THIRD DIVISION
|
ALFONSO T.
YUCHENGCO, Petitioner, - versus - THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING
CORPORATION, ROBERTO COYIUTO, JR., NOEL CABRERA, GERRY ZARAGOZA, DONNA
GATDULA, RODNEY P. DIOLA, RAUL VALINO and THELMA SAN JUAN, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 184315 Present:
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: November 25, 2009 |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
When malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous
articles are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being
qualifiedly privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice
from attaching in a defamatory imputation.
This is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari assailing the
Amended Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76995 dated
The facts of the case, as
summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
In his Complaint, plaintiff Alfonso T.
Yuchengco alleges that in the last quarter of 1994, Chronicle Publishing
Corporation (“Chronicle Publishing” for brevity) published in the Manila
Chronicle a series of defamatory articles against him. In two of the subject articles (November 10
and 12, 1993 issues), he was imputed to be a “Marcos crony” or a
“Marcos-Romualdez crony,” which term according to him is commonly used and understood
in Philippine media to describe an individual who was a recipient of special
and underserving favors from former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or his
brother-in-law Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez due to special and extra-ordinary
closeness to either or both, and which favors allowed an individual to engage
in illegal and dishonorable business activities.
The plaintiff claims that the said
articles further branded him as a mere front or dummy for the Marcos and
Romualdez clans in Benguet Corporation, which company sought to take-over the
management of Oriental Petroleum Mineral Corporation (“Oriental” for
brevity). He contends that such an
imputation is untrue since his holdings in Benguet Corporation were legally
acquired by him.
Also, he was likewise accused of unsound
and immoral business practices by insinuating that he wanted to take control of
Oriental in order to divert its resources to rescue the debt-ridden Benguet
Corporation. He claims that the accusation
is untrue since he was merely interested in being represented in the board
thereof so as to protect his and his companies’ interest therein as
shareholders.
The subject articles insinuated that he
personally and intentionally caused the failure of Benguet Corporation and that
if even if he ever assumed control of Oriental, it would suffer the same fate
as the former. According to him, at the
time he assumed chairmanship of Benguet Corporation, it was already
experiencing financial downturns caused by plummeting world prices of gold and
unprofitable investments it ventured into.
Moreover, one of the articles portrayed
him as being an unfair and uncaring employer when the employees of Grepalife
Corporation, of which he is the Chairman, staged a strike, when the truth being
that he had nothing to do with it. And
that if his group takes over Oriental, it will experience the same labor
problems as in Grepalife.
Furthermore, the subject articles accused
him of inducing Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (“RCBC” for brevity) to
violate the provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans. He denies the imputations believing that
there is nothing irregular in the RCBC-Piedras transaction for the acquisition
of shares of Oriental.
Also, the plaintiff claims that the
subject articles insinuated that he induced others to disobey lawful orders of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” for brevity) when the truth is
that the officials of RCBC and Alcorn never defied any SEC order, and that if
ever they did, he never induced them to do so.
Finally, the plaintiff asserts that the
subject articles imputed to him the derogatory tag of “corporate raider,”
implying that he was seeking to profit for something he did not work for. He denies the imputation since he acquired
his stake in Oriental for adequate and valuable consideration at the time when
no one was willing to bailout the government from its difficult and losing
position thereto.
In their Answer, the defendants deny
liability claiming that the subject articles were not defamatory since they
were composed and published in good faith and only after having ascertained
their contents. In any event, they claim
that these articles are privileged and/or constitute reasonable and balance[d]
comments on matters of legitimate public interest which cannot serve as basis
for the finding of libel against them.
They likewise alleged that they were acting within the bounds of
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.
Furthermore, they contend that since
plaintiff is a public figure, and assuming that the articles were indeed
defamatory, they cannot be held liable for damages since they were not impelled
by actual malice in the composition thereof.
They did not compose and/or publish said articles with the knowledge
that they contained falsehoods, or with reckless disregard on whether or not
they contained falsehood.
As to defendant Coyiuto, he claims that he
had no participation in the publication of the subject articles nor consented
or approved their publication.
PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENCE
During the trial, the plaintiff himself,
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, testified that prior to his appointment as Ambassador to
Japan, he was the chairman of various business organizations notably: Benguet
Corporation (“Benguet”), Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (“RCBC”), Bank of America Savings Bank, House of
Investments, Inc., Dole Philippines and Philippine Fuji Xerox Corporation. He was also the President of the Philippine
Ambassadors; chairman or vice president of Bantayog ng Bayan; and chairman of
AY Foundation, Inc. He was appointed
Philippine Ambassador to People’s Republic of
As regards the article referring to the
Regarding the
About the
Referring to
As regards the
Regarding the
About the
On cross-examination, plaintiff Yuchengco
testified that he does not consider himself a public figure; and that he felt
maligned by the references to him as a “Marcos crony”. [TSN, 07 February 1997;
10 February 1997; 12 February 1997]
ROSAURO ZARAGOZA testified that he is the
Executive Vice-President of RCBC; that the statement in Exhibits “D”, “E” and
“F” with regard to the interest free loan allegedly granted to Piedras
Petroleum Company, Inc. (“Piedras”) are false because the Piedras deal was a
trust transaction which involved an advance in exchange for shares of stock;
that plaintiff Yuchengco did not have a personal interest in the Piedras deal;
that Piedras or Oriental Petroleum Mineral Corporation (“Oriental Petroleum”)
shares were not transferred to plaintiff Yuchengco’s name by virtue of the
transaction; and that the defendants did not approach him or RCBC to check the
veracity of the subject articles. The
affidavit of Mr. Zaragoza (Exhibit “H”) was adopted as part of his testimony.
On cross-examination, Mr. Zaragoza
testified that he volunteered to testify in the instant case because he was the
most knowledgeable about the Piedras deal; that plaintiff Yuchengco was
aggrieved upon reading the subject articles; that under the Memorandum of
Agreement (“MOA”) between RCBC and Piedras, should the latter fail to comply
with its obligations under the MOA, it will pay interest at the prevailing
market interest rate from the date of advance until full payment; and that
there was a complaint filed with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas against RCBC
by Mr. Felipe Remollo questioning the Piedras deal. [TSN
JOSE REVILLA testified that he and Amb.
Yuchengco were long time friends, where he (Revilla) worked for him (Yuchengco)
for thirty-two (32) years in his (Yuchengco) credit card company – Industrial
Finance Corporation Credit Cards; that knowing Amb. Yuchengco for a
considerable period of time, he does not believe the truth of the contents of
the subject articles; that plaintiff Yuchengco appeared distressed when he
joked about the subject articles; that other people approached him to ask
whether the subject articles are true [TSN 25 August 1997].
x x x x
DEFENDANTS’ EVIDENCE
On the other hand, defendants
GERRY ZARAGOZA testified that he was the
Managing Editor of Manila Chronicle in charge of the national and political
news; that defendant San Juan was the other Managing Editor in charge of the
lifestyle section; that a story conference is conducted everyday where the
articles, including the pages where they will appear, are discussed; that the
editor-in-chief (defendant Cruz), executive editor (defendant Tolentino) and
deputy editor (defendant Cabrera) were the ones responsible for the decisions
of the story conference relative to the printing of the newspaper; that he was
not involved in the writing and editing of the subject articles; that Exhibits
“A” to “D” are classified as business news; that columns, specifically Exhibits
“E” and “F” are not discussed during story conferences; and that Exhibit “G”,
which appeared in the “Money Section” did not pass thru him.
On cross-examination, defendant Zaragoza
testified that except for the columns, Exhibits “A” to “D” and Exhibit “G” are
considered hard news; that he handled the hard news, while defendant San Juan
handled the soft news; and that defendant Valino was the business editor in
charge of the business section (TSN 22 July 1998; 23 September 1998]
DONNABELLE GATDULA claimed that she was a
correspondent for Manila Chronicle assigned to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) beat; that she had no participation in the writing or
publication of Exhibits “A” to “C” and “G” to “E”; that she attended the
hearing conducted by the SEC and interviewed the two lawyers of RCBC and SEC
Chairman Rosario Lopez regarding the Oriental Petroleum case; that her name
appears as a tag line in Exhibit “D”, because she only wrote part of the story;
and that she did not write the entire article (Exhibit “D”) as some of the
statements therein were added by the editor/s; and that she did not discuss
Exhibit “D” with any of the editors.
On cross-examination, defendant Gatdula
testified that she does not have a copy of the original article which she
wrote; that she read Exhibit “D” after it was published; that she did not
compare her original story with Exhibit “D” nor question the authority of the
editor to edit her story; and that she agreed to put her name on Exhibit “D”. (TSN
23 September 1998; 05 October 1998).
NOEL CABRERA contended that after having
gone through the subject articles, he believes that the news stories and
commentaries were fair and that those who wrote the same followed the proper
standards; that as regard the contents of Exhibits “E” and “F”, the opinion of
Mr. Raul Valino, as written in the said articles, were valid and based on documentary
facts; as to Exhibit “D”, pertaining to the article of Ms. Donnabelle Gatdula,
she based her article on documents pertaining to the Oriental transaction,
other documents, as well as interviews; that at the time the subject articles
were written, Amb. Yuchengco was a public figure, being a very prominent
businessman with vast interest in banks and other businesses; that during the
year 1993, the word “crony” was more or less accepted to mean as a big
businessman or close associate of the late President Marcos, and its use in the
column was meant only to supply the perspective as to the figure or subject
involved in the news story, and there is thus no malice or derogatory intent
when the same was used.
On cross-examination, defendant Cabrera
testified that defendant Coyiuto is one of the owners of Manila Chronicle; and
that he only saw the records of Exhibits “8” to “10” and “16” to “20” after the
publication of Exhibits “A” to “G” (TSN 21 April 1999; 28 April 1999 05 May
1999; 10 May 1999).
RAUL VALINO stated that he was the Acting
Business Manager and later Managing Editor and Business Editor-in-Chief of
Manila Chronicle; that after having consulted several dictionaries as to the
meaning of the word “crony”, he did not come across a definition describing the
word to mean someone who is a recipient of any undeserving or special favor
from anyone, that it merely refers to someone who is a friend or a special
friend; there was no mention whatsoever in the subject article that Amb.
Yuchengco was being accused of fronting for the late President Marcos
(referring to par. 2.3.2 of the complaint); that nowhere in the said paragraph
was Amb. Yuchengco accused of having acted as a front to facilitate the
acquisition of a prohibited interest in a private corporation by a public
official while occupying a public office; that nowhere in the article was Amb.
Yuchengco accused of being directly or indirectly involved in unsound business
practices (referring to par. 2.4 of the complaint); that whatever imputation of
ill-will in par. 2.4.1 of the complaint was only in plaintiff’s mind; and as
regards par. 2.6 of the complaint, that he was merely reporting on what
transpired at the picket line and what the striking employees answered to him;
and that he did not state in his columns (Exhibits “E” and “F”) that plaintiff
Yuchengco violated banking laws. [TSN
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering
defendants Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera,
Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino and Rodney Diola to
pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:
a. the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00)
as moral damages; and
b. the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00)
as exemplary damages;
2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering
defendants Roberto Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing to pay plaintiff
Yuchengco, jointly and severally:
a.
the
amount of Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) as moral damages; and
b. the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00)
as exemplary damages;
3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all
defendants to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally, the amount of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as attorney’s fee and legal costs.[4]
The respondents, namely the Manila
Chronicle Publishing Corporation, Neal H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel
Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino, Rodney P.
Diola, and Roberto Coyiuto, Jr. appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
76995 and was raffled to the Fifth Division.
On
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises,
judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING
the appeals of defendants-appellants and AFFIRMING
the decision dated
Respondents filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. On
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated March 18,
2008 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the court a quo dated
Hence, this Petition for
Review on Certiorari, where
petitioner puts forth the following Assignments of Error:
A.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE
CASE OF ARTURO BORJAL, ET AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. CITED BY RESPONDENTS
IN THEIR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WARRANTED THE REVERSAL OF THE CA DECISION
DATED
B.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE
SUBJECT ARTICLES IN THE COMPLAINT FALL WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION.
C.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER IS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR PUBLIC FIGURE.[6]
Libel is defined in
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 353. Definition of Libel. – A libel is a public and malicious imputation
of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who
is dead.
Based on this definition,
this Court has held that four elements constitute the crime of libel, namely (a)
defamatory imputation tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt; (b)
malice, either in law or in fact; (c) publication; and (d) identifiability of the
person defamed.[7]
Despite being defined in the
Revised Penal Code, libel can also be instituted, like in the case at bar, as a
purely civil action, the cause of action for which is provided by Article 33 of
the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
The above elements of
libel were adopted as well in a purely civil action for damages. As held by this Court in GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos[8]:
An award of damages under the premises
presupposes the commission of an act amounting to defamatory imputation or
libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice.
Libel is the public and malicious imputation to another of a discreditable
act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a
natural or juridical person. Liability
for libel attaches present the following elements: (a) an allegation or
imputation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d)
existence of malice.
Of these four elements,
the most apparent in the case at bar would be the publication of the alleged
imputation. Libel is published not only
when it is widely circulated, but also when it is made known or brought to the
attention or notice of another person other than its author and the offended
party.[9] The circulation of an allegedly libelous
matter in a newspaper is certainly sufficient publication. We are thus left with the determination of the
existence of the three remaining elements of libel, namely: (1) the defamatory
imputation; (2) the identity of the person defamed; and (3) the existence of
malice.
Defamatory Imputation
Defamation, which includes
libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or
reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or
to diminish esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in the plaintiff, or to
excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything that is
injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into
disrepute.[10] In determining whether certain utterances are
defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and taken in
their plain, natural and ordinary meaning, as they would naturally be
understood by persons hearing (or reading, as in libel) them, unless it appears
that they were used and understood in another sense.[11]
In order to fully
appreciate whether the subject articles are, in fact, defamatory, an analysis
thereof is in order. The following are
what have been referred to as the subject articles:
|
Manila Chronicle Issue Date (Author) |
Title |
Exhibit |
|
(no by-line) |
“Yuchengko joins forces with Kokoy” |
A, A-1 to A-5 |
|
(no by-line) |
“RCBC probed for violating CB rules” |
B, B-1 to B-2 |
|
(no by-line) |
“RCBC called to SEC”; subtitled “Yuchengco Bank defies government
order” |
C, C-1 to C-3 |
|
(Donna Gatdula) |
“Alcorn, RCBC execs own guilt” |
D, D-1 to D-4 |
|
(Raul Valino) |
“Bank runs and RCBC free loans” |
E, E-1 to E-2 |
|
(Raul Valino) |
“RCBC case bugs Bangko Sentral” |
F, F-1 to F-3 |
|
(Rodney P. Diola) |
“The |
G, G-1 to G-4 |
In two of the subject
articles, respondents allegedly accused and labeled Yuchengco as a Marcos crony,
who took advantage of his relationship with the former President to gain
unwarranted benefits:
Yuchengco joins forces with
Kokoy[12]
Alfonso Yuchengco, a Marcos crony who
wants to takeover the ownership and management of the highly profitable
Oriental Petroleum Minerals Corp. (OMPC), has tied up with Marcos brother-in-law
Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez through two of his sons, records at the securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) showed yesterday.
Kokoy’s two sons, Benjamin Philip Gomez
Romualdez, 32, and Ferdinand Martin G. Romualdez, 29, are now members of the
board of the debt-ridden and heavily losing Benguet Corp., a company taken over
by Marcos during his dictatorship, but which was sequestered at the start of
President Aquino’s term.
x x x x
Observers said they believed the elections
of the Romualdez sons officially confirmed suspicions that the Marcos and
Romualdez clans really owned Benguet.
Benguet’s former president, Jaime Ongpin,
employed by the company for 10 years before he was named finance secretary by
then President Aquino, committed suicide after being accused of being a
Marcos-Romualdez crony.
Yuchengco Bank under CB
probe[13]
x x x x
The official said the case was recently
brought to Bangko Sentral’s attention by an RCBC creditor who felt he was being
cheated by the bank through interest-free loans granted to related interests.
Under the interest-free loan scheme,
Yuchengco was able to own OMPC shares of Piedras since they were the same
shares RCBC financed and which were turned over to the bank as payment for the
loan.
The Central Bank official said that Bangko
Sentral is now determining whether RCBC violated the rule on loans to
directors, officers, stockholders and related interests (DOSRI).
Yuchengco is both a director (chairman)
officer, stockholder, and a related interest of RCBC.
x x x x
Violating the DOSRI rule is a criminal
offense. The Bangko Sentral official
stressed. “I believe that that is
tantamount, not only to cheating the depositor, but also robbing the bank of
its clients’ money.”
“If Bangko Sentral does not act decisively
on this matter,” the official asked “what will prevent the other banks from
resorting to this kind of transactions to enrich their owners and enable them
to acquire shares of stock from other companies?”
The interest-free loan controversy also
involves Traders Royal Bank (TRB), a sequestered bank, owned by Roberto
Benedicto, a Marcos crony.
x x x x
The deal could be from one crony to
another since Yuchengco is very much associated with the Marcoses and the
Romualdezes, a source opined.
Yuchengco owns Benguet Corp., which is
heavily losing since he joined the Company as Chairman in 1989.
x x x x
Since Benguet is encountering all kinds of
financial problems, losses and overdue debts, observers say they fear that
Oriental may also suffer the same fate when and should Yuchengco and his
partners assume management of OMPC.
Already, it was noted the Oriental shares
sold on the stock market are weakening, and stock observers say this could be
attributed to the planned entry into the company of Yuchengco, Leonardo
Siguion-Reyna and their minority partners.
In another of the subject
articles, respondents allegedly insinuated that Yuchengco induced others to disobey
the lawful orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC):
Alcorn, RCBC execs own guilt[14]
Two officials of Alcorn Petroleum and
Minerals Corporation (AMPC) and Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
admitted before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) yesterday that
they ignored the SEC order commanding them to process all Alcorn shares in the
name of R. Coyiuto Securities Inc. and its investor clients such as Oriental
Petroleum and Minerals Corporation (OMPC).
x x x x
RCBC is owned by Alfonso Yuchengco,
chairman of the debt-ridden and heavily-losing Benguet Corp. He also owns Great Pacific Life Insurance
Co., whose employees are on strike because of the company’s refusal to grant
them better salaries and benefits.
x x x x
SEC insiders said that while Monreal and
Ricalde should be punished for disobeying a lawful order from the SEC, people
who masterminded the APMC order should also be penalized once proven guilty.
x x x x
Some observers said the APMC order to RCBC
could be a ploy to prevent Robert Coyiuto, Jr., chairman and president of OPMC,
from retaining his majority control of Oriental, and a scheme to put on the
board members of the Yuchengco company.
In fact, when Yuchengco created his own
OPMC “board of directors,” he appointed Ricalde as corporate secretary, OPMC
officials pointed out.
“In our opinion,” observers following the
OPMC developments stated, ‘this is a clear and simple case of criminal
conspiracy whose perpetrators must be meted the harshest punishment to prevent
corporate thieves from making a mockery of the law and from illegally taking
over corporations which they do not own in the first place.”
Yuchengco further
presented the following articles which allegedly accused him of inducing Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) to violate the provisions of the General
Banking Act on Directors, Officers, stockholders, and Related Interest (DOSRI)
loans:
Bank runs and RCBC free
loans[15]
The Bank runs that devastated the economy
in the recent past were, first and foremost, instigated by rumors that bank
owners were, themselves, using the public’s money to promote their own
businesses and interests in violation of Central Bank rules and regulations.
x x x x
Now here comes Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC) being charged with engaging in unsound banking by lending an
interest-free loan of P101 million to one company, Piedras Petroleum
Corporation, which Marcos crony Roberto Benedicto had surrendered to the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
x x x x
What would happen if all the other banks
resort to this kind of lending activity, giving away loans without
interest? The entire banking system
would certainly be compromised.
The owners or RCBC, therefore, should not
be too liberal with their depositors’ money.
They should also consider what fatal effects such a practice could
inflict on the very system where RCBC operates.
The country, at this time, cannot afford another series of bank runs,
nor a run at RCBC.
RCBC case bugs Bangko
Sentral[16]
x x
x x
The P101 million interest-free loan
to Piedras is of national interest for not just one reason alone.
First, the money involved came from the
depositors, and not from the pockets of Yuchengco.
Second, banking rules dictate that a bank
must be prudent in lending out its clients’ money, so that its financial
viability must never be put in question.
Third, the money lent to a borrower must
never end up in the pocket of the owner of the bank.
Fourth, such a practice could lead to a
bank run, which the economy cannot afford at this time, even if the run is
confined to just one bank.
Yuchengco further claims
that the following article, in labeling him as a “corporate raider,” implies
that he is seeking to profit from something he did not work for:
The
Ledesma says Coyiuto will not wilt from
Yuchengco’s fabled financial power.
‘Robert has a lot of friends that will help him fend off a raider like
Yuchengco’, says Ledesma.
x x x x
Ledesma of OPMC says that even if Coyiuto
loses in the bid, he’ll still remain a very significant player in OPMC given
his substantial personal holdings and proxies in the company. Coyiuto’s investment in OPMC is now valued at
more than a billion pesos compared to the Yuchengco block which, the Coyiuto
group points out, has only minimal investments.
That’s our moral ascendancy over their
group. Coyiuto virtually made Oriental
what it is today unlike Yuchengco who is just getting into the act now because
Oriental has become an attractive cash cow’ says Ledesma.
War
of Families
The fight for control of Oriental
Petroleum gains particular poignancy given the long history of feuding between
the families of Yuchengco and Coyiuto.
Their families were bitter rivals in the insurance business way back in
the seventies. The Yuchengcos own the
Malayan Group of Insurance Companies while the Coyiutos used to control Pioneer
Insurance. That rivalry seems to have
come full circle with their battle in Oriental Petroleum.
Pomento says the best arrangement would
have been a modus vivendi between the two groups to stop their quarrel and work
instead for the interest of the company.
But given the bad blood that exists between the two families, that might
be a difficult proposition, he says.
The trial court and the
Court of Appeals are in agreement that the above articles contain defamatory
imputations. Even the Amended Decision
of the Court of Appeals, wherein the appellate court reversed itself and held
that respondents were not liable for damages, did not modify its earlier ruling
affirming the defamatory character of the imputations in the above articles. The Court of Appeals merely reversed itself
on account of the allegedly privileged nature of the articles, which goes into
the element of malice. Malice, as an
element of libel, and the defenses affecting the existence of the same shall be
discussed later.
In arguing that the
subject articles are not really derogatory, respondent Cabrera explains that
the word “crony” was more or less accepted to describe a big businessman or
close associate of the late President Marcos, and its use in the column was
meant only to supply the perspective as to the figure or subject involved in
the news story. Respondent Valino
further claimed that after consulting several dictionaries as to the meaning of
the word “crony,” he did not come across a definition describing the word to
mean someone who is a recipient of any undeserving or special favor from
anyone.
We are not swayed by the
explanations of respondents Cabrera and Valino.
In determining the defamatory
character of words used, the explanation of the respondent should not prevail
over what the utterances (or writing) convey to an ordinary listener (or
reader).[18] Furthermore, as held by this Court in United States v. Sotto[19]:
[F]or the purpose of determining the
meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous “that construction must be
adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious
in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand
what was uttered. The published matter
alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole. In applying these rules to the language of an
alleged libel, the court will
disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being
called to account. The whole question
being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they
not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it
comes too late to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from
the word used in the publication.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
In finding that the
phrase “Marcos crony” is derogatory, the trial court took judicial notice of
the fact that the said phrase, as understood in Philippine context, refers to
an individual who was the recipient of special and/or undeserved favors from
the late President Marcos due to a special closeness to the latter. This finding, which was upheld by the Court
of Appeals in its original Decision and was not tackled in the Amended
Decision, is even supported by one of the subject articles. In particular, the
Even a cursory reading of
the subject articles would show the intention of the writers to injure the
reputation, credit and virtue of Yuchengco and expose him to public hatred,
discredit, contempt and ridicule. The
indirect manner in which the articles attributed the insults to Yuchengco (e.g., “the money involved came from
depositors, and not from Yuchengco”) does not lessen the culpability of the writers
and publishers thereof, but instead makes the defamatory imputations even more effective.
Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy
reputation than false charges directly made. Ironical and metaphorical language
is a favored vehicle for slander.[21]
In sum, this Court
upholds the ruling of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the subject
articles contain defamatory imputations.
All of the following imputations: (1) the labeling of Yuchengco as a
Marcos crony, who took advantage of his relationship with the former President
to gain unwarranted benefits; (2) the insinuations that Yuchengco induced
others to disobey the lawful orders of SEC; (3) the portrayal of Yuchengco as an unfair and uncaring
employer due to the strike staged by the employees of Grepalife; (4) the accusation that he induced RCBC to violate the
provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans; and (5) the tagging of
Yuchengco as a “corporate raider” seeking to profit from something he did not
work for, all exposed Yuchengco to public contempt and ridicule, for
they imputed to him a condition that was dishonorable.
Identification
Defamatory words must
refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person, and that person must be the
plaintiff. Statements are not libelous
unless they refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person.[22] However, the obnoxious writing need not
mention the libeled party by name. It is
sufficient if it is shown that the offended party is the person meant or
alluded to.[23]
In the case at bar, all
but one of the subject articles explicitly mention the name of petitioner
Yuchengco. The lone article, which does
not mention Yuchengco at all, “Bank runs & RCBC free loans,”[24]
nevertheless chided the owners of RCBC:
The owners or RCBC, therefore, should not
be too liberal with their depositors’ money.
They should also consider what fatal effects such a practice could
inflict on the very system where RCBC operates.
The country, at this time, cannot afford another series of bank runs,
nor a run at RCBC.[25]
Identifying Yuchengco in
said article by name was, however, not necessary, since the other subject
articles, published a few days before and after this one, had already referred
to Yuchengco as the owner of RCBC,
sometimes explicitly (“Benguet started to bleed in 1989, the year Yuchengco,
who owns Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. [RCBC], took over as chairman of the
company”[26]),
and sometimes implicitly (“the money involved came from depositors, and not
from Yuchengco”). While the defamation of
a large group does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an
individual, this is subject to exception when it can be shown that he is the
target of the defamatory matter.[27] This Court therefore finds that Yuchengco was
clearly identified as the libeled party in the subject defamatory imputations.
Malice
Malice connotes ill will
or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation
of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm.[28] It is present when it is shown that the
author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.[29]
Malice, however, does not
necessarily have to be proven. There are
two types of malice – malice in law and malice in fact.[30] Malice in law is a presumption of
law. It dispenses with the proof of
malice when words that raise the presumption are shown to have been
uttered. It is also known as
constructive malice, legal malice, or implied malice.[31] On the other hand, malice in fact is a
positive desire and intention to annoy and injure. It may denote that the defendant was actuated
by ill will or personal spite. It is
also called express malice, actual malice, real malice, true malice, or
particular malice.[32]
In this jurisdiction,
malice in law is provided in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, which also
enumerates exceptions thereto:
Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed
to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any
person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good
faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
There is, thus, a
presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory imputation, where there
is no showing of a good intention or justifiable motive for making such
imputation.
The exceptions provided
in Article 354 are also known as qualifiedly
privileged communications. The
enumeration under said article is, however, not an exclusive list of
qualifiedly privileged communications since fair
commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged.[33] They are known as qualifiedly privileged
communications, since they are merely exceptions to the general rule requiring
proof of actual malice in order that a defamatory imputation may be held
actionable. In other words, defamatory
imputations written or uttered during any of the three classes of qualifiedly
privileged communications enumerated above – (1) a private communication made
by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty;
(2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in
said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions; and (3) fair commentaries on matters of public
interest – may still be considered
actionable if actual malice is proven.
This is in contrast with absolutely
privileged communications, wherein the imputations are not actionable,
even if attended by actual malice:
A communication is said to be absolutely
privileged when it is not actionable, even if its author has acted in bad
faith. This class includes statements
made by members of Congress in the discharge of their functions as such,
official communications made by public officers in the performance of their
duties, and allegations or statements made by the parties or their counsel in
their pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial proceedings, as
well as the answers given by witnesses in reply to questions propounded to
them, in the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or
statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive or
pertinent to the questions propounded to said witnesses. Upon the other hand, conditionally or
qualifiedly privileged communications are those which, although containing
defamatory imputations, would not be actionable unless made with malice or bad
faith.[34]
In the case at bar, both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the publication of the
subject articles was attended by actual malice:
In the instant case, there is
preponderance of evidence showing that there exists malice in fact in the writing and publication of the subject
libelous articles.
As correctly found by the trial court, [petitioner] was able to show that
[respondents] were animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his
reputation as shown by the timing and frequency of the publication of the
defamatory articles. Further, as
previously stated, [respondents] failed to show that they had any good
intention and justifiable motive for composing and publishing the vicious and
malicious accusations against [petitioner].
Moreover, [respondents] published or
caused the publication of the subject defamatory articles with reckless
disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.
As previously stated, there is no proof that the contents of the subject
articles are true or that the respondents exercised a reasonable degree of care
before publishing the same. [Respondents]
failed to present evidence showing that they verified the truth of any of the
subject articles, especially in light of the categorical denial by [petitioner]
of the accusations made against him.
[Respondents] did not exercise reasonable
degree of care or good faith efforts to arrive at the truth before publishing
the subject defamatory articles. [Respondents] did not present any competent
evidence to establish the truth of their allegations against [petitioner]. There
was no showing that [respondents] made any attempt to talk to [petitioner] to
verify the statements contained in the defamatory articles, especially
considering the gravity of the accusations made against [petitioner]. At the very least, [respondents] should have
exercised efforts to talk to [petitioner] to clarify the issues and get his
side. [Respondents’] failure to verify
the truth of the information from [petitioner] himself is in itself an evidence
of their lack of bona fide efforts to
verify the accuracy of her information.
The incessant publication of the defamatory
articles attacking the honor and reputation of [petitioner] is also proof of
[respondents’] malicious scheme to malign and defame the name, honor and
reputation of [petitioner]. As earlier
pointed out, in a span of one (1)
month, [respondents] wrote and published and/or caused the publication of seven
(7) libelous articles against [petitioner] attacking his honor and reputation
as a distinguished businessman, philanthropist, his political inclination, and
as an employer in his insurance company. In fact, the presence of malice is made more
evident by [respondents’] baseless and uncalled for attack on the person of
[petitioner] as an employer. As aptly
noted by the trial court in the assailed Decision:
“Also in one of the articles, herein
plaintiff was portrayed as an unfair and uncaring employer due to the strike
staged by the employees of Grepalife suggesting that it was the [petitioner] who
was the cause, and of insinuating that if [petitioner’s] group takes over
control of Oriental, it would experience the same labor problem as in
Grepalife. The Court finds that
[respondents] failed to render an unbiased and fair report as to the real cause
of the strike except to lay the blame to [petitioner], without stating, much
less describing, his participation thereon, knowing fully well that Grepalife
is an entity distinct from the plaintiff.
In other words, the labor policies implemented by Grepalife as regards
its employees are obviously not that of Yuchengco.”
Such baseless and malicious accusation of [respondents] on
[petitioner] only proves the intention of the [respondents] in publishing the
defamatory articles was not to present an unbiased report on current issues but
to launch a personal attack on the very person of [petitioner].
As earlier explained, as correctly found
by the trial court, even the timing
of the publication of these subject articles is highly suspicious inasmuch as
the subject libelous articles came out in the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper
owned and under the control of [respondent] Coyiuto, around November to
December of 1993, a couple of months prior to the January stockholders meeting
of Oriental Corporation. From
this, it is logical to conclude that the publication of the subject defamatory
articles defaming the good name and reputation of [petitioner] is but a part of
[a] grand scheme to create a negative image of [petitioner] so as to negatively
affect [petitioner’s] credibility to the public, more particularly, to the then
stockholders of Oriental Corporation.
Worth noting also is the fact that the subject articles did not only
portray [petitioner] in a bad light. Curiously, in these articles,
[respondent] Coyiuto, a known rival of [petitioner], was portrayed as the
underdog, the “David” and [petitioner] as the “Goliath” in their battle for
control over Oriental Corporation. This
does not escape the Court’s attention.
These circumstances clearly indicate the
presence of actual malice on the part of [respondents] in the publication of
the subject libelous articles.[35] (Emphases supplied.)
When the Court of Appeals
granted the Motion for Reconsideration, it did not touch upon its earlier
finding of actual malice on the part of respondents in publishing the subject
articles. Instead, the Court of Appeals
merely held that the subject articles were fair commentaries on matters of
public interest, and thus fell within the scope of the third type of
qualifiedly privileged communications.
This was a glaring error
on the part of the Court of Appeals. As discussed
above, whereas there is an absolute bar to an action in the case of absolutely
privileged communication, the same is not true with respect to qualifiedly privileged
communication, wherein the law merely raises a prima facie presumption in favor of the occasion. In the former, the freedom from liability is
absolute, regardless of the existence of actual malice, as contrasted with the
freedom in the latter, where it is conditioned on the want or absence of actual
malice. Conditionally or qualifiedly
privileged communications are actionable when made with actual malice.[36]
When malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous
articles are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being
qualifiedly privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice
from attaching to a defamatory imputation.
Neither is there any
reason for this Court to reverse the findings of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals that there was actual malice on the part of the respondents. As held by the courts a quo, Yuchengco was able to show by the attendant circumstances that
respondents were animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his
reputation, as shown by the timing and frequency of the publication of the
defamatory articles. The portrayal of then
Chronicle Publishing Chairman Coyiuto as an underdog and his rival Yuchengco as
the greedy Goliath in their battle for control over Oriental Corporation, taken
with the timing of the publication of these subject articles a couple of months
prior to the January stockholders’ meeting of Oriental Corporation, clearly
indicate that the articles constituted an orchestrated attack to undermine the
reputation of Yuchengco. Furthermore, respondents
were shown to have acted with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of
the articles they published, when they were unable to rebut the categorical
denial by Yuchengco of the accusations made against him, and his allegation
that he was not approached by respondents for his side of the stories before
the publication thereof. Respondents’
failure to present evidence showing that they verified the truth of any of the
subject articles is fatal to their cause. In In
re: Emil P. Jurado,[37]
this Court ruled that categorical
denials of the truth of allegations in a publication place the burden upon the
party publishing it, either of proving the truth of the imputations or of showing
that the same was an honest mistake or error committed despite good efforts to
arrive at the truth. There is actual
malice when there is either (1) knowledge of the publication’s falsity; or (2)
reckless disregard of whether the contents of the publication were false or not.[38] Failure to even get the side of Yuchengco in
the published articles clearly constituted reckless disregard of the truth or
falsity of said articles.
Finally, even if we
assume for the sake of argument that actual malice was not proven in the case
at bar, we nevertheless cannot adhere to the finding of the Court of Appeals in
the Amended Decision that the subject articles were fair commentaries on
matters of public interest, and thus fell within the scope of the third type of
qualifiedly privileged communications.
In Philippine Journalists, Inc. (People’s Journal) v. Theonen,[39] this Court adopted the pronouncement in the
United States Decision in Gertz v. Robert
Welsch, Inc.[40] that, in order to be considered as fair
commentaries on matters of public interest, the individual to whom the
defamatory articles were imputed should either be a public officer or a public
figure:
In Borjal v. Court of Appeals, we stated
that “the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly
privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest
are likewise privileged. We stated that the doctrine of fair commentaries
means “that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order
that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it
must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition.”
Again, this argument is unavailing to the
petitioners. As we said, the respondent is a private individual, and not
a public official or public figure. We are persuaded by the reasoning of
the United States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., [418 U. S. 323
(1974)] that a newspaper or
broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither
a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional privilege
against liability, for injury inflicted, even if the falsehood arose in a
discussion of public interest. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, in trying to prove
that the subject articles delved on matters concerning public interest, the
Court of Appeals insisted that Yuchengco was a public official or public
figure, who “must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his
official acts.”[41] The Court of Appeals then noted that
Yuchengco was, at the time of the Amended Decision, appointed as a Presidential
Adviser on Foreign Affairs with Cabinet rank, and proceeded to enumerate[42]
the public positions held by Yuchengco through the years.
However, an examination
of the subject articles reveals that the allegations therein pertain to
Yuchengco’s private business endeavors and do not refer to his duties,
functions and responsibilities as a Philippine Ambassador to
Neither is Yuchengco a
public figure. The above case Philippine Journalists continues to cite
the
More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved. In
either event, they invite attention and comment. Third, this
would impose an additional difficulty on trial court judges to decide which
publications address issues of “general interest” and which do not. Even
if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every instance, the
communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public
officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased
risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption is
justified with respect to a private individual. He has not accepted public
office or assumed an “influential role in ordering society.” (Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388
The records in the case
at bar do not disclose any instance wherein Yuchengco had voluntarily thrust himself
to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved. He
cannot, therefore, be considered a public figure. Since Yuchengco, the person defamed in the
subject articles, is neither as public officer nor a public figure, said
articles cannot be considered as qualifiedly privileged communications even if
they deal with matters of public concern.
In view of the foregoing,
this Court is constrained to grant the instant Petition and reinstate the
Decision of the trial court, as previously affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
its original Decision. This Court,
however, finds the award of damages in the total amount of One Hundred Million
Pesos by the trial court to be rather excessive given the circumstances. This Court, thus, further resolves to reduce
the award of damages, as follows:
1. The damages for which
Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San
Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino and Rodney Diola shall be jointly
and severally liable under the first cause of action shall be reduced as
follows:
a. The amount of moral
damages shall be reduced from Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to Two Million
Pesos (P2,000,000.00); and
b. The amount of exemplary
damages shall be reduced from Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00);
2. The damages for which Roberto
Coyuito, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing shall be jointly and severally liable
under the second cause of action shall be reduced as follows:
a. The amount of moral
damages shall be reduced from Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) to Twenty-Five
Million Pesos (P25,000,000.00); and
b. The amount of exemplary
damages shall be reduced from Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 76995 dated
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering
defendants Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera,
Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino and Rodney Diola to
pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:
a. the
amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) as moral damages; and
b. the
amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as exemplary
damages;
2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering
defendants Roberto Coyuito, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing to pay plaintiff
Yuchengco, jointly and severally:
a. the
amount of Twenty-Five Million Pesos (P25,000,000.00) as moral damages;
and
b. the
amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as exemplary damages;
3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering
all defendants to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally, the amount of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as attorney’s fee and legal costs.
Costs against respondents.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
|
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice |
|
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring; rollo, pp. 53-62.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring; rollo, pp. 195-248.
[3] Rollo, pp. 114-121.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] People v. Monton, 116 Phil. 1116, 1120-1121 (1962).
[8] G.R. No. 146848,
[9]
[10] MVRS Publications, Inc., v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., 444 Phil. 230, 241 (2004).
[11] Lacsa
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-74907,
[12] Manila Chronicle,
[13] Manila Chronicle,
[14] Manila Chronicle,
[15] Manila Chronicle,
[16] Manila Chronicle,
[17] Manila Chronicle,
[18] Madrona,
Sr. v. Rosal, G.R. No. 39120,
[19] 38 Phil. 666, 672-673 (1918).
[20] Rollo, p. 63.
[21]
[22] Corpus
v. Cuaderno, Sr., G.R. No. L-16969,
[23] Quisumbing v. Lopez, 96 Phil. 510, 513 (1955).
[24] Exhibit D; rollo, p. 67.
[25]
[26] Exhibit A; rollo, p. 63.
[27] MVRS Publications, Inc., v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., supra note 10.
[28]
[29] Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 238, 254 (1999).
[30] Lawson
v. Hicks, 38,
[31] Leonardo P. Reyes, Fundamentals of Libel Law, p. 15
(2007), citing William v. Hicks Printing
Co., 150 N.W. 183, 159
[32]
[33] Borjal v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 1, 19 (1999).
[34] Orfanel v. People, 141 Phil. 519, 523-524 (1969).
[35] Rollo, pp. 234-236.
[36] Orfanel v. People, supra note 34.
[37] 313 Phil. 119, 169 (1995).
[38] Villanueva v. Philippine Daily Inquirer, G.R. No. 164437, 15 May 2009.
[39] G.R. No. 143372,
[40] 418
[41] Rollo, p. 55.
[42] 1.
Presidential Adviser on Foreign Affairs with Cabinet Rank (
2. Philippine Permanent Representative to the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador (November 2001-December 2002);
3. Presidential Special Envoy to
4. Presidential Assistant on APEC Matters with Cabinet Rank (1998-2000);
5. Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the Republic of the
6. Chairman, Council of Private Sector Advisors to the Philippine Government on the Spratlys Issue (Marine and Archipelagic Development Policy Group (1995-1998). (Rollo, p. 56.)
[43] Philippine Journalists, Inc. (People’s Journal) v. Theonen, supra note 38 at 497.