Commission on Elections,
Petitioner, -
versus - Conrado Cruz,
Santiago P. Go, Renato F. Borbon, Levvino Ching, Carlos C. Florentino, Ruben G.
Ballega, Loida Alcedo, Mario M. Cajucom, Emmanuel M. Calma, Manuel A. Rayos,
Wilma L. Chua, Eufemio S. Alfonso, Jesus M. Lacanilao, Bonifacio N. Alcapa,
Jose H. Silverio, Rodrigo Develles, Nida R. Paunan, Mariano B. Estuye, Jr., Rafael C. Arevalo, Arturo
T. Manabat, Ricardo O. Lizarondo, Leticia C. Maturan, Rodrigo A. Alayan,
Leonilo N. Miranda, Desederio O. Monreal, Francisco M. Bahia, Nestor R.
Foronda, Vicente B. Que, Jr., Aurelio A. Biluan, Danilo R. Gatchalian,
Lourdes R. del Mundo, Emma O. Calzado, Felimon de Leon, Tany V. Catacutan,
and Concepcion P. Jao,
Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 186616
Present:
PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CORONA,* CARPIO
MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO,
velasco, JR.,I**
NACHURA, leonardo-de castro, brion, pERALTA,*** BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, and VILLARAMA, jr., JJ. Promulgated: November 20, 2009 |
x
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x
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this
Decision the constitutional challenge, originally filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128 (RTC),
against the following highlighted portion of Section 2 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9164 (entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991”):
Sec. 2. Term of
Office. – The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan
officials after the effectivity of this Act
shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more
than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the
1994 barangay elections. Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official was elected.
The RTC granted the
petition and declared the challenged proviso constitutionally infirm. The
present petition, filed by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeks a review of the RTC decision.[1]
THE ANTECEDENTS
Before the October 29,
2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of
Caloocan City[2]
filed with the RTC a petition for
declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the
above-highlighted proviso, based on the following arguments:
I.
The
term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not
retroactively.
II.
Implementation
of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of the equal
protection of the law.
III.
Barangay officials have always been
apolitical.
The RTC agreed with the respondents’
contention that the challenged proviso retroactively
applied the three-term limit for barangay officials under the following
reasoning:
When the Local Government Code of 1991 took effect
abrogating all other laws inconsistent therewith, a different term was
ordained. Here, this Court agrees with
the position of the petitioners that Section 43 of the Code specifically
exempted barangay elective officials from the coverage of the three (3)
consecutive term limit rule considering that the provision applicable to these (sic) class of elective officials was
significantly separated from the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b)
thereof. Paragraph (b) is indeed
intended to qualify paragraph (a) of Section 43 as regards to (sic) all local elective officials
except barangay officials. Had
the intention of the framers of the Code is (sic) to include barangay elective officials, then no
excepting proviso should have been expressly made in paragraph (a) thereof or, by
implication, the contents of paragraph (c) should have been stated ahead of the
contents of paragraph (b).
x x x x
Clearly,
the intent of the framers of the constitution (sic) is to exempt the barangay officials from the three (3)
term limits (sic) which are otherwise
applicable to other elected public officials from the Members of the House of
Representatives down to the members of the sangguniang bayan/panlungsod. It is up for the Congress whether the three
(3) term limit should be applied by enacting a law for the purpose.
The
amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8524 merely increased the term of office of barangay
elective officials from three (3) years to five (5) years. Like the Local Government Code, it can be
noted that no consecutive term limit for the election of barangay
elective officials was fixed therein.
The advent of R.A. 9164 marked the revival of the
consecutive term limit for the election of barangay elective officials
after the Local Government Code took effect.
Under the assailed provision of this Act, the term of office of barangay
elective officials reverted back to three (3) years from five (5) years, and,
this time, the legislators expressly declared that no barangay elective
official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. The petitioners are very clear
that they are not assailing the validity of such provision fixing the three (3)
consecutive term limit rule for the election of barangay elective
officials to the same position. The
particular provision the constitutionality of which is under attack is that
portion providing for the reckoning of the three (3) consecutive term limit of barangay
elective officials beginning from the 1994 barangay elections.
x x x
Section 2, paragraph 2 of R.A. 9164 is not a mere
restatement of Section 43(c) of the Local Government Code. As discussed above, Section 43(c) of the
Local Government Code does not provide for the consecutive term limit rule of barangay
elective officials. Such specific
provision of the Code has in fact amended the previous enactments (R.A. 6653
and R.A. 6679) providing for the consecutive term limit rule of barangay
elective officials. But, such specific
provision of the Local Government Code was amended by R.A. 9164, which reverted
back to the previous policy of fixing consecutive term limits of barangay
elective officials.” [3]
In declaring this
retroactive application unconstitutional, the RTC explained that:
By giving a retroactive reckoning of the three (3)
consecutive term limit rule for barangay officials to the 1994 barangay
elections, Congress has violated not only the principle of prospective
application of statutes but also the equal protection clause of the
Constitution inasmuch as the barangay elective officials were singled
out that their consecutive term limit shall be counted retroactively. There is no rhyme or reason why the
consecutive limit for these barangay officials shall be counted
retroactively while the consecutive limit for other local and national elective
officials are counted prospectively. For
if the purpose of Congress is [sic] to classify elective barangay
officials as belonging to the same class of public officers whose term of
office are limited to three (3) consecutive terms, then to discriminate them by
applying the proviso retroactively violates the constitutionally enshrined
principle of equal protection of the laws.
Although
the Constitution grants Congress the power to determine such successive term
limit of barangay elective officials, the exercise of the authority
granted shall not otherwise transgress other constitutional and statutory
privileges.
This Court
cannot subscribe to the position of the respondent that the legislature clearly
intended that the provision of RA No. 9164 be made effective in 1994 and that
such provision is valid and constitutional.
If we allow such premise, then the term of office for those officials
elected in the 1997 barangay elections should have ended in year 2000
and not year 2002 considering that RA No. 9164 provides for a three-year term
of barangay elective officials.
The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8524 would be rendered nugatory in
view of such retroactive application.
This is absurd and illusory.
True, no
person has a vested right to a public office, the same not being property
within the contemplation of constitutional guarantee. However, a cursory reading of the petition
would show that the petitioners are not claiming vested right to their office
but their right to be voted upon by the electorate without being burdened by
the assailed provision of the law that, in effect, rendered them ineligible to
run for their incumbent positions. Such
right to run for office and be voted for by the electorate is the right being
sought to be protected by assailing the otherwise unconstitutional provision.
Moreover,
the Court likewise agrees with the petitioners that the law violated the
one-act-one subject rule embodied in the Constitution. x x x x The challenged
law’s title is “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SYNCHRONIZED BARANGAY AND SANGGUNIANG
KABATAAN ELECTIONS, AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT 7160 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.” x x x x
x x x x
To this
court, the non-inclusion in the title of the act on the retroactivity of the
reckoning of the term limits posed a serious constitutional breach,
particularly on the provision of the constitution [sic] that every bill
must embrace only one subject to be expressed in the title thereof.
x x x the
Court is of the view that the affected barangay officials were not
sufficiently given notice that they were already disqualified by a new act,
when under the previous enactments no such restrictions were imposed.
Even if
this Court would apply the usual test in determining the sufficiency of the
title of the bill, the challenged law would still be insufficient for how can a
retroactivity of the term limits be germane to the synchronization of an
election x x x x.[4]
The COMELEC moved to
reconsider this decision but the RTC denied the motion. Hence, the present petition on a pure
question of law.
The Petition
The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is
valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164 is
an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991 or LGC)
and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be considered an ex post facto law. The
three-term limit, according to the COMELEC, has been specifically provided in
RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term limitation. It further asserts that laws which are not
penal in character may be applied retroactively when expressly so provided and
when it does not impair vested rights.
As there is no vested right to public office, much less to an elective
post, there can be no valid objection to the alleged retroactive application of
RA No. 9164.
The COMELEC also argues
that the RTC’s invalidation of RA No. 9164 essentially involves the wisdom of the
law – the aspect of the law that the RTC has no right to inquire into under the
constitutional separation of powers principle.
The COMELEC lastly argues that there is no violation of the one
subject-one title rule, as the matters covered by RA No. 9164 are related; the
assailed provision is actually embraced within the title of the law.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find the petition
meritorious. The RTC legally erred when it declared the challenged proviso
unconstitutional.
Preliminary
Considerations
We find it appropriate,
as a preliminary matter, to hark back to the pre-1987 Constitution history of
the barangay political system as outlined by this Court in David v. COMELEC,[5] and we quote:
As a unit of government, the barangay antedated the
Spanish conquest of the
After the Americans colonized the
Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, “a Punong
Barangay (Barangay Captain) and six Kagawads ng Sangguniang
Barangay (Barangay Councilmen), who shall constitute the
presiding officer and members of the Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay
Council) respectively” were first elected on
The Local Government Code of 1983 also fixed the term of
office of local elective officials at six years. Under this Code, the chief officials of the barangay were the punong
barangay, six elective sangguniang barangay members, the kabataang
barangay chairman, a barangay secretary and a barangay
treasurer.
B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, reiterated that barangay
officials “shall hold office for six years,” and stated that their election was
to be held “on the second Monday of May nineteen hundred and eighty eight and
on the same day every six years thereafter.” [Emphasis supplied.]
The 1987 Philippine
Constitution extended constitutional recognition to barangays under
Article X, Section 1 by specifying barangays as one of the territorial
and political subdivisions of the country, supplemented by Section 8 of the
same Article X, which provides:
SEC. 8. The term of
office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. [Emphasis
supplied.]
The Constitutional Commission’s
deliberations on Section 8 show that the authority of Congress to legislate
relates not only to the fixing of the term of office of barangay
officials, but also to the application of the three-term limit. The following deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission are particularly instructive on this point:
MR. NOLLEDO: One
clarificatory question, Madam President.
What will be the term of the office of barangay officials as
provided for?
MR. DAVIDE: As
may be determined by law.
MR. NOLLEDO: As
provided for in the Local Government Code?
MR. DAVIDE: Yes.
x x x x x x x
x x
THE PRESIDENT: Is
there any other comment? Is there any objection
to this proposed new section as submitted by Commissioner Davide and accepted
by the Committee?
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, does this prohibition to
serve for more than three consecutive terms apply to barangay officials?
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, the voting that we had
on the terms of office did not include the barangay officials because it
was then the stand of the Chairman of the Committee on Local Governments that
the term of barangay officials must be determined by law. So it is now for the law to determine whether
the restriction on the number of reelections will be included in the Local
Government Code.
MR. RODRIGO: So that is up to Congress to decide.
MR. DAVIDE: Yes.
MR. RODRIGO: I
just wanted that clear in the record.”[6] [Emphasis supplied.]
After the effectivity of
the 1987 Constitution, the barangay election originally scheduled by Batas Pambansa Blg. 881[7]
on the second Monday of May 1988 was reset to “the second Monday of November 1988
and every five years thereafter by RA
No. 6653.”[8] Section 2 of RA No. 6653 changed the term of
office of barangay officials and introduced a term limitation as
follows:
SEC. 2. The term of
office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years from the
first day of January following their election. Provided, however, That no
kagawad shall serve for more than two (2) consecutive terms. [Emphasis
supplied]
Under Section 5 of RA No. 6653, the punong barangay
was to be chosen by seven kagawads from among themselves, and they in
turn, were to be elected at large by the barangay electorate. The punong barangay, under
Section 6 of the law, may be recalled for loss of confidence by an absolute
majority vote of the Sangguniang Barangay, embodied in a resolution that
shall necessarily include the punong barangay’s successor.
The
election date set by RA No. 6653 on the second Monday of November 1988 was
postponed yet again to March 28, 1989 by RA
No. 6679 whose pertinent provision states:
SEC. 1. The elections of barangay officials set on
the second Monday of November 1988 by Republic Act No. 6653 are hereby
postponed and reset to
There shall be held a regular election of barangay
officials on the second Monday of May 1994 and on the same day every five (5)
years thereafter. Their term shall be
for five (5) years which shall begin on the first day of June following the
election and until their successors shall have been elected and qualified: Provided, That no barangay
official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms.
The barangay elections shall be nonpartisan and
shall be conducted in an expeditious and inexpensive manner.
Significantly, the manner
of election of the punong barangay was
changed –
Section 5 of the law
provided that while the seven kagawads were to
be elected by the registered voters of
the barangay, “(t)he candidate who obtains the highest
number of votes shall be the punong barangay and in
the event of a tie, there shall be a drawing of lots under the supervision of
the Commission on Elections.”
More
than two (2) years after the 1989 barangay
elections, RA No. 7160 (the LGC)
introduced the following changes in the law:
SEC. 41. Manner
of Election. -- (a) The x x x punong
barangay shall be elected at large x x x by the qualified voters”
therein.
SEC. 43. Term of Office. - (a) The term of office
of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code
shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as
may be provided for by law, except that of elective barangay officials:
Provided, That all local officials first elected during the local elections
immediately following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve
until noon of June 30, 1992.
(b) No local
elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of
the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which
shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the
second Monday of May 1994.
SEC. 387. Chief
Officials and Offices. -- (a) There
shall be in each barangay a punong barangay, seven (7) sangguniang
barangay members, the sangguniang kabataan chairman, a barangay
secretary and a barangay treasurer.
x x x x x x x
x x
SEC. 390. Composition.
-- The Sangguniang barangay, the
legislative body of the barangay, shall be composed of the punong
barangay as presiding officer, and the seven (7) regular sanguniang
barangay members elected at large and the sanguniang kabataan
chairman as members. [Emphasis
supplied.]
This law started the
direct and separate election of the punong barangay by the
“qualified voters” in the barangay and not by the seven (7) kagawads
from among themselves.[9]
Subsequently or on
Congress’ Plenary Power to
Legislate Term Limits for Barangay
Officials and Judicial Power
In passing upon the
issues posed to us, we clarify at the outset the parameters of our powers.
As reflected in the above-quoted
deliberations of the 1987 Constitution, Congress has plenary authority under
the Constitution to determine by legislation not only the duration of the term
of barangay officials, but also the application to them of a consecutive
term limit. Congress invariably
exercised this authority when it enacted no less than six (6) barangay-related
laws since 1987.
Through all these
statutory changes, Congress had determined at its discretion both the length of
the term of office of barangay officials and their term limitation.
Given the textually demonstrable commitment by the 1987 Constitution to
Congress of the authority to determine the term duration and limition of barangay officials under
the Constitution, we consider it established that whatever Congress, in its
wisdom, decides on these matters are political questions beyond
the pale of judicial scrutiny,[11]
subject only to the certiorari
jurisdiction of the courts provided under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law contrary to
the Constitution.[12]
Political questions refer “to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government; it
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality
of a particular measure.”[13] These questions, previously impervious to
judicial scrutiny can now be inquired into under the limited window provided by
Section 1, Article VIII. Estrada v. Desierto[14] best describes this constitutional
development, and we quote:
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the “thou shalt not’s” of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. xxxx
Thus, we can inquire into
a congressional enactment despite the political question doctrine, although the
window provided us is narrow; the challenge must show grave abuse of discretion
to justify our intervention.
Other than the Section 1,
Article VIII route, courts can declare a law invalid when it is contrary to any
provision of the Constitution. This
requires the appraisal of the challenged law against the legal standards
provided by the Constitution, not on the basis of the wisdom of the enactment. To justify its nullification, the breach of
the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful or equivocal
one, as every law enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality.[15] These are the hurdles that those challenging
the constitutional validity of a law must overcome.
The present case, as framed
by the respondents, poses no challenge on the issue of grave abuse of
discretion. The legal issues posed
relate strictly to compliance with constitutional standards. It is from this prism that we shall therefore
resolve this case.
The Retroactive Application Issue
a. Interpretative /
Historical Consideration
The respondents’ first
objection to the challenged proviso’s constitutionality is its purported
retroactive application of the three-term limit when it set the 1994 barangay
elections as a reckoning point in the application of the three-term limit.
The respondents argued
that the term limit, although present in the previous laws, was not in RA No.
7160 when it amended all previous barangay election laws. Hence, it was re-introduced for the first
time by RA No. 9164 (signed into law on
Our first point of
disagreement with the respondents and with the RTC is on their position that a
retroactive application of the term limitation was made under RA No. 9164. Our own reading shows that no retroactive application
was made because the three-term limit
has been there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No.
6679) after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued under the LGC
and can still be found in the current law.
We find this obvious from a reading of the historical development of the
law.
The first law that
provided a term limitation for barangay officials was RA No. 6653 (1988); it imposed a
two-consecutive term limit. After only
six months, Congress, under RA No. 6679
(1988), changed the two-term limit by providing for a three-consecutive term
limit. This consistent imposition of the
term limit gives no hint of any equivocation in the congressional intent to
provide a term limitation. Thereafter,
RA No. 7160 – the LGC – followed, bringing with it the issue of whether it
provided, as originally worded, for a
three-term limit for barangay officials.
We differ with the RTC analysis of this issue.
Section 43 is a provision
under Title II of the LGC on Elective Officials. Title II is divided into several chapters
dealing with a wide range of subject matters, all relating to local elective officials, as follows: a.
Qualifications and Election (Chapter I); b. Vacancies and Succession (Chapter
II), c. Disciplinary Actions (Chapter IV) and d. Recall (Chapter V). Title II likewise contains a chapter on Local
Legislation (Chapter III).
These Title II provisions
are intended to apply to all local elective officials, unless the
contrary is clearly provided. A
contrary application is provided with respect to the length of the term of
office under Section 43(a); while it applies to all local elective officials,
it does not apply to barangay officials whose length of term is
specifically provided by Section 43(c).
In contrast to this clear case of an exception to a general rule, the
three-term limit under Section 43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies
to all local elective officials who must perforce include barangay
officials.
An alternative
perspective is to view Sec. 43(a), (b) and (c) separately from one another as
independently standing and self-contained provisions, except to the extent that
they expressly relate to one another. Thus, Sec. 43(a) relates to the term of
local elective officials, except barangay officials whose term of office
is separately provided under Sec. 43(c). Sec. 43(b), by its express terms,
relates to all local elective officials without any exception. Thus, the term
limitation applies to all local elective officials without any exclusion or
qualification.
Either perspective, both
of which speak of the same resulting interpretation, is the correct legal
import of Section 43 in the context in which it is found in Title II of the
LGC.
To be sure, it may be argued,
as the respondents and the RTC did, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 43
are the general law for elective officials (other than barangay
officials); and paragraph (c) is the specific law on barangay officials,
such that the silence of paragraph (c) on term limitation for barangay
officials indicates the legislative intent to exclude barangay officials
from the application of the three-term limit.
This reading, however, is flawed for two reasons.
First, reading Section 43(a) and (b) together to the exclusion of
Section 43(c), is not justified by the plain texts of these provisions. Section 43(a) plainly refers to local
elective officials, except elective barangay officials. In comparison, Section 43(b) refers to all
local elective officials without exclusions or exceptions. Their respective coverages therefore vary so
that one cannot be said to be of the same kind as the other. Their separate topics additionally strengthen
their distinction; Section 43(a) refers to the term of office while Section
43(b) refers to the three-term limit.
These differences alone indicate that Sections 43(a) and (b) cannot be
read together as one organic whole in the way the RTC suggested. Significantly,
these same distinctions apply between Sec. 43(b) and (c).
Second, the RTC interpretation is flawed because of its total
disregard of the historical background of Section 43(c) – a backdrop that we
painstakingly outlined above.
From a historical
perspective of the law, the inclusion of Section 43(c) in the LGC is an
absolute necessity to clarify the length of term of barangay
officials. Recall that under RA No.
6679, the term of office of barangay officials was five (5) years. The
real concern was how Section 43 would interface with RA No. 6679. Without a categorical statement on the length
of the term of office of barangay officials, a general three-year term
for all local elective officials under Section 43(a), standing alone, may not
readily and completely erase doubts on the intended abrogation of the 5-year
term for barangay officials under RA No. 6679. Thus, Congress added Section 43(c) which
provided a categorical three-year term for these officials. History tells us, of course, that the unequivocal
provision of Section 43(c) notwithstanding, an issue on what is the exact term
of office of barangay officials was still brought to us via a petition filed by no less than the
President of the Liga ng Mga Barangay in 1997. We fully resolved the issue in the cited David v. Comelec.
Section 43(c) should therefore
be understood in this context and not in the sense that it intended to provide
the complete rule for the election of barangay officials, so that in the
absence of any term limitation proviso under this subsection, no term
limitation applies to barangay officials. That Congress had the LGC’s three-term limit
in mind when it enacted RA No. 9164 is clear from the following deliberations
in the House of Representatives (House)
on House Bill No. 4456 which later became RA No. 9164:
THE DEPUTY
SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). Majority Leader.
REP.
ESCUDERO. Mr. Speaker, next to interpellate is the Gentleman from
THE DEPUTY
SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). The Honorable
Lobregat is recognized.
REP.
LOBREGAT. Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, this is just …
REP.
MACIAS. Willingly to the Gentleman from
REP.
LOBREGAT. … points of clarification, Mr. Speaker, the term of office. It says in Section 4, “The term of office of
all Barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of
this Act shall be three years.” Then it says, “No Barangay elective
official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position.”
Mr.
Speaker, I think it is the position of the committee that the first term should
be reckoned from election of what year, Mr. Speaker?
REP. MACIAS. After the adoption of the Local
Government Code, Your Honor. So that the
first election is to be reckoned on, would be
REP.
LOBREGAT. Yes, Mr. Speaker. So there was
an election in 1994.
REP.
MACIAS. Then an election in 1997.
REP.
LOBREGAT. There was an election in 1997.
And there will be an election this year …
REP.
LOBREGAT. … election this year.
REP.
MACIAS. That is correct. This will be the third.
xxx xxx
REP.
SUMULONG. Mr. Speaker.
THE DEPUTY
SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.) The Honorable Sumulong is recognized.
REP.
SUMULONG. Again, with the permission of
my Chairman, I would like to address the question of Congressman Lobregat.
THE DEPUTY
SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). Please proceed.
REP.
SUMULONG. With respect to the three-year consecutive term limits of Barangay
Captains that is not provided for in the Constitution and that is why the
election prior to 1991 during the enactment of the Local Government Code is not
counted because it is not in the Constitution but in the Local Government Code
where the three consecutive term limits has been placed. [Emphasis
supplied.]
which led to the
following exchanges in the House Committee on Amendments:
COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENTS
REP. GONZALES. May we
now proceed to committee amendment, if any, Mr. Speaker.
THE DEPUTY
SPEAKER (Rep. Gonzalez). The Chair
recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms.
REP.
SYJUCO. Mr. Speaker, on page 2, line 7,
after the word “position”, substitute the period (.) and add the following:
PROVIDED HOWEVER THAT THE TERM OF OFFICE SHALL BE RECKONED FROM THE 1994
BARANGAY ELECTIONS. So that the amended
Section 4 now reads as follows:
“SEC. 4. Term of
Office. – The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan
officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective local official shall serve for
more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position
The House therefore
clearly operated on the premise that the LGC imposed a three-term limit for barangay
officials, and the challenged proviso is its way of addressing any confusion
that may arise from the numerous changes in the law.
All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the
challenged proviso has been there all along and does not simply retroact the
application of the three-term limit to the barangay elections of 1994.
Congress merely integrated the past statutory changes into a seamless whole by
coming up with the challenged proviso.
With this conclusion, the
respondents’ constitutional challenge to the proviso – based on retroactivity –
must fail.
b. No Involvement of Any
Constitutional Standard
Separately from the above
reason, the constitutional challenge must fail for a more fundamental reason –
the respondents’ retroactivity objection does not involve a violation of any
constitutional standard.
Retroactivity of laws is
a matter of civil law, not of a constitutional law, as its governing law is the
Civil Code,[16]
not the Constitution. Article 4 of the
Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided. The application of
the Civil Code is of course self-explanatory – laws enacted by Congress may
permissibly provide that they shall have retroactive effect. The Civil Code established a statutory norm,
not a constitutional standard.
The closest the issue of
retroactivity of laws can get to a genuine constitutional issue is if a law’s
retroactive application will impair vested rights. Otherwise stated, if a right has already
vested in an individual and a subsequent law effectively takes it away, a
genuine due process issue may arise.
What should be involved, however, is a vested right to life, liberty or
property, as these are the ones that may be considered protected by the due
process clause of the Constitution.
In the present case, the
respondents never raised due process as an issue. But even assuming that they did, the
respondents themselves concede that there is no vested right to public office.[17] As the COMELEC correctly pointed out, too,
there is no vested right to an elective post in view of the uncertainty
inherent in electoral exercises.
Aware of this legal
reality, the respondents theorized instead that they had a right to be voted
upon by the electorate without being burdened by a law that effectively
rendered them ineligible to run for their incumbent positions. Again, the RTC agreed with this contention.
We do not agree with the
RTC, as we find no such right under the Constitution; if at all, this claimed
right is merely a restatement of a claim of vested right to a public office.
What the Constitution clearly provides is the power of Congress to prescribe
the qualifications for elective local posts;[18]
thus, the question of eligibility for an elective local post is a matter for
Congress, not for the courts, to decide.
We dealt with a strikingly similar issue in Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections[19]
where we ruled that SK membership – which was claimed as a property right
within the meaning of the Constitution – is a mere statutory right conferred by
law. Montesclaros
instructively tells us:
Congress
exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is no
longer qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being
deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can
contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK
membership or from voting in the SK elections.
SK membership is not a property
right protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right
conferred by law. Congress may amend at
any time the law to change or even withdraw the statutory right.
A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a
“[P]ublic office is a public trust.” No one has a vested right to any public
office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public
office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel,
decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:
Again, for this petition to come under the due process of
law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office a “property.” It is, however, well settled x
x x that a public office is not property within the sense of the
constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust
or agency. x x x The basic idea of the government x x x is that of a popular
representative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the
people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual
right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the
provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he
represents.
Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office,
should realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary right to
public office. While the law makes an SK
officer an ex-officio member of a local government legislative council,
the law does not confer on petitioners a proprietary right or even a
proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils. The constitutional principle of a public
office as a public trust precludes any proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy directing “equal
access to opportunities for public service” cannot bestow on petitioners a
proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex-officio
public offices.
Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the
youth’s involvement in public affairs, this policy refers to those who belong
to the class of people defined as the youth.
Congress has the power to define who are the youth qualified to join the
SK, which itself is a creation of Congress.
Those who do not qualify because they are past the age group defined as
the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. In government service, once an employee
reaches mandatory retirement age, he cannot invoke any property right to cling
to his office. In the same manner,
since petitioners are now past the maximum age for membership in the SK, they
cannot invoke any property right to cling to their SK membership. [Emphasis
supplied.]
To recapitulate, we find
no merit in the respondents’ retroactivity arguments because: (1) the
challenged proviso did not provide for the retroactive application to barangay
officials of the three-term limit; Section 43(b) of RA No. 9164 simply
continued what had been there before; and
(2) the constitutional challenge based on retroactivity was not anchored
on a constitutional standard but on a mere statutory norm.
The Equal Protection
Clause Issue
The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under
its Section 2, Article III, which provides: “Nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause
is equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly
situated. It is equality among equals,
not similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one another on
the basis of substantial distinctions related to the objective of the law; when
things or persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may be treated
differently in law.[20]
Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies
inevitably leads to the conclusion that no basis exists in the present case for
an equal protection challenge. The law
can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective
officials because the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction
between these elective officials with respect to length of term and term
limitation. The clear distinction,
expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides
for a three-year term and three-term limit for local elective officials, it
left the length of term and the application of the three-term limit or any form
of term limitation for determination by Congress through legislation. Not only
does this disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes
as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under
these conditions.
From another perspective, we see no reason to apply the equal
protection clause as a standard because the challenged proviso did not result
in any differential treatment between barangay officials and all other
elective officials. This conclusion
proceeds from our ruling on the retroactivity issue that the challenged proviso
does not involve any retroactive application.
Violation of the Constitutional
One Subject- One Title Rule
Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof. Fariñas v. Executive Secretary[21] provides the reasons for this
constitutional requirement and the test for its application, as follows:
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the
so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious
and/or unconsidered encroaches. The
provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding
expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its
title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the
subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation.
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its
title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute
seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of
the Act.
x x x x
x x x This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
x x x x
x x x Moreover, the
avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill
should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes,
the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of
matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators
and the public.
We find, under these settled parameters, that the
challenged proviso does not violate the one subject-one title rule.
First, the title of RA No. 9164, “An Act Providing for
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataang Elections,
amending Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991,” states the law’s general subject matter – the
amendment of the LGC to synchronize the barangay and SK elections and
for other purposes. To achieve
synchronization of the barangay and SK elections, the reconciliation of
the varying lengths of the terms of office of barangay officials and SK
officials is necessary. Closely related
with length of term is term limitation which defines the total number of terms
for which a barangay official may run for and hold office. This natural linkage demonstrates that term
limitation is not foreign to the general subject expressed in the title of the
law.
Second, the congressional debates we cited above show that the
legislators and the public they represent were fully informed of the purposes,
nature and scope of the law’s provisions. Term limitation therefore received
the notice, consideration, and action from both the legislators and the
public.
Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in the title of
RA No. 9164 is to make the title an index of all the subject matters dealt with
by law; this is not what the constitutional requirement contemplates.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly AFFIRM the constitutionality of the challenged proviso under
Section 2, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 9164. Costs against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
(On official leave) |
|
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
(On official leave)
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
(On official leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice
|
REYNATO S. PUNO
* On official leave.
** On official leave.
*** On official leave.
[1] Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; the RTC Decision was penned by Judge Eleonor Kwong.
[2] The respondents herein: Conrado Cruz, Santiago P. Go, Renato F. Borbon, Levvino Ching, Carlos C. Florentino, Ruben G. Ballega, Loida Alcedo, Mario M. Cajucom, Emmanuel M. Calma, Manuel A. Rayos, Wilma L. Chua, Eufemio S. Alfonso, Jesus M. Lacanilao, Bonifacio N. Alcapa, Jose H. Silverio, Rodrigo Develles, Nida R. Paunan, Mariano B. Estuye, Jr., Rafael C. Arevalo, Arturo T. Manabat, Ricardo O. Lizarondo, Leticia C. Maturan, Rodrigo A. Alayan, Leonilo N. Miranda, Desederio O. Monreal, Francisco M. Bahia, Nestor R. Foronda, Vicente B. Que, Jr., Aurelio A. Biluan, Danilo R. Gatchalian, Lourdes R. del Mundo, Emma O. Calzado, Felimon de Leon, Tany V. Catacutan, and Concepcion P. Jao.
[3] Rollo, pp. 46-56
[4] Ibid.
[5] 337 Phil. 534 (1997); penned by Associate Justice, later Chief Justice, Artemio V. Panganiban (retired).
[6] Underscoring supplied; cited in David v. Comelec, supra.
[7] Omnibus Election Code.
[8] Section 1, R.A. No. 6653.
[9] See David v. COMELEC, supra note 5.
[10] See the Deliberations in the Senate, cited in the respondents’ Petition for Declaratory Relief; rollo, pp. 66-67.
[11] See Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L ed 2d 663, 686 (1962), as cited in Estrada v. Desierto, 406 Phil. 1 (2001).
The
power of judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of
executive and legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution. Through such power, the judiciary enforces
and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution. For a court to exercise this
power, certain requirements must first be met, namely:
(1)
an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power;
(2)
the person challenging the act must have
“standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement;
(3)
the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
[13] See Estrada v. Desierto, supra note 11.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima,
G.R. No. 166715,
[16]
Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the
[17] See Respondents’ Comment, pp. 8-9.
[18] CONSTITUTION, Article X, Section 3 provides:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government
code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with
effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources,
and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization
and operation of the local units.
[19] 433 Phil. 620 (2002).
[20] Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 16.
[21] 463 Phil. 179 (2003).