JOSEPHINE
MARMO,*
NESTOR ESGUERRA, DANILO
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G.R. No. 182585
Present: Carpio,
J., Chairperson, leonardo-de castro, BRION, DEL CASTILLO, and ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: November 27, 2009 |
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D
E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Before
us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari,[1]
filed by the spouses Josephine Marmo and Nestor Esguerra and the spouses
Danilo del Pilar and Marisa del Pilar (collectively, the petitioners), to reverse and set aside the Decision[2]
dated December 28, 2007 and the Resolution[3] dated
April 11, 2008 of the Former Special Eleventh Division of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94673. The assailed
CA Decision dismissed the petitioners’ petition for certiorari challenging the Orders dated March 14, 2006[4] and May
8, 2006[5] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
90, Dasmariñas, Cavite in Civil Case No. 2919-03, while the assailed CA
Resolution denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The
facts of the case, as gathered from the parties’ pleadings, are briefly
summarized below:
On
P520,000.00, payable in monthly installments of P8,667.00
from May 2001 to June 2006; petitioner Danilo defaulted in his installment
payments from December 2002 onwards; the respondent subsequently discovered
that TCT No. 815595 had been cancelled and TCT No. T-972424 was issued in petitioner
Josephine’s name by virtue of a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale dated September
20, 2001; petitioner Josephine subsequently transferred her title to petitioner
Danilo; TCT No. T-972424 was cancelled and TCT No. T-991035 was issued in petitioner
Danilo’s name. The respondent sought the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated P347,000.00 with interest from
December 2002, and the payment of moral damages, attorney’s fees, and cost of
suit.
In
her Answer, petitioner Josephine averred, among others, that the respondent’s
children, as co-owners of the subject property, should have been included as
plaintiffs because they are indispensable parties.[8] Petitioner Danilo echoed petitioner Josephine’s
submission in his Answer.[9]
Following
the pre-trial conference, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the case
for the respondent’s failure to include his children as indispensable parties.[10]
The
respondent filed an Opposition, arguing that his children are not indispensable
parties because the issue in the case can be resolved without their
participation in the proceedings.[11]
THE RTC RULING
The
RTC found the respondent’s argument to be well-taken and thus denied the
petitioners’ motion to dismiss in an Order dated
After
the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration,[13] the
petitioners elevated their case to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.[14] They charged the RTC with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not dismissing the case after the
respondent failed to include indispensable parties.
THE CA RULING
The
CA dismissed the petition[15] in
a Decision promulgated on
The
petitioners moved[16] but
failed[17] to
secure a reconsideration of the CA Decision; hence, the present petition.
Following
the submission of the respondent’s Comment[18] and the
petitioners’ Reply,[19] we
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.[20] Both parties complied.[21]
Meanwhile,
on
THE PETITION and
THE PARTIES’
SUBMISSIONS
The
petitioners submit that the respondent’s children, who succeeded their deceased
mother as co-owners of the property, are indispensable parties because a full
determination of the case cannot be made without their presence, relying on Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,[22] Orbeta v. Sendiong,[23] and
The
respondent, on the other hand, counters that the respondent’s children are not
indispensable parties because the issue involved in the RTC – whether the
signatures of the respondent and his wife in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
THE ISSUE
The
core issue is whether the respondent’s children are indispensable parties in
Civil Case No. 2919-03. In the context of the Rule 65 petition before the CA,
the issue is whether the CA correctly ruled that the RTC did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in ruling that the respondent’s children are not
indispensable parties.
OUR RULING
We see no merit in the
petition.
General Rule: The
denial of a
motion to dismiss
is an
interlocutory
order which is
not the proper
subject of an
appeal or a
petition for
certiorari.
At
the outset, we call attention to Section 1 of Rule 41[25] of the Revised
Rules of Court governing appeals from the RTC to the CA. This Section provides that an appeal may be
taken only from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case,
or of a matter therein when declared by the Rules to be appealable. It explicitly states as well that no appeal
may be taken from an interlocutory order.
In
law, the word “interlocutory” refers to intervening developments between the
commencement of a suit and its complete termination; hence, it is a development
that does not end the whole controversy.[26] An “interlocutory order” merely rules on an
incidental issue and does not terminate or finally dispose of the case; it
leaves something to be done before the case is finally decided on the merits.[27]
An
Order denying a Motion to Dismiss is interlocutory because it does
not finally dispose of the case, and, in effect, directs the case to proceed
until final adjudication by the court. Only
when the court issues an order outside or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate
and expeditious relief, will certiorari be considered an appropriate
remedy to assail an interlocutory order.[28]
In
the present case, since the petitioners did not wait for the final resolution
on the merits of Civil Case No. 2919-03 from which an appeal could be taken,
but opted to immediately assail the RTC Orders dated March 14, 2006 and May 8,
2006 through a petition for certiorari
before the CA, the issue for us to address is whether the RTC, in issuing its
orders, gravely abused its discretion or otherwise acted outside or in excess
of its jurisdiction.
The RTC did not commit
grave
abuse of
discretion in denying
the petitioners’
Motion to
Dismiss; the
respondent’s co-
owners are not
indispensable
parties.
The
RTC grounded its Order dated
We
agree with the RTC.
Section
7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court[29] defines
indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final
determination of an action and who, for this reason, must be joined either as
plaintiffs or as defendants. Jurisprudence
further holds that a party is indispensable, not only if he has an interest in
the subject matter of the controversy, but also if his interest is such that a
final decree cannot be made without affecting this interest or without placing
the controversy in a situation where the final determination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and good conscience. He is a person whose absence disallows
the court from making an effective, complete, or equitable determination of the
controversy between or among the contending parties. [30]
When
the controversy involves a property held in common, Article 487 of the Civil
Code explicitly provides that “any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment.”
We
have explained in Vencilao v. Camarenta[31] and in Sering v. Plazo[32] that
the term “action in ejectment” includes a suit for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio).[33] We also noted in Sering that the term “action in ejectment” includes “also, an accion publiciana (recovery
of possession) or accion
reinvidicatoria[34] (recovery
of ownership).” Most recently in Estreller v. Ysmael,[35] we
applied Article 487 to an accion
publiciana case; in Plasabas v. Court
of Appeals[36] we categorically
stated that Article 487 applies to reivindicatory actions.
We
upheld in several cases the right of a co-owner
to file a suit without impleading other co-owners, pursuant to Article 487 of
the Civil Code. We made this ruling in Vencilao, where the amended
complaint for “forcible entry and detainer” specified that the plaintiff is one
of the heirs who co-owns the disputed properties. In Sering, and Resuena
v. Court of Appeals,[37] the
co-owners who filed the ejectment case did not represent themselves as the
exclusive owners of the property. In Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and
Teresa Santiago,[38] the
complaint for quieting of title was brought in behalf of the co-owners
precisely to recover lots owned in common.[39] In Plasabas, the plaintiffs alleged in their
complaint for recovery of title to property (accion reivindicatoria) that they are the sole owners of the
property in litigation, but acknowledged during the trial that the property is
co-owned with other parties, and the plaintiffs have been authorized by the
co-owners to pursue the case on the latter’s behalf.
These
cases should be distinguished from Baloloy
v. Hular[40] and Adlawan
v. Adlawan[41] where the actions for quieting of title
and unlawful detainer, respectively, were brought for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone who claimed to be the sole owner. We held that the
action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleaded the other co-owners who are indispensable parties. In these cases, the absence of
an indispensable party rendered all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even
as to those present.
We
read these cases to collectively mean that where the suit is brought by a
co-owner, without repudiating the co-ownership, then the suit is
presumed to be filed for the benefit of the other co-owners and may proceed
without impleading the other co-owners. However, where the co-owner repudiates
the co-ownership by claiming sole ownership of the property or where the suit
is brought against a co-owner, his co-owners are indispensable parties and must
be impleaded as party-defendants, as the suit affects the rights and interests of
these other co-owners.
In
the present case, the respondent, as the plaintiff in the court below, never
disputed the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or
exclusive owner of the litigated lot. In fact, he recognized that he is a
“bona-fide co-owner” of the
questioned property, along with his deceased wife. Moreover and more
importantly, the respondent’s claim in his complaint in Civil Case No. 2919-03 is
personal to him and his wife, i.e., that his and his wife’s signatures
in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner Josephine were falsified. The
issue therefore is falsification, an issue which does not require the
participation of the respondent’s co-owners at the trial; it can be determined
without their presence because they are not parties to the document; their
signatures do not appear therein. Their rights and interests as co-owners are
adequately protected by their co-owner and father, respondent Moises O. Anacay,
since the complaint was
made precisely to recover ownership and possession of the properties owned in
common, and, as such, will redound to the benefit of all the co-owners.[42]
In
sum, respondent’s children, as co-owners of the subject property, are not indispensable
parties to the resolution of the case. We held in Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman[43] that in
cases like this, the co-owners are not even necessary parties, for a complete
relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the
suit is presumed to be filed for the benefit of all.[44] Thus, the
respondent’s children need not be impleaded as party-plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 2919-03.
We
cannot subscribe to the petitioners’ reliance on our rulings in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,[45] Orbeta v. Sendiong[46] and
Arcelona involved
an action for security of tenure filed by a tenant without impleading all the
co-owners of a fishpond as party-defendants. We held that a tenant, in an action
to establish his status as such, must implead all the pro-indiviso co-owners as party-defendants since a tenant who fails
to implead all the co-owners as party-defendants cannot establish with finality
his tenancy over the entire co-owned land. Orbeta,
on the other hand, involved an action for recovery of possession, quieting
of title and damages wherein the plaintiffs prayed that they be declared
“absolute co-owners” of the disputed property, but we found that there were
third parties whose rights will be affected by the ruling and who should thus be
impleaded as indispensable parties. In
In
light of these conclusions, no need arises to act on petitioners’ prayer for a
TRO to suspend the proceedings in the RTC and we find no reason to grant the
present petition.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for its failure to show
any reversible error in the assailed Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
MARIANO
C. Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Known as “Josephine Marmo-Esguerra” in other
parts of the rollo.
[1] Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring; rollo, pp. 123-131.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Excluding petitioner Marisa del Pilar.
[7] Rollo, pp. 27-34.
[8] Rollo, pp. 35-40.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Supra note 2.
[16] Rollo, pp. 132-140.
[17] Supra note 3.
[18] Rollo, pp. 153-156.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] 345 Phil. 250 (1997).
[23] G.R.
No. 155236,
[24] G.R.
No. 155785,
[25] SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be
taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion
for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An
order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from
judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An
order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An
order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise
on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating
consent;
(f) An
order of execution;
(g) A
judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in
separate claims, counterclaims, crossclaims and third-party complaints, while
the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an
action without prejudice;
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (Emphasis provided.)
[26] See Ex-Mayor Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 683, 695 (2001); and Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 130 Phil. 806, 811 (1968).
[27]
Repol v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161418,
[28] See Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, 495 Phil. 422, 435 (2005); Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company v. Valencia-Bagalasca, 435 Phil. 104, 111 (2002); and J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 25 (2000).
[29] SECTION 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
[30] See Moldes v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 161955, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 697, 707-708; Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 602, 612 (1999).
[31] 140 Phil. 99 (1969).
[32] 298 Phil. 315 (1988).
[33] See also De Guia v. Court of Appeals, 459 Phil. 447 (2003).
[34] Other
decisions spell it as “accion reivindicatoria,” see
Heirs of Tomas Dolleton v. Fil-Estate Management, Inc., G.R.
No. 170750, April 7, 2009; Estate of Soledad Manantan v. Somera, G.R. No.
145867, April 7, 2009; Amoroso v. Alegre,
Jr., G.R. No. 142766, June 15, 2007, 524 SCRA 641;
[35] G.R.
No. 170264,
[36] G.R.
No. 166519,
[37] G.R.
No. 128338,
[38] 479 Phil. 617 (2004).
[39]
[40] 481 Phil. 398 (2004).
[41] G.R.
No. 161916,
[42] See also Wee v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176405, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 695, 711; and Santos v. Heirs of Dominga Ilustre, G.R. No. 151016, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 120, 132.
[43] G.R. No. 160347,
[44]
[45] Supra note 23.
[46] Supra note 24.
[47] Supra note 25.