdiction. It
had no jurisdiction to enforce payment of the widow’s allowance ordered by this
Court.
Reviewing the antecedents, we note
that the claim for widow’s allowance was made before the Supreme Court in a
case that did not arise from the guardianship proceedings. The case subject of the Supreme Court petition
(Civil Case No. 8578) is still pending before the RTC of Lucena City.
Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of
Court states:
SEC. 3. Allowance to widow and family. – The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Correlatively, Article 188 of the
Civil Code states:
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
Obviously, “the court” referred to in
Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court is the court hearing the settlement of
the estate. Also crystal clear is the
provision of the law that the widow’s allowance is to be taken from the common
mass of property forming part of the estate of the decedent.
Thus, as
evident from the foregoing provisions, it is the court hearing the settlement
of the estate that should effect the payment of widow’s allowance considering
that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the exclusion
of all other courts.[99]
In
emphasizing the limited jurisdiction of the guardianship court, this Court has
pronounced that:
Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed, or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, x x x the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the persons said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in a guardianship proceedings.[100]
Further, this
Court has held that the distribution of the residue of the estate of the
deceased incompetent is a function pertaining properly, not to the guardianship
proceedings, but to another proceeding in which the heirs are at liberty to initiate.[101]
Other Unresolved Incidents
Payment of Widow’s Allowance
It has been 13 years since this Court
ordered petitioners to pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy her monthly widow’s allowance. Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma
have since fought tooth and nail against paying the said allowance, grudgingly
complying only upon threat of incarceration. Then, they again argued against the grant of widow’s
allowance after the DOJ issued its Resolution finding probable cause in the
falsification charges against respondents. They contended that the criminal cases for
falsification proved that Rosita is a mere common-law wife and not a “widow” and,
therefore, not entitled to widow’s allowance.
This argument deserves scant
consideration.
A finding of probable cause does not
conclusively prove the charge of falsification against respondents.
In a preliminary investigation,
probable cause has been defined as “the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.”
It is well-settled that a finding of probable cause
needs to rest only on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime
has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt.[102]
Hence, until the marriage is finally
declared void by the court, the same is presumed valid and Rosita is entitled
to receive her widow’s allowance to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang.
We remind petitioners again that they
are duty-bound to comply with whatever the courts, in relation to the
properties under litigation, may order.
Motion to Include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando
Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widow’s
Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang
On March 14, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion to include Rosalino Sy,
Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the
Payment of Widow’s Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang.
The Motion is denied.
The widow’s allowance, as discussed above, is chargeable to Sy Bang’s estate.
It must be stressed that the issue of
whether the properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and
Enrique Sy form part of Sy Bang’s estate remains unsettled since this Petition
questioning the trial court’s Third Partial Decision has been pending. On the other hand, there has been a
categorical pronouncement that petitioners are holding properties belonging to
Sy Bang’s estate.
That the full extent of Sy Bang’s estate has not yet been determined is
no excuse from complying with this Court’s order. Properties of the estate have been identified
– i.e., those in the names of
petitioners – thus, these properties should be made to answer for the widow’s
allowance of Rosita. In any case, the amount Rosita receives for support, which
exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to her, will be deducted from her share
of the estate.[103]
A Final Note
We are appalled by the delay in the disposition of this case brought
about by petitioners’ propensity to challenge the Court’s every directive. That the petitioners would go to extreme
lengths to evade complying with their duties under the law and the orders of
this Court is truly deplorable. Not even a citation for contempt and the threat
of imprisonment seemed to deter them. Their
contumacious attitude and actions have dragged this case for far too long with practically
no end in sight. Their abuse of legal and court processes is shameful, and they
must not be allowed to continue with their atrocious behavior. Petitioners deserve to be sanctioned, and
ordered to pay the Court treble costs.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
Petition in G.R. No. 150797 is GRANTED,
while the Petition in G.R. No. 114217 is DENIED.
The
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
[1] The Petition was originally filed by Spouse Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan, Spouses Julian Sy and Rosa Tan, Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, and Oscar Sy. Respondents filed a Motion for Substitution of Parties on June 23, 2006, informing this Court of the deaths of Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy. The Court granted the Motion in a Resolution dated July 5, 2006.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (a retired member of this Court), with Associate Justices Luis A. Javellana (ret.) and Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes (a retired member of this Court), concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 114217), pp. 154-164.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (a retired member of this Court), with Associate Justices Alfredo L. Benipayo (ret.) and Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes (a retired member of this Court), concurring; rollo, pp. 186-187.
[4] Other respondents became complainants; rollo (G.R. No. 114217), p. 155.
[5] Rollo, p. 155.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Penned by Judge Benigno M. Puno, id. at 77-101.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Supra note 2.
[18] Supra note 3.
[19] Rollo (G.R. No. 114217), p. 39.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Sinumpaang Salaysay, id. at 661.
[27] Rollo (G.R. No. 114217), pp. 664-668.
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35] Rollo (G.R. No. 150797), pp. 43-44.
[36] Rollo (G.R. No. 114217), p. 719.
[37] Rollo (G.R. No. 150797), p. 271.
[38]
[39] Penned by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. (ret.), with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (ret.), concurring; id. at 11-20.
[40] Rollo (G.R. No. 150797), p. 69. (Citations omitted.)
[41] CA Resolution penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (ret.), concurring; id. at 73.
[42] Rollo (G.R. No. 150797), pp. 33-59.
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50] Rollo (G.R. No. 114217), pp. 762-763.
[51] Rollo (G.R. No. 150797), p. 511.
[52]
[53]
[54]
[55]
[56]
[57]
[58]
[59]
[60]
[61]
[62]
[63]
[64]
[65]
[66]
[67]
[68]
[69]
[70]
[71]
[72]
[73]
[74]
[75]
[76]
[77]
[78]
[79]
[80]
[81]
[82]
[83] Rollo (G.R. No. 114217), p. 161.
[84] Fernando v. Santamaria, 487 Phil. 351, 357 (2004).
[85] Rollo (G.R. No. 114217), p. 161.
[86]
[87]
[88] SECTION
1. When order for distribution of residue made.—When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have
been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or
of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall
assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming
them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons
may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there
is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be
allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs.
[89] See Estate of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 590, (1996).
[90] Estate of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, id., citing Castillo v. Castillo, 124 Phil. 485 (1966); Edmands v. Philippine Trust Co., 87 Phil. 405 (1952).
[91] Heirs of Velasquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126996, February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA 552, 566, citing de Mesa v. CA, 231 SCRA 773.
[92]
[93] Rollo (G.R. No. 114217), p. 162.
[94]
[95] Romero v. Court of Appeals, 497 Phil.
775, 784-785 (2005), citing Heirs of
Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez,
G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 173.
[96] Romero v. Court of Appeals, id. (Citations omitted.)
[97]
Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-60323, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA
325, 330; Yared v. Ilarde, G.R. No. 114732,
August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 53.
[98] Rollo (G.R. No. 114217), p. 163.
[99] Rule 73, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 1. Where estate of
deceased persons settled.—If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,
in the Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of
his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Regional Trial
Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(Emphasis supplied.)
[100] Paciente v. Dacuycuy, etc., et al., 200 Phil. 403, 408-409 (1982), citing Cui, et al. v. Piccio, et al., 91 Phil. 712 (1952); Parco and Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 197 Phil. 240 (1982).
[101] Gomez v. Imperial, 134 Phil. 858, 864 (1968); Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 465 (1998), where the Court
upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s
jurisdiction over a case for
guardianship holding that the reliance on Gomez was misplaced, since in that case, the petition was only for
guardianship; while in Garcia, the action was for both guardianship and
settlement of the estate.
[102] Lastrilla
v.
[103] See Article 188 of the Civil Code.